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Foreword
Dynamic Finland is a welcome addition to political science. To those of
us interested in the comparative analysis of politics – the only effective
way to analyze politics! – Finland is an especially important case. It com-
bines several phenomena in ways seen nowhere else, and in fact anchors
the scale on many important aspects of politics:
– The process of building the Finnish state was relatively recent, and it
is of special interest. Among other things, because its international
position during its early decades as a state was contested and deli-
cate, Finland offers a fascinating case of the impact of international
politics on the domestic politics of states.
– Perhaps partly because of this history, its party system and the Finn-
ish approach to resolving political conflict is of great interest on the
broader canvas of cross-national comparison. Finland was one of the
few European democracies with a large and active Communist Party
during the post-war period, and was the only one to combine this
with an essentially consensus-based society. All other West Euro-
pean states with a large Communist presence were stalemated poli-
ties; Finland was not.
– In the last sentence above, I called Finland “West European”, but
that is not really true. Another virtue from the standpoint of the com-
parative scholar is that it is not exactly “Western” or “Eastern”, ei-
ther geographically or historically. One puzzle for comparative schol-
ars, for instance, is to assess the extent to which democratic institu-
tions in Western Europe in the post-war years were shaped by Ameri-
can influence, by the emerging pan-European institutions of the Com-
mon Market, and by mutual imitation. None of these applied in the
same way to Finland, so Finland serves as a very useful control.
– Finland’s political institutions are unique and interesting; more about
this below.
– Finland has perhaps the most equal income distribution in the world.
– Finland has perhaps the least corrupt system of public administration
and politics in the world.
– Much has been made of the pressures on the modern welfare state,
from global competitive pressures and other economic dislocations
that make it difficult for states to maintain comprehensive support
for their citizens. In the 1990s Finland experienced greater economic
dislocation and pressures than any other mature welfare state has
ever experienced. The Finnish case is very important for understand-
ing the resilience of welfare states.
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:389
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I could have added many more examples, but I hope these are enough
to make the picture clear: Finland provides unique phenomena of great
importance in comparative political analysis.
But there is another reason why Finland is of special interest in com-
parative politics. The science of politics is a science of design; the reason
we study politics comparatively is to assess the impact of different de-
signs for governance, so that we can improve our political lives. It should
be no surprise that, just as Finland is a leader in industrial and material
design, so is it a leader in political design. Finland pioneered early in the
twentieth century in the experiment of combining elements of presiden-
tial government and parliamentary government in one system, something
that has been picked up and used in dozens of states in the latter part of
the twentieth century, starting with France in 1958.
Finland embarked in the late 1990s on a plan of reorganization and
reform that is intended to balance the president and cabinet in the way
that France and many other imitators intended, but have never achieved.
Perhaps because the model of hybrid executive power has so often been
adopted in stalemated societies like France’s, it has usually evolved into
a system in which President and cabinet compete for power rather than
sharing power. In France, for instance, Presidents wholly dominate cabi-
nets unless they are forced into a situation of cohabitation, at which time
the situation flips to one of domination by the cabinet.
In Finland, too, political leaders are not oblivious to power. Through
much of the first several decades there was a polite tug-of-war between
president and cabinets for power with some presidents, like Kekkonen,
gathering the reins largely into their own hands. Over the last couple of
decades, though, as is admirably laid out in Dynamic Finland, a redesign
of the powers of the president and cabinet has been carried out that should
leave the relationship much like what DeGaulle and his advisors origi-
nally intended for France: a president with great residual power and re-
sponsibility for the security and intergrity of the state, but removed from
most immediate political conflicts. As we see in the pages of this book,
power has been fine-tuned in innumerable ways to produce a redesigned
presidency.
For all these reasons, Finland is a case of very special interest in the
comparative study of politics. But, political scientists are human too.
Everywhere in the world there is a great affection for Finland, which we
share. Finland is a plucky nation that has managed to thrive in a cold,
forbidding climate, off the major trade and communication lines, and in
an international situation throughout the twentieth century that was fraught
with danger and hardship. Somehow this people have managed despite
the rigors of their environment to produce a renaissance in music, suc-
cess in athletic enterprise far beyond what one could expect of such a
Foreword
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small country, leadership in industrial design – and an original, superbly
functioning democracy. In reading this book, pleasure mingles with in-
tellectual stimulation.
The book presents a very clear exposition and introduction to the poli-
tics of Finland, and as such it is a real boon to the field of comparative
politics. But fortunately for us, the authors also go beyond plain exposi-
tion to add a great deal of very accessible but nonetheless original and
useful analysis of politics to the book. Their analysis of how Finnish
nationalism developed, or their assessment of how effectively the Finn-
ish welfare state decommodifies society, are but two examples of how
they build on their excellent exposition and introduction to Finnish poli-
tics. And finally, just as this reader combined pleasure with intellectual
stimulation in reading the book, it is good to see that Professors Pesonen
and Riihinen, also, could not resist showing their admiration for the way
Finns have built their state. It is clear as one reads this book that it was as
much a pleasure for the authors, as for the reader, to reflect on the poli-
tics of this remarkable state.
W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY
Minneapolis, August 23, 2002
Foreword
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Preface
Finland is small and little known. Even where the name is familiar, re-
cent changes may have passed unnoticed. But we have also observed a
rising interest in Finland. And we have seen how difficult it can be to
obtain a general presentation, written for an international audience, that
would outline our country’s political system and civil society, its devel-
opment, and the services it provides for the wellbeing of its citizens.
This was our motivation in writing a book for a foreign audience about
Finland and the Finnish experience. We had a variety of readers in mind:
university students engaged in area studies or comparative politics, people
whose professional interests create an interest in Finnish society or a
need to grasp its essentials quickly, and friends of Finland who desire
more knowledge about the country.
We aimed to offer a view of Finland’s presence and dynamic develop-
ment from political and social points of view. This is not to deny that it
was enjoyable to set down our country’s achievements and uniqueness
and it was encouraging that Finland ranks so high among the countries of
the world in cross-national comparisons, but we have sought to remain
objective. We have no illusions of Finland as a model society, free of
error or pressing problems.
Our general approach is descriptive and analytic. Theoretical consid-
erations are added if they could help the reader understand certain points,
but the material is not viewed through a systematic frame of analysis.
The goal is to offer a description of the basis and functioning of democ-
racy in Finland, and to present selected policy areas that are essential in a
welfare state.
The book contains 17 chapters. We divided our task keeping in mind
that Pesonen’s academic background is in political science and Riihinen’s
in social policy. Pesonen wrote chapters 1, 4, 6 to 13, and 15, and Riihinen
chapters 3 and 5. Four chapters (2, 14, 16, and 17) were co-written, as
designated by the initials at the end of each section. As coauthors we
assume responsibility for the entire text. Pesonen wrote in English, and
texts by Riihinen were translated by Mikko Pitkänen, Nina Tuominen,
and Pesonen. We thank Patrick Humphreys for his able and creative edit-
ing of the manuscript.
Kaisa-Riitta Puttonen assisted us in many ways and prepared the in-
dexes and the list of references. The Research Institute for Social Sci-
ences of the University of Tampere has kindly provided working facili-
ties for Pesonen, and the University of Helsinki offered a place for our
joint meetings.
Our work would not have been possible without the cooperative atti-
tude of the people who have provided us with specialist information. We
encountered the same willingness to help at government offices, research
outfits, organizations, and companies. Without mentioning by name the
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many individuals to whom we are indebted, we would like to express
how inspiring it was to meet such positive understanding of our aims.
Special thanks are due to the Alfred Kordelin Foundation for financial
support that covered our expenses. And we are pleased to have this book
published by the Finnish Literary Society, particularly because it launched
the rise of Finland’s civil society 171 years ago.
At one time the authors attended the same sociology seminar at the
University of Helsinki. We enjoyed working together as students. Hav-
ing observed our country’s changes and stability through half a century,
it has been a pleasure to work together once more.
Tampere and Helsinki, July 17, 2002
Pertti Pesonen and Olavi Riihinen
Preface
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:3814
15
1 Finnish Features
Finland, or, as the natives call it in Finnish, Suomi, is a country of lakes
and islands. It is a vast continent about which strangers until lately hardly
knew anything, beyond such rude facts as are learnt in school, viz., that
“Finland is surrounded by the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia on the South
and West, and borded by Russia and Lapland on the East and North,”
and yet Finland is larger than our own England, Scotland, Ireland, aye,
and the Netherlands, all put together… Finland is not the home of bar-
barians, as some folk then imagined; neither do Polar bears walk con-
tinually about the streets, nor reindeer pull sledges in summer – items
that have several times been suggested to the writer.
Tweedie 1913, pp. 11–12
This quotation is no longer news. It is from a travel book on Finland
written before the First World War. Its British author, Mrs E. Alec Tweedie,
closed her various observations with a political survey that included the
following crucial facts of those days:
It is a fundamental principle of the Finnish Constitution that the country
shall be governed with the assistance of native authorities only... The
people of Finland are awaiting with grave anxiety further developments
in the present Russian policy.
Op.cit., pp. 461, 476
Indeed, Finland had developed a political identity of its own; largely be-
cause it had been an autonomous state with its own “home rule” since
1809. For a century its head of state was an authoritarian ruler in other
parts of his Russian empire, but with constitutionally limited powers in
Finland. Then, in 1917, quite unexpected “further developments” de-
throned Russia’s emperor, the Tsar. Finland seized the opportunity and
declared its independence on December 6, 1917. Soon thereafter, in the
aftermath of World War I, several more states in Europe gained indepen-
dence or adopted a new constitution but, before three decades had passed,
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:3815
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Finland remained the only one among those states that had kept the same
constitution in force without interruption.
In 1997, the eightieth year of Finland’s independence, there were no
fewer than 186 independent countries in the world. One of them, and
since 2000 two, had more than a billion inhabitants. Forty-eight had at
least 20 million, while the population of thirty-five countries was below
a million. Such a comparison ranks Finland near the median of all coun-
tries. In Europe Finland is typically classified as one of the small states.
Its population of 5,181,000 (in 2000) makes it smaller than Switzerland
or Denmark but larger than Ireland or Norway.
Finland’s area of 338,145 square kilometers (130,558 sq mi.) means
that the country is relatively spacious, being 46 percent larger than Great
Britain and 12 percent larger than Italy. A comparable area in the United
States would cover New York, Pennsylvania, “aye,” and Indiana “all put
together,” but it would be smaller than California.
In August 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) was signed in Helsinki. The number of European
heads of state or government who participated in the conference was 33, and
the participation of Canada and the United States increased the number of
signatories to 35. Later, when Finland began to organize the fourth follow-
up conference of the CSCE in 1991-1992, facilities were being prepared for
only 34 delegations, because the unification of Germany had recently re-
duced the number of European states. But before the opening of the confer-
ence, the number of participating states had increased to no less than 51. So
many newly independent states had suddenly made their appearance on the
European scene. In 2000, the revamped Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) included 55 states.
Such a change illustrates the fact that the number of independent coun-
tries was flexible throughout the 20th century. Some were, forcefully or
otherwise, annexed by a neighbor, some disengaged themselves from an
undesired ruler, and former colonies gained independence. In the entire
world, there were 129 independent countries in 1965. Political scientists,
as well as the leaders of great powers, had a general tendency to predict
that the number would decline. What actually happened, however, was a
rapid increase to 186 states by 1997, and to 194 by the year 2000.
Among the countries of the world, and even among the small Euro-
pean democracies, Finland is unique in many respects. It does not conve-
niently meet all the expectations and stereotypes of cross-national com-
parisons. While it is one of the five Nordic countries of Europe, often
jointly called the Scandinavian countries, most Finns do not speak a Scan-
dinavian or even an Indo-European language. It is the northernmost coun-
try in the world after Iceland – but its agriculture produces more than the
country consumes.
Having gained independence, Finland shared a 1566-kilometer long
land border (973 mi.) with the newly established communist superpower,
the Soviet Union (1922–1991). This did not prevent Finland from devel-
oping its advanced free-market economy, and the life of Finnish citizens
Finnish Features
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was firmly based on Western traditions, a democratic political system, a
market economy, and full respect for human rights.
In November 1939, Finland met a concerted attack by the Soviet Union
quite alone. However, “David” was able to repulse the “Goliath” and to
prevent the Red Army from occupying its territory, and thus defend its
national independence. Finland – with Great Britain and the USSR – was
one of the three European countries engaged in World War II that were
not occupied by a foreign army.
After the war, Finland did not accept Marshall aid and did not join a
military alliance. It belonged to the group of Europe’s neutral “N-coun-
tries,” lived in “peaceful co-existence” with its communist neighbor, and
cultivated good relations with all countries.
The Finns have some tendency to believe, even “beyond rude facts,”
that their relative visibility in world culture and sports, as well as in inter-
national organizations, exceeds their meager 0.1 percent of the world
population, possibly even their 0.7 percent of the world trade. Should the
Finns really want to feel big, they could at least think of themselves as
almost one-third of the world’s population who live north of the 60th
parallel. But they take much more pride in entering the 21st century as a
well-developed, modern country, in being one of the world’s foremost
users of information technology, and also in having been the first nation
in the world to hold democratic elections with universal and equal suf-
frage and eligibility during the early part of the 20th century, and the
only country that paid back its World War I debt to the United States.
Finland’s location between west and east has brought fruitful influ-
ences from both directions, while also causing severe problems. Indeed,
geostrategic location has made survival Finland’s most essential national
goal. Culturally, however, Finland is strongly oriented toward the west
and is relatively less influenced by the east. The country has created a
strong and seemingly self-confident identity of its own.
The last decade of the 20th century again brought drastic changes in
the international environment. The cold war ended and the Soviet Union
collapsed, and the processes of globalization and European integration
advanced significantly. Finland, conscious of its identity and proud of its
independence, became one of the fifteen countries in Western Europe
that yielded some of their independence to the supranational organiza-
tion called the European Union in 1995. Although the union is not, and is
not intended to be, a federal state, some visionaries have been hoping or
predicting since the 1950s that deeper integration will eventually lead
western Europe toward the federal goal.
During the 1990s, Finnish politics needed to adjust to an unpredicted
domestic difficulty. Finland was by no means the only country that faced
economic problems in those years and was, therefore, compelled to trim
its public expenditure and reconsider the benefits and services a country
can provide for its citizens, but the sudden economic slump that hit Fin-
land in the early 1990s was exceptionally severe, being worse than the
great depression of the 1930s.
Finnish Features
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The following pages will describe various features of Finland’s poli-
tics and policies, such as they were at the turn of the 21st century. The
governance of Finland involves unique features, but also features that
are familiar from country to country. Moreover, many aspects of the po-
litical system can only be understood against their historical background;
nor would it be possible to account for the basics of how Finland is gov-
erned without constantly alluding to quite recent transformations of the
system. The 1990s, with the economic crisis and the new international
environment, were an exceptional decade. The political system was tested
in various ways over quite a short time span. What was essential was the
interplay between stability and change.
Democracy is an ideal that permeates or is intended to permeate the
entire political system. Although the ideal is not easy to define in uni-
form and exact terms, it serves as a highly valued guideline for gover-
nance, in Finland as in numerous other nations. Sevenscore years ago
Abraham Lincoln defined it concisely as “government of the people, by
the people, for the people.” Accordingly, this book on Finnish democ-
racy describes the people, their political institutions, and what the politi-
cal system does for them. The functions of authorities and official deci-
sion-makers occupy an obvious place in the picture, but so do the roles
and organization of civil society and non-governmental actors, the po-
litical involvement of individual citizens, and the conflicts caused by
differences in social structure and ideologies.
Concerning the system’s output “for the people,” particular attention
will be directed to the social benefits the country provides for its indi-
vidual citizens. The characteristics of the Finnish welfare state, its ability
to meet its established goals, and its effectiveness in protecting less for-
tunate persons against the unexpected economic hardships of the 1990s,
are of obvious interest here. In retrospect, it seems fair to say that the
social security network has provided successful protection for the Finn-
ish people. However, new circumstances and modified values have ne-
cessitated some rethinking of the general structure and affordability of
the country’s public services.
In the latter part of the 1990s, some small member countries of the
European Union – notably Ireland, Portugal and Finland – again experi-
enced unusually rapid economic growth. Indeed, Finland’s recovery from
the slump was unusually rapid. However, what was the normal state of
affairs before the slump will obviously never return unaltered. Irrevers-
ible changes have occurred both domestically and in the political and
economic environment and, possibly, in the prevailing values. Finland
entered the 21st century with many new adjustments in how the country
governs itself.
Consequently, this book is not only about Finnish institutions and prac-
tices, and not only about the political system’s inputs and outputs; it is
also about stability and change. It is obvious that the text would have
been considerably different if it had been written in the late 1980s. Soon
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thereafter, the general view would have been far more cautious and pes-
simistic than it again appears at the very beginning of the 21st century.
However, before embarking on the account of Finland’s governance,
both its stable patterns and its recent flexibility, its environment and in-
stitutions, a broad outline of the history of the country is in order. The
following chapter will also include a more specific list of topics that
concern the functioning of democracy in Finland (on page 37), and spe-
cific questions about the Finnish welfare state (on page 51).
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2  Pathways to Modern Finland
Swedes we are not; Russians we do not want to become; so let us be
Finns.
 A. I. Arwidsson 1791–1858
I believe...that Finland has emerged a winner from the ordeals of the
twentieth century.
Max Jakobson 1998, p. 1
Roots, Autonomy, and Independence
Because Finland and Sweden were united for more than 600 years, their
shared history had a deep impact on Finnish society and left durable
traces on the governance of modern Finland. For example, one historical
paradox is that the constitution of 1772 and 1789, which lived only until
1809 in Sweden, remained effective in Finland 110 years longer, until 1919.
Sweden’s constitution swung like a pendulum. From Finland’s point
of view, its power relations were quite convenient in 1809, when Finland
broke away from Sweden. During the late 17th and early 18th century
the regime had become an absolute monarchy. The estates then reversed
the system in 1719, and in 1720 the Form of Government abolished ab-
solutism even more categorically. What followed then was the “Age of
Freedom” with all political power in the hands of the Diet of Estates. The
next swing of the pendulum was the bloodless coup d’état of King
Gustavus III in 1772. The Form of Government adopted in 1772 and
followed in 1789 by the Act on Union and Security again made the mon-
arch the very powerful ruler of the country, albeit one whose powers
were constitutionally limited. The next swing, the more balanced consti-
tution of 1809, no longer affected Finland.
In much earlier times, almost a millennium ago, the Finns had been
less organized politically than the Swedes and the Danes. Their land was
thinly populated and they lived in isolated settlements. However, they
had some trading contacts all the way to Mediterranean Europe. They
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became a tempting target for the power politics of the Swedes and also of
the Danes and the German Hansa League, whereas the Finns living in
Karelia became the allies of Novgorod (later Russia). Christianity spread
into Western Finland in the early twelfth century, and the Popes were
anxious to conquer all Finns for the realm of the Roman Catholic Church.
Swedish kings and warlords and English missionary bishops served as
the Church’s tools.
The first crusade took place in 1157 (or in 1155), and eastbound ex-
pansion from the west continued. In 1293 the Castle of Vyborg was built
about 100 miles west of what would become, centuries later (in 1703),
the site of St. Petersburg. The Peace of Pähkinäsaari (Schlüsselburg) in
1323 defined for the first time the border between Sweden and Novgorod.
It also confirmed the division of Karelia and its Finnish population be-
tween Sweden and Russia and, at the same time, between the Catholic
and Orthodox versions of Christianity.
Finland gradually became a part of Sweden. Although the two peoples
spoke different languages, Finland gained hardly any identity of its own.
There was also some migration from Sweden to the coastal areas of South-
ern and Western Finland, as well as westbound migration from Finland.
The Baltic Sea was a unifying rather than a separating factor. In 1362 the
right of Finnish representatives to participate in the election of the king
was confirmed, and King Magnus Ericson’s National Code of Laws in
1347 and the common law of the land in 1442 applied to Sweden’s
“Eastland” as much as to its “Northland” and its more central provinces.
Formally, the king was elective until 1544 and hereditary after that.
During the late Middle Ages the one administrative unit that covered
Finland as such, and actually had a dominating position in the governing
of the country, was the Diocese of Turku. Originally it was guided di-
rectly by the pope, not by the Church of Sweden. In 1291 a native Finn
was for the first time appointed to the office of bishop. Even in those
days, Finland kept in close contact with European cultural developments.
Many Finns studied at the University of Paris as members of the English
nation and two served as rectors of the university. Prague was an early
alternative and, especially in the fifteenth century, Finns studied in Ger-
man universities.
The centralization of the Swedish state after the Lutheran reformation
in the sixteenth century, the role of Sweden as a great power in the seven-
teenth century, and Sweden’s reformed laws and social developments
particularly in the 18th century, all concerned Finland as much as they
concerned the rest of the kingdom. For example, in the 1600s the expan-
sion of Swedish rule tempted Lutheran Finns to settle Ingria, an area east
of Estonia and south of eastern Karelia. The Swedish General Code of
1734 remains effective in some fields of law even in today’s Finland.
However, during the 18th century Finland also began to grow apart
from Sweden. Sweden’s declining strength touched Finland much more
than the rest of the kingdom. Central Sweden was unable or unwilling to
defend Finland against the Russians, who occupied the country both in
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1710 and in 1741. As the consequence of wars, famine, and disease,
Finland’s population declined dramatically at the turn of the eighteenth
century.
In 1807, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon made peace at Tilsit,
East Prussia. The two rulers also agreed to exercise complete political
control in central Europe, and the Russian emperor promised to persuade
the Scandinavian countries to join the Continental System (the boycott
of British goods). Because Sweden did not comply, Russia punished it by
forcing it to surrender all of Finland after the Finnish War of 1808–1809.
This war was still going on in the north when Tsar Alexander I sum-
moned the Finnish Diet of the Four Estates to convene in March 1809 in
Porvoo, on the southern coast of Finland. Fortunately for Finland, King
John III of Sweden had in 1581 added to his titles that of Grand Duke of
Finland, and this was conveniently transferred to the Russian emperor’s
long list of titles. He ratified “the religion and fundamental Laws of the
Land” and the privileges and rights which each estate and all the inhabit-
ants of Finland “have hitherto enjoyed.” Thus the emperor, who was an
authoritarian ruler elsewhere, became a monarch with constitutionally
limited powers in Finland. The Diet, in turn, pledged the Finnish people’s
oath of allegiance to their new ruler. Only later, in September 1809, was
Finland formally ceded to Russia in the peace treaty signed in Hamina.
Thereby Finland was “elevated” to the status of an autonomous “state
among states” with its own legal system, its own representative body
(the Diet), its government (called the Senate) and civil servants. It also
had its own postal service and, later, state railways and even its own
army (until 1904) and own currency, the Finnish markka (from 1860).
The Imperial Finnish Senate included two divisions, economic and
judicial. Later, in independent Finland, the economic division became
the government, which is called the Council of State, and its administra-
tive departments1 continued their functions as the ministries of the gov-
ernment. The judicial division, in turn, was the forerunner of the Su-
preme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. Chairmanship of
the Senate belonged to the governor-general, who was the emperor’s
personal representative in Finland, and in St. Petersburg the minister state
secretary presented the emperor with matters about Finland that required
his decision. There was a gradual retreat in Finland from the principle of
concentrating all governmental affairs in the Senate, so that by 1881 the
country had set up 24 national boards or other separate national offices
(Savolainen 1999, p. 123).
Further steps toward independence presupposed a conscious national
identity. Finnish had become a written language in the 1540s when the
ABC book, the prayer book, and the New Testament were published.
1  At the beginning of the 20th century, there were nine administrative depart-
ments, dealing with ecclesiastical affairs, financial affairs, justice, transport,
the treasury, internal affairs, trade and industry, agriculture, and (until 1903)
military affairs.
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A true Finnish identity and a sense of the Finnish nation began to gain
importance rather late, only after 1809. The growth of nationalism will
be discussed more in the next section of this chapter but, as milestones in
its growing strength, one could mention here the publication of the na-
tional epoch Kalevala in 1835 and the first public performance of Finland’s
national anthem in 1848. Nationalist feelings dominated Finland’s cul-
tural life increasingly toward the end of the nineteenth century. The do-
mestic political processes that led to independence were hastened in the
1860s. The Diet of the Estates began regular sessions and the 1860s be-
came an important decade of political, administrative, economic, and
cultural reforms in Finland.
At the very end of the nineteenth century Finland’s position was en-
dangered by the growing force of pan-Slavism and the growing power of
the nationalists in Russia. What was called a policy of unification in St.
Petersburg meant a policy of Russification at the country’s edges and
among its minorities. In 1899 the Finns, as well as wide circles of west-
European intellectuals, were shocked by the “February Manifesto,” which
declared and concretely commenced attempts to Russify the country, in
gross violation of Finland’s legal rights.
These measures provoked passive resistance. “Within a few weeks,
three million of the Czar’s most faithful subjects began to despise him”
(Jutikkala with Pirinen 1996, p. 355), and the desire for full indepen-
dence was strengthened. Defeat in the war with Japan and the general
strike in November 1905 weakened Russia, which in turn enabled Fin-
land to democratize its popular representation. The traditional Diet of the
Four Estates was replaced by the most democratic representative body
the reformers could imagine: a parliament characterized by universal and
equal suffrage, universal eligibility, unicameralism, and proportional rep-
resentation. At the 1904 election only 125,000 men had the right to vote
but in 1907 the electorate numbered 1,273,000 persons.
A second period of Russification started in 1909. Russia itself experi-
enced internal unrest again, and Nicholas II, the Emperor and Grand Duke,
was dethroned in 1917. Four weeks after the October Revolution, on
December 6, 1917, Finland declared itself independent. On January 4,
1918, Finland’s independence was recognized by Russia’s new Central
Executive Committee and by France and Sweden, and soon also by Ger-
many. A War of Liberation was still fought from January to May 1918,
between the “White” forces of the government and rebellious “Red” so-
cialist forces. Russian troops stationed in Finland participated on the side
of the rebel Red Guard and, in April, the White army received support
from a German expeditionary force. Primarily, however, it was fought as
a bitter civil war, in which the Reds were defeated. Peace with Soviet
Russia was concluded in 1920 in Tartu, Estonia.
The nonaggression pact that Finland and the Soviet Union signed in
1932 did not prevent the USSR from invading Finland on November 30,
1939. The Russian aim was to gain possession of the whole country, but
it failed because of Finland’s unexpectedly strong defense. The Winter
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War ended in March 1940 with the cession of 12 percent of Finland’s
land area to the Soviet Union. The entire population of the lost area was
evacuated to other parts of Finland. The Continuation War of 1941–1944
was terminated by the armistice in September 1944, later confirmed in
the Paris peace treaty of 1947, where the area lost in 1940 and some extra
land was ceded. In the two wars Finland lost the lives of 91,000 soldiers.
In addition, 122,500 were wounded, of whom 93,000 remained perma-
nent invalids (Honkasalo 2001, pp. 10-11). A third war was fought in
1944-1945 against German troops in Lapland.
In 1997 Finland celebrated eighty years of independence. It is the only
state to have gained national independence in 1917, when World War I
was still going on. At the time of World War II Finland was still young
among the world’s independent states but it is no longer young today. Its
economic, political, and social development was rapid and in many re-
spects quite successful during the two decades after 1918, but the Finns
also tend to feel that the final confirmation of their independence was
their successful armed defense of their country during World War II.[PP]
Emerging National Identity
As mentioned above, Finland’s independence would not have been pos-
sible without the conscious national identity that emerged during the 19th
century. More generally, the birth of nation states is considered to be a
typical 19th century development, although in some countries national
identity began to emerge a century or two earlier. The “nation state” con-
cept has been defined as an entity consisting of a homogeneous people
having its own political system, common culture and language, and shared
interests. It is also obvious that no nation in the world does completely
fulfill these requirements of homogeneity.
Values influencing the birth of national identity have included, on the
one hand, a common language and literature, and on the other hand, a
generally felt loyalty toward the legal and political authority. To this one
should add religion, which has been a paradoxical factor. The history and
present day of Europe have proven how religious tradition can unite, or
how it can sharply divide people who inhabit the same area. There is
good reason to consider language and religion to be the central elements
of culture. In Europe the impact of a common religion has been much
more powerful than in the USA, for example.
Western culture spread into Finland with Christianity in the 12th cen-
tury, but the people also preserved their heathen habits and beliefs. When
the pagan peasant Lalli killed Finland’s first bishop Henry, he defended
very concretely what was Finnish some eight and a half centuries ago.
Christianity became Lutheran during the 16th century, and this became
one of the solid cornerstones of the Finnish value structure. Together
with Lutheranism, some typically German ways of thinking and German
ideals spread into Finland, while the political connection with Sweden
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stabilized western governmental institutions. An essential element of
Lutheranism is the protestant work ethic, which emphasizes both zeal-
ous work and social trust. Even nowadays it provides an obvious con-
trast to Finland’s eastern neighbor, Orthodox Russia.
The Lutheran church offered its sermons and instruction in the people’s
native language. Thus the Church, together with western institutions,
helped to initiate among the Finns a consciousness of their own identity.
There was a problem, however. Having reached a great power position
in the 17th century, Sweden lost some interest in Finland. The central
administration became unresponsive toward the needs and desires of the
Finnish people, and officials in Finland were more and more of Swedish
origin. Administration both in religious and in secular offices, and to
some extent even in the courts, was conducted in a language that was
foreign to the majority of the population. This was opposed by the Early
Fennophiles in the 1660s, and the intellectuals of Turku (Åbo) Academy
continued to criticize Swedish policies throughout the 18th century, until
such criticism was combined with the Fennoman movement of the 19th
century. During the 18th century there also were political and partly revolu-
tionary endeavors to separate Finland from Sweden and, for the first time,
some members of the educated class referred to the Finns as a nation.
While Finland’s position between Sweden and Russia made Finland a
battle field, it became obvious that, when Finland’s vital interests were at
stake, it was much more important to take Russia into consideration than
seemed necessary from the point of view of Sweden proper, still dream-
ing of its great power status. Already during the 1740s, the officers of
some military units in Finland contacted the Russian ruler without
Sweden’s permission, and Russia even offered independence for Finland
in order to create a convenient buffer against Sweden.
The idea of national independence emerged more distinctly during the
1780s. Some military officers who had been influenced by the French
enlightenment philosophy strongly criticized the king and the govern-
ment of Sweden. The most central figure of the independence movement
was Göran Magnus Sprengtporten (1740–1819), who was called
“Finland’s Washington” by many of his contemporaries. He even out-
lined a constitution for Finland: the country was to become a federal
republic, characterized by liberalism, tolerance, and equality. The time
was too early to realize such a plan, but the idea of independence stayed
alive and gave strength to Finnish identity.
Simultaneously with the birth of the Fennoman movement, the Euro-
pean Geistesleben, or spiritual life, adopted new values and ideas that
later became known as romanticism. This turned the attention of edu-
cated persons inward: to their own nation, its language and literature,
and the nature and history of the country. Such ideas introduced new
dynamics into nation building, particularly because they connected the
upper classes with ordinary people. In Finland, an essential precondition
for national awareness and national identity was research on the Finnish
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language and on the origin of the Finns. Romanticism appeared effec-
tively through research done by Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739–1804) on
Finnish poetry and Finland’s history and language.
National identity was also greatly strengthened by the political change
resulting from the Napoleonic wars. The Russian ruler promised to main-
tain the laws of the country and its religion. The civil servants and the
military personnel could remain in their positions, with the exception of
those born in Sweden who might, the Tsar thought, tempt Finns to favor
Sweden. Thus Finnish identity was strengthened in the governing of the
country.
However, the language of the educated class of people had become
Swedish, although most of them originated from Finnish-speaking homes.
Many young educated persons looked with disapproval on the promi-
nent position of Swedish among the educated class; they had been influ-
enced by romanticism, and the national values of the majority were cen-
tral in their thinking. Finland’s autonomy opened opportunities for fo-
menters of nationalism, the main figures being Elias Lönnrot (1802–1884)
and J.V. Snellman (1806–1881). Following the romantic heritage, Lönnrot
took it upon himself to assemble the folklore of Finland. His work be-
came known in 1835 as the Kalevala and in 1849 he published a new
version of this national epic of Finland. Snellman, in turn, was a philoso-
pher who had adopted ideas from Friedrich Hegel; he was troubled by
the lack of nationalism and patriotism and he considered it important to
save Finland’s national uniqueness.
Without Lönnrot’s and Snellman’s input there might not have occurred
such a strengthening of national identity during the 19th century. The
Kalevala made the Finns realize that they possessed an old culture of
their own: poetry and literature that so far had remained unpublished.
Thanks to Snellman, people began to understand the importance of their
own language and of Finnish governmental institutions for maintaining
Finnish culture. Furthermore, Snellman was influential in obtaining for
Finland its own monetary unit in the 1860s. With some exaggeration it
has been claimed that Finland became independent already when it ob-
tained its own Finnish markka, separate from the Russian ruble.
By the end of the 19th century Finnish society became a new type of
arena for ideological conflicts. The new ideas emphasized international
values, which could potentially weaken Finland’s national identity. At
the same time, the class structure, in politics known as the estate-society,
was subjected to three kinds of pressure, namely liberalism, Finnish na-
tionalism, and socialism.
The impact of liberalism became visible from the 1860s onward. Empha-
sis on personal freedoms, industrial freedom, and freedom in general, evoked
the importance of the individual person. Such a change in thinking was a
necessary precondition for modernization, especially for the birth of mod-
ern manufacturing. Liberalism was an ideology that emphasized interna-
tionalism more than national viewpoints. It also began to tear apart the uni-
fied Christian culture that had been prominent in Finland.
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But alongside liberalism arose the Finnish cultural movement, which
attempted to improve the position of the Finnish language and Finnish-
speakers in general. An additional aim of this movement was to further
national unity and catalyze a broad political and educational awakening.
This became quite successful. In order to further national unity the move-
ment resisted the prevailing class society, which was for its part hinder-
ing the goals of the masses, especially because class society strength-
ened the position of the Swedish language. However, Finnish and Swed-
ish speaking Finns agreed on the necessity of preserving the social sys-
tem of Nordic origin, in spite of Finland being an autonomous part of
Russia. Thus the Russian connection strengthened Finland’s Nordic-type
social system as one element of Finnish identity.
The development of Finnish culture began to reach realization from
the 1880s onward. A national romantic orientation was most visible in
painting, in architecture, and in music. Akseli Gallen-Kallela (1865–1931),
possibly the most noted Finnish pictorial artist, created an impressive
production of Kalevala themes, and was followed by artists inspired by
the same national origins. Eliel Saarinen (1873–1950), who later worked
in the USA, based his world-famous Finnish architecture on national
romanticism. Jean Sibelius (1865–1957) is perhaps the best-known rep-
resentative of Finland’s national romanticism. Several of his composi-
tions were based on Kalevala themes. The artistic orientation represented
by Gallen-Kallela, Saarinen, Sibelius, and many others, was known as
Karelianism, because Karelia had preserved many of the old cultural
characteristics that no longer could be found elsewhere in Finland.
Sibelius published his Finlandia, the famous musical expression of
Finland’s desire for independence, in 1899, some months after the Rus-
sian government had launched its policy of Russification. The strongest
expression of Finnish nationalism up to that point had been to collect,
very quickly and in secret, 522,931 signatures to an address strongly
opposing the Russian February manifesto. However, Tsar Nicholas II
did not receive the 500-member delegation that traveled to St. Peters-
burg to present the address to him.
Russification attempts were continued under Governor General Nikolai
Bobrikov’s leadership, until a Finnish patriot assassinated him in 1904.
The pan-Slavistic policy of Russification greatly strengthened Finnish
identity, awareness of the country’s own national interests, even though
Bobrikov made use of political disagreements among the Finns. Such
disagreements concerned three issues: how to resist Russification; con-
flicts of interest between the growing workers’ movement and the ‘old’
parties; and the language cleavage. The February manifesto was repealed
during the general strike in 1905, in conjunction with the events that led
in Finland to the world’s most advanced body of popular representation.
In a country located next to reactionary Russia, a modern parliament
became a symbol of Finland’s national identity. It differentiated the Finns
sharply from the Russians, and even from the people of Sweden, who did
not yet have comparable political rights.
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The Russian government recovered quickly from the shock caused by
defeat in the Russo-Japanese war and by the rebellious actions of 1905–
1906. A new period of oppression started in Finland and the attempts to
Russify the country lasted until the World War. Although democratic free-
doms facilitated internal political struggles, all Finns opposed the
emperor’s power politics. Thereby the Finnish identity grew stronger in
every part of the nation. This is well illustrated by the Olympic Games in
Stockholm in 1912. During the opening ceremonies the Finns could not
use their own flag, but they also refused to follow the flag of Russia.
They marched as a separate group and carried only a sign bearing the
name of their country. Finland’s athletes emerged as the third most suc-
cessful national team at the games, a success that helped to strengthen
Finnish self-esteem.
The unity of Finnish identity was tested when independence was gained
in 1917–1918. Disagreement on social conditions and the proximity of
the Russian revolution provoked portions of the workers and tenant farm-
ers to rebel against the legal government of the new republic. Obviously
the people’s political and social rights were mutually inconsistent: large
parts of the nation were frustrated because the promises attached to broader
democracy did not lead to desired social reforms.
Because the Whites won the civil war, Finland was spared the kind of
development experienced in the Soviet Union. Instead, it now became
possible to develop independent Finland with democratic rules of play
and in accordance with the Nordic model. Two decades later, in 1939-
1940, the same rebellious reds and their descendants fought against Stalin
as a vital part of Finland’s field army. Not only did the Finnish people
succeed in their defensive fight but, during the extreme danger, their Finn-
ish identity also won a great victory over the nation’s internal political
cleavages.[OR]
The Rise of Civil Society
Political democracy can hardly develop in the absence of a functioning
civil society. The birth and development of the democratic system in
Finland support this claim. In the 19th century there were increasing
numbers of people joining popular movements, associations and organi-
zations, paving the way for the political reform of 1906. A legislative
precondition for the trend was the realization of freedom of trade, free-
dom of migration and freedom of association from the 1850s to the 1880s.
What makes this more interesting is that Finland was a part of Russia, a
very conservative country.
The foundations of civil society were being laid throughout the 19th
century. Its building materials were liberal ideas about individual rights
and, on the other hand, thoughts awakened by nationalism on the possi-
bilities to influence society and the state. The elite of the autonomous
grand duchy also quickly learned what John Stuart Mill wrote about civil
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liberties in his book On Liberty (1859). There were ideological contrasts
between liberalism and Fennomania, but both ideologies promoted the civil
society: the liberals by conveying ideas on liberties, and the Fennomans by
drawing in the Finnish-speaking majority and by emphasizing equality and
solidarity between the educated class and the common people (Alapuro and
Stenius 1987, pp. 8–39; Pulkkinen 1987, pp. 54–69).
The founding of the Finnish Literature Society (Suomalaisen Kirjalli-
suuden Seura) in 1831 was the true starting point of organized civil activ-
ity. The Society developed Finnish cultural life and pioneered the in-
crease in organizational activity. As early as the 1840s, it started to ac-
cept women and peasants in addition to educated men as its members,
which helped to clarify the idea of civil society and to broaden ideas
towards democracy.
The revolutionary movement in Europe in 1848 made the Russian au-
thorities cautious and, in 1849, freedom of association was restricted by
forbidding common people from participating in the Literary Society’s
activities. It became the emperor’s prerogative to approve or reject the
rules of various associations, and associations were ordered to strengthen
governmental authority. Freedom of association was not expanded until
1893, when the task of confirming of association rules was transferred to
the Finnish Senate; four years later it became the duty of provincial gov-
ernors. However, the early signs of Russification did not take long to
surface: at the beginning of the 1890s, confirmation of association rules
was made dependent on the will of the Russian governor general.
Despite all this, several associations were founded between the 1860s
and 1880s that played a major role in the development of civil society
and the idea of the state. The pressure to organize was so strong that
many new associations kept their true aims secret in order to circumvent
the restrictions and be allowed to exist. For example, many volunteer
fire-brigades were set up that had their goals in educational matters and
class fellowship rather than fire fighting. They became forerunners in
establishing libraries, choirs, orchestras and theater groups. From the
1880s, as the literacy rate increased, more and more representatives of
the lower classes assumed leading roles in associations (Alapuro and
Stenius 1987, pp. 31–35). This served the needs of the new parliament
from 1907 onwards.
A good example of an association with national goals is the Society
for Popular Education (Kansanvalistusseura), founded in 1874. It was a
project of leading Fennomans and a loose political group called the Finnish
Party. Its leadership wanted to steer clear of language conflicts and keep
the doors open to both Finnish and Swedish speakers. The Society’s goals
included raising the education and well-being of the people, which in
practice meant the educational interests of the Finnish-speaking major-
ity. The conscious goal was to give the people the necessary tools to meet
the spiritual and material challenges of a new kind of society and state.
The Fennomans saw to it that the Society stayed in their hands although
the language question was kept in the background (Inkilä 1969).
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The Society for Popular Education in its early days was the biggest
and most influential contact network independent of state and church.
Starting from the 1870s, Fennomania evolved in a more liberal direction,
stressing the demands of social fairness. As early as 1880, the head of the
Society, professor E. G. Palmén, described its mission in accordance with
the principles of a modern civil society: “The autonomy of the people, its
right to participate in decisions on how to proceed, requires that the rep-
resented follow the work of those who represent them, in order to call the
representatives to account for how the task was carried out” (Liikanen
1987, pp. 126–134). The sentence defines one of the basic functions of
civil society: its role in determining a state’s legitimacy. Palmén pre-
sented his view twenty-six years before the democratic parliament was
created and thirty-eight years before Finland’s independence.
Membership of the Society reached 5300 by the end of the century.
Yet the combined membership of the temperance movement, the youth
society movement, and the labor movement overtook it. The influence
that the Society for Popular Education had lay in its publishing opera-
tions and the patriotic song festivals it organized, rather than in its mem-
bership numbers. Decades after Finland had become independent, the
Society continued to publish a very popular almanac with articles on
national questions and all-round education. By the end of the 19th cen-
tury the song festivals had already grown into massive patriotic manifes-
tations that reflected Finnish identity and the urge for national indepen-
dence (cf. op. cit., pp. 136–141). Finland’s civil society was organizing
rapidly, which was a precondition for the political turning point of the
next decade.
The goals of the Friends of Temperance, founded in 1884, were simi-
lar to those of the Society for Popular Education: it aimed to improve the
morals, manners, and sense of responsibility of the people. Halfway
through the 1890s, it was the biggest organization until youth societies
overtook it. At the beginning of the 20th century, its membership in-
creased manifold reaching 40,000. The members were primarily work-
ing-class.
The role of the Friends of Temperance, from both a societal and politi-
cal viewpoint, developed into a historical one that the founders could not
have foreseen. Its ideology included a strong political message, an accu-
sation that the state was pursuing the wrong policy towards alcohol. It
allowed financial profits to be made through the production and sale of
alcohol, while numerous people, especially among the workers and the
poor, suffered from the consequences of alcohol consumption. This mes-
sage helped working-class people see the societal connections of their
alcohol problems. That the faults were to be eliminated by legislation
was something that fitted like a glove the state-centered ideas of the
Fennomans in the organization.
The temperance ideology also provided important support for the radi-
cal labor movement that was rising to its feet. Its aim was to recruit work-
ing-class people to support major reforms in society. At the end of the
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19th century, the leaders of the labor movement organized an alcohol
boycott, the radical mass nature of which was emphasized by mass meet-
ings, demonstration marches and popular petitions. Soon active work-
ing-class people started to demand a prohibition law, and that demand
was included in the program of the Social Democratic Party, founded in
1899 and originally called the Finnish Labor Party. The temperance move-
ment realized that an effective expansion of its ideology required coopera-
tion with the growing labor movement; otherwise the masses could not be
attracted to stand behind the movement (Sulkunen 1986, pp. 249–253).
The Fennoman dream of improving the people’s morals and manners
may have been realized in a surprisingly successful way, but it also played
an unexpected role in the organization of the labor movement. The recip-
rocal effects of the temperance movement and the labor movement show
what kind of connections the organization of a civil society may have
with political activity and the development of a state.
The Society for Popular Education, the Friends of Temperance, and
the labor movement are part of a historically essential phase in the cul-
tural and political modernization of Finnish society. They do not, how-
ever, constitute the whole picture of that modernization process. The 1870s
and 1880s had already seen the emergence of other popular movements
that strengthened civil society. They included the youth society move-
ment, the cooperative movement, the sports movement and the trade union
movement within the labor movement. The women’s movement was also
an integral part of the modernization process; its significance is reflected
by the fact that Finnish women gained the right to vote in 1906, at the
same time as men. However, women participated, above all, in other
mass movements. For example the Finnish Women’s Association, estab-
lished in 1884, did not have many members, but like other ideological
organizations had an impact based more on the message than the num-
bers. The women’s association to attract the largest membership was the
Martha Association, born in the aftermath of the February Manifesto in
1899. Its home economics extension work has been significant (cf.
Jallinoja 1983, pp. 32–50; Sulkunen 1987, pp. 162–172).
The goals of the youth society movement were largely similar to those
of the Society for Popular Education and the Friends of Temperance: to
civilize the people, improve their morals and teach them a proper way of
life. With its aim on self-education and on upbringing of decent human
beings, the movement also emphasized national ends. Its central organi-
zation, the Finnish Youth League, was founded in 1897. As a politically
independent organization it was able to influence a high proportion of
young people in Finland, even in the most remote areas (Numminen 1961).
Sports and physical exercise corresponded to the youth society activ-
ity in the field of physical culture. There had been gymnastics and sports
within various associations for decades before the foundation of the Finn-
ish Gymnastics and Sports Federation (SVUL) in 1900. The mental state
and pressing values of the Finnish society also surfaced in the formation
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process of this central sports organization, with national motives rising
to the fore. Physical exercise was seen as a means to improve the fitness
of threatened people and unite their resources in the struggle against op-
pressive Russian rule and against unhealthy habits, such as drinking
(Halila 1960, pp. 5–30).
As for cooperative action, it has, in a sense, been part of the traditional
popular culture of Finland for hundreds of years: neighborly help, the
purpose of which is to provide assistance in demanding tasks, such as
building and harvesting, has been characteristic of an agrarian society.
Perhaps this was why cooperation in its more modern form also suited
Finnish society. Ever since the 1860s, various trades and worker groups
had created cooperative associations and various predecessors of coop-
eratives, such as stores and common means of production (Mauranen
1987, pp. 179–180). The first central organization, the Pellervo Confed-
eration, was founded in 1899. Its name refers to the old Finnish god of
tilled fields and its ideology combined cooperation and nationalism. It
has been said that the Pellervo Confederation was born in a spring of
great sorrow, awakening, and hope. The saying refers to the coincident
existence of Finnish nationalist enthusiasm and Russian oppression
(Henttinen 1999, pp. 32–56).
National ends did not manifest themselves in the same manner at the
outset of the labor movement as in other old movements. The initiative
was usually taken by the upper social classes. In the 1880s they tried to
establish politically independent workers’ associations, which would have
functioned as meeting places for the propertied and working classes. The
upper social classes also aimed at keeping Finnish workers apart from
the radical doctrines of European socialism. Nevertheless, the labor move-
ment underwent radicalization in the 1890s, putting an end to the activity
that stressed class unity.
This was the beginning of a labor movement that emphasized collec-
tive values and, at the time, had no parallel outside Europe. In 1899, with
the Russification attempts intensifying, the newly founded political party
became the core of the labor movement. Its program contained many
demands, including freedom of association, freedom of assembly, free-
dom of speech, freedom of the press, universal suffrage, equality be-
tween men and women, compulsory education, and an eight-hour work-
ing day (Soikkanen 1961, pp. 21–72). The demands were influenced by
the 1891 Erfurt program of the German Social Democrats. They seemed
particularly radical in a dark phase of Finland’s history when the conserva-
tive Russian regime was trying to abolish most of the existing rights. During
the Great Strike of 1905, with the grip of the Russian regime slipping, this
radical program was paving the way for the democratic reform of 1906.
The labor movement grew stronger at the beginning of the new cen-
tury. In common with other old movements, its aim was to improve the
economic conditions and education of the ordinary people. At the same
time, it strongly emphasized equality and economic, educational, and
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civil rights. In 1905–1906, inspired mainly by the Great Strike, workers
joined trade unions in great numbers. The bipolar field of the Finnish
labor market also took its early shape when employers saw it necessary
to form their own central organization. The establishment of the Confed-
eration of Finnish Employers (STK) in 1907, two weeks before the first
parliamentary elections, foreshadowed the formation of a new kind of
organizational field; six weeks later, unionized workers set up their cen-
tral organization, the Trade Union Organization of Finland. However,
the labor market did not begin to function as a centralized system until
decades later, after the Second World War.
Unionization was encouraged by the success of the Social Democratic
Party in the first parliamentary elections, the party winning eighty of the
200 seats. Yet, in 1907, the membership of the Trade Union Organization
of Finland did not rise much above 23,500 even though the number of
unionized workers may have been many times higher. Many trade unions
had not yet joined the central organization. In the following years, un-
settled conditions with numerous strikes prevailed in the labor market,
which was marked by workers’ great expectations and by the employers’
refusal to make collective agreements (Ala-Kapee and Valkonen 1982,
pp. 176–210, 792–793). There was disappointment in the air arising from
unchanging working conditions and the weakness of parliament.
The various organizations had already been trying to influence na-
tional and local decision-making under the old Diet of the Estates and
pursued their attempts after the new Parliament had come into existence.
They collected popular petitions, which was one way to express the pub-
lic will. For example, the Friends of Temperance organized the collec-
tion of several petitions to change the licensing laws during 1885-1900,
and the small Finnish Women’s Association presented to the Diet a peti-
tion with 5700 names to suppress prostitution in 1888. Many other means
were also used to influence the Diet and the new Parliament (Tuominen
1974).
Finnish civil society emerged mainly during the latter half of the 19th
century and, after the parliament reform of 1906, organizations were rather
numerous, diverse and strong. What was special about the emergence of
civil society was the fact that the values that promoted national identity
and state formation were central in very different types of associations
and organizations.
Without this activity the parliamentary reform of 1906 would have
been impossible. The reform was essential for Finnish democracy but
much effort and many sacrifices were still required. Society became stag-
nant due to conservative Russian rule and, as a consequence, civil soci-
ety soon split in two. One side did not regard the prevailing system as
legitimate, which resulted in the tragic civil war in 1918. There are many
viewpoints about what caused the war. One explanation could be the
contradiction between an active civil society and a non-functioning po-
litical democracy. [OR]
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The Democratic Republic
When all the countries of the world were reviewed in 1980, only 21 of
them were identified having been continuously democratic since the time
of World War II. They included the five Nordic countries, ten other coun-
tries in Europe and two in North America, plus Australia, New Zealand,
Israel, and Japan. (Raymond D. Castil, according to Lijphart 1984,
p. 38). All 21 countries also entered the 21st century as stable democra-
cies. Furthermore, by 1980 the total number of democracies around the
world already was much larger, and a very important new wave of de-
mocratization started in the early 1990s.
Finland, on the other hand, is one of the 13 countries that have been
democratic continuously since the time of World War I. National inde-
pendence was the final step to be taken before it was possible for Finland
to adopt a democratically functioning political system. On the other hand,
it is obvious that democracy cannot be introduced instantly. In Finnish
society some of its foundations had prevailed for centuries, and others
had appeared during the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th
century. Important among those were personal freedom, the rule of law,
and participation in local decision-making, followed by the emergence
of a civil society, democratically structured political institutions, and a
unifying national identity that was connected to the basic legitimacy of
the government of the country.
There had been a tradition of personal freedom throughout Finland’s
known history. The farmers were independent. Unlike most parts of Eu-
rope but like England, Switzerland, and some parts of the Netherlands,
Sweden-Finland had no serfdom. Neither was there personal authoritar-
ian rule without legal-constitutional limitations of power (with the ex-
ception of the short period from 1680 to 1718). As described above, a
civil society was being activated during the 19th century. Political par-
ties were also emerging.
When Finland was separated from Sweden, Finland’s negotiators were
unwilling to discuss the country’s position in Russia without obtaining
the formal consent of the people. Tsar Alexander I summoned the Finn-
ish estates, which assembled in the coastal town Porvoo in March, 1809.
At this Diet of Porvoo the Emperor and the Estates exchanged the sover-
eign pledge and oath of allegiance. The focal role of Finland’s own leg-
islature in the country was thus recognized, although the Diet did not
actually meet again until September 1863. Thereafter the legislature was
elected and convened at regular intervals and the representation of the
people became firmly established in the country.
The Diet represented various elements of Finnish society, as well as
the country as a whole, but it did not have a democratic base. The big
change was accomplished at the beginning of the 20th century. Soon
after the first period of attempted Russification, the Finnish people in-
vested great hopes in their democratically based parliament, the
Eduskunta, which replaced the Diet of the Estates and was elected for the
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first time in March 1907.2 Before that election, political parties were re-
organized so that they could appeal to the newly enfranchised mass elec-
torate. The Social Democrats established the first party organization with
a large mass membership. They were, with their devoted “agitators,” the
most effective election campaigners. A lively party press also emerged in
all regions of the country to support party activity. The new electorate
had high expectations and was mobilized so well that 71 percent turned
out to vote.
Finland’s modern parliament was reformist and passed important new
legislation. But even the most democratic representative body did not
suffice when the right to veto the bills and to dissolve parliament was in
the hands of an outside monarch. The Eduskunta was elected for a term
of three years, but its dissolutions were so frequent that it needed to be
elected no fewer than eight times between 1907 and 1917. For example,
parliament was dissolved instantly after the opening session in February
1909, because the speaker’s remarks contained “impertinent criticism.”
Indeed, nothing short of full national independence could have made it
possible to realize in practice the potential of democratic government.
In 1918 the form of government was a crucial political issue. When
Norway became independent in 1905, it followed the Scandinavian mo-
narchical tradition and invited a king from Denmark. When Finland de-
clared independence twelve years later, it specifically decided to break
away from the monarchical tradition and to give the new state a republi-
can constitution.
However, due to the chaotic conditions in 1918, there grew a desire
for strength and continuity in the political system. The parliament that
had been elected in July 1917, but in which 80 socialist members no
longer participated, proceeded to elect Prince Friedrich Karl of Hessen
as king of Finland in October 1918. Due to Germany’s collapse soon
thereafter, he relinquished his crown and never went to Finland. Iceland,
too, became a republic after its independence from Denmark in 1944.
Consequently, the five Nordic countries of Europe consist of two repub-
lics (Finland and Iceland) and three monarchies (Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway).
Although Finland’s monarchists lost their cause, their goal had some
impact on the Form of Government Act that was passed by the newly
elected parliament in July 1919. This constitution became a dualistic one,
adding a strong elected president (of the American type) to the parlia-
mentary form of government (of the British type). Later, in 1958, the
Fifth Republic of France made use of a similar dualistic idea.
Finland, in turn, made use of the French type of direct elections in
1994. Originally the Finnish president was chosen by a popularly elected
electoral college of 300 members (301 in 1982 and 1988). The important
2 The Parliament Act was passed by all four estates (two of them unanimously) in
May 1906 and it became effective in October 1906.
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point, also concerning indirect elections, was the detachment of presi-
dential from parliamentary elections. The president’s direct mandate from
the people, as well as the relatively long term of six years, highlights his
or her independent position.
However, in the political life of the country the president is very de-
pendent on the parliamentary prime minister and his cabinet. The presi-
dent does send the government’s bills to parliament and he promulgates
the laws passed by it, but ordinarily that is only a formality and the prime
minister’s cabinet assumes the political responsibility. The president’s
power to dissolve parliament and order new elections has been applied
six times (in 1924, 1929, 1930, 1962, 1972 and 1975), but a constitu-
tional amendment in 1991 made parliament’s dissolution conditional upon
the prime minister’s initiative. The president leads foreign policy, has
wide powers of appointment and is supreme commander of the armed
forces, whereas parliament’s right to overrule a presidential veto was
simplified in 1991. The reformed new constitution, effective since 2000,
weakened the powers of the president further, making the head of state
cooperate still more closely with the parliamentary cabinet, in Finland
called the Council of State.
Voting age in Finland was originally 24 years. That was lowered in
1945 to 21 years, then to 20 years in 1970, and to 18 years in 1975.
Eligibility has involved the same age requirements, no more. The most
recent change took place in 1996. Until then the age requirement had to
be met by the end of the preceding year, but now the youngest voters
reach the minimum age on election day.
Voter turnout is one indication of how democracy functions. In Finn-
ish elections it has not reached the highest European levels. However,
turnout in Finland’s election of 1907, (71 percent) was exceptionally high
for a newly enfranchised electorate. In the fifth election in 1913 the turn-
out was down to 51 percent. It remained below 60 percent during the
1920s and was less than 70 percent during the 1930s.
In the election of 1945 turnout rose to 75 percent and the record for
parliamentary elections was 85.1 percent in 1962. It began to decline
again during the 1970s; in 1991 and in 1995 it was down to 72 percent, in
1999 to 68.3 percent. The elections of the president (actually, the elec-
toral college) mobilized 40 percent of the electorate in 1925, but such
elections became the most active ones during the 1980s. In 1982 voter
turnout was 86.8 percent, and in both rounds of the first direct elections
in 1994, 82 percent participated. The turnout remained rather high in
2000 as well, being first 77, then 80 percent.
Voting behavior of the Finnish electorate is but one of the many as-
pects of the democratic governance of the country. Democratic rules of
play are firmly established and internalized in Finland. This book at-
tempts to describe various aspects of Finnish democracy:
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– what are the political institutions like and how do they function and
interact;
– what is their social environment, and how do citizens and civil soci-
ety support and influence democratic governance;
– what other factors influence Finnish politics;
– how are the goals and the output of the decision-makers implemented
in the governance of the country, and how does this influence society
and the lives of ordinary citizens; and
– how has the political system reacted to change and changed itself?
[PP]
From Preindustrial to Postindustrial Economy
Compared with the leading industrial nations, isolated Finland long re-
mained a backward country in terms of its economic structure. It is true
that some industries developed rather early; for example, the first iron
blast furnace was built in 1616 and the manufacture of glass began in
1681. Founded in 1793, Finland’s oldest glass factory still in operation is
Nuutajärvi Glass, which is one of the major art glass manufacturers in
the world. The textile industry emerged in the 1730s and the spinning
machine and weaving machine, which mark the beginning of the Indus-
trial Revolution, came to Finland as the forerunners of modern industry
around 1800.
However, the turn towards a modern industrial society dates back to
about 1860. In 1856, the new emperor, Tsar Alexander II, dictated into
the records of the Senate a statement that called for special attention to
the development of trade, maritime commerce, industry and traffic routes,
and to the establishment of primary schools. The statement clearly re-
vealed liberal ideas, which were easier to put forward in Finland than in
conservative Russia. In 1860, 82 percent of Finns earned their living in
agriculture and forestry and only 5 percent in industry, handicrafts and
construction. Typical of the age of mercantilism, this economic structure
and the values associated with it did not suit a society that was aiming for
economic growth.
A very remarkable reform that was to serve the increasingly liberal
economy was Finland’s independent monetary unit, despite suspicions
about Finnish separatism on the part of Russian authorities. It was bound
to release the Finnish economy from its many ties to the Russian economy
and the rouble, and to bring it closer to the European economy. The change
in the monetary system did not disturb trade with Russia to any signifi-
cant extent, and Finland’s economic independence was further increased
when it, along with several other European countries, switched to the
gold standard in 1870.
Liberal legislation reflecting new values was implemented in Finland
from the late 1850s onwards. There was a desire to bring into effect three
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essential freedoms concerning economic life: freedom of occupation, free-
dom of contract and freedom of ownership. These were supported by
some other freedoms, such as freedom of migration. Historically, liberal-
ism was connected to technical development, which at first was most
clearly seen in a considerable improvement of communication. For ex-
ample, the Saimaa Canal, an important connection particularly for the
transport of timber, was completed in 1856, and Finland’s first railway
was opened to traffic in 1862. In 1870, the train service was extended
from Helsinki to the capital of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg, where
a Finnish-owned railway station was established.
The earliest stage of industrialization in Finland was the emergence of
the sawmill sector. It started the exploitation of forests, the most abun-
dant of Finland’s natural resources, and expanded rapidly although it
was restricted by a lack of ports that remained unfrozen throughout the
year (cf. Rasila 1982, pp. 13–26). For the next hundred years, forest prod-
ucts were to be the backbone of Finnish industry. Sawn goods were the
single main export group from 1860 until World War I, reaching 45 per-
cent of the total value of exports in 1913. However, the fastest expanding
branch of industry was paper, which between 1860 and World War I in-
creased more than thirty fold in the number of its personnel, and hun-
dredfold in the volume of its output. Other sectors also grew during that
first period of industrialization; in 1860–1913, the annual output growth
of industry and handicrafts averaged as much as 5.2 percent.
Most of the exports were directed to Russia, the railway connection to
St. Petersburg being an essential prerequisite for them. Exports to the
west increased in the early 1900s, but exports to Russia totaled 60 per-
cent as late as the onset of the World War I. The separateness of autono-
mous Finland from Russia is reflected by the fact that Russia levied tar-
iffs on Finnish goods, if not usually as high as those on goods from other
countries (Heikkinen and Hoffman 1982, pp. 60–84).
By the First World War, the forest sector’s share of the total value of
exports rose to over 70 percent. Sawmills faced great difficulties after
the outbreak of the war, while the war had quite an opposite influence on
paper mills, which experienced a sharp increase in demand for their prod-
ucts from Russia. The situation was, however, revolutionized by the trans-
formation of Russia into the Soviet Union: Paper exports to the east,
which constituted 80 percent of Finland’s paper production, ended com-
pletely. Therefore, independent Finland had an urgent need to expand its
export markets. New trading partners were found in western and central
Europe in the early 1920s. It was a successful decade, above all, for me-
chanical woodworking. Particularly sawmills captured new markets.
Again, this development was held back by the onset of the Great Depres-
sion at the turn of the 1930s. Now, if not before, the Finns realized that
sawn goods were very sensitive to economic fluctuations, whereas the
economically well-organized paper sector, based on modern technology,
was able to expand into new markets even during the depression (Seppälä
1990, pp. 34–35).
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The 20th century was a time of intense change for Finland, and the
speed of the change was exceptional. For example, the decline from 50
to 15 percent of the people working in agriculture and forestry, which
lasted approximately 80 years in Norway (1882–1963) and 50 years in
Sweden (1909–1959), took only 26 years in Finland (1946–1972). As
tertiary production simultaneously grew rapidly, Finland moved almost
directly from an agricultural to a post-industrial society and passed through
the phase of industrial society quite briefly (Karisto et al. 1999, pp. 63–
65). Between 1900 and 1995, the proportion of the working population
engaged in primary production (mostly agriculture and forestry) was re-
duced from 68 percent to only 6 percent. During the same period, sec-
ondary production rose from 11 to 27 percent and tertiary production
from 13 to 65 percent of the working population. The rest, 8 and 2 per-
cent, had miscellaneous jobs or their occupation was unknown (Myrskylä
1999, p. 108; SYF 2000, p. 83). Such an enormous change in the eco-
nomic structure in less than a hundred years illustrates most of the fac-
tors that explain the development of living conditions in Finland.
The relative share of primary production decreased from 60 percent in
1860 to 40 percent at the beginning of the World War I. In the end of the
1920s, tertiary production grew to be the biggest sector, measured by
output, for the first time. This was partly due to the public sector’s ex-
pansion, required by the functions of an independent state. By World
War II, the exports of the forest industry reached approximately 85 per-
cent of the total value of exports. However, primary production remained
the biggest employment sector until the 1950s (Hjerppe 1989, pp. 64–
65; Seppälä 1990, p. 35), partly due to the agrarian reforms that had
started in the 1920s and continued until the post-war resettlement of the
Karelian people and the settlement of war veterans.
The number of farms began to decline in the 1960s, reaching 80,000
by 2000. The scale of the change is illustrated by the fact that the number
of milk suppliers fell by over 90% in those forty years. However, larger
farms with better herds were more productive, and the volume of milk
sent to dairies hardly changed at all. In the 1990s alone, the number of
farms exceeding 100 hectares (250 acres) rose some 240 percent.
Employment in secondary and tertiary production did not outnumber
that in primary production until the end of the 1950s (Figure 2.1). How-
ever, due to higher productivity, the output of these modern sectors grew
more rapidly: Secondary production exceeded primary production at the
end of the 1940s, while tertiary production had exceeded it since before
the Great Depression. Finland turned into an industrial society around
1960. At that stage, the structure of industry also became more diversi-
fied as the value of metal production and engineering reached that of
forest products. Since the end of the 1960s, the value of metals and engi-
neering output has increased approximately twice as fast as forest prod-
ucts although the value of its exports did not exceed forest product ex-
ports until the mid-1980s.
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Figure 2.1
Distribution of employment from 1860 to 2000 (in %).
Sources: Hjerppe 1989 and Statistics Finland.
In Finland’s case, industrialization involved a significant rise in pro-
ductivity. Finland was in the position to utilize the catch-up effect: it
could adapt innovations developed by the forerunners of industrialism.
The preconditions for catching-up included expanding the number of edu-
cated people, increasing foreign connections, bolstering the country’s
own central administration, and so on. The change is clearly visible in a
comparison of gross national income per capita in 16 industrialized coun-
tries from 1870 to 1970. This comparison includes the major west Euro-
pean countries and Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States. In
1870, Finland was in fifteenth place before Japan. In 1970 Finland ranked
12th. Its productivity had risen the third fastest after Sweden and Japan,
to 14.3 times that of 1870. At the same time, the productivity of the top-
ranking country of 1870, Australia, had risen to 3.9 times that of 1870.
As long as Finland remained a typically industrial society in the 1960s
and the 1970s, the productivity growth rate of the business sector was
rather similar to that of the other European OECD countries. After the
1970s, Finland’s development has been remarkable: both overall pro-
ductivity and labor productivity have risen twice as fast as the European
average.3 In some comparisons Finland’s productivity has even ranked
as the world’s highest. At least two essential factors can be mentioned as
reasons for this new development: differences in the way economic struc-
tures have changed and in the pace of technical development. Finland
3 Between 1970 and 1995 the average annual growth in overall productivity in Finland
was 2.5 percent and in the OECD 0.8 percent, labor productivity in Finland rose 3.5
percent annually, in the OECD 1.8 percent (Vartia and Ylä-Anttila 1996, p. 221).
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experienced great changes in the last two decades of the 20th century:
The economy shifted to a post-industrial stage and the society to late
modernism.
The structural changes of industry are usually caused by three differ-
ent factors: demand, international trade, and technological changes. The
favorable development of Finland’s industry in the past couple of de-
cades is primarily due to changing technology. These changes are largely
the result of intensifying research input, which has been growing faster
in Finland than in any other OECD country. Overall productivity has
developed rapidly and the share of high technology products in Finland’s
exports has more than doubled. But, starting from the end of the 1980s,
the structural changes of demand and international trade have also been
remarkable and Finland’s industry has been able to respond. Although
forest products are no longer the leading branch of industry, they have
had a positive effect on industrial development in cooperation with other
industries. Finland has become the leading paper machine manufacturer
with a 30 percent market share, as well as a producer of electronics and
automation connected with process control. Other new sectors born from
the needs of the forest products sectors have been harvesters and har-
vester technology, and some fields of chemistry. (Cf. Vartia and Ylä-Anttila
1996, pp. 54, 77-83, 222.)
Table 2.1
Employed persons by occupation in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1995 (in %)
Occupation 1970     1980     1990     1995
Technical, natural, and
social science; humanistic
and artistic work 11.9 16.8 24.0 28.1
Administrative, managerial,
and clerical work 9.9 13.7 14.5 14.8
Services 10.5 11.7 12.3 12.5
Military work  0.4 0.4  0.5  0.6
Sales work 8.2  7.3 8.5 8.5
Transport and
communications 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.1
Industrial and other
production work 31.2 28.3 22.6 21.3
Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing 20.1 12.5 9.0 6.6
Unknown 0.3 2.1 2.1 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistics Finland, Population Statistics.
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The shift to a post-industrial economy and a late modern society is
also reflected in the development of the major sources of employment.
(Table 2.1). In the areas of employment that show the expansion of infor-
mation technology and the growth of education input, the change between
1970–1995 was dramatic: employment more than doubled. On the other
hand, employment in primary production dropped by two-thirds and em-
ployment in secondary production by one-half (Riihinen 1998, p. 38). [OR]
The Arduous Road to Welfare State
Economic development is a necessary precondition for improvements in
social conditions, which, in turn, influence economic development. In
the global context, all welfare states are rich countries, but the historical
roots of welfare states can be found in their poor past. Finland was just
like the rest of Europe, a poor country before the period of industrialization.
In the Middle Ages and during early modern times, the standard of
living fluctuated in Europe because of three factors: weather, wars, and
epidemic diseases. The so-called small Ice Age from the beginning of
the 17th century to the mid-nineteenth century made agriculture diffi-
cult, especially in the north. As a part of Sweden, Finland also had to
contribute to several wars Sweden fought both on Finnish soil and abroad.
After the mid-eighteenth century, it seems that fluctuations of mortality
were caused by epidemic diseases, primarily smallpox and measles, rather
than by periods of famine (Jutikkala 1988, pp. 128–129). The Swedish
era was economically unfavorable for Finland: the Finns could not have
a strong enough influence on the decisions that were made in Stockholm.
Autonomy, with its important domestic institutions, opened up new
opportunities. However, towards the end of that era, the Russian govern-
ment slowed down the pace of reforms, particularly those of a social
kind, because it apparently feared that they would set an example for the
rest of its vast empire. In this social sense, the Swedish connection would
have been an obviously better choice for Finland than autonomy as a part
of Russia.
Industrialization brought capital and even wealth to the country in the
latter half of the 19th century, but the wealth was unevenly distributed.
Many employees, whom liberalism set free of their traditional ties, ended
up in an even worse situation as they lost their communal security. Fur-
thermore, in those days the ordinary people still lived at the mercy of
uncertain weather conditions, with an undeveloped transport system. Food
supplies from abroad were very limited, if not impossible, during winter.
The 1860s was especially difficult. The severe weather conditions reached
their worst in 1867 and the consequences were fatal. Infant mortality
rose to 392 deaths per 1000 children in 1868, the highest in the known
history of the country (Turpeinen 1987, p. 377).
Poor relief, built largely after the English model and partly conveyed
by Sweden, formed the basis of social policy. It became the municipali-
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ties’ duty to look after the disabled, elderly, orphans, and other persons
who could not manage on their own or with their families, but this care
was insufficient, and the state began to assume more responsibility for
those who needed care. Universal suffrage accelerated the process
(Haatanen 1992, pp. 90–102). Although the measures were modest in
terms of social policy, the stronger role of the state from the end of the
19th century should be noted. It marked the beginning of a vast line of
development.
What was also typical of Finland’s early industrialization period was
the polarization of social differences in rural areas. A peasant proletariat
had been forming from the 18th century onwards, consisting mainly of
tenant farmers and farm workers. Social inequalities were polarized be-
cause land prices went up when the value of forest increased and because
the population grew rapidly. The number of those who did not own land
grew and the position of tenant farmers worsened. Around 1880, rural ar-
eas were overpopulated by an estimated 40 or 50 percent, and the majority
of the surplus population were farm workers and tenant farmers (Kaukiainen
1981, p. 55). To some extent this problem was eased by the expansion of
towns and by emigration, above all to the United States. By 1914, 2.2 times
more people were employed in Finnish industry than in 1890, which also
relieved the problem (Vattula 1983, pp. 133–134). However, a sufficient so-
lution, the agrarian reform, was achieved only after agrarian problems had
helped spark the civil war of 1918.
Looking at Finland’s 20th century, it is possible to distinguish some
fundamental factors that have had a great influence on the living condi-
tions of the people. In addition to industrialization and the change in
economic structure in general with subsequent urbanization, the most
influential factors include independence, democracy, and the building of
a welfare state.
The long-term rise in productivity, described above, enabled Finland
to grow wealthier and to achieve social reforms despite the wars and
other setbacks. The catch-up effect also applied to social reforms: it was
possible to observe the advantages gained by others, as well as the mis-
takes they had made. The news of the birth of a new kind of social policy
in Bismarck’s Germany quickly reached Finland. The German system of
workers’ insurance, constructed in fear of socialism in the 1880s, in-
cluded sickness insurance, accident insurance and disability and retire-
ment insurance. Finland soon adapted accident insurance (1895) but for
various reasons the other reforms were put on hold. In the meantime, the
German model of workers’ insurance was, especially in Scandinavia,
molded into a national insurance, the ideals of which included universal-
ism: social security covering all citizens. This ideal later played a major
part in the building process of the Finnish welfare state.
The new parliament made it possible to transmit the preferences of
citizens to decisionmakers in the form of constant reform initiatives.
However, the reforms progressed slowly because of Russian obstruc-
tion. After 1917, the pace of reforms picked up. Already in the summer
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of 1917, before Finland’s independence and also before any other Euro-
pean country, parliament passed a bill on an eight-hour working day. It
had long been one of the demands of the international labor movement.
The law was approved by Lev Trotsky’s Russian government. This tem-
porary government also approved prohibition, which had been repeat-
edly agreed upon by the Finnish Parliament, and it approved changing
the organization of the Senate so that a department of social affairs was
founded. In independent Finland the name of the department was changed
to the ministry of social affairs. In 1918 came a significant law on the
redemption of leased land, which made independent farmers of almost
100,000 tenant farmers. The reforms greatly strengthened the legitimacy
of the young republic.
Between the world wars, the agrarian economic structure seemed to
change slowly, although Finland was paradoxically industrializing rela-
tively faster than any other country in Europe. Most people earned their
livelihood in agriculture, but its share of the gross domestic product had
already sunk to less than one-half in the early 1920s. Before World War
II, Finnish values, reflected also in the party structure and the support of
different parties, favored agrarianism characterized by small farms. The
unfavorable climate kept the productivity of agriculture low. Neverthe-
less, in the long run the country grew wealthier quite fast. Because of an
ideological antithesis with the former mother country, now the Soviet
Union, foreign trade was directed almost entirely to the west and south.
Compulsory education in 1921 was one of the early independence
period reforms, but it did not mean any radical change. Already in the
1680s, the Lutheran Church had ordered that the people be taught to read
so that they could familiarize themselves with the Bible. An extensive
network of basic education had been developed starting from the 1860s but,
despite its autonomy, Finland had not been able to implement compulsory
education during Russian rule. Nevertheless, the Finnish people were al-
ready among the most literate in the world at the end of the 19th century.
The most far-reaching social policy reform in the period between the
world wars was the National Pensions Scheme in 1937. The enactment
of general disability and retirement insurance was an important revision
of the social contract and a step towards a welfare state.4 At the begin-
ning of the 1920s labor legislation was also reformed and in 1924 the
first bill on collective labor agreements was passed. Due to the opposi-
tion of employers, it did not become effective until 1944. At that time the
employers had accepted an equal agreement system in principle, because
the majority of the field army in the Winter War consisted of workers
who were determined to defend their country and society.
The hard war years of 1939–1944 and the cessions of territory which
followed, together with the settling of evacuees and the war reparations,
made the country poorer. But they also forced the nation to reform. The
4 Actually, the original funding system would have been all too slow to offer immedi-
ate protection.
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level of pre-war total production had already been regained by 1946 and
an exceptional growth period began: until the mid-1970s the annual
growth of gross national product was almost 5 percent (Vartia and Ylä-
Anttila 1996, pp. 66–67). At the same time, an intensive period of build-
ing the welfare state was experienced. Economic growth contributed to
the social building process. Besides, Finland had a particular motive in
developing the living conditions of its people. The communist super-
power behind the border tried to influence Finland ideologically, and the
people’s democracies in central Europe set a warning example. Great
care had to be taken of the legitimacy of the political and social system.
Already during the Second World War (1942), an extensive program
of social reforms was introduced in Great Britain. Called the Beveridge
Plan, its aim was described by its planner as a fight against five giants:
want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, by which he meant un-
employment. This program had two goals: raising well-being and up-
holding the legitimacy of the society, which would be promoted by in-
creasing the equality of the citizens. The plan, the economic views of
which were based on the theoretical thinking of John Maynard Keynes,
included the essential principles of a modern welfare state. William
Beveridge’s description of the aims of his plan influenced European coun-
tries on their way to a welfare state.
Finland’s post-war social policy began in 1945 with the extensive mea-
sures taken to organize the living arrangements of the evacuees and sol-
diers who returned from the war, and to help them acquire land. The
number of the evacuees was approximately 12 percent of Finland’s popu-
lation at that time, which, if scaled up to the population of the United
States in 2000, would have meant resettling some 33 million people.
Another immediate task was to organize the welfare and rehabilitation of
disabled war veterans.5
In the peace treaty, Finland lost 10 percent of its arable land and forest
resources, 12 percent of its total area, 13 percent of its national wealth,
and 20 percent of its railway network. In addition, one-quarter of the
pulp production capacity and one-third of the hydroelectric capacity were
lost (Myllyntaus 1992, p. 46). The war reparations, paid in total by 1952,
added to Finland’s difficulties. At their highest in 1945, they were 61
percent of exports and 6.4 percent of the GDP, but their proportional
share decreased as exports grew and national income increased (Auer
1956, pp. 243–245). Finland’s losses also included its second largest city,
Vyborg. Being a neighbor to the Soviet Union was a heavy burden on
Finland, a small nation struggling to preserve its freedom.
In this situation, the Finns started building their country’s future with
three goals: securing independence and democracy, and providing wel-
fare for the people. The total war, with its comprehensive planning, taught
5 Proportioned to the U.S. population, the 94,000 permanently disabled veterans would
equal 6.7 million.
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the Finns, as so many other peoples, a new way of thinking: the country
could be developed by planning. During the war, Finland had had to rely
on an unprecedentedly large public sector, which rose to 20 percent (ex-
cluding the military), although such an increase in the public sector em-
ployment remained temporary.6 Organizing the welfare and rehabilita-
tion of the disabled veterans was started ahead of the Act on Military
Injuries of 1948, and Finland has received a great deal of international
recognition for its disabled veteran policy. At the same time, the veterans
themselves have taken responsibility for their own wellbeing in an ex-
emplary fashion. (Honkasalo 2000.)
As had been agreed during the Winter War, the law on the collective
labor agreement system was reformed in 1946. In addition, a holiday law
that granted a right to three weeks’ annual leave with pay, was passed.
Because the birth rate was on the rise and large families were hard pressed
under the tough conditions of continued rationing, attention was drawn
to family policy. A law was passed in 1948 on child allowances, and a
year later on maternity benefits. In these laws, the Nordic principle of
universalism was followed: every child under 17 years was entitled to
child allowances and every woman giving birth was entitled to maternity
benefits. Also, it was necessary to expand housing production. Three laws
were passed in 1949: on housing loans and benefits, on promoting hous-
ing production in population centers, and on subsidizing building with
state money. The reforms were an effort to bring some improvement in
the nearly chaotic situation in post-war Finland. Despite the reforms,
social expenditures did not rise very high in retrospect; they amounted to
approximately 8 percent of the gross domestic product in 1950 (Sosiaali-
turvan kehitys Suomessa 1950–1977. 1978, p. 37). But considering the
circumstances of the time, they were a heavy burden.
The war had delayed the development of social security. National Pen-
sion Insurance, which was intended as basic security to all citizens, was
reformed in 1957, and a corresponding system for employees, the Em-
ployees’ Pension Scheme, was created in 1962. National Pension Insur-
ance was based on a flat-rate pension system, the Employees’ Pension
Scheme on earnings-related pensions.
The 1960s was a time of growing radicalism in all democratic states.
In Finland, radicalism furthered the development of social policy since it
included a strong pathos of equality. The rapidly growing economy cre-
ated resources for reforms. During the decade, the Finnish trade union
movement quickly became stronger as social democrats and communists
agreed on cooperation, as social democrats settled their internal differ-
ences, and as unionization gained further popularity among white-collar
workers. One of the major aims of the trade union movement was the
6 The corresponding level of public sector employment was only reached in the middle
of the 1980s, now as the consequence of the developing welfare state. The growth of
the public sector continued until the beginning of the 1990s; in 2000 it amounted to
27.3 percent. (Vartia and Ylä-Anttila 1996, p. 280; SYF 2001, p. 366.)
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development of a welfare state. Employers also adopted rather positive
attitudes to social policy: they realized that improving the know-how,
health, and motivation of the population would increase human capital.
Cooperation between labor market organizations became clearly evi-
dent when the Employees’ Pension Scheme was being prepared and imple-
mented (cf. Suonoja 1992, pp. 441–457). While parliament had the final
word in enacting social policy laws, labor market organizations greatly
contributed to the development of the welfare state and influenced the
content of its laws, beginning from the early 1960s and especially from
the end of that decade. The development that began at that time seemed
to foreshadow a later claim that a welfare state means a working society,
an essential element of which is a fully employed wage earner. There
was much truth in that statement before the 1990s.
The evolving Finnish welfare state had its problems. One of them was
a high incidence of various diseases in the 1960s. Life expectancy at
birth, however, had risen greatly. In 1911–1920 male life expectancy was
43.4 years and female 49.1 years; in 1961–1965 the figures were 65.4 for
men and 72.6 for women (The Yearbook of Population Research in Fin-
land XXXIII. 1996, p. 347). The health care of young children and ex-
pectant mothers was of a high standard, which was shown by low infant
mortality. In this respect, Finland had its place among the elite countries
of the world. The hospital system had been developed especially in the
1950s, with the number of beds being of average European level. How-
ever, there were few doctors per capita and a high mortality rate among
working-age men. These factors and their uneven regional distribution
remained a great problem, and in this regard Finland belonged to the
most problematic countries in Europe (Kuusi 1961, pp. 254–267).
The problems of national public health were taken up with determina-
tion. In 1963, National Sickness Insurance attempted to bring health ser-
vices within the reach of all citizens. At the same time, medical educa-
tion was substantially increased. It was soon noted that the high mortal-
ity of men was connected to circulatory diseases. Extensive follow-up
research on public health showed that Finns needed to change their
lifestyle to reduce these diseases, and Finns have proved to be adept at
this: since the late 1970s, they have changed their diet and the differ-
ences in dietary habits between various socio-economic groups have di-
minished or disappeared.
By 1993, the age-standardized mortality of women from circulatory
diseases had fallen below that of most European countries, and men, too,
had almost reached the average European level. In 2000, women’s life
expectancy at birth was 81.2 and men’s 73.7. The figure for women was
higher and that for men slightly lower than corresponding estimates in
the United States, but life expectancy was shorter in both countries than,
for instance, in Sweden or France (SYF 2001, p. 593).
Obviously, better health is due to many other factors besides health
care; a general improvement in living conditions affects health. A higher
standard of living in Finland is reflected, for example, by the fact that the
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proportion of food in all private consumption was 52.1 percent in 1900,
but only 12.5 percent in 1997. Correspondingly, more was spent for health
care, transport, recreation, leisure time, foreign travel, etc. (Tennilä 1999,
p. 202). The quality of life improved as a result of a number of factors.
From the late 1960s until the late 1980s, employers’ and workers’ or-
ganizations had such a strong influence on social policy reforms that, in
the opinion of some critics, they were dictating parliament’s decisions.
But during those decades Finland realized the characteristic features of
Nordic welfare states that it had lacked previously. They included the
forty-hour working week (1965); five-week annual leave with pay (1978);
the Employment Act, including a reform of unemployment benefits
(1972); the Public Health Act, which also transformed the traditional
hospital organization into municipal health centers (1972); day care for
all children (1973); an increase of the private sector’s full employment
pension from 40 to 60 per cent (1975); the Social Welfare Act (1984);
and several revisions of the National Pensions Act.
The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 put strain on the economies of nearly
all industrialized countries and, for example, in Great Britain led to criti-
cism of the welfare state and a reduction in social expenditures. In Fin-
land, the ensuing slump lasted for a shorter time than elsewhere, partly
because Finland benefited from its position as a neighbor of the Soviet
Union. Bilateral trade agreements guaranteed Finland advantageous ac-
cess to Soviet oil, which was bartered for Finnish goods.
Housing conditions improved particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. In
1960, the average number of rooms in Finnish homes was 2.7, reaching
3.7 in 1997. At the same time, the average number of people living in a
household decreased from 3.3 to 2.3, which added to more spacious liv-
ing.7 In addition, amenities in Finnish homes increased significantly
(Juntto 1999, p. 135). Nowadays many Finns have both a bath and a
sauna; in recent decades it has been quite common to build a sauna in
modern urban flats and the estimated total number of saunas in Finland
exceeds 2 million (equivalent to over 100 million in the U.S.). Besides,
800,000 Finns, about 16 percent of the population, live in households
that also have a holiday home.8
Finland is one of the most equal societies in the world, but differences
remain in housing conditions. Finnish social policy has long struggled to
solve the problem. Numerous factors, such as high building and housing
costs due to the northern climate and the high price of land – surprising
in a country large in area – have hindered progress. On the other hand,
Finland has few homeless people, who in many other countries pose a typi-
cal problem. Further, the safety of living is raised by an internationally high
7 Between 1960 and 2000, the number of rooms per person increased from 0.76 to 1.68,
and floor space per person from 14.3 to 35.3 square meters (SYF 2001, p. 229).
8 The number of summer cottages in Finland rose from 252,000 in 1980 to 451,000 in
2000 (SYF 2001, p. 232).
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proportion of owner-occupied homes, which totaled 59 percent of all homes
in 1999, having been as high as 67 percent in 1990 (SYF 2001, p. 231).
The quality of housing depends, above all, on domestic conditions and
policies. The causes of another significant social problem, unemploy-
ment, include both domestic structural factors and international factors.
In the early 1900s, Finland’s unemployment was mainly caused inter-
nally, relating to the economic structure of the country. In the country-
side, unemployment arose largely from issues connected to land owner-
ship and in the cities from seasonal variations in construction. However,
the Great Depression of the 1930s already showed how easily interna-
tional economic conditions affect employment. In the winter of 1931–
1932, the number of unemployed people rose to over 90,000 (Figure 2.2),
which led to extensive arrangements for relief work.
Figure 2.2
Unemployment from 1900 to 2001
Source: Statistics Finland.
Finland recovered from the depression quite fast, and the war and the
following years were a time of labor shortage rather than unemployment.
But from the 1960s, structural factors as well as international economic
conditions increased unemployment. Since Finland at the time adopted
the ideology of a welfare state, which included the aim of full employ-
ment, unemployment began to be seen as a serious defect. At first, struc-
tural factors played an important role. Although large numbers of Finn-
ish women had traditionally participated in the labor market, growth in
the number of working women during the 1960s and 1970s came unex-
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pectedly. In 1960, 24 percent of family mothers were wage earners or
entrepreneurs; by 1975, the percentage had risen to 60 (Suominen 1979,
p. 51). In addition, the large post-war generations were reaching working
age. Hence, the supply of labor leapt to a new level, and this resulted in a
wave of migration from the countryside to population centers, consider-
able emigration to Sweden, and increased unemployment.
As a result of the international oil crisis, the number of unemployed
rose to 180,000 in 1977, corresponding to over 7 percent of the labor
force. The fact that president Urho Kekkonen wanted to appoint an emer-
gency government because of unemployment and that a goal was set to
lower it again by the 1980s to 2.5 percent – virtually full employment –
reflects the values of the welfare state and the fears that political legiti-
macy would be shaken. The political decisions were typical of a welfare
state: the Unemployment Pension Scheme (1981) meant, before long,
that wage earners unfit for work could retire; the Unemployment Secu-
rity Act (1985) improved earnings-related security for the jobless; the
Employment Act (1987) obliged the state and municipalities to create
employment for the young and the long-term unemployed (cf. Keinänen
1999, pp. 74–76).
However, the welfare state was confronted with quite another type of
challenge when Finnish society entered the deep recession of the early
1990s. This subject will be dealt with in Chapter 15. At that stage, the
ability of the welfare state to take care of the wellbeing of its citizens was
put to a severe test.
The proportion of social expenditure in the gross domestic product
has often been used as a criterion in determining which countries can be
regarded as welfare states. In Finland, the percentage was below the EU
average until the turn of the 1990s, but jumped significantly above it
after the exceptional rise in unemployment and the exceptional fall in the
GDP in the early 1990s. In 1999, social expenditures were estimated at
26.5 percent of the GDP, which was again below the average in EU coun-
tries (Sosiaaliturvan suunta 1999–2000. 1999, p. 13). Economic growth,
which has been faster in Finland than in most EU countries since 1994,
reduced unemployment, and cuts in social expenditures also contributed
to the falling proportion of social spending.
Thanks to its advanced social welfare legislation and high level of
wellbeing, Finland has fulfilled the criteria of a welfare state since the
mid-1970s at the latest, but did not reach the level of the Nordic welfare
states before the 1980s. And the proportion of public sector employees
among all employed persons exceeded 15 percent at that time (Vartia
and Ylä-Anttila 1996, p. 280).
The diversity of the welfare state is also evident in the wide scope of
legislation dealing with social policy. It has been concluded in jurispru-
dence that the legal paradigm of the constitutional state has been replaced,
to a large extent, by that of the welfare state. This reflects a deep change
in values and even in culture. The fundamental rights of the citizens have
been enlarged to include their social rights in order to safeguard their
Pathways to Modern Finland
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:3850
51
ability to utilize their rights to freedom and participation in practice.
(Habermas 1996; see also Ilveskivi 2000, pp. 12–19.) The Finnish con-
stitution was influenced by the new emphasis when a comprehensive list
of economic, social, and educational rights was added to its text in 1995
(see Chapter 14).
This book attempts to provide answers to various questions about the
welfare state:
– What is the structure of the Finnish welfare state;
– how does Finland implement the goals of the welfare state, including
the citizens’ economic, social, and educational rights;
– what impact did these rights have on Finland’s efforts to build an
information society;
– what are the roles of civil society in the welfare state;
– how did the welfare state survive the consequences of the serious
recession of early 1990s; and
– can the welfare state maintain its goals under the pressure of global-
ization and increased international competition?[OR]
Foreign Relations
The 20th century brought about unforeseen technical advances and so-
cial progress, but it has also been called Europe’s “century of violence.”
Autonomy within the Russian empire protected Finland from World War
I, but two decades later the country was deeply involved in World War II.
Because of its geographic location between east and west, the relations
with Finland’s eastern neighbor have been of constant importance and
the collapses of the Russian regime in 1917 and in 1991 greatly shaped
Finland’s international environment. During the latter half of the 20th
century Finland was able to remain outside the Soviet power block, main-
taining its democratic form of government, strengthening its economy,
and cultivating its lively cultural and trade contacts around the world.
Finland declared its independence in December 1917 and adopted the
new constitution in July 1919, but some additional time went by before
the international borders were clearly established. Peace with Soviet
Russia was concluded in October 1920. On the west side, Sweden made
attempts, both at the Versailles peace conference and in the League of
Nations, to gain possession of the Åland islands. This issue was referred
in 1920 to the League of Nations, which in 1921 pronounced Åland his-
torically, geographically, and economically a part of Finland.
In March 1922, Finland’s foreign minister negotiated a defense pact
with three other newly independent neighbors of Soviet Russia (Poland,
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Latvia, and Estonia), but parliament refused to ratify the treaty. Rather,
Finland believed in the collective security provided by the League of
Nations. This belief was severely shaken in 1935, when the League did
not react to Germany’s unilateral abrogation of the Versailles Peace Treaty.
From the middle of the 1930s, Finland’s principal foreign policy orienta-
tion was one of neutrality, leaning toward Scandinavian cooperation.
However, the USSR and Germany agreed in August 1939 in a secret
protocol to their Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that Finland would belong to
the Soviet sphere of influence, a pact which the Finns did not let the
USSR consummate.
In the postwar world the main characteristic of the international envi-
ronment was global balance between two military alliances. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was started in 1949 and the War-
saw Pact followed suit in 1955. Europe was effectively divided by an
“iron curtain,” and Finland needed to adjust its foreign policy to the cold
war situation. Like Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, Finland
stood outside both military alliances. Among the five neutrals, Finland
was the only direct neighbor of the USSR9 and very carefully guarded its
relations with Moscow. For example, in order to safeguard its neutrality
Finland declined Marshall aid for postwar reconstruction. Instead, Fin-
land built bilateral economic ties with the western countries and, for ex-
ample, reconstruction of Finnish export industries received support from
the United States.
Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assis-
tance with the USSR in April 1948. The FCMA treaty was drafted by the
Finns and differed from the ones the USSR had with the Warsaw Pact
countries. It also was, implicitly at least, interpreted differently by the
two countries. The Finnish interpretation stressed not only friendly rela-
tions between the two countries but also the neutrality clause in the pre-
amble.10 On the other side, only Nikita Khrushchev, in 1956, referred to
Finland’s neutrality in public, until Mikhail Gorbachev finally acknowl-
edged it in October 1989 when speaking in Finland.
In 1955 Finland joined the Nordic Council and also became one of the
16 new member states of the United Nations. Thus a good opportunity
was obtained to demonstrate the policy of neutrality, and Finland’s links
to its primary foreign reference group, the Nordic countries, were illus-
trated. Finland was striving for a clear recognition of its neutral position.
The cautious opening up to West European integration coincided with
that goal.
The elements of the Finnish model of becoming involved in integra-
tion policy included the protection of essential trade interests and guar-
anteeing its exporters the same benefits as were offered by competitors
9 Finland’s land border with Russia is 1269 km (789 miles), with Norway 716 km
(445 mi), and with Sweden 536 km (333 mi).
10 Regarding mutual assistance, Finland agreed to enter negotiations about the need
for Soviet assistance in the event that Finland was attacked by Germany or its allies.
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(e.g., Sweden), and doing both of these in harmony with the policy of
neutrality. Finland sought separated solutions, avoided political commit-
ments, guaranteed to the USSR same trading benefits as to its Western
partners and, in addition, sought to protect the adjustment of domestic
industries. A convenient solution was Finland’s association with the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1961.
During the 1960s Finland’s foreign policy became more active. Since
1963 an oft-repeated Finnish suggestion was that a nuclear-free zone
should be created in northern Europe. In 1969 Finland proposed the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and, at the same
time, was a member of the UN Security Council and hosted the SALT
negotiations. In 1975 Finland hosted the signing of the “Helsinki Ac-
cords,” the Final Act of the CSCE, by thirty-five heads of government.
During the 1980s, relationships between the European Community and
EFTA grew closer, and Finland participated actively in the integration
process, but within the limits set by its neutrality policy.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the unification of Germany
in October 1990, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991
represented dramatic changes in the international environment. Finland was
involved in launching in January 1994 the European Economic Area, con-
sisting of EFTA and the European Community, but Austria and Sweden had
quite early taken one step further, applying for membership of the European
Community. In March 1992 Finland, in turn, applied for membership of
what has been called since November 1993 the European Union. The acces-
sion treaty was signed in June 1994, and after an affirmative referendum on
October 16, 1994, Finland joined the EU from January 1, 1995, together
with Austria and Sweden. In 1999 it was Finland’s turn to assume responsi-
bility for the rotating presidency of the EU.
Because the EU-countries had long been Finland’s most important trad-
ing partners, Finnish industries had already become integrated in the eco-
nomic system of Western Europe. For several decades the policy of neu-
trality had been the most important element in Finland’s foreign policy.
Now Finland declared that it fully accepted the goals and policies of the
EU, including the formation of a common foreign and security policy.
The presidency of the European Council also engaged Finland in 1999 in
the formulation of common EU policies and, in addition, made Finland
the EU’s spokesman in various international contexts. However, in its
own security policy Finland wanted to remain nonaligned. Its doctrine
has been national security based on nonalignment and a credible national
defense.
Although Finland has bound itself to the policies of the EU, it also
pursues numerous other foreign interests, both bilaterally and through
international organizations. It continues its small-state approach to for-
eign policy with a certain regional emphasis. In the EU Finland has em-
phasized the importance of the northern dimension – the Baltic Sea area
and the Barents Sea area – and common policies toward Russia, as well
as stressing the role and the position of small member states in the struc-
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tural reforms of the European Union. Finland continues to take an active
part in the United Nations and to provide troops for peace-keeping op-
erations. Other forums of active participation include the Nordic Coun-
cil, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Coun-
cil of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, and the World Trade Organization.
In a small symposium, arranged in Porvoo in May 1999 to commemo-
rate the 190th anniversary of the Finnish diet’s meeting in that coastal
town, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen drew broad conclusions about
Finland’s current international role: “Today Finland is living through the
most significant period in its international relations... In joining the Eu-
ropean Union and the economic and monetary union EMU, we have fully
utilized the opportunities open for us... In the 15-member union, empha-
sizing relations with Russia before the next enlargement, our influence is
at the maximum.” He also referred to President Martti Ahtisaari’s par-
ticipation in international attempts to settle the crisis in Kosovo: “Fin-
land has made a clear choice in favor of the type of policy which tries to
participate closely in the structures of European and international coop-
eration.” [PP]
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3  Finnish Nationalism
People are very stubborn there [in Finland]. We were smart not to annex
Finland. It would have been a festering wound.
Former Soviet foreign minister Vyachesvlav Molotov twenty years after
World War II. Chuev 1993, p. 10
Sisu, Sauna, and Sibelius.
Finnishness defined by Finnish Americans
As was outlined in Chapter 2, Finnish identity grew strong enough to
prompt Finland to declare its national independence in 1917. From then
on, strong and healthy nationalism remained a necessary prerequisite for
survival next to an imperialistic superpower. When Finland’s existence
was at stake during the Winter War of 1939–1940, nationalism was one
of the factors uniting the people and healing the wounds of the civil war
of 1918. And the success story continued: After the war Finland remained
the one European neighbor of the USSR that preserved its independence
and democratic social system. At the beginning of the 21st century nation-
alism may face a new problem: how to retain national identity as a member
of the European Union and pressured by ever stronger globalization?
Early Nationalism
Nationalism contains explicit or implicit ideas about a nation’s charac-
teristics as compared with those of other nations or ethnic communities.
It is based on slowly changing values that touch people’s identity. Na-
tionalist attitudes vary greatly: they may appear as a slight attachment to
one’s own nation and as tolerant attitudes towards foreign peoples and
races. But they may also include strict views according to which one’s
own people are seen as superior to other peoples, which are classified as
inferior, even in terms of their race.
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Doctrines such as Fascism and National Socialism, or the sad events
in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda and Burundi, are examples of ex-
ceptions in which such an ideology and ethnic feelings are taken to ex-
tremes. But even strong nationalism can be sane: recall the Greek tri-
umph against the Persians at Marathon, Joan of Arc’s heroism against
the English, and the Finnish Winter War 1939–1940.
State and nation-state are concepts that help to understand national-
ism, even though it can exist irrespective of these institutions. A com-
mon language and shared history are among nationalism’s underlying
factors. Various narratives about the past describe how a nation or an
ethnic group perceives its own essence or what concepts it identifies with.
As a reflection of common values, nationalism helps a nation create and
strengthen the legitimacy of its societal and political system.
The rise of nationalism has been linked to modernism by most schol-
ars who have analyzed this topic. It appears to have proceeded in two
ways. Earlier, it was born within strong, already existing states: a strong
state created opportunities for the rise of nationalism, even regardless of
the ethnic composition of the nation. In the more slowly developing con-
ditions of Eastern Europe, contrary development was experienced: the
rise of nationalism gave birth to a state. In developing conditions, a pre-
requisite for nationalism is an ethnic community that people want to iden-
tify with. The desire for national attachment results, above all, from a
common culture, the central elements of which are a common language
and religion and shared historical experiences.
However, neither model suits adequately the rise of Finnish national-
ism, because in Finland the rise of nationalism was neither state-cen-
tered nor ethnic-centered. When nationalism rose in Finland, the country
was an autonomous part of the Russian empire having its own distinct
administrative system. The culture belonged to Western Europe but the
language was sharply different from West European languages and even
more from Russian. The religions were different in Finland and Russia.
The economy was less developed in Finland than in most of Western
Europe, but overdeveloped if compared with the rest of the Russian em-
pire. Finland had a non-feudal class structure, and although the upper
class spoke Swedish, it soon began to feel Finnish. By the end of the 19th
century Finnish had already achieved a strong or even a predominant
position in central institutions.
Due to the exceptional growth of civil society (see Chapter 2), the
patriotic message of numerous associations was accepted by a large ma-
jority of the people. Finland’s independence in 1917 was an awaited con-
sequence of the developments of its civil society, nationalism, and de-
mocracy. But the Finns did not agree about the kind of societal system
that ought to be chosen: capitalist or socialist. The civil war broke out in
January 1918, causing tragic human destinies and bitterness, and tearing
the nation in two. There is reason to ask how nationalism was able to
survive and develop in a young state whose population was ideologically
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divided. How was it possible that, two decades later, a field army comprised
mainly of workers and small farmers defended its fatherland as one – in a
manner that reflected strong nationalism?
Chapter 2 presented some of the factors that strengthened Finnish iden-
tity and nationalism particularly in the late 19th century: a common lan-
guage spoken by the great majority of the population, very dissimilar to
other European languages (except for Estonian and to some extent Hun-
garian); the northern area that Finns had inhabited for thousands of years;
old popular culture, manifested in many ways in spiritual and material
folklore; the rise of modern culture, and pride in Finnish achievements.
The Fennomans’ dream came true when the Finnish language made its
breakthrough in the most significant social institutions by the beginning
of the 20th century, which created a link between the elite and the mass
of the people.
Several institutions, for example religion, united the Finns with West-
ern Europe. Lutheranism originated in Germany, and when Finland be-
came independent, the Evangelical Lutheran Church was a state church
comprising virtually the entire population. As a continuing cultural un-
dercurrent, religion unified the people and created a strong tradition.
During the Second World War, the Finns said that they were fighting for
their “home, religion, and fatherland.”
Another strong institution, local self-government, was of Nordic ori-
gin and became firmly established in Finland during the period of Swed-
ish rule. It derives from ancient Germanic and Nordic conceptions: from
the right and duty of free men to engage in decision-making on public
issues. Even though this right came into conflict with state absolutism at
some stage in history, it remained and grew stronger again after the mid-
nineteenth century, drawing its inspiration from romanticism, liberalism,
and Hegelian thought. This happened because these ideologies preferred
the local government system (Soikkanen 1966). Strong local government
has become an essential part of the Finnish political culture, and in its
background one finds a cultural ethos that is in harmony with a more
common feature of Finnish culture, namely, the Nordic tradition that
emphasizes the importance of liberty and self-determination. Such cul-
tural uniformity fortifies both legitimacy and positive attitudes towards
own country.
At the level of national government, the parliamentary reform of 1906
was bound to raise hopes among the majority of the population of ever-
stronger democratic development and of a state that people could iden-
tify with. The radical Marxist wing of Finland’s old labor movement,
which rejected rather than favored nationalism, grew stronger when the
parliamentary reform showed few immediate results. On the other hand,
the Social Democratic Party had strong leaders who stressed the impor-
tance of national ends. These leaders, together with non-socialist politi-
cians, smoothed the path of independent Finland toward a legitimate so-
ciety in which healthy nationalism strengthened. The historical conflict
between international Communism and Finnish nationalism presents a
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series of interesting events that were also linked to the extreme national-
ist tendencies troubling the young republic.
 Nationalism vs. Communism
The revolutionary Marxist tradition and the bitterness caused by the civil
war prepared the ground for Communism. The Finnish Communist Party
was founded back in August 1918, not in Finland but in Moscow, where
Red émigrés together with Russian communists began to make plans on
a new revolution in Finland.
In Finland, communist action was centered in the Socialist Workers’
Party, founded in May 1920. Soon the Moscow-based group of the Finn-
ish Communist Party took up the reins in the Workers’ Party, and in the
parliamentary elections of 1922 the Communists received fifteen per-
cent of the vote. In 1923, the Socialist Workers’ Party was outlawed,
which ever tightened the grip of Moscow-stationed communists on the
party’s former members. During the civil war, both Whites and Reds had
exercised terror, which was typical of such a war, but it can be said that
the terror campaign was continued by the victorious side after the war.
This added to the bitterness and helped the communists. There were,
however, supporters of moderate nationalism in Finland, the most vis-
ible of whom was K.J. Ståhlberg, the first president of the republic (1919–
1925). By 1930, the ban on communist activities was tightened, and the
underground operations of the Finnish Communist Party were increas-
ingly run from Moscow (cf. Rentola 1998, pp. 159–163). But the struggle
between moderate nationalism and the extreme movements was still to
continue for decades.
The Communists sought to weaken Finnish nationalism and the will
of the people to defend their country. Nevertheless, in the early 1920s
sentiments of nationalism rose among young people with an academic
background. Their concern was mainly to support the national and cul-
tural interests of the Finnish population across the border in the Soviet
Union. The Academic Karelia Society also aimed at strengthening the
patriotic defensive will and nationalist thinking in Finland. Some mem-
bers, however, carried their ideologies to such extremes that many re-
signed from the Society. The society was dissolved by the 1944 armi-
stice treaty. Although extreme rightist in a sense, the Society, nevertheless,
aimed at national integration and at repairing the division caused by the civil
war. It particularly stressed that the duty of the educated class was to remain
close to the common people (cf. Soikkanen 1975; Alapuro 1973.)
Another extreme rightist organization, the Lapua Movement, was
formed in 1929. Unlike the Academic Karelia Society, it was a popular
movement. One of its aims was to eliminate Communism in Finnish so-
ciety, but it failed to see the crucial difference between moderate and
revolutionary leftists. The movement organized a peasants’ march, which
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was joined by some 12,000 rural people from Ostrobothnia, to pressure
parliament to pass anti-communist laws. Such laws were actually rati-
fied in 1930. In 1932, the unrest provoked by the Lapua Movement cul-
minated in a coup attempt, which the conservative president P.E.
Svinhufvud was able to avert with a determined radio speech. When the
movement began to direct its operations against normal Finnish
parliamentarism, it was suppressed in 1934.
The early 1930s thus saw the suppression of two extreme movements
that both were preparing revolution: a leftist one which put both democ-
racy and independence in danger, and a rightist one which endangered
democracy. Restraining these movements benefited the development of
healthy nationalism and social life. In 1932 a party was founded, named
the Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL), whose objectives were essen-
tially similar to those of the Lapua Movement, but it did not receive
much support; in 1939 it had only eight seats in Parliament.
The relationship of Finnish communists to their own nationality and
nationalism turned out to be interesting in a tragic way. The Finnish Reds
who had fled to Soviet Russia in 1918 faced a terrible fate there: they
were suspected and persecuted and a large proportion of them, especially
from the mid-1930s onwards, became the victims of expanding purges.
This was also to be the fate of large numbers of Finnish immigrants who
had moved to East Karelia from the Midwestern United States and Canada.
News of the atrocities of Stalin’s regime quickly reached Finland, and
those who managed to escape brought concrete evidence of what was
happening across the border. The mentality of Finnish communists was
twofold from the outset, and the persecution of minority nationalities
strengthened their awareness of being Finnish both in Finland and the
Soviet Union. Some communists were ready even to take up arms to
defend the Republic of Finland. Hence, Stalin on his part had been pre-
paring the ground for “the miracle of the Winter War” (Rentola 1998,
pp. 163–169). Insofar as there existed Communism in Finland, it for-
mally opposed nationalism and put emphasis on the international soli-
darity of the working class.
How attached citizens are to their fatherland, is after all largely depen-
dent on the conditions provided by society. It was important for the new
republic that independence in 1917 be followed by significant social re-
forms. An eight-hour working day was already achieved and soon other
reforms that met a long-time need were passed (see Chapter 2). The in-
terwar period also gave faith in favorable economic development. Inde-
pendent Finland had itself become a concrete object of identification.
The Soviet offensive in 1939 and the Winter War that followed made
Finnish national solidarity stronger. It was reinforced by the territorial
cessions after the war in 1940, which were regarded as a heavy loss and
an act of infamy. The Finns were now prepared for a new war. The fate of
the Baltic States lay before their eyes: the Soviet Union had invaded
them in the summer of 1940 and annexed them to the Soviet empire, had
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begun to terrorize their population and had transformed their societal
system into Communism. The Soviet Union’s intention was to extend
the invasion to Finland, as its Foreign Minister Molotov informed Adolf
Hitler in November 1940 (Jakobson 1998, p. 35). Such factors and a
desire to recover lost areas motivated Finland to join a new war against
the Soviet Union in 1941.
At first, the Continuation War proved a success but in the end was a
difficult experience. Finland managed to keep its independence and po-
litical and societal system, but again lost Finnish Karelia and various
other territories. War-weariness, the territorial cessions, the war indem-
nities, resettlement of evacuees, and some bitterness were shown in the
people’s political reactions. In the general elections in March 1945, the
Finnish People’s Democratic League, an umbrella organization set up by
the Communists, won forty-nine seats in parliament (see Table 8.1). At
that stage, many countries adopted a skeptical attitude toward the future of
independent Finland and to the nation’s likelihood of retaining its identity.
However, most Finns did not lose their sense of nationalism as a result
of the war. There were large projects ahead that had to be coped with: the
settlement of evacuees, the acquisition of land and housing for war vet-
erans, reconstruction, the welfare of disabled war veterans and the pay-
ment of war indemnities. In retrospect, Finland managed to handle the
projects very well. While many other countries were left with a great
refugee problem, this was not the case in Finland, although twelve per-
cent of the population had to be evacuated and resettled. Finland’s suc-
cess in dealing with the problems caused by the war was the key factor in
maintaining the legitimacy of its political system and true nationalism.
Nevertheless, Communism sought ways to increase its influence in
Finland. The Soviet Union was transforming countries of Eastern Eu-
rope into people’s democracies and, with the aim of doing the same in
Finland, tried to gain more ideological influence in Finland. In a letter in
February 1948 to President Paasikivi, Stalin stressed that Finland was
the only European neighbor of the Soviet Union that did not have a de-
fense agreement against a recurrence of German aggression. The letter
was dated the same day that the communist attempt to seize power in
Czechoslovakia culminated. It was a determined Finnish aim to elimi-
nate the possibility of Soviet troops entering the country on some ex-
cuse. The FCMA treaty that Finland concluded with the Soviet Union
was mainly based on a Finnish draft, designed with this aim in mind
(Jakobson 1998, pp. 55–59; see Chapter 2, page 51).
The destinies of Finland and Czechoslovakia took different paths in a
way that also describes the differences in the nationalism of these two
countries. The Winter War had taught Stalin to respect the Finnish people’s
will for independence. This was apparent in the Tehran conference in
December 1943. In a discussion about Finland, Stalin told Roosevelt and
Churchill that “any nation that fought with such courage for its indepen-
dence deserved consideration.” The Czechs and the Slovaks, on the other
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hand, regarded Russians as their friends and allies, the one people that
had expressed the will to help Czechoslovakia in 1939. Most Finns saw
the USSR as Finland’s archenemy. Soviet leaders had a clear view of
how hardheaded the Finns were, as revealed by Molotov in an interview
twenty years later (see the citation above). The communists also held a
stronger position in Czechoslovakia than in Finland in 1948. Despite this, a
Communist coup was feared in Finland; the army and the police were on the
alert (op. cit., pp. 47, 61–62). The will for independence and Finnish nation-
alism did not fail when the survival of the country was on a razor’s edge.
In addition to parliament and political parties, the trade union move-
ment, standing in a decisive position because of its economic and other
potentially disruptive effects, was the main battlefield for ideological dis-
sension. Although less than a quarter of the population supported the
communists, many unions were led by them. If they had reached a ma-
jority in the movement as a whole, the situation would have become criti-
cal. Much of the credit for their lack of success goes to the “companions-
in-arms socialists”, Social Democrats whose ideology was in line with
the majority, emphasized both their own war experience and national
aims. In terms of Finland’s future, the battles between the Communists
and the Social Democrats, fought on every level from the local branches
to the central organization of the trade union movement, were just as
important as governmental negotiations with the neighboring great power.
The Social Democrats, as representatives of moderate nationalism,
emerged the winners from these battles.
The aim of upholding good relations with the great power was quickly
established as the main line of Finland’s foreign policy, but at the same
time the importance of national cohesion was stressed. This policy, known
as the “Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line,” ritually assured the Soviet Union of
Finland’s desire for peace and the will for good neighborly relations, at
the same time as realistically pursuing national aims. Finland tried to
emphasize its neutrality in every chance it got, whereas the Soviet Union
preferred to remain silent about it.
Although Finnish nationalism was no longer as evident as in the 1920s
or the 1930s, it lived on strongly among both the Right and the moderate
Left. The Communist Party split in two already in the 1960s, into a “blue
and white” wing with national ideas and a “Stalinist” minority closer to
the Soviet Union. The former, the majority in the party, was an example
of Eurocommunism. It seems that since the 1960s the Finnish Commu-
nist Party was never a real domestic or foreign political threat because of
its moderate and even nationalist majority.
The development of the welfare state since the 1960s fortified not only
citizens’ welfare but also the legitimacy of the state. The strong if quiet
nationalism of the Finns is perhaps best illustrated by their patriotic de-
fensive will, which, in international comparison, has remained at a very
high level ever since the Second World War. Those who talked about
“Finlandization” in the 1960s–1980s disregarded the most significant
matter: the will to defend the country had not diminished over the years.
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According to surveys, in Finland it remained on a clearly higher level
than in any of the countries in which “Finlandization” was discussed.
This fact was also well known among the Russians.
Nationalism and Globalization
Currently nationalism exists in a totally different cultural environment
than in its early days during the rise of modernism. The era described as
postmodern involves an enormous change in the pace of communication
and information, an epoch-making increase in international cooperation
and relations, shortening of distances, expansion of trade of goods, of
services and, above all, of capital transfers, growing tourism, and so on.
These changes as a whole have been called globalization, which refers to
a global strengthening of the dependencies between individuals and
peoples and especially the effects of a market economy transcending all
national borders. It will be discussed more in Chapter 16 below.
Some are of the opinion that globalization evens out the differences
between cultures or at least creates multicultural communities. Cultural
diversity incorporated in postmodernism points to the kind of new identities
in which both national and various international cultural elements are com-
bined. However, there are differences in the emphases of the concepts of
postmodernism and globalization: the former stresses diversity and hetero-
geneity, whereas the latter emphasizes the power of economics.
Governmental relations and ties between nations also change their
nature in the course of time. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland
immediately repudiated the FCMA treaty. The existence of the Soviet
Union had been, however, a factor strengthening the Finns’ will to em-
phasize their own identity: they had to ensure that the communist aim of
ideological infiltration would not affect their will for independence. In
January 1995, three years after the collapse of the USSR, Finland, to-
gether with Austria and Sweden, joined the European Union with a large
majority of the people in support of it. The main motives were economic
or related to national security.
As a member of the European Union Finland is committed to follow-
ing a number of governmental and administrational norms that are aimed
at harmonizing policies with the other EU countries. Another great change
that has led to internationalization is linked to multinational enterprises.
At the dawn of the new millennium, Nokia was the largest company in
Europe measured by market capitalization and a Finnish-led paper manu-
facturer was the biggest in its sector in the world, another paper company
placing third. The international operations of these companies and many
smaller ones mean that despite their Finnish management more and more
of their business is done outside Finland. In a small country like Finland,
the position of companies is very different from that in the United States,
for example, and their actions are more likely to affect the preconditions
of economic and national balance.
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Are national cultures and, above all, the cultures of small nations –
and with them national identities – changing their nature as globalization
and postmodernism proceed and, in Finland’s case, as the unification of
Europe proceeds? A country rather isolated for so long has, thanks to its
developed information technology, come into closer contact with univer-
sal cultural trends in a very short period of time. How will Finnish iden-
tity and nationalism live through this?
A unique foundation of the Finnish culture is the language. Finnish is,
however, under the growing influence of foreign languages, now espe-
cially English, and when it comes to other aspects of cultural change, it
has been claimed that Finland is the most Americanized country in Eu-
rope. Despite all this, purist measures, like those taken in France to pre-
serve the country’s own language from Americanisms, have not been
regarded as necessary. Many are concerned about the survival of regional
dialects and the changes in intonation and accent typical of Finnish,
changes that are mostly due to the role of the media in everyday life. The
development of languages has been a continuing process: their structure
and vocabulary change as a result of cultural influence. Despite the
changes, the disappearance of the distinctive Finnish language, which is
so characteristic of the Finnish identity, is nowhere in sight.
Finns have many other distinctive cultural features as part of their
identity, such as persistence and the characteristic described by the Finn-
ish word “sisu” (perseverance, guts). The subcultures that are reflected
in a strong identification with local tradition and units of local govern-
ment form an important part of the foundation of Finnish national iden-
tity. Finns are also proud of the old tradition of personal freedom. Equal-
ity, exceptional by international standards, is present in today’s Finland
in many ways: in the division of labor between the sexes, in the great
number of women actively taking part in working life and social life in
general, and in perhaps the most even distribution of wealth in the world.
One part of the Finnish identity is the memory of the successful defen-
sive battle against the communist superpower. Finns have great interest
in books and films about the wars that Finland fought; thus the battles for
national survival continue to create cultural narratives for generations to
come.
The material culture reflects some very old features. For example, the
sauna illustrates the affection a Finn of the 21st century has for a very
old institution. Another reflection from old times is the Finns’ love for
summerhouses and for a rural environment. Summerhouses are usually
built by lakes and, if possible, far away from permanent residential ar-
eas. When a Finn, after a sauna bath, speaks on his mobile phone on the
porch of his summer house, the act combines age-old and ultra-modern
national phenomena: there are more saunas and mobile phones per capita
in Finland than anywhere else in the world.
The Finnish culture is quite homogenous, for some concepts and val-
ues seem to be commonly held. In a comparison of characteristics of the
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Dutch, Americans, Hungarians and Finns, Finnishness was found to be
defined by such concepts as homeland, state, independence, work, school,
and national defense, and that especially the first three concepts were
emphasized. The unity of the Finnish culture seems to enable a good
mutual conceptual understanding. Low-context cultures such as this are
typical of the Nordic countries: they are well integrated and homogenous,
which is largely based on ethnic, linguistic and religious unity (Anttila 1993,
pp. 114–115).
Some researchers have claimed that Finns are inclined to suffer from
inferiority complexes. Surveys paint a different picture. In 1984, when
the claim “It is good luck and a privilege to be a Finn” was presented to
Finnish respondents, the percentage of those who agreed was 90. In 1992,
during deep economic recession, the percentage dropped to 61 but rose
back to 68 in 1994 and to 79 in 2000 (EVA 2001a, p. 74). The strong
patriotic defensive will illustrates an affection for one’s own country and
Finnishness. At the turn of 1994–1995, Finnish people were asked to list
characteristics typical of Finnish mentality; the most typical characteris-
tic given was the will to defend the country (82%). Patriotism and na-
tional spirit were in second place (81%) in this “self-portrait,” the fol-
lowing being industriousness and entrepreneurship, a feeling of insecu-
rity and concern for the future, sisu (perseverance), respect for work and
honesty, and xenophobia. The feeling of being part of Western Europe and
the EU (32%) and an interest in other countries and cultures (29%) were
ranked among the last characteristics on the list (EVA 1995, pp. 32–33).
Behind the above-mentioned beliefs lie values and narratives typical
of the Finnish culture that reflect nationalism. The feeling of insecurity
was probably partly due to the point of time when the interviews were
carried out: the deep economic depression was only just easing. The es-
timated level of xenophobia is rather surprising since there have been no
racist movements in Finland, let alone racist parties. The few and scat-
tered racist phenomena, above all skinheads, have met determined oppo-
sition. On the other hand, many refugees that have entered Finland have
reported Finnish prejudices towards foreigners. Whether the negative side
of Finnish nationalism is reflected in these prejudices remains unclear.
The change towards an information society will probably lay the way
into the Finnish society for forces of globalization and will affect the
Finnish consciousness. Empirical studies indicate a change. In 1994, clear
tendencies were observed: the younger the generation, the more educa-
tion and the more exposure to news from abroad there was and, conse-
quently, the more international the people felt themselves to be. In addi-
tion, occupation was of significance: those working in agriculture con-
sidered themselves the least international. The results concerning people’s
spatial identification were hardly surprising. Those who identified the
strongest with their own locality were the most opposed to EU member-
ship and the most parochial, while an identification with international or
global phenomena was connected to international and cosmopolitan atti-
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tudes. Those who regarded the country as their foremost object of identi-
fication were placed midway between weak and strong internationalism.
(Sänkiaho and Säynässalo 1994, pp. 114–116.)
The Eurobarometer survey on the EU countries in autumn 2000 showed
that the share of those who are very attached to their own village or town
was the smallest in Finland (30 percent) and the greatest in Greece (75
percent), whereas the Finns were more attached to their own country
than the average. Citizens in eight countries, particularly Luxembourg,
Sweden, and Spain, were more attached to Europe than the Finns were.
When asked about European and national identity, the majority of Finns
identified with only their own nation, while no more than 5 percent felt
more European than Finnish (Eurobarometer 54, pp. 13, B13–16).
The years ahead will show how Finnish nationalism changes as young
generations who have always known an environment of internationality
define their own relationship with Finnishness under the influence of
globalization and the European Union. Renouncing one of the national
symbols, Finland’s own monetary unit, in 2002 may have an impact on
this. The Finns are attached to their own country, but in the future the
objects of identification will be increasingly international. Because in-
formation technology is especially multinational, the rapid growth of jobs
in this sector will probably have influence on the way the Finnish people
feel and think.
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4  Social Structure and Bases of Conflict
We have had fierce internal disagreements and conflicts, but it has been
possible to bridge them and to unite our nation.
Mauno Koivisto in December 2000
Issues and cleavages derivative from those of industrial society… re-
main the more important source of policy division and electoral choice.
Seymour Martin Lipset 2001, p. 7
The Population
During the 20th century the world experienced an unforeseen population
explosion: from 2 billion people in 1930 to 6 billion in 2000, and the
growth is predicted to continue. The European countries, however, face
an opposite trend. They will no longer have natural growth. For a while
their growth may still be sustained by longer life expectancies, but soon
it will be based only on the number of immigrants they receive from
outside countries.
In Finland the population has grown for almost three centuries, but a
projected downturn is now approaching. In the early eighteenth century
tragic events reduced numbers to only 390,000. It then reached 1 million
in 1812, which equaled 13 percent of the population of the United States
in those days. But the 3 million Finns of 1920 and the 4 million of 1950
equaled only 3 percent, and the 5 million Finns in 1991 equaled 2 per-
cent of the U.S. population. In 1995–1999, Finland’s average annual popu-
lation growth was only 0.3 percent, low compared with the entire world’s
1.6 percent but rather typical of Europe.11
Consequently, at the turn of the 21st century the age structure of the
population is a major social problem in Finland, as it is in other Euro-
11 Finland’s total fertility rate in 1999 was 1.74 (Sweden 1.50, Britain 1.68, France
1.73, and Germany 1.36, but USA 2.06 (in 1997) and India 3.13 (SYF 2001, p. 592).
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pean countries. More children were born in Finland during the six years
between 1945 and 1950 (619,300) than during the ten years 1991-2000
(616,700). In 1960, only 7 percent of Finland’s population was sixty-five
years and older, but in 2000 the corresponding percentage was 15 and
growing fast: 20 percent is predicted in 2015 and 25 percent in 2026.
Longer life expectancies have kept the total population growing, but the
net production rate of 83 percent foreshadows a sharp decline after the
2020s. (See Table 4.1.)
Table 4.1
Population and projected population by age from 1950 to 2030 (in %)
Year Population* Age groups Total
0–14 15–34 35–64 65–
1950 4,029,800 30.0 30.1 33.2  6.7 100.0
1960 4,446,200 30.1 28.9 33.6 7.4 100.0
1970 4,598,300 24.4 32.2 34.1 9.3 100.0
1980 4,787,800 20.2 34.2 33.6 12.0 100.0
1990 4,998,500 19.3 28.1 39.1 13.5 100.0
2000 5,181,100 18.1 25.3 41.6 15.0 100.0
2010 5,267,900 16.2 25.0 41.5 17.4 100.0
2020 5,317,400 15.7 23.3 38.1 22.9 100.0
2030 5,290,600 15.2 21.9  36.6 26.3 100.0
* Actual from 1950 to 2000, projected from 2010 to 2030.
Source: SYF 1961, p. 28; 1962, p. 28; 1972, p. 41; 1981, p. 39; 1992, p. 70; and
2001, pp. 76, 121.
Some tension has already developed between Finland’s active and re-
tired people, but so far the retirees have not been a strong interest group
politically. Although they are active voters and have formed several pen-
sioners’ organizations, and the party register contains two pensioners’
parties, the political parties of the aged have not gained any weight and
their organizations have not exerted effective political pressure. Rela-
tively speaking, retired persons even lost some of their benefits during
the 1990s, such as their monthly pension payments from the Social In-
surance Institution in case they are covered by another pension. The press-
ing political problem is, how and to what extent does the reduced active
population protect or intend to protect the interests of the increasingly
numerous elderly.
Twice during Finland’s rapid population growth there was consider-
able emigration, which eroded the number of inhabitants of the “old coun-
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try.” The first such wave peaked more than a century ago, the other one
mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. Emigration to America in the late 19th
and early 20th century involved about 350,000 persons, quite a large num-
ber from a small country, although relatively less than from many other
European countries, such as the Scandinavian countries and, particularly,
Ireland. The second big wave was the post-war emigration of Finns to
Sweden, which peaked in 1951, in 1965, and, most strongly, in 1969–
1970.12
During the 1980s Finns returning from Sweden were already compen-
sating for emigration from Finland. In other respects, Finland has re-
ceived fewer immigrants than most other European countries. In public
discourse there has also been some tendency to confuse two different
groups of foreigners: the immigrants with the refugees and asylum seek-
ers. Out of Finland’s total population of 5,181,000 in 2000, only 136,000
(2.6 percent) were born in a foreign country and 91,000 (1.8 percent)
were foreign citizens. Such numbers seem very small when compared
with other European countries. Yet the number of foreign-born persons
had actually doubled and the number of foreign citizens had more than
tripled since 1990 (SYF 2001, pp. 104, 110).
The numbers and treatment of foreigners, both the immigrants and the
refugees, have become salient political issues in Finland. However, nega-
tive mass attitudes are not prevalent, nor have they led to populist politi-
cal movements with xenophobic leanings that could be compared with
the Freedom Party of Austria, the Progressive Party of Norway, and so
on. Very few Finns would go as far as to approve “skinhead” actions
against foreigners, and in 1998 only one out of six Finns thought that “if
unemployment grows, some foreigners should be sent back.” Such an
opinion had been held more widely five years earlier, during the highest
mass unemployment. (Jaakkola 2000, pp. 138, 147.)
Finland is a thinly populated country and its population is unevenly
distributed. The region called Uusimaa covers 6366 square kilometers
and had 1,305,000 inhabitants in 2000, whereas North Karelia of 17,782
sq. km. had 172,000 inhabitants and Lapland of 93,003 sq. km. had
192,000 inhabitants (SYF 2001, pp. 78–96). These figures translate to
two hundred, ten, and just two inhabitants per square kilometer of land
area. The country’s central regions have grown due to net movement in
two directions: to the south, and to urban centers. Industrialization cata-
lyzed unusually vigorous internal migration during the 1960s, and so did
the post-industrial economic development of the 1990s.13 Differences
between the regions will be discussed more below (pages 77–81).
12 According to one estimate, some 700,000 to 800,000 Finns moved to Sweden be-
tween 1945 and 1994, and about 250,000 of them remained there permanently
(Reinans 1996, p. 66).
13 In the 1990s about five percent of the population moved annually from one munici-
pality to another. In 2000 their number was 260,000, including 119,000 persons who
moved from one province to another (SYF 2001, pp. 145–146).
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Language
The arrival of the Finns in their country belongs to distant pre-history,
undocumented in writing. The earliest remains of any human activity in
Finland since the Ice Age are from approximately 7200 B.C., and ar-
cheological finds indicate various phases of the Stone Age, each with
a different culture and some characterized by contacts with distant peoples.
Then the Bronze Age lasted one millennium from about 1500 B.C. on-
ward. The pre-Roman Iron Age, in turn, began two millenniums ago.
That was long believed to be the time when the forebears of today’s
Finns settled in Finland. More recently, this so-called resettlement theory
has been replaced by the continuity theory: what really arrived in Fin-
land 2000 years ago was a new culture that was adopted by the people
who already lived there. Possibly the proto-Finns inhabited both sides of
the Gulf of Finland as early as the beginning of the Bronze Age and,
thus, before Finnish and Estonian developed into two different languages.
(Jutikkala with Pirinen 1996, pp. 11–24.)
It is easy to detect the close linguistic relationship of Finnish and Es-
tonian. The Finno-Ugric group also includes Hungarian, although the
Finnish and Hungarian are not as close to each other as are, for example,
English and Russian within the Indo-European language group. Among
the several other peoples of the Finno-Ugric language group are the Sami
(who have been commonly known as Lapps), the indigenous minority of
northern Europe. They have their recognized territorial base. About 5000
Sami live in Finland (40,000 in Norway, 17,000 in Sweden, and 2000 in
Russia).
Table 4.2
Population by language from 1900 to 2000
Year Finnish Swedish Sami Other Total
1900 2,353,000 349,700 1,300 8,500 2,712,500
1920 2,754,200 341,000 1,600 8,300 3,105,100
1940 3,027,500 354,000 2,300 11,800 3,695,600
1960 4,108,300 330,500 1,300 6,100  4,446,200
1980  4,476,800 300,500 1,300 9,100  4,787,800
1990 4,675,200 296,700 1,700 24,800  4,998,500
2000  4,788,500 291,700 1,700 99,200* 5,181,100
* “Other” in 2000 included Russian 28,200; Estonian 10,200; English 6900; Somali
6500; Arabic 4900; Vietnamese 3600; German 3300, Albanian 3300, Kurdish 3100,
Chinese 2900, etc.
Source: SYF 2001, pp. 112, 114.
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In 1973 a government decree demarcated almost 10 percent of Finland’s
territory as the Sami’s homeland region and, in fact, their traditional re-
indeer husbandry extends even further south of the designated region
(Sillanpää 1994, pp. 3, 183). Only 1700 persons in Finland now speak
Sami (Lappish) as their mother tongue (see Table 4.2), but literature and
schooling are available in it and Sami Radio is operated by the Finnish
Broadcasting Company.
In 1995 a constitutional amendment guaranteed the cultural autonomy
of the Finnish Sami14 and a new law was passed that reorganized Finland’s
Sami Assembly. This 21-member body is elected for a term of four years
and represents the four major areas of Sami population, and the govern-
ment is required to consult the assembly in matters relating to the Sami.
In October 1999, there was some controversy regarding the exact defini-
tion of Sami origin: 5000 persons had the right to vote in the election, but
a court refused the petition of another 800 persons, who could not prove
Sami origin at least three generations back in their family tree.
In the future the courts may face a bigger problem. A study published
in 2000 came to the conclusion that some Sami can claim legal rights of
ownership to much of the forestland in Lapland, which the state has owned
since the end of the 19th century (Korpijaakko-Labba 2000). Such a con-
clusion may raise the possibility of complicated court proceedings in
which the state and Sami groups fight over large land areas.
Ordinarily the few Sami people do not receive much national atten-
tion in Finnish politics, whereas relations between the Finnish speakers
and the Swedish-speaking minority are of a completely different magni-
tude. This language cleavage has even dominated the political scene in
the past. Finland’s Swedish speakers are numerous enough to explain the
country’s official bilingualism, which was stipulated by the Constitution
Act of 1919 and repeated in the Constitution of 1999 as follows: “The
national languages of Finland are Finnish and Swedish. The right of ev-
eryone to use his or her own language, either Finnish or Swedish, before
courts of law and other authorities, and to receive official documents in
that language, shall be guaranteed by an Act.” (Constitution of 1999,
Section 17).
The Swedish language became established in Finland during the six
centuries of shared history, but the proportion of Swedish-speakers ap-
parently never reached as high as 20 percent of the population (McRae
1997, p. 86). The Finns who spoke Swedish were largely concentrated
along the western and southern coastal regions. At the turn of the 20th
century, 350,000 Finns or 13 percent of the population spoke Swedish as
14 The amendment also concerned other minorities: “The Sami, as an indigenous people,
as well as the Roma and other groups, have the right to maintain and develop their
own language and culture. Provisions on the right of the Sami to use the Sami lan-
guage in their dealings with the authorities are laid down by an Act. The rights of
persons using sign language and of persons in need of interpretation or translation aid
owing to disability shall be guaranteed by an Act.” (Constitution of 1999, Section 17).
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their native language. The following one hundred years reduced their
absolute number by only 58,000, but the growth of the total population
lowered their proportion to less than 6 percent (see Table 4.2).
After the separation in 1809, Swedish remained the official language
of Finland’s administration, courts, and higher education, until the Lan-
guage Ordinance of 1863 declared Finnish “to be on a footing of com-
plete equality with Swedish in all matters that directly concern the Finn-
ish-speaking part of the population.” Actually it took longer than was
intended, until 1902, before the system of equality between Finnish and
Swedish was implemented. In public life and in the economy of the coun-
try, Swedish long continued to be relatively more significant than plain
numbers would indicate.
During the 1870s, the position of these two domestic languages also
caused the country’s first political cleavage. Two estates of the Diet (no-
bility and burgesses) were controlled by the Swedish party, and two (clergy
and peasantry) by the Finnish parties. Universal suffrage, which was
granted in 1906, motivated Swedish-speaking politicians to organize the
Swedish People’s Party, a mass membership party with the ability to reach
out to the enlarged electorate. Linguistic strife was very salient in Finland’s
politics during the half century from the late 1880s to the late 1930s.
However, as mentioned above, the basic settlement was written in the
Constitution Act of 1919. It also emphasized equal principles in meeting
the cultural and economic needs of the two language groups. The consti-
tutional provisions were supplemented by detailed legislation in 1922
(amended in 1935, 1962, and 1975). The language legislation sought to
accommodate two conflicting aims, namely, the need of the individual
citizen to use his or her own language in dealings with the authorities,
and the practical problems caused by the regional concentration of Swed-
ish-speakers, which left most of the country almost entirely Finnish speak-
ing (Jansson 1985, pp. 78–83).
Thus, the Language Act implements Finland’s principle of bilingual-
ism on the level of municipal administration so as to let most municipali-
ties function in Finnish only. Unilingual municipalities can contain
a minority that is smaller than 8 percent (a bilingual municipality be-
comes unilingual if its minority declines below 6 percent). If the minor-
ity in a unilingual municipality grows larger than 8 percent, or if the
minority consists of at least 3000 persons, local administration becomes
bilingual.
The language that municipalities use in their administration is deter-
mined for ten-year periods on the basis of the latest census results. Table
4.3 summarizes how the language situation has grouped the municipali-
ties since the 1950s. Fewer than 50 municipalities have been required, at
any given time, to conduct their local administration in two languages,
while the number of unilingual Swedish municipalities has gradually
declined. From 1993 to 2002, they have numbered only 21. Of those, 16
are in the province of Åland and 5 on the west coast.
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Table 4.3
Official language of Finland’s municipalities from 1953 to 2002
1953–1962 1963–1972 1973–1982 1983–1992 1993–2002
Finnish 458 457 407 396 391
Bilingual, Finnish majority 12 13 18 21 21
Bilingual, Swedish majority 32 34 25 20 22
Swedish 47  44 31 24 21
Total* 549 548 481 461 455
* The numbers concern the beginning of the ten-year period; they may have changed
during subsequent years, primarily as the result of mergers of municipalities.
Source: SYF 1953, p. 26; 1963, p. 46; 1973, p. 11; 1983, p. 12;  1994, p. 78.
The language conflict between Finnish and Swedish speaking Finns is
one of the social tensions that were mollified by the war experience.
Also, it became easier to cater to the special interests of the linguistic
minority when the language of the majority had reached an unquestioned
dominance in public life. Nowadays a large majority (75 percent) of the
Finns support treating the Swedish language equally as the country’s sec-
ond national language, and almost all the Swedish speakers in the coun-
try (96 percent) identify with the Finnish people (Allardt 1997, pp. 26,
30). Nevertheless, over 40 percent of the Finns also think that there still
remains at least some conflict between the two language groups (see
Table 4.5 below).
Actually, opinion surveys have recorded disparities in how the Finn-
ish speakers and Swedish speakers have felt about each other, or about
various other groups in Finland and abroad. When sympathy scores were
used in 1983 to compare people’s feelings toward selected ethnolinguistic
groups, both the Finnish and the Swedish speakers placed their own lan-
guage group at the very top and they shared warm feelings toward the
Sami and the Norwegians, whereas Swedish-speaking Finns were more
sympathetic toward Finland’s (but not Sweden’s) Finnish speakers than
were Finnish-speaking Finns toward Swedish speakers, whether in Fin-
land or in Sweden (McRae 1997, p. 156).
Finland’s Swedish-speakers developed their own network of volun-
tary associations very early on, active in different cultural fields, as well
as in economic activities, sports, and recreation. During the 1990s some
of them were integrated with the larger Finnish-speaking associations,
for example, the Swedish-speaking cooperatives with the Pellervo Move-
ment. There is also an umbrella body that attempts to link general Swed-
ish interests in politics, culture, and the economy. Called Svenska Finlands
Folkting, it was established in May 1919. It has functioned on a more
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regular basis since 1941 and was restructured in 1977 to an assembly of
75 members, who represent different regions and different political par-
ties in proportion to the votes cast for Swedish-speaking candidates in
municipal elections. It can be seen “as a pragmatic substitute for the au-
tonomous Swedish-speaking province that was dreamed of by a few
visionary leaders but never achieved” (McRae 1997, p. 217).
There is also some pressure from a small but vocal ultra-Finnish move-
ment, which has compared the rights of the Swedish minority in Finland
with the position of the Finnish minority in Sweden. It has advocated
either reduced minority rights in Finland or thorough improvements for
Finnish speakers in the neighboring country. The most current language
debate, however, concerns primary education. The issue is known as “com-
pulsory Swedish,” in other words the required teaching of Swedish as
the second new language (if not already chosen as the first one).
In his comparison of three multilingual societies, Kenneth McRae
pointed out the low level of linguistic conflict in Switzerland, but he also
emphasized the fact that neither in Finland nor in Belgium has the lin-
guistic conflict ever “degenerated into mass violence but has been fought
politically.” What distinguishes Finland is its linguistic instability, which
is “to a degree unmatched by Switzerland or Belgium or Canada.” (Op.
cit., p. 361.) This refers particularly to the declining proportion of Swed-
ish speakers in Finland, as noted above: the fall of their relative share
from 14.3 percent in 1880 to only 5.6 percent in 2000.
Social Class and the Red-White Cleavage
Next to the language issue Finland’s most pervasive political division,
the conflict between social classes, arose a century ago. It had two ori-
gins. One was the inability of the economy and the legislature to correct
the poor social conditions of the time, and the other was the rapid dis-
semination of radical socialist ideology. The division has many names.
For historic reasons it is called the red-white cleavage, and ideologically
it is known as the left-bourgeois or the socialist-nonsocialist (or social-
ist-bourgeois) division. “Left-right” would not be accurate because of
the strong political center that belongs on the white, or nonsocialist-bour-
geois, side of the dividing line.
The official statistics of the 2000 municipal elections recorded de-
tailed results not only by party but also in the traditional manner by the
socialist-nonsocialist summary: the socialist parties had 33.4 percent and
nonsocialist parties 54.6 percent of the national vote. The former group
included the Social Democratic Party, the Left Alliance, and two small
communist parties, while in the latter group were the Center Party, Con-
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servative Party, Swedish People’s Party, Christian League (now Chris-
tian Democrats) and the True Finns (former Finnish Rural Party). How-
ever, the dichotomy did not suffice, because it left 12 percent of the votes
unaccounted for. There was also a third group, “others,” containing the
Green League, a pensioners’ party, and various small political groups
and independents, unwilling to declare for either the socialist or the
nonsocialist camp. The Greens became the first such political group in
parliament in 1983. The party system will be described in Chapter 8.
In political rhetoric the left side of the party spectrum has been identi-
fied with the working class; the Social Democratic Party and the parties
further to the left have been traditionally called the working-class par-
ties. This had solid empirical grounds in the formative years of the mass
parties and much later as well. In 1966, Robert R. Alford’s “index of
class voting” led to the following simplified picture: the three socialist
parties were supported by 79 percent of blue-collar workers (excluding
the nonpartisans), but by 24 percent of farmers and white-collar groups,
so that the index measure was 79–24 = 55. In cross-national comparisons
it represented a high degree of class voting (Pesonen 1974, p. 294).
However, because changes have occurred in both the objective social
structure and in people’s subjective ideological attachments, the domi-
nance of the class cleavage appears somewhat outdated. Farm laborers
have almost disappeared and other blue-collar workers have declined in
numbers. From 1981 to 2000 the share of unskilled workers dropped
from one-half to one-third, while the percentage of skilled workers (26%)
remained unchanged (Blom and Melin 2002, p. 45). The total population
in 1995 could be divided into the following socio-economic groups:
18.7 percent: blue-collar workers (including .7 percent in agriculture)
  2.9 percent: farmer employers and farmers on own account
  4.7 percent: other employers and self-employed workers
29.1 percent: white-collar workers (including 11.1 percent upper level)
22.2 percent: pensioners
  8.1 percent: students and pupils
14.2 percent: others (SYF 2001, p. 102).
The effect of socioeconomic background on party choice has weakened,
but it still remains significant: 58 percent of the workers and only 24
percent of the white-collar group voted in 1991 for one of the two leftist
parties, and three-quarters of the farmers were loyal to the Center Party.
The Greens, in turn, got relatively more support among students than
from other social groups. (See Table 4.4.)
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Table 4.4
Distribution of votes in 1991 among six social groups (in %)
Parties Workers Farmers White Retired Students Others Total
Collar
Left Alliance 24  – 6 11 4 7 10
Soc.Dem.Party 34 – 18 27 10 25 22
Center Party 21 74 17 28 26 25 25
Rural Party 3 – 6 5 5 6 5
Christ.League 3  – 2 4 7 3 3
Swedish 1 4 8 5 7 5 5
Conservative 5 19 30 14 23 17 19
Greens 5 3 9 1 15 7 7
Others 4 – 3 3 33 4 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(n)                        (186) (53) (314) (155) (77)        (180)       (994)
Source: Adapted from Pesonen, Sänkiaho, and Borg 1993, p. 108.
However, very little remains of people’s subjective class identifica-
tion, which provided the basis for the ideological “class struggle” not so
long ago. According to a study in 1991, only 11 percent of the Finnish
people identified spontaneously with the working class, while 17 percent
identified with the middle class and 16 percent with something else.
A 56-percent majority said that they do not belong to any class (Pesonen
et al. 1993, p. 115). Since then, working-class identification has declined
even further.15 Even so, perceptions of group conflicts in general, or the
class struggle in particular, have not disappeared from people’s thoughts
and discourse.
In 1991, 31 percent of the Finns were of the opinion that there is
a strong conflict between the rich and the poor, and three-quarters thought
the conflict is either “strong” or “rather strong” (in 1972, 85 percent
thought so). Two-thirds thought that employers and employees are in
conflict (in 1972, 73 percent). Table 4.5 summarizes how many perceived
the existence of these and eight other social conflicts. Surprisingly, the
most generally recognized conflict was, in 1991, the new one between
the environmentalists and the industry’s decision makers. Two additional
conflicts appeared strong: the old one between farm producers and con-
sumers, and a more recent one between the politicians and the people.
15 Responses to a structured (non-spontaneous) survey question have shown that the
percentage choosing working class declined from 26 to 17 percent between 1984
and 2001. Those choosing middle class increased from 40 to 54 percent, while 34
and 28 percent chose “no class” (EVA 2001a, p. 22).
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A factor analysis extracted three general factors out of the ten social
conflicts listed in the survey, but the three factors explain only 33 percent
of the total variance.16 Indeed the strongest perceived conflict emerged
as the “class conflict” (defined by blue-collar vs. white-collar workers,
employers vs. employees, the rich vs. the poor, and socialists vs. bour-
geoisie). The second general conflict can be given the more diffuse label
“new conflicts” (the unemployed vs. employed, men vs. women, and
politicians vs. the people). The third factor is the “nature-conflict” (envi-
ronmentalists vs. the industry’s decision-makers).
Table 4.5
Perceived existence of group conflicts in 1991 (% saying “strong” or “rather strong”),
and factor loadings (varimax-rotation)
The Conflicts Conflict Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
exists “Class” “New” “Na-
  ture”
Blue collar/ White collar 45% .65 .37 –.02
Employers/ Employees 68% .54 .23 .24
The Rich/ The Poor 74% .46 .17 .28
Socialists/ Bourgeois 55% .43 .20 .32
Farm Producers/ Consumers 67% .27 .18 .21
Unemployed/ Employed 57% .17 .56 .14
Men/ Women 32% .33 .46 .11
Politicians/ The People 65% .21 .38 .25
Finnish/ Swedish-speakers 44% .25 .31 .28
Environmentalists/Economy 82% .12 .13 .58
Explained variance (cumulative %) 27.2 30.8 33.2
Source: Pesonen et al. 1993, pp. 124, 543.
Of the three conflict dimensions the strongest one, the extended idea
of the class struggle, is also clearly reflected in Finland’s party system on
the level of the mass electorate: the supporters of the Left Alliance tended
to think that this is a strong conflict, and the supporters of the Swedish
People’s Party and the Conservatives felt that it is relatively weak. The
Social Democrats leant toward the strong estimate, and supporters of the
Center Party were closer to the Conservatives. The two other factors also
16 Factor analysis is a statistical technique to see whether a larger number of disparate
objects (ten social conflicts in this case) can be summarized by a smaller number of
variables, which help to discover underlying patterns. Rotation is the position in
which each item loads on as few factors as possible. The higher the “variance” ex-
plained by the factors, the more fully they account for the objects.
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differentiated the party groups to some extent and placed parties in a
different sequence, but they were less party politicized. For example, the
existence of a nature conflict was perceived the strongest by the Greens
and the weakest by Rural Party supporters. (Pesonen et al. 1993, p. 129.)
Regional Differences
Finland’s land area is located between the 60th and the 70th parallel (67
being the arctic circle). Unlike neighboring Sweden, which extends close
to the 55th parallel in the south, Finland does not have any milder and
more fertile areas, reminiscent of north-central Europe. Even so, the geo-
graphic differences and the long distance between northern and southern
Finland offer very different economic opportunities and have caused big
regional differences. In the south the country faces the Gulf of Finland,
part of the Baltic Sea, which provides direct links to central Europe and
the oceans of the world. The country’s economic development has been
guided by proximity to energy, raw materials, and markets.
The dissimilarities of Finland’s regions obviously cause conflicting
interests. Many of these are related to the economy, but additional differ-
ences are more the result of political tradition and differences in people’s
values and attitudes. Active farms are being discontinued while central-
ized services and modern production draw people toward the south and
to a few central cities. There has been some such mobility ever since
industrialization started, and the process accelerated in the 1990s. The
loss of rural population was offset by higher rural birth rates, but now the
situation is becoming critical because birth rates are low and the popula-
tion is aging. Emptying areas are more than a demographic problem. It
has long been possible to identify the vicious circle in which population,
economy, and culture interact (Riihinen 1965). Now Finnish poverty
means most of all poverty in the peripheral countryside. The loss of rural
population has already created a shortage of forestry workers and even
led to worries about national defense.
The map of Finland in Figure 4.1 presents the country’s twenty for-
mally defined regions that also perform certain governmental functions.
They have distinct cultural identities and they vary greatly in area and
the number of residents. As the comparisons in Table 4.6 indicate, their
social situations are not similar: the center fares better than the peripheries.
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Table 4.6
Regions in 2000: Population; population change in 2000; degree of urbanization;
gross value added per capita (in 1999); rate of unemployment; and mean disposable
income of households
Major Ragions* Population Change Urbani- Value Unemp-  Income
and Regions zation added loyment
% % (index) % (FIM)
Whole country 5,181,000 0.2 82 100 10 155,000
Uusimaa 1,395,000 1.1 93 138 6 174,000
11. Uusimaa 1,305,000 1.1 94 142 6
12. East Uusimaa 90,000 0.6 76 83 6
Southern Finland 1,819,000 0.0 83 92 10 149,000
21. Varsinais-Suomi 447,000 0.4 82 101 8
22. Satakunta 237,000 –0.7 81 71 11
23. Kanta-Häme 165,000 0.1 80 78 9
24. Pirkanmaa 447,000 0.6 85 87 10
25. Päijät-Häme 197,000 0.0 85 81 12
26. Kymenlaakso 187,000 –0.6 86 100 12
27. South Karelia 137,000 –0.2 80 92 10
Eastern Finland 681,000 –0.7 70 74 14 135,000
31. South Savo 167,000 –0.8 67 71 14
32. North Savo 252,000 –0.7 73 77 12
33. North Karelia 172,000 –0.5 68 75 15
34. Kainuu 90,000 –1.4 68 69 19
Mid-Finland 704,000 0.2 75 82 11 154,000
41. Central Finland 264,000 0.2 68 85 19
42. South Ostrobothnia 196,000 –0.6 69 70 14
43. Ostrobothnia 173,000 –0.2 83 94 11
44. Central Ostrobothnia 71,000 –0.5 75 75 16
Northern Finland 557,000 0.1 76 85 14 151,000
51. North Ostrobothnia 365,000 0.8 81 87 12
52. Lapland 192,000 –1.3 74 82 18
60. Åland 26,000 0.3 58 136 1 149,000
* Major regions correspond to level 2 of the statistical classification system of the EU.
  Numbering of the regions refers to the map in Figure 4.1.
Source: SYF 2001, pp. 78-98, 100, 310, 373, 400.
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Between 1960 and 2000 Finland’s population increased by 16.5 per-
cent, but Helsinki and two neighboring cities grew by 71 percent. Popu-
lation changes within one year, shown in Table 4.6, illustrate the country’s
regional variation. Uusimaa region in the south grew by 1.1 percent in
2000, while all small eastern regions lost population. Lapland in the north
and Kainuu in north-east lost relatively the most. In addition, Finland’s
declining area includes four regions on the west coast and two regions in
south east.
People have been attracted to the most urbanized areas and the less
urbanized are losing population. The winning region had the most pro-
ductive economy and the lowest unemployment, whereas the added gross
value was much lower in the less urbanized regions. They also suffered
from the worst unemployment. The mean disposable income of house-
holds was fairly close to national average in four major regions, but aver-
age households in Uusimaa earned 12 percent more, and those in Eastern
Finland 13 percent less than national average in 2000. Differences in
disposable income would have been even greater without current income
transfers, which flattened regional differences. Chapter 14 will discuss
the issues of regional support and reallocation of resources.
The magnitude of internal migration is illustrated by the fact that of
the 200 members of parliament (MPs), the two southern election dis-
tricts (Helsinki and Uusimaa) elected 31 MPs in 1948, but 52 MPs in
1999. On the other hand, it is illustrative of regional political differences
that in 1999 the Center Party received only 9 percent of the votes cast in
these two southern districts, but 43 percent in the two most northern dis-
tricts (Oulu and Lapland).
Because most Swedish speakers live near the coasts or in the archi-
pelago, the language issue involves a regional element too. Such a con-
centration of voters benefits the Swedish People’s Party in parliamentary
elections, because it makes the party relatively strong within four elec-
tion districts. On the other hand, the political power of the Swedish speak-
ers as a social group is weakened by regional variations between their
different living areas. They are also connected to the center-periphery
dimension: some Swedish speakers live in the center, i.e. the capital city
area, while others live in economically declining areas, and the Swedish-
speakers are a minority both in the center and in the periphery (Allardt
and Miemois 1982).
Another example of regional variations in people’s political thinking is
evident in differences in opinions concerning the European Union. In the
consultative referendum on Finland’s membership of the EU in October
1994, a 57 percent majority voted yes, but of the 15 election districts,
a majority of voters in the six northern districts opposed it. The affirmative
votes varied from 74 percent in Helsinki and 68 percent in the surrounding
Uusimaa district, to only 44 percent in two districts (Vaasa and Oulu). Both
the region and population density had an independent influence on voting in
all three Nordic EU referenda in 1994, in Norway somewhat more so than in
Finland and Sweden (Ringdahl and Valen 1998, pp. 176–178, 185–188).
Social Structure and Bases of Conflict
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:3880
81
An international aspect was also linked to the regional conflicts when
Finland joined the EU: Finland’s regions were organized for the purpose
of more effective lobbying, and they began to compete for the resources
that are returned to Finland from the EU in what the EU calls “the Eu-
rope of Regions.” In this activity the regions compete less with each
other than with areas that are located far away, mostly in the peripheries
of western Europe.
As mentioned above, the prevailing paradox in Finnish society was
that families in the country’s peripheral and poor regions produced the
most offspring and thus took care of the growth of the nation’s popula-
tion. Only slight traces of such a difference still remain. By now the
average household size has become small everywhere. Three-generation
households are rare, children are few, and they leave the nest early.
Other Conflicts and Cleavages
The center-periphery cleavage is not as apparent in Finnish politics and
culture as it is in Norway, and the difference between private and public
employment is not as significant as in Sweden. But both conflicts exist,
and many other differences in the social structure cause permanent or
periodic political conflicts.
Retirees worry about the level of current and future pensions, students
worry about study support and employment prospects, young families
find child care and children’s allowances inadequate, patients and the
aged need more attention, the unemployed focus on their problems, and
feminists find women to be underprivileged. Many such issues became
increasingly salient because of difficulties in public finance and attempts to
balance the budget. This has also caused additional tension between the state
and local self-government. When the state pruned the support it pays to the
municipalities, it did not relax local responsibilities for schools and welfare.
Increasing public attention has been directed to the cleavage that ex-
ists between the society’s included and excluded members, the “ins” and
the “outs”. An important reason for the division’s current significance is
unemployment, which became a difficult problem in the 1990s. Not only
did many people lose their jobs temporarily, but number of permanently
unemployed also began to rise. This is the main reason why unemploy-
ment has led to serious social and political problems: a small segment of
the population is becoming more and more alienated. The situation will
be discussed more in Chapter 17 below.
Not all conflicts are based on structural differences. It is also possible
to speak of non-structural social cleavages, as many ideological cleav-
ages and various disagreements on current issues can be virtually unre-
lated to social structure. Historic examples of nonstructural cleavages
include the conflict between the constitutionalists and the compliers and
subsequent disagreements concerning Finland’s foreign policy, or the 1918
struggle between the monarchists and the republicans. A very important
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ideological cleavage separated the communists and the majority of the
people, also dividing Finland’s political labor movement into commu-
nists and social democrats, as described in Chapter 3 above. For a long
time it split the left side of the party system and the trade unions, and was
a sharp divider of people in places of work.
The Social Democrats returned to normal parliamentary life after the
civil war, but the radical leaders of the red rebellion founded the Finnish
Communist Party. Originally, both leftist orientations aimed at social-
ism, but they were divided by the ideological conflict between democ-
racy and democratic procedures, on the one hand, and “the dictatorship
of the proletariat” through revolution, on the other. In the 1960s the Com-
munist Party modernized its program, declaring that it aimed at a social-
ist revolution through peaceful and democratic means: through parlia-
mentary decisions and changes in ownership. Its Moscow-oriented and
more uncompromising wing could not accept this and organized an in-
ternal opposition to the more moderate wing. Later the end of the Soviet
Union and the financial bankruptcy of the Finnish Communist Party, for
all practical purposes, terminated the entire history of the party. Since
1991 the Left Alliance has continued its tradition, but denies any linkage
to the communist past. In a modified form, traces of the cleavage remain
relevant, especially in some trade unions.
Different approaches to Finland’s foreign policy, and in particular the
relationship toward the Soviet Union, were debated more intensively soon
after the Second World War than in the 1970s, when the official foreign
policy line was quite generally accepted. In the 1990s, Finland’s role in
the integration of Western Europe became a salient issue. As was men-
tioned above, when the basic decision, membership of the European
Union, was decided in a national referendum in October 1994, regional
differences in EU support were considerable. As an EU member Finland
again had conflicting opinions on the next step, the common European
currency and membership of Economic and Monetary Union. The EU
issue continues to separate the antagonistic farmers from the favorable
business world and even from most trade unions. Political parties differ
on it, and some are internally divided about the EU questions (see Table
16.2 on page 269). In some parties, the rank-and-file also tend to dis-
agree with the party leaders.
Other new confrontations have appeared. Protection of the environ-
ment was the strongest conflict in the minds of the people in 1991 (Table
4.5). Actions by small “eco-activist” groups have been directed against
fur farming and the forest industry, and the “Natura 2000” environmen-
tal program of the EU caused much controversy. Increased nuclear en-
ergy has been an issue and in 2001 again returned very much to the fore
as a major political conflict. And the typical Finnish belief in a conflict
between politicians and the people was not at all muted by the slowness
of the government in curing the serious unemployment problem.
Some structural and political differences that are familiar in many other
countries are not salient in Finnish society. Most notably, the people are
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not divided by a religious cleavage, as people in the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, and Italy have been; nor are there currently divisive moral issues,
such as the questions of abortion and death penalty in the United States.
A Case Story: The Nuclear Power Issue
According to Table 4.5, the most commonly perceived group conflict in
Finland in the 1990s was more ideological than structural, as most people
viewed the environmentalists and the industry’s decision-makers as two
groups that strongly opposed each other. This “nature conflict” was not
related to the “class” and the “new” dimensions of social conflict. One
aspect of the perceived nature conflict had to do with nuclear energy,
which first became widely debated by the very end of the 1970s. Even
some political parties were divided on this issue while the environmen-
talist movement focused on it as one of their most central goals.
In Finland the state-owned electric power company IVO started a
nuclear reactor in 1977. The Olkiluoto company that was founded coop-
eratively by privately owned industrial companies, followed suit in 1978.
The second nuclear reactors of both power stations began to operate in
1980, and for a while Finland was relatively the most nuclear-powered
country in the world (to be soon overtaken by France). In 2000, when
nuclear power was the source of 17 percent of the world’s electricity
generation, the percentage was 32.2 in Finland and 76.4 in France. Many
countries were more dependent than Finland on nuclear power.17
The opponents of nuclear energy could draw some arguments from
events abroad. Warnings about potential dangers included the Harris-
burg accident in the USA in 1979 and, worst of all, the catastrophe in
Chernobyl in 1986. Nuclear energy was losing political support. In Aus-
tria, a closely fought referendum blocked the start-up of the country’s
brand new reactor in 1978. After a referendum the Swedish government,
too, decided in 1980 that the country would close all its nuclear power
stations by 2010 (nine active ones and two under construction).18 Both
sides in the debate have made use of an environmental argument: radia-
tion and nuclear waste vs. air pollution and the greenhouse effect.
Thus the opposing groups in the Finnish debate have been, on the one
hand, the energy dependent and energy producing sectors of industry
and, on the other hand, the environmentalist movement. To a very large
extent their fight has involved an attempt to influence public opinion
17 31 countries had nuclear power stations in 2000. The percentage of nuclear power in
electricity generation was 74 in Lithuania, 57 in Belgium, 53 in Slovakia, 47 in
Ukraine, 39 in Sweden, 38 in Switzerland, and 34 in Japan, but 31 in Germany, 22 in
Britain, 20 in the USA, 15 in Russia, and 12 in Canada (SYF 2001, p. 604).
18 In fact, the Swedish government is not acting in accordance with this decision. It
plans to close nuclear reactors in about 2040 or 2050.
Social Structure and Bases of Conflict
Dynamic Finland osa 1 28.10.2002, 12:3883
84
which, in turn, has influenced politicians. The decision to build a fifth
reactor was first postponed to 1982. The “Energy Policy Association”
EVY campaigned against nuclear power but did not gain enough public
support to stop the two power companies from jointly applying in March
1986 for permission to build Finland’s fifth nuclear reactor. If the appli-
cation had been submitted a couple of months earlier (or if the Chernobyl
accident had happened a couple of months later), the license would have
been granted. But now public opinion changed sharply, the anti-nuclear
movement gained strength, and politicians became very hesitant. A new
law on nuclear energy made construction of a nuclear power station sub-
ject to a decision in principle by the government and by parliament.
Eventually, the opinion climate mellowed enough to warrant present-
ing the issue for a decision in parliament. The vote in September 1993
was very exciting and, unexpectedly, went against increased nuclear
power. Thereby the environmentalist movement defeated the forest in-
dustry, the biggest labor unions, and many leading politicians. The power
industry suffered its second big setback. The new government, which
took office in 1995, refused to tackle the issue at all. In the meantime, the
circumstances had changed somewhat after the country’s economic slump:
reasonably priced imported electricity had become easily available, and
doubts were expressed about whether the new economy would consume
as much energy as had been predicted.
When the Greens joined the new five-party coalition government in
1999, they demanded that nuclear power should not be dealt with again
by this government. Elsewhere, Germany decided in 2000 that its 19
reactors would be closed by the end of the 2020s (but the issue was again
debated in 2002). What cannot be doubted is Finland’s need to secure
additional electricity in the future. How to generate it is the salient issue.
Even inside the government, the Green Minister of the Environment and
the Social Democratic Minister of Trade and Industry disagreed sharply
on the nuclear energy issue, while the nuclear industry, having carefully
observed the dynamics of public opinion and the opinions of members of
parliament, made its move in November 2000 and asked for parliament’s
permission to build a new reactor.
The new debate concerned the need to arrange a consultative referen-
dum on this issue. According to a survey of MPs in November 2000,
a majority did not want to refer the issue to a referendum (Helsingin
Sanomat daily, 30 November 2000). Obviously, it was the MPs who were
against additional nuclear power who wanted a consultative referendum,
especially because public opinion was known to be adverse and a large
majority of the people wanted to have a referendum (HS, 18 November
2000). The government was against any referendum but two unsuccess-
ful private member’s motions in parliament requested it. In January 2002
the government voted in favor of permitting the construction of more
nuclear generating capacity and the members of parliament were given a
free hand without party guidance in their vote in May. For both the pro-
ponents and the opponents of more nuclear power the situation was “now
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or never,” because, obviously, whatever parliament decided would no
longer be on the agenda of the new parliament elected in 2003.
The mass media intensively followed what MPs were deciding; the com-
merce committee reported in favor of the license in early May, and on May
24 Parliament decided in principal to allow construction of a fifth nuclear
reactor. The winning margin was larger than expected, 107 to 92. Because
both sides had pressured politicians and public opinion more quietly and
with more factual information than in 1993, open reactions were not very
emotional. Only a Greenpeace vehicle disturbed the forecourt of the parlia-
ment building with its loud siren. The Green League resigned from the five-
party government and some environmentalists maintained that upcoming
bureaucratic, political, economic, and technical problems would offer addi-
tional opportunities to block a new reactor’s operation in 2008 or 2009, as is
now projected.
One might say that the issue was exaggerated, because the permit
merely gives private companies the right in principle to raise the propor-
tion of nuclear power in Finland’s total energy supply from 30 to 35
percent. For the environmentalist movement, however, this was an im-
portant issue of principle. Besides, Finland’s decision may reverse the
anti-nuclear trend that has prevailed in western Europe. The case sug-
gests a few general observations:
– While many conflicting political interests are based on cleavages in
social structure, others are more ideological and only remotely, if at
all, linked to social differences; in this case age, sex19 and engage-
ment in industrial production are of minor significance.
– Decision-makers can be influenced both directly and through public
opinion, and effective lobbying requires time, skill, and persistence.
Threats from either side are less effective than presentation of fac-
tual information.
– Domestic decisions have international connotations and may acti-
vate interested outsiders, in this case both Greens in official posi-
tions in the EU as well as environmentalist activists, including the
Greenpeace organization, which sent its ship to Helsinki in Decem-
ber 2000 to monitor the situation.
– While it is the duty of the representatives of the people to make po-
litical decisions, the referendum is a desired tool not only for those
who emphasize direct democracy in principle, but also for those who
want to use it as a strategic tool to prevent change.
19 Male members of parliament voted 85–40 in favor, female MPs 22–52 against. The
cleavage between government and opposition was not very visible in this case, as all
party groups except the Greens were split and 8 of the 17 government ministers
voted against the government’s proposal. – A gallup survey also showed the sex
difference: more men than women approved parliament’s decision (66% and 44%)
while more women disliked it (23% and 40%). The old liked it better than the young.
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5  Civil Society
Society is one half of an antithetic tandem in which the other is the state.
 Immanuel Wallerstein 1987, p. 315
In Finland the state permeates civil society and civil society permeates
the state.
Jussi Simpura in 2001
As was described in Chapter 2, Finland’s functioning civil society origi-
nated in the 1830s, emerged during the latter half of the 19th century, and
was varied and relatively strong in the eve of independence. When Fin-
land still was part of the Russian empire, civil society served the essen-
tial function of strengthening Finland’s position and Finnish identity. In-
dependence opened a new era, differentiating civil society more distinctly
to serve the goals of interest groups. Individual citizens felt that the state,
as the counterpoise of civil society, was closer to them and more useful
than before, and their role in the state became emphasized and concret-
ized. They assumed more responsibility as citizens.
This chapter carries the picture into the 21st century, dealing first with
trade unions and the other old organizations, then with more recently
born organizations, and especially with those active in the field of social
welfare and health care. For a fuller picture of the democratic system it
seems appropriate here to begin with a conceptual analysis of how civil
society relates to the state.
The Concepts
The state may be viewed as the antithesis of civil society. The state uses
power and is grounded on the rule of law. As a system built on law it
consists more of offices and tasks than of persons; rights and responsi-
bilities are closely defined in the law. What is important is the imperson-
ality of power and the justifiability of measures. But the justification of
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the state should also be viewed from the side of the citizens: they need to
accept the state, regard it as credible, and find it trustworthy, in other
words, they need to legitimize it. That goes beyond the obligations con-
nected to power and legality. The state has to justify its power and prove
its usefulness in practice (cf. Dyson 1980, pp. 101–118).
Thus, a democratic state links the citizens to the state through the law
with a degree of independence and the authorities must be able to justify
their measures. Legitimacy, in turn, ties the state and civil society more
firmly together: the state’s legitimacy implicitly includes the concept of
civil society. Civil society cannot exist without the freedom of assembly
and the freedom and opportunity of expression, which enable citizens to
criticize the use of power and to attempt to influence it, while a demo-
cratic state cannot exist without a functioning civil society. Legitimacy
also requires transparency, because confidence cannot be born if the citi-
zenry and civil society are not aware of how power is being used.
Globalization expands the problems of civil society. Multinational or-
ganizations influence people’s lives. Critical reactions from the citizens
may focus on multinational corporations, or on the consequences of in-
ternational treaties, or the lack of appropriate agreements. In a globaliz-
ing world also the functions of civil society internationalize. Numerous
cross-national or worldwide movements have been born. For many of
them the primary legitimacy target is the nation-state, but for perhaps
a larger number it is an international organization.
Two principal lines of thought have concerned the relationship be-
tween individual citizens and the state, namely, the liberal and the
communitarian. The liberal way of thinking that started with John Locke
defines the citizen’s role as individualistic and instrumental. It sees citi-
zenship as membership of an organization; individuals, in a sense, work
for the state in return for the benefits they get from their organizational
membership. Citizens are private persons with pre-political or non-po-
litical interests.
The other way to look at citizenship is based on communitarian and
ethical interpretation, tracing via political philosophy back to Aristotle.
In it the model of citizenship is earned membership in a self-determining
ethical community and citizens are integrated into the political commu-
nity as parts of the entity. They can only form their personal and social
identity in close contact with the other traditional and commonly ac-
knowledged institutions.
Charles Taylor is a communitarian who has criticized the liberal view
because it structures citizenship in a totally instrumental way and does
not value participation and the feeling of unity as such. Jürgen Habermas
pointed out that the holistic model of the communitarians, which consid-
ers every citizen fully bound, is insufficient because of the many aspects
of modern politics. He admits, however, that it has its merits when com-
pared with the organization model of the liberals, which leaves isolated indi-
viduals alone against the state apparatus, although private persons cannot
realize their political autonomy only by looking after their special interests.
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Habermas added that according to Taylor’s remarks the universal prin-
ciples of democratic states need to be anchored to the political culture
typical of each country, whereas, in Habermas’ own opinion, a political
culture rising above different cultural backgrounds must function as
a common denominator. To prove the one-sidedness of Taylor’s view, he
mentions multicultural democracies such as the United States and Swit-
zerland as examples of countries where the principles of the constitution
have been successfully implanted in anything but a uniform linguistic and
cultural background. (Habermas 1994, pp. 24–28; Taylor 1989, p. 178.)
In reality the liberal and the communitarian models are hardly mutu-
ally exclusive. Individuals have interests that are at the same time related
to themselves and the community. Social structures and situations influ-
ence the different emphases of these interests. A civil society cannot con-
sist of individuals totally independent of each other, nor can it be a to-
tally monolithic, normative entity. The fact alone that individuals are
often forced to look after their own interests in cooperation with others,
as is the case with interest organizations, means that the two models are
ideal types rather than true descriptions of reality. When associations,
organizations, and social movements are seen as central parts of civil
society, what is emphasized implicitly is that autonomous citizens need
cooperation in order to influence the state and society. On the other hand,
a functioning civil society requires that the political culture adheres to
the values and norms related to human rights and civil liberties.
Although civil society is more than the sum of associations, organiza-
tions, and social movements, it is normally studied using these kinds of
collectives: they reflect the actions based on the freedom of association
and other freedoms. The difference between associations and organiza-
tions and, on the other hand, social movements, concerns the degree of
formality of structures. Social movements are born to pursue certain ideo-
logical, social, or international aims and they may evolve into associa-
tions and organizations, and associations may also be born without the
movement phase. Associations, organizations, and federations have con-
firmed rules that define their goals and lines of action. The birth of asso-
ciations and organizations does not necessarily end the existence of the
movement, but usually it brings about some bureaucracy, as was pointed
out by Max Weber as early as the beginning of the 20th century (cf.
Siisiäinen 1998, p. 220).
A large number of associations and organizations and active participa-
tion in them are typical features of democratic countries. A civil society
of course allocates its influence in conferring legitimacy through con-
ventional democratic channels too, first and foremost through the elec-
tion process. Ideal voting follows the liberal behavioral model: the citi-
zens should decide themselves. Political socialization, the mass media,
and various social contacts and ties, however, direct people’s behavior in
a way that blends in ingredients of the communitarian model.
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Labor Market Organizations
Finns like to talk of their country as the promised land of associations.
International comparisons seem to justify that image: there are very few
countries where citizens have more association memberships than in Fin-
land (Inglehart 1997, p. 190). Unionization is especially extensive; Swe-
den is probably the only country where the density of labor union mem-
bership is approximately as high as in Finland (Borg 1990, p. 314; Mansner
1999, p. 342). There are three major labor union confederations: the Cen-
tral Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) with 1,071,000 mem-
bers in its 31 unions in 2000, the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Em-
ployees (STTK) with 625,000 members, and the Confederation of Unions
for Academic Professionals in Finland (AKAVA) with 391,000 mem-
bers. Table 5.1 presents a list of their largest member unions in 2000.
The history of unionization remained multi-phased and colorful after
the early stages described in Chapter 2. In 1917, when social contrasts
became acute, the membership of the Trade Union Organization of Fin-
land rose from 42,000 to 160,000. That year, employees organized al-
most 500 strikes and the general strike in November was clearly a new
development on the road to the 1918 civil war. After the Whites had won
the war, membership of the Trade Union Organization dropped to ap-
proximately 20,000 in March 1919. For the union movement, the 1920s
was a period when the Finnish Communist Party had a strong background
influence. Employers responded by selecting their employees on politi-
cal grounds and by using strikebreakers. The Trade Union Organization,
with a membership of approximately 90,000 in 1928, started to dissolve
after the moderate social democrats were left outside the radical move-
ment. It was abolished in October 1930 and only weeks later the moder-
ate social democrats founded the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions
(SAK) (Haatanen 1998, pp. 35–51). As mentioned earlier, this organiza-
tion earned its legitimacy during the Winter War of 1939–1940.
The history of the organization of government employees has not been
so exciting. There had been various kinds of activity already before the
First World War, but actual interest organization activity did not truly
exist at all until Finland’s independence. Organizations of officials from
various fields founded the Partnership of Intellectual Work in 1922. Its
birth reflected many social changes: democratization, growth in the num-
ber of civil servants, weakening of the status of officials from the elite to
the middle class, and the loss of the financial privileges enjoyed in class
society (cf. op. cit., pp. 56–57). The true occupational interest organiza-
tion activity of government employees did not begin until the second half
of the 20th century.
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Table 5.1
Membership of employee organizations in 2000
Organizations Number of members
Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) 1,071,000
  Trade Union for Municipal Sector (KTV) 208,000
  Service Unions United 201,000
  The Finnish Metalworkers’ Union 170,000
  Construction Trade Union 79,000
  Finnish Transport Workers’ Union (AKT) 51,000
  The Wood and Allied Workers’ Union 50,000
  Paperworkers’ Union 49,000
  Finnish Foodstuff Workers’ Union 41,000
  Affiliated Unions of the Joint Organization  of State Employees (VTY) 36,000
  Chemical Workers’ Union 35,000
  Finnish Electrical Workers’ Union 30,000
  Ten others 119,000
Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) 625,000
  Union of Salaried Employees 126,000
  Union of Health Care Services (Tehy) 121,000
  Pardia - Confederation of State Employees’ Unions 88,000
  Federation of Municipal Officers (KVL) 74,000
  The Finnish Union of Practical Nurses 60,000
  Financial Sector Union SUORA  39,000
  Sixteen others 117,000
The Confederation of Unions for Academic
Professionals in Finland (AKAVA) 391,000
  Trade Union of Education in Finland (OAJ) 108,000
  The Finnish Association of Graduate Engineers 51,000
  Union of Professional Engineers in Finland 49,000
  The Finnish Association of Graduates in
   Economics and Business Administration 37,000
  The Finnish Medical Association 18,000
  Twenty-seven others 128,000
Sources: SYF 2001, p. 380; www.sttk.fi.
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The strong social and political influence of the trade union movement
was felt immediately after the Second World War. Society became more
radical and the political Left gained electoral support (cf. Table 8.1 on
page 146). Membership of the SAK reached 340,000 in 1947. The den-
sity of union membership was now at 40 percent, having been at 7 per-
cent before the war. The period of 1944–1948 in Finnish history has been
called the “years of peril.” As was described in Chapter 3, the commu-
nists aimed at taking over the trade unions. Power struggles between
communists and social democrats were raging in most parts of Europe,
and Finland’s geopolitical location was especially vulnerable. However,
the communists failed in their attempt to conquer the commanding heights
of the trade union movement. Finland’s slide toward a people’s democ-
racy definitely ended in 1948. The communists suffered a defeat in the
parliamentary election, and the social democrats were victorious in that
year’s trade union election.
The first general agreement between the Confederation of Finnish Trade
Unions (SAK) and the Confederation of Finnish Employers (STK), con-
cerning the whole country, was reached in 1944. It determined not only
wage levels but also forbade striking without advance warning. Never-
theless, the Communists kept organizing wildcat strikes until the 1950s
in order to stir up workers and to cause disturbance in society. In addition
to several strikes, the SAK threatened a general strike as many as four
times by 1950. These were avoided because the employers agreed to the
wage claims. But the recession that started in the middle of the 1950s
made the employers unwilling to accept the wage demands of the SAK
and a general strike began on 1 March 1956, joined by more wage-earn-
ers than there were SAK members. The strike, the largest in the history
of independent Finland, lasted 19 days but proceeded in a surprisingly
peaceful way. The government, however, considered the situation dan-
gerous and tried to arbitrate. Finally, the employers conceded the wage
rises. For the workers the achievement was a Pyrrhic victory: wage rises
triggered inflation that cancelled out the increase in purchasing power by
autumn that year. Taking into consideration the pay foregone for the du-
ration of the strike and the empty state of strike funds, it clearly turned
into a bitter defeat.
The 1956 general strike was a lesson to remember for the trade union
movement. Two changes became visible in the strategy of the move-
ment. Firstly, if strikes became unavoidable, the tendency was to plan
them carefully so as to stop all activity in the most important sectors
while other sectors could continue to operate and generate resources to
support the strike. Secondly, it was realized that fighting for money alone
is not wise because financial achievements were vulnerable to inflation.
The quality aspects of working life had to be considered as well.
Attitudes towards communism were among the factors that split the
trade union movement and the Social Democratic Party in the period
from the late 1950s to 1969. A great majority of SDP members remained
in the more traditional (right-wing) party, whereas the minority formed a
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more left-wing Social Democratic League (TPSL). In the trade union
movement the situation was quite the reverse: the new Trade Union Or-
ganization of Finland (SAJ) was far more right-wing than the bigger
Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), whose large member-
ship included communists. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
had long had some influence on the Finnish trade union movement via
the large communist minority. Now the CIA stepped in and supported
the SAJ financially. The disintegration of the SDP ended before the mid-
1960s and the division of the trade union movement was over by the end
of the decade. A formally new organization, the Central Organization of
Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) united the two competing groups and its
membership reached 600,000, more than ever in the history of the Finn-
ish trade union movement. It was obvious that foreign forces would hardly
play any role in the Finnish trade union movement in the future.
Harmonization initiated the growth of the trade union movement and
its very significant role. The SAK had already expanded into a large
organization of over one million people by the mid-1970s. Despite re-
duced employment in the secondary sector, the SAK has remained an
organization of approximately 1,100,000 union members, establishing
its position as the biggest and most influential organization.
However, the organizations of those with a higher education have grown
immensely. The Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TVK),
founded in 1957 and consisting primarily of women in the public sector,
expanded to close to 400,000 members at the beginning of the 1990s.
The Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) has grown
even faster: from less than 50,000 members in 1970 to 625,000 members
by the beginning of the new millennium. A great change took place in
1992, when the TVK dissolved due to economic difficulties. Most of its
members switched to the STTK, leaving Finland with three trade union
confederations. The AKAVA of academic professionals grew from over
40,000 members in 1970 to 391,000 in 2000. While the number of uni-
versity graduates has risen fast, the fact that their income level in com-
parison to other groups dropped motivated them to organize.
The trade union movement faces three employers’ organizations in
the private sector, two of them big and one small. In addition there are
a few public sector employer organizations. None of them has experi-
enced bitter, ideological power struggles similar to those of the employ-
ees’ organizations. However, there have often been clashes between the
different interests of large and small companies. The above-mentioned
Confederation of Finnish Employers (STK) was founded in 1907 and
was regarded as the central organization of large-scale industry. In 1992
it merged with the Confederation of Finnish Industries, which did not
add members but rationalized operations. The new Confederation of Finn-
ish Industry and Employers (TT) represents employers of approximately
545,000 workers and salaried employees, only 20 percent of whom work
in small companies. The Employers’ Confederation of Service Industries
(PT) was founded in 1996. It came to replace a central organization that
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had primarily represented companies in commerce. In 2000 its member
companies employed 349,000 people. The public sector, which employs
540,000 people, has two employer organizations, namely, the Commis-
sion for Local Authority Employers and the State Employers’ Office.
At the end of 1994 there were 2,064,000 members in Finnish trade
union organizations, including small, independent organizations. Because
the number of wage earners was 2,137,000, the density of union mem-
bership appeared as high as 96.5 percent. However, in addition to wage
earners the member listings included many others (pensioners, students,
non-paying members). Actual density of union membership was 78.5
percent, which still is internationally high. Sweden reported its density
to be 82.5 in 1990, but it was not announced whether this percentage
included others than wage earners. Elsewhere in Europe the percentages
are much lower, normally 30–50, and in France the rate was only 9.8
percent in 1990. (Haatanen 1998, pp. 105–108.) In the United States union
membership was 13.9 percent in 1999 (The World Almanac 2001, p. 171).
The fundamental reason for the success of the trade union movement
in Finland is that it has managed to acquire a major role in social and
economic policies. A system of incomes policies has been created since
the end of the 1960s. In it the central interest organizations and the state
together with the other public administration institutions negotiate on
the important decisions of economic policy. An organizational prerequi-
site of this change was the above-described harmonization of the trade
union movement.
In addition, the change contributed to wise economic policy. Inflation
had been at a high level almost continuously since the Second World
War. The damage to foreign trade had been solved by repeated devalua-
tions. According to Keynesian economic theory, the aim now was to ap-
ply an incomes policy so as to control both demand inflation and cost
inflation. It was in the state’s interest to use agreements that would com-
mit the big organizations to adhering to both wage and price discipline.
Incomes policies truly started in 1968, after a large devaluation the pre-
vious year. The agreement of 1968, signed by all central interest organi-
zations, has been a frame of reference in later incomes policy agree-
ments, although inflation was not successfully prevented until the 1990s.
Difficulties have been caused by individual unions, which have not al-
ways adhered to the general agreements made by the central organiza-
tions, and by wage rises that have exceeded agreements (Pekkarinen and
Vartiainen 1993, pp. 310–317).
Among the state’s interests in the incomes policy agreements are eco-
nomic growth, a reasonable interest rate level, creating more jobs, and
raising general welfare. This is why the government has been ready to
negotiate about the taxation of wage-earners and companies, social policy
benefits, the laws on working conditions, and so on. The incomes policy
negotiations after the mid-1970s have also settled the size of income tax
adjustments due to inflation. It is in the employers’ interest to uphold
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a good working atmosphere and competitiveness. The incomes policy
system apparently increases social solidarity, although in collective bar-
gaining, unions may express very different views. The Finnish system
seems relatively successful. It is also explained by the country’s unique
historical and geopolitical factors.
The unions continued to grow in the 1990s despite the changes in ideo-
logical, economic, and social structures, which in many other countries
have caused problems to the trade union movement. The Finnish system
may indeed be regarded exceptional. The political space of the labor
movement has narrowed because the central source of social conflicts,
relations of production, has lost some of its significance. This narrowing
is due to many reasons. A growing proportion of the labor force works in
the private and public sector service industry, in which the problems of
relations of production are not as clear as in traditional blue-collar work.
Employees have also reached a new understanding of the interests they
share with employers, such as the aim of preserving jobs by upholding
competitiveness. It has even been claimed that the foundation of the la-
bor movement – that is, collective identification with a workplace – is
falling apart (Ilmonen 1998, pp. 26–27).
There are also groups other than the labor market organizations that
have influence on incomes agreements. The most notable of the organi-
zations not part of the labor market sector proper, but having a signifi-
cant impact on incomes policy, is the Central Union of Agricultural Pro-
ducers and Forest Owners (MTK). It was founded as early as 1917. Until
the Second World War its primary function was to act as an educational
organization, but when the number of farms increased greatly after the
war, the organization expanded rapidly and adapted new tasks: It be-
came a typical interest organization and, at the same time, pursued na-
tional objectives that were important when the country was threatened
by the dangers of Soviet Communism. The organization has been con-
trolled by the Agrarian Union, since 1965 the Center Party. It had influ-
ence in economic policy especially when it was still possible to restrict
the import of agricultural products by tariffs and when the Agrarian/Cen-
ter Party had significant political power.
A new era began when Finland joined the European Union. The MTK
still influences incomes policy because many of its members are forest
owners, who can jointly affect the price of timber. There are over 440,000
private forest owners in Finland, nearly 330,000 of whom are members
of Forest Management Associations. Since approximately 80 percent of
the domestic wood purchased by industry comes from small privately
owned forests, these statutory associations also influence incomes policy.
The Forestry Council of the MTK works closely together with the Forest
Management Associations, which explains the significant influence of
the MTK (cf. Henttinen 1999, pp 166–169; www.mmm.fi/metsatalous).
Incomes policy alone does not explain the high density of union mem-
bership; some features of the Finnish employment model also influence
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it. Since 1968, employers have, as a gesture of social harmony, agreed to
deduct the union membership fees directly from wages.20 Consequently,
the unions have become wealthier and have been able to offer various
benefits to their members. Another factor is that union membership fees
are tax deductible in personal taxation. By making this concession in
1968, the state helped the parties to reach agreement and since then the
practice has remained permanent. Thirdly, the 1971 law on unemploy-
ment funds made the administration of the funds a task of the unions. To
be entitled to unemployment benefit from an unemployment fund, a wage
earner has to pay unemployment insurance. Although it is possible to
belong to the fund without being a union member, in practice joining the
fund has also meant joining a union.
One more explanation of the high density of union membership is
that, in Finland and the other Nordic countries, membership by women
is just as common as by men. Besides, in Finland, unlike countries of lower
union membership, the unionization of salaried employees has risen to an
even higher level than that of workers (Haatanen 1998, pp. 75–77, 109).
So there are several reasons why the disintegration of people’s collec-
tive identification is not leading to a loss of members from the trade
union movement. A study of the values of central organization members,
made in the mid-1990s, classified values into two categories: collective
and individualistic.21 In the trade unions of the SAK, age divided the
members into two relatively clear-cut parts: those born before the end of
the 1950s were collectively oriented while younger members were indi-
vidualistic. The line of business had similar effects: those in the private
service sector were individualistically oriented; and there are relatively
many young workers in this sector. In the confederation of salaried em-
ployees (STTK) no similar distinction between different age groups was
found. Within the unions for academic professionals (AKAVA) the dif-
ference was the reverse of the SAK: the young had the strongest collec-
tive orientation, the old were individualistically oriented. (Jokivuori et
al. 1996.)
It is surprising that the attitudes of young workers and young people
with a university degree differ greatly from those of the older members
in their respective organizations. The collective orientation of young sala-
ried employees with university degrees, however, does not seem to be
connected to communitarian solidarity, as is the case with the old em-
ployees in the SAK, but rather to their lower wages and more insecure
position in working life. The collectivity of young salaried employees
20 This gesture of goodwill has also been explained by reference to the personal rela-
tionship between Päiviö Hetemäki, managing director of the employers’ STK and
Niilo Hämäläinen, chairman of the employees’ SAK. They were companions-in-
arms in the Second World War and had great respect and trust for each other.
21 Members with collective values emphasize equalized income, equality between men
and women, workplace democracy, and decisions on benefits made by organization
representatives. Individualistic values prefer individually agreed terms of employ-
ment and more limited tasks for organizations.
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illustrates an instrumental attitude, while the collectivity of the older
employees is an indication of internalized values and solidarity (cf.
Ilmonen and Jokivuori 1998, pp. 156–159). The young university-edu-
cated salaried employees represent the fastest growing part of the labor
force.
Since the mid-1990s, Finland’s labor force has grown faster than union
membership. Thereby the level of unionization went down from 78.5
percent in 1994 to an estimated 72 percent in 2002. Although unioniza-
tion still ranks exceptionally high in international comparisons, the new
trend suggests that wage earners are losing interest in joining unions.
The unions themselves explain this as a consequence of the economy’s
structural change that has made short-term jobs increasingly numerous,
because temporary workers are not as motivated to join unions as perma-
nent ones. Furthermore, wage earners can join an unemployment fund
without becoming union members. Despite recent difficulties in recruiting
new members, labor unions remain very influential in Finnish society.
In the political system the Finnish pattern may be regarded as an ex-
ample of corporatism. If observed from this point of view, it is a case of
bargained corporatism, in which free collective agreements and direc-
tive measures of the state are combined (cf. Ponton 1984, p. 150).
Other Old Movements
While the labor market organizations have become a part of Finland’s
daily politics and social life, some old movements have not kept their
traditional social position. The tasks that once powered them are no longer
of interest and do not inspire Finns. The achieved goals may be trea-
sured, but cherishing is not the same as an uplifting aspiration towards
goals. Thus, the Society of Popular Education is still operating, but its
importance is not what it was a century ago, even though it has adapted
its program to such modern functions as adult education, language train-
ing, education for international understanding, etc.
The temperance movement is also operating but its tone of voice does
not carry the same weight as it did at the beginning of the 20th century.
Its values have long influenced the thinking of the Finnish people. When
the first parliament in 1907 passed the prohibition law, the importance of
the temperance movement was decisive. The law was not, however, imple-
mented until 1919. Just as in the United States, it proved a failure and
after a consultative referendum in 1931 the law was annulled with the
alcohol law of 1932. Even after that, the influence of the temperance
movement has remained in the values of many people and, as a result of
the ideology of the movement, Finland’s policy towards alcohol remains
more restrictive than policies in Southern or Central Europe. Currently,
alcohol policy and related educational information emphasize public
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health work and its basis, scientific research, while average Finns are
less and less conscious of the influence of the temperance movement in
their own culture.
The youth society movement has also lost the very important position
it had until the mid-twentieth century. Back then, it was mainly based on
activities organized by young people from rural areas. Urbanization and
modern mass communication have narrowed its arena. It still organizes
significant art events for the young on a yearly basis, and cultural organi-
zations such as the Finnish Folk Music Association and the Association
for Free Cultural Activities are part of it. But the movement no longer
has its previous status.
The 1944 armistice treaty led to the dissolution of some movements
that were claimed to be fascist. The most notable ones were the Civil
Guard defense organization and its sister organization, the Lotta Svärd.
The Civil Guards were formed in the autumn of 1917 when disagree-
ments between the Whites and Reds came to a head. In January 1918,
they were appointed as government troops and for a while they formed
the majority of the Finnish White Army. The ideological scale of their
local units varied from the political center to extreme rightism. The sta-
tus of the Civil Guard Organization became official with its incorpora-
tion into the Finnish armed forces in 1927. Thus the president of the
republic became its supreme commander. At the same time, it was brought
under tighter state control. Left-wingers were not admitted to the organi-
zation until February 1940, when some thousand social democrats joined
it. At its highpoint, total membership topped 100,000. There is no doubt
it was one of the factors that allowed Finland’s successful defensive battle
in the Winter War of 1939–1940.
The wartime role of the Lotta Svärd also turned out to be remarkable, for
its members significantly contributed to national defense in air surveillance,
war hospitals and even field hospitals, communication, etc. In 1944, the
membership of the organization reached 220,000. This  women’s organiza-
tion was largely responsible for the total involvement of Finnish society in
the war. Now it is reservist organizations, which do not have any ideological
preconditions for membership, that extol patriotic defensive spirit.
Two old movements have continued their activities. These are the co-
operative and sports movements, both influential in today’s society. In
the cooperative movement, similarities to the labor movement, and par-
ticularly to the trade union movement, can be observed. Even the mem-
berships of these three movements overlap to a great degree. Both the
cooperative and the trade union movement are tormented by the weaken-
ing of collective identification. This is also true for the one core group of
cooperative movement supporters, the rural population. The growth of
average farm size and the transition to a demanding, competitive economy
have altered agriculture in a way that has been described as a profound
change of values, or a transformation from a way of life into a form of busi-
ness.
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The cooperative movement continues to operate strongly despite all
the factors that are presumed to weaken the motivation of the member-
ship in a late modern society. Cooperation remains one of the mainstays
of Finnish civil society. Its activities cover a number of different fields:
commercial cooperation between producers and consumers, cooperation
between agricultural producers and forest owners, dairy and slaughter-
house production, banking, communication (telephone cooperatives) and
water supply and sewerage, etc. The memberships of these cooperatives
are large: in 2001 the Finnish Co-operative Wholesale Society, SOK,
had 787,000 members and the Cooperative Tradeka Corporation, which
has its origins in the old left-wing cooperative movement but no longer
has ideological ties, was owned by 370,000 consumers. The Okobank
Group Central Cooperative has the largest relative influence; in March
2002 its number of owner-members topped one million. Its market share
of euro-denominated deposits was 33 percent. These three memberships
totaled 2,357,000, making Finland one of the most “cooperative” countries
in the world and perhaps the most cooperative market economy country.
In the early days of the cooperative movement, the activities of small
cooperatives had features similar to those of the communitarian model.
The large cooperative central organizations typically developed into eco-
nomic bureaucracies and their membership became alienated. Recent
years have seen the emergence of a new type of cooperative activity that
aims to restore the original ideals of the movement and at the same time
to create activities that meet people’s needs in a modern society. The
economic slump of the early 1990s added to this. For example, various
marketing and purchasing cooperatives and those providing welfare ser-
vices have been formed (Hänninen 1995, pp. 67–69). Fresh ideas may
enliven activities and restore the enthusiasm of the good old days.
The sports movement has undergone many changes over the decades.
Already in the early 20th century, competitive sports began to dominate
this large movement, and the Finnish Gymnastics and Sports Federation
(SVUL, the Finnish Central Sports Federation as of 1962), which was
licensed in 1906, represented competitive sports above all. After the civil
war, political disagreements led to the foundation of the Finnish Labor
Sports Federation (TUL) in 1919. Thirdly, the Swedish speakers wanted to
safeguard their linguistic identity and founded the Swedish Central Sports
Federation of Finland (CIF) in 1946. The Sport for All Association, which
focuses on recreational sports, is considerably younger and more moderate
in its sphere of activities than the above-mentioned organizations.
Sport and various sports organizations attract masses of people from
all strata of society. Apparently they have unifying effects as there are no
major disagreements between various organizations with different ideo-
logical backgrounds. Competitive sports unites people: When Finns watch
their compatriots compete in international events, what counts is how
the athletes perform, not which sports organization they are members of.
Political barriers have also broken down among the memberships of sports
organizations. A report from the 1970s showed that the membership of
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the “bourgeois” SVUL was comprised as follows: the working class (42
percent), white-collar employees (32 percent) and farmers (28 percent).
In the 1980s, 9 percent of bourgeois party supporters who belonged to
a sports organization were members of the “leftist” TUL, and that pro-
portion was on the rise (Hentilä 1992, pp. 366–367). This kind of organi-
zational behavior, in which politics and sports are not dependent on each
other, has become more general since the 1980s as the old left-bourgeois
cleavage has increasingly lost significance in Finnish politics.
In 1993 the independent central organizations joined forces and founded
the Finnish Sports Federation (SLU) that consists of the three central
organizations, national associations of different kinds of sports, and some
regional associations and special sport clubs, altogether 127 societies
with 1,100,000 individual members. Of them, 338,000 belong to the TUL
and 120,000 to the CIF, and the rest, some 640,000 people, are members
of the associations that belonged to the SUL. The aim of joining forces
was to increase the influence of sports upon the public sector, because
that is where most of the sports’ funding comes from. This is especially
true when new facilities are built. The state has reciprocating interests,
such as the favorable impact of sports on public health. (Heikkala 1998;
www.cif.fi; www.slu.fi; www.tul.fi.)
The New Movements
The old movements in Finland were also characterized by their unique,
historical role in nation building. And, as in other countries, their influ-
ence has been based on large memberships. Typical of new movements
is their involvement in international, even global questions and their in-
fluence through the media rather than through large memberships.
New movements have been a consequence of changes in western cul-
ture. One of the major changes is the increasing dominance of economy
in today’s society. In the United States, dominant economic values have
left a lasting mark on society, and such values came under criticism in
that country as early as the beginning of the 1960s. Social Indicators,
a US publication issued in 1966, states on its cover page that “economic
indicators have thus far dealt not with how good but with how much, not
with the quality of our lives but rather with the quantity of goods and
dollars.” The importance of the quality of life was given prominence in
a NASA publication (sic!) by the researchers of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences. The study stressed that new kinds of “measures of
social performance are all the more important in a ‘postindustrial’ society,
one in which the satisfaction of human interests and values has at least as
high a priority as the pursuit of economic goals.” (Gross 1966, p. viii.)
The contradiction between economic ends and the quality of life is
only one, if essential, example of the contradictions that began to emerge
in the 1960s. Already from the late 1950s, the Beat Generation presented
new views about man’s subjectivity. Similar cultural criticism was pre-
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sented somewhat later by the hippie movement. Rebellion against the
prevailing culture was shown in attempts to penetrate the roots of human
experience, in a desire to seek ecstasy even in drugs, and in a conscious
emphasis of rootlessness. The Beat Generation was interested in eastern
religions and also openly brought out the possibility of sexual deviation.
Many favored leftist ideas but it was impossible for the beatniks to iden-
tify with systems such as communism, which did not tolerate deviation
(Burner 1996, pp. 113–125).
Another movement that started in the United States and rejected the
dominant culture was the student movement. Its protests continued
throughout the 1960s. It has been explained, in part, by the exploding
numbers of university students and by their widening social backgrounds
from the late 1950s, but these are certainly only one aspect in the com-
plex phenomenon. The themes included the status of racial minorities,
opposition to the Vietnam War and rejection of university administra-
tions. The radical students protested against mainstream capitalist cul-
ture without acknowledging its pluralism. (Op. cit., pp. 134–166.) In Eu-
rope the movement adapted themes that were much the same as those in
the United States. Students, also in Finland, included environmental prob-
lems in their programs. These were regarded as resulting from capitalism
and many saw the solution in the Soviet system.
In the sixties and seventies, the programs of the new movements in
Finland included pacifism and equality, with specific issues such as femi-
nism, the rights of sexual and other minorities, the problems of develop-
ing countries, and economic exploitation. Other themes were tolerance,
liberal sexual behavior, the Vietnam War, and later on, environmental
questions (cf. Konttinen 1998, pp. 187–195). These movements had an
interest in rational societal planning, which was not as apparent in their
American counterparts.
The ideals of rational planning received great support in Finland. This
can be largely traced to a plan of a welfare state by Pekka Kuusi, a senior
administrator and researcher in social policy. His publication in 1961,
“The social policies in the 60s” (60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka), was a most
remarkable book. It includes a strong message of the applicability and
indispensability of rational planning. Kuusi and many other Finnish ex-
perts were unaware that such planning had been already criticized with
good reason at the end of the 1950s and replaced mainly by a strategy of
disjointed incrementalism (cf. March and Simon 1958; Myrdal 1958;
Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963).
Since the new movements tried to bring about immediate far-reaching
social changes, the model of rational planning seemed very promising. More
realistic options to reform society would hardly have been equally inspiring.
The model had utopian elements, such as comprehensiveness and the idea
that it was possible to make use of perfect information. In Finland, rational
planning inspired not only the politically radical youth, who connected it to
the development of socialist countries, but many others as well. What was
essential was the strong belief that societies could be changed.
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However, reforming a society is not merely a matter of reason and
rationality; it requires morality too. It is not surprising that modern ethics
deals with similar issues to many of the new movements: poverty in the
world, environmental questions, problems of crime and criminal policy, fun-
damental questions involved in sexual behavior, human relations, equality,
discrimination, treatment of animals, ethics of business and economy, and
issues of war and peace (cf. e.g. Singer 1994, pp. 273–395).
Pacifism is one of the central areas of morality. Founded in 1920, the
Peace Union of Finland, tinged with liberal and Christian ideas, stood
for traditional pacifism in Finland. Its aim was to promote the views of
the League of Nations and later the United Nations, in solving conflicts.
In 1949, the supporters of the extreme left and the Agrarian Union (later
the Center Party) created an organization named the Finnish Peace Com-
mittee. It was a member of the communist-led World Peace Council and
undertook to cherish Finnish-Soviet relations (Litmanen 1998, p. 284).
However, the organization seemed to consider political “expediency,”
which meant largely agreeing with Soviet views, to be more important
than true pacifism.
Modern pacifism began to spread to Finland from the West in the early
1960s. In England, the Committee of 100 was founded as a result of the
criticism that Bertrand Russell directed towards nuclear armament. Fin-
land followed suit and an organization of the same name was created. Its
purpose was to function as a provocative pacifist forum that questioned
the prevailing defense doctrines and even demanded unilateral disarma-
ment. In West Germany, for example, the equivalent organization en-
countered severe criticism, whereas in Finland the organization’s pro-
vocativeness was interpreted as peaceful activity. It was a discussion fo-
rum, above all, for young academic intellectuals. Only the student orga-
nization of the Conservative Party wanted to steer clear of the activities
of the Committee of 100, and to make its stand it adopted the name “Com-
mittee of 1000” (Tuhatkunta).
The Committee of 100 participated in demonstrations for the peace
cause but at the same time urged social reforms. Several of its members
took part in single-issue movements. The leaders of Finnish foreign policy
in the 21st century were members of the organization in their youth: Presi-
dent Tarja Halonen, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, and Foreign Minis-
ter Erkki Tuomioja. They all were members of the Social Democratic
Party, which took a cautious view of the organization, fearing that it would
fall into communist hands. The Committee of 100 even inferred that the
then-President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, was a member of their orga-
nization (Suominen 1997, pp. 165–167).
In a number of countries anti-war movements and environmental
movements were connected by their mutual interest in opposing nuclear
energy. In Finland, however, their values came into conflict when the
Finnish Peace Committee took a stand in favor of nuclear plants because
nuclear energy was favored in the USSR. Other organizations promot-
ing pacifism did not take part in the discussion about nuclear energy to
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any significant extent. In 1977 the environmental activists set up their
anti-nuclear organization (Energy policy society – Alternative to nuclear
power) (cf. Litmanen 1998, pp. 289–291).
The Committee of 100 functioned as an example for the formation of
a number of movements whose origins went further back in history than
those of the Committee of 100. One such organization was the Tricont,
which was founded in 1968 to support the developing countries. The
United Nations paid attention to Third World problems, which were al-
ready sparking discussion among the academic youth in the early 1960s.
The name Tricont referred to the Tricontinental symbol used by the
OSPAAL – a solidarity organization of Asian, African and Latin Ameri-
can peoples. In the Finnish organization, political barriers were becom-
ing blurred, which has become characteristic of late modern society. The
membership included people from nearly all political parties and, in ad-
dition, independents and religious persons. Often the members criticized
their own parties and assumed the political line of the New Left. The
Tricont represented itself as anti-imperialistic, criticizing the politics and
policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (Tuominen
1991, pp. 216–222).
One typical single-issue movement of the age was the “November
Movement”, born in 1967, whose aim was to achieve a rational and hu-
mane control policy. The movement’s membership overlapped with the
Committee of 100. It saw that people who were different in some respect
were often treated arbitrarily and harshly because they were different
(op. cit., pp. 229–235). Soon the revolutionary left wing of the move-
ment gained the upper hand and control policy came to be seen as part of
a socialist revolution. Thereafter the movement began to decline. How-
ever, its propagation and vast publicity helped to soften the existing strict
attitudes towards deviation.
The overall image of the new movements that were born in the 1960s–
1970s involved the student movement, mentioned above. As in the United
States, the Finnish movement attacked the power structure of universi-
ties. The student organizations aimed at a system in which the adminis-
tration of universities would be elective, on the “one man - one vote”
principle. The idea was to achieve an equal opportunity for all, from
first-year students to professors, to have their say about the composition
of administrative organs. The professors and most of the staff found the
demand unviable because they considered universities to be expert orga-
nizations. However, in 1970 a reform bill based on the “one man - one
vote” principle was nearly passed in parliament. MPs who were familiar
with how universities functioned saw the danger and, by filibustering,
managed to defer the proposed reform bill past the March 1970 parlia-
mentary elections (see Pesonen 1982).
Even though the objectives of the student movement were overambi-
tious and unrealistic, they probably prepared the way for an administra-
tive reform in the 1970s. The adopted quota system brought representa-
tion of students and staff to the administrative bodies of the universities.
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Earlier the Finns had seen how students could fall under the spell of
fanatics. Such fears did not prove unfounded when the Soviet-oriented
“Stalinists” gained a strong foothold in many Finnish student organiza-
tions at the beginning of the 1970s. However, this radicalism rapidly
came to an end, not the least because the students were able to get
a closer view of Soviet conditions. History has proved that student move-
ments are not long-lived and that students change their minds quickly.
Their organizations, on the other hand, are well established in Finland.
Students’ interests are represented on the national scene by the National
Union of Students (SYL), founded in 1921, and some student organiza-
tions own valuable property, including dormitories.
The women’s movement has survived since the 19th century. Never-
theless, a qualitative transition took place when the task of women’s
emancipation was taken up by an organization called the “Association
9,” founded in 1966. It was the only women’s organization that managed
to increase its membership in that radical decade. Instead of equal rights
the organization began to speak about gender roles in the effort to make
women’s and men’s roles more similar. It also wanted to alter the role of
men. Almost one-third of the members were men, which further illus-
trates that the organization was not merely a women’s interest organiza-
tion; its goal was to change the whole culture (Jallinoja 1983, pp. 123–
190).
Neo-feminism proper – as distinguished from traditional feminism and
its striving for emancipation, in which economic status and political power
were essential questions – has not received strong support in Finland.
Women have long participated in political organizations within the party
system, and this traditional and established channel seems to have curbed
the feminist movement. Ever since the early 20th century, the proportion
of women in various political fields has been internationally high. Until
the 1970s, the percentage of women in parliament was higher in Finland
than in any other west European country. It was not until the end of that
decade that the other Nordic countries, except for Iceland, caught up
with Finland. Neo-feminists’ theses on women’s social and sexual rights
and physical integrity have not caused any major public stir because the
demands have been channeled into the political arena and the official
equality policy. It is justifiable to characterize Finland as the home of
“state feminism” (cf. Bergman 1998, p. 170–181).
Women’s participation in social activities through the trade union and
cooperative movements and party organizations has been tens of times
higher than that through the women’s movement. The importance of the
women’s movement has been based on its role as the societal vanguard
and, especially since the 1960s, on its extensive use of publicity. One of
the remaining problems is economic inequality, mainly concerning the
wage differential between men and women, but in fact the most efficient
group to urge improvement in the issue is the large body of trade union
women. Another problem, if a diminishing one, is the small number of
women occupying top positions in businesses and public administration.
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Modern civil society covers such a wide range of activities that it would
not be possible to outline all of them here. What need to be emphasized,
however, are the environmentalists. They attract plenty of publicity and,
as was shown in Table 4.5, are regarded by most people as conflicting
with the economy. The Greens began to inspire young people in the 1970s,
won their own representation in parliament in 1983, and thereafter founded
their political party. But they form only a part of the picture. The Nature
Society was founded in 1938, and in 1969 it helped to establish the Finn-
ish Union for Natural Protection, which does nationwide education work
and participates in environmental planning. The World Wildlife Fund
has had a Finnish branch since 1972. Greenpeace, a radical although
nonviolent international organization that fights polluters, also has ac-
tive members in Finland. Some nature groups are prone to advance their
goals through illegal acts. A notorious example were the “fox girls,” ac-
tivists who have damaged fur farms.
ATTAC was founded in Paris in 1998 to protect democracy against
undesirable consequences of the globalized economy. The Finnish ATTAC
started in 2001; it wants the Tobin tax imposed on speculative transfers
of capital and opposes the privatization of health services, education,
and government enterprises. Other international organizations advocat-
ing high moral principles include the Friends of the Earth Finland, which
was founded in 1996 (internationally in 1971) to further “the creation of
a democratic and economically sustainable society” and “social, eco-
nomic, political and intergenerational equality.”
Amnesty International, established in 1961, has been active in Finland
since 1967. It is a global organization working to protect human rights.
Paying special attention to autocratic systems, it focuses on “grave abuses
of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and
expression, and freedom from discrimination.” It is a sharp opponent of
recent limitations or attempted limitations of citizens’ personal freedoms
in connection with anti-terrorist government activity. Amnesty attracts
plenty of publicity in Finland but has only about 9000 members. The one
area where it has been in disagreement with the Finnish government con-
cerns conscientious objectors who refuse military training.22
The anti-globalization activists are international movements that are
typically held together through intensive Internet contacts. The Finnish
activists have taken part in big international demonstrations, but appar-
ently not at all in the related violence. Certain other new international
movements have not gained mentionable foothold in Finland. For in-
stance, there have been hardly any neo-Nazis comparable to those found
in Germany and Sweden.
22 Compulsory military service lasts 180, 270, or 360 days, the alternative and easier
option of civilian service 395 days. A majority of Finns regard civilian servicemen
as freeloaders, while Amnesty claims that civilian service lasts too long. It is par-
ticularly critical of Finland for having “prisoners of conscience,” those who refuse
to do even civilian service.
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The significance of the new movements has no doubt been greater
than what could be inferred from the number of their members. They
have often exposed to the public problems which political parties and
state institutions have neglected. At the same time, they have been pio-
neers in adapting new values, which has paved Finland’s way to a late
modern society.
Social Welfare and Health Care Organizations
The grouping into old and new movements does not apply to most social
welfare and health care organizations. Their objectives and lines of ac-
tion differ from those of the movements discussed above. The Finnish
Red Cross was formed as early as 1877 and the Finnish Association for
Mental Health in 1897, whereas organizations such as the Center of Ex-
pertise in Child Welfare and the Association for Care-Giving Relatives
and Friends were founded in the 1990s. However, approximately 35 per-
cent of these organizations date back to the 1960s–1970s (Social Welfare
and Health Care Organizations in Finland. 1999). During those decades,
Finland’s fast modernization process included extensive political reforms
on social welfare and health care. The new winds in setting sociopolitical
goals illustrate that one aim was to develop civil society at the same time
as the state was given new obligations to take care of its citizens.
The objectives of social welfare and health care organizations are usu-
ally clearly defined and do not include general political aims or aims
intended to change the culture, which are typical of most old and new
movements. They are service or voluntary organizations, in legal terms
associations or foundations. However, there exist some organizations that
are conceptually close to the new movements. For example, the Sexpo
Foundation was formed in 1969 to promote healthy sexuality, and the
Finnish Lesbian and Gay Organization was founded in 1974. These or-
ganizations indicate a reaction to attitudes against sexual minorities and
aim at changing prevailing values ond norms.
Finland has three central organizations of social wellfare and health.
The Association of Voluntary Health, Social and Welfare Organizations
(YTY) consisted of 115 organizations with some 9500 local associations
and 1,600,000 individual members in 2000. Another big central organi-
zation is the Finnish Federation for Social Welfare and Health (STKL),
which generally shares its membership with the YTY but in addition has
most of Finland’s municipalities as its members. This illustrates close con-
nections between the local government units and civil society. The third
central organization is the Finnish Center for Health promotion (TEK).
These central organizations, as well as their large member organiza-
tions, are influential in social and health care policy. Some of their func-
tions coincide, but they also emphasize individual aims. The YTY con-
centrates upon the cooperation of voluntary organizations and furthers
cooperation between its members and public authorities. One scholar
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has characterized it as the trade union of social and health care organiza-
tions. The more policy-oriented STKL is interested in promoting social
and health policy on local, regional, and national levels. It is active in
education and research and its concrete activities are performed mainly
by member organizations. TEK’s obvious role contains preventive health
care information and activity. (Poteri 1998, p. 23; Myllymäki and Tetri
2001, pp. 118-123.) The three central organizations also disseminate
knowledge on social policy in the third world.
The Disabled War Veterans Association of Finland is a typical Finnish
organization, which has proved successful. It was founded after the Win-
ter War in 1940. Its membership has been above 100,000 but naturally
decreases year by year. In the past the state took care of disabled war
veterans by providing them with education, work, and housing. The vet-
erans have striven for their cause with the help of their association, in
line with the principle of not deserting a comrade-in-arms. Without the
veterans’ own efforts, supported and encouraged by their socially influential
association, it would not have been possible to take care of their welfare in a
way that has received international recognition. (Honkasalo 2000.)
The Slot Machine Association is an institution unique to Finland. It
supports voluntary, non-governmental social welfare and health care or-
ganizations, which set up the association in 1938. At the beginning of the
21st century it has ninety-six member organizations. The association,
whose board of directors consists of representatives of state administra-
tion and social welfare and health care organizations, has a legal mo-
nopoly on slot machine games in Finland. The profits are allocated yearly
to charity. Its specific purpose is to support civil society, the so-called
third sector, and not to finance the tasks of the government or munici-
palities. There is one exception to this: within limits set by the state budget
the association’s profits can be used to improve the condition of war veter-
ans and to treat military injuries. In 2001, its profits were 2060 million markkas
(346 million euros), of which 546 million markkas went to the government
and 1513 million markkas (254 million euros) were allocated to 1075 orga-
nizations and foundations. Formerly, some of them had received support
from the state budget. (Myllymäki and Tetri 2001, pp. 163, 293–294.)
After Finland joined the European Union, some private entrepreneurs
claimed that there was a contradiction between the monopoly and free com-
petition. The result of a series of trials, the final one in the EU court, was that
the Slot Machine Association could carry on as before. What influenced the
decision was that the monopoly reduces the possibility of misusing slot
machines and that the association is more efficient than private businesses in
controlling the problems caused by cases of compulsive gambling.
It is worth noting that in a welfare state, in which the state and the
municipalities spend much of their tax revenue on social welfare and
health care services, voluntary action promotes such a wide range of the
welfare of the citizens. In 1998, the proportion of voluntary organiza-
tions in total social expenditure was about 5 percent, that is 6.3 billion
markkas (1.1 billion euros). Nevertheless, their actual share in advancing
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the welfare of citizens was considerably larger as it includes much vol-
untary activity, which cannot be measured in money. What the voluntary
organizations can contribute is years of experience and expertise, coop-
eration with customers and intensive group work. They operate in such a
wide area that only few examples can be mentioned here: the mainte-
nance of rehabilitation centers and hospitals, vocational guidance, hous-
ing services for the disabled, day care for children, shelter homes for
children and adolescents, sheltered work centers, and holiday activities
for the sick and disabled. At the beginning of the new millennium, issues
of special concern are young people and the unemployed, housing of the
elderly, mental health problems, and drug problems. The task of volun-
tary organizations is to complement the measures taken by the welfare
state’s government in all these areas.
The Finnish example illustrates that a welfare state and voluntary help
are not mutually exclusive, quite the contrary. There is a dense local gov-
ernment network in Finland (see Chapter 12), which as an institution
resembles civil society. This is concretely shown in cooperation between
municipalities and social welfare and health care organizations. For ex-
ample, the municipalities pay most of the expenses that the organizations
incur in rehabilitation, and the organizations for their part provide a con-
siderable part of the necessary workforce. Also, they have become major
initiators and operators of various projects funded by the EU. In the fu-
ture the role of voluntary organizations in social welfare and health care
is likely to grow stronger, a development that does not conflict with the
idea of retaining the welfare state. It is perhaps justifiable to talk about
moving from a welfare state to a welfare society, which, however, does
not mean that the state can renounce its role as the highest guardian of its
citizens’ welfare.
Political Influence
Citizens’ organizations and social movements form an essential part of
any democratic society, and an active civil society is particularly charac-
teristic of established and stable democracies. A great deal of their influ-
ence occurs outside the political system, but most political decisions also
concern the interests of some organizations, groups, or businesses. Poli-
tics can be of great importance for various organizations, and all associa-
tional interest groups complement representational democracy by pro-
viding citizens with alternative channels for political influence.
In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, trade unions and business
organizations have become the strongest political actors outside the con-
ventional representative system. Their impact covers the entire society.
For example, the development of social legislation, described above in
Chapters 2 and 5, can provide numerous examples of the political influ-
ence of labor market organizations.
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In the turbulent spring of 1917 the length of working days in industry
was shortened to eight hours, and trade unions, which were growing stron-
ger and more radical, soon pressured parliament to pass the law that made
the eight-hour working day a legal requirement (excluding farming and
domestic work). During the inter-war period the trade unions were not
strong politically, but the Second World War added much to their strength.
A period of efficient influence was launched. In 1946 alone, legislation
on working life developed more than it had during the twenty inter-war
years. The law on collective agreements was renewed, a system of shop
stewards was created, and the Labor Court was established. Even a law
on production committees was legislated, but such committees did not
gain real influence in the shops. On the other hand, collective agree-
ments became an established pattern and relationships in the shops
changed into a situation that was, with some exaggeration, described as
relations of equal parties. (Haatanen 1998, pp. 141–143.)
In the 1940s and 1950s, political pressure was seen as a very central
feature in trade union activities, which were now often called extra-par-
liamentary. Thus, after the general strike of 1956 there followed a debate
that pitted the interest organizations and the constitution against each
other; even the unconstitutionality of the strike was discussed (Borg 1990,
p. 321). Organizational pressure seems to have been called extra-parlia-
mentary pressure because, on the one hand, the more conservative groups
were not accustomed to the new role of the unions and, on the other
hand, especially the communist members of trade unions organized ille-
gal actions and disrupted the functioning of society. The use of organiza-
tional pressure has become less frequent, but it has not been discontin-
ued. And the power of different unions does not depend on their size
only. In the mid-1900s the government had to yield to the small Locomo-
tive Engineers Union despite the threat to order the engineers to run trains
as military reserve training; the longshoremen are in a strategic position
to block foreign trade, and the Paperworkers’ Union of under 50,000
members have had a stronger voice in labor negotiations than the Trade
Union for Municipal Sector with 208,000 members.
In the 1960s and 1970s labor legislation advanced the era of rapid
change in Finnish economy. Mutual antagonisms of the negotiating par-
ties began to fade away: they saw more and more advantages that could
only be gained through cooperation. The employers and the employees,
corresponding in politics to the conservatives and the social democrats,
found the basis for consensus in labor policies, which later developed
into one of the foundations of Finland’s national consensus and legiti-
macy. In this spirit, laws were passed on working time (1962, 1964) and
health insurance (see Chapter 2, p. 47). The labor market organizations
participated in governmental commissions when the reforms were being
prepared. A new approach to social policy in the employers’ central orga-
nization was related to the arrival of the “comrades in arms” generation
in positions of leadership (Suonoja 1992, pp. 441–457).
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A parliament with a socialist majority, elected in 1966, and the New
Left that swept through the society, were the background for many initia-
tives to develop labor legislation. Workshops got their extensive systems
of labor protection, drawing the following ironic comment from one ex-
pert: “One would have thought that this mighty-looking reform would
have lowered the internationally high work accident numbers and cur-
tailed work-related illness, but the statistics do not show any essential
change. Each year about the same 200,000 work accidents were reported
to the insurance companies, before as well as after the reform” (Haatanen
1998, p. 143). But even though working safety could not be improved,
the labor market organizations had a decisive influence on large social
policy reforms in the area of pensions and insurance.
In 1968 there was a thorough change in the opportunities for labor
market organizations to influence national policies, when the broadly
based comprehensive incomes policy agreements started. These organi-
zations became able to influence a great deal of Finnish legislation
(Myllymäki 1979, pp. 190–197). Government bills concerning the wel-
fare state system were combined with agreements on incomes policy,
and it was difficult to make changes to any proposals because rejecting
one law would have blocked the entire agreement and been fatal for eco-
nomic development. Such a strong influence continued up to the turn of
the 1990s (Piirainen 1992, pp. 300–301). One observer concluded that
“the labor market organizations became, in a way, a part of the formal
decision-making machinery, although no judicial change had happened
in their position” (Borg 1990, p. 321).
The strong role of the labor market organizations, especially in the
social policy area, has not escaped criticism. Soon it was no longer called
extraparliamentary activity. It became customary to call parliament a rub-
ber stamp, the role of which was to formalize the laws that had been
actually decided in the “smoke-filled rooms” of the organizations. It is
true that the influence of the organizations was strong from the 1960s to
the end of the 1980s, in other words, during years when the Finnish wel-
fare state was created. Their voice was heard because they had close
connections to the parliamentary groups of the relevant parties. Many
members of parliament had also personally held important positions in
labor market organizations.
The growing influence of the organizations can be seen in their in-
creased representation in governmental commissions; they had 76 mem-
berships in 1946 and 87 memberships in 1950, but 499 memberships in
1970 and about 1660 in 1987. For example, in 1975 only 16 percent of
government commissions functioned without representation of labor
market organizations. About one-half of the memberships in 1980 had to
do with social policy. The Confederation of Finnish Industry was effi-
ciently represented in bodies dealing with industry, and the agricultural
producers were in those dealing with agriculture. Already at the end of
the 1980s some signs indicated a lessening role of organizations in gov-
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ernmental planning (op.cit., pp. 323–326). It is also possible that the eco-
nomic slump of the 1990s halted the growth of their influence.
Active attempts to reform societal policies continued. The red-blue
coalition government of the Conservatives and Social Democrats (1987–
1991) aimed at “managed” structural change, in which as many citizens
as possible would benefit from the economic growth and nobody would
suffer (Haatanen 1998, p. 144). The slump reversed these plans, and the
bourgeois government in 1991–1995 openly resisted the trade unions.
The recession showed that the power of organizations is dependent on
the economic situation. In times of rising unemployment trade unions
lose power and their cooperation with the employers becomes more
troubled.
The bourgeois government was forced to cut some social expendi-
tures when tax revenue declined and, still more expensively, unemploy-
ment grew. The reform plans of the young prime minister Esko Aho of
the Center Party aimed at discontinuing comprehensive trade agreements
and moving income negotiations to the union level. The negative reac-
tion of the trade unions may have been one reason why the election of
1995 changed political power relations. In the very close election of 1999,
too, the Social Democrats were able to remain the largest party and hold
on to the premiership. Obviously the experience of the 1990s proved that
large trade unions can influence national politics.
Attempts to influence public opinion are an indirect way to influence
politics, while assisting the campaign work of party organizations is a
more direct method. Both of these were at work during the 1990s. Natu-
rally, the organizations are active also when particular political decisions
are planned; the role of labor market and business organizations in social
reforms was mentioned above, and so was the role of organizations when
new legislation is prepared. They are invited to have their representa-
tives take part in planning commissions, and a variety of group represen-
tatives are normally invited for questioning in parliament’s committees
when government bills are being handled. In these cases their influence is
largely based on the expertise that they can add to the preparation process.
The labor market organizations are also consulted in directing national
economic policies. For example, essential interest organizations, and not
only the labor market organizations, are represented in the Economic
Council, which is chaired by the prime minister. In it members of the
government, together with organizational representatives, make plans for
economic policy. This council is assisted by the Incomes Policy Infor-
mation Commission, which comprises experts from interest organiza-
tions and representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Fin-
land, and economic research institutes.
Large organizations are conscious of their power. In 2002 the Confed-
eration of Finnish Industry declared that it “plays, together with its branch
organizations, a major role when political and economic decisions which
influence companies’ activities and this economic operating environment
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are prepared.” Its “expertise is engaged in drawing up legislation and
agreements” and it is represented on some 300 committeess, boards and
working groups. (www.tt.fi/english/tarinat.shtml#pkt-asiat.) The organi-
zations of wage earners hardly lag behind in the willingness and oppor-
tunity to influence politics and decision making.
Many studies have shown that making special expertise available for
politicians is, in fact, the most efficient method of pressure politics. It is
also possible that some speeches read by MPs in parliament were actu-
ally written inside interested organizations. But the popular expression
“there is no such thing as a free lunch” sounds somewhat irrelevant in Fin-
land, at least as far as senior civil servants are concerned, because the coun-
try is strictly opposed to any corruption and personal gain in public office.
Mass demonstrations are the most visible form of political pressure
via public opinion. However, the character of demonstrations has changed.
They have become less massive and their primary purpose is to obtain
maximum exposure in the mass media. Many demonstrations are orga-
nized in front the parliament building, because it is a background to which
it is relatively easy to attract television news crews. There were times
when the labor movement organized annual massive May Day parades,
but very few people want to march today and outdoor speeches are the
only remaining part of the tradition. Public demonstrations do happen,
but they are few and typically quite peaceful. Besides, there are more
direct links to the attention of political decision-makers. The sports orga-
nizations provide a good example: The SLU has formed within parlia-
ment a network of 42 MPs from different parties who hold leadership
positions in sports organizations and, therefore, can be expected to react
favorably to goals of the sports movement.
Many organizations also approach the authorities in their organiza-
tional self-interest, because money can be obtained for good causes from
the state and local government and from the Slot Machine Association.
Even political parties discovered long ago that public funding could help
to support their organizations, with government subsidies for temper-
ance, youth, and pensioner work, as well as general adult education.
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6  The Mass Media
The relations between politicians and the press have been bad. They are
getting even worse. We must definitely see to it that they get no better.
Lord Sydney Jacobson in 1978
I can remember I went to a pizzeria, I don’t need to read about it in a tabloid
paper.
Pentti Arajärvi, husband of President Halonen, in 2001
No political system can exist without communication, and no democratic
system can function without free communication. Finland’s constitution
states this as follows: “Everyone has the freedom of expression. Free-
dom of expression entails the right to express, disseminate and receive
information, opinions and other communications without prior preven-
tion by anyone” (Section 12). Naturally, opinions are communicated to
wider audiences via the mass media, which have essential roles within
civil society as well as the political system.
A great deal of publicly disseminated opinions consist of the elite’s
political discourse, and politicians use the media as a tool to influence
public opinion. This they can do as long as they are newsworthy. Through
their news reporting the mass media keep audiences informed about es-
sential events, thereby contributing to the awareness of the citizenry. At
the same time, the media can be independent actors on behalf of their
own political goals. They can even lobby in their own self-interest.
The Press and Other Print Media
The growth of radio and television changed mass communication dra-
matically in the 20th century, but Finland’s printed press does not feel
much threatened by the growth of the electronic mass media. The total
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circulation of daily newspapers has remained one of the highest in the
world. Counting the dailies that appear 4–7 times a week, the number of
printed copies was 558 per 1000 inhabitants in 1990. By 1998 it had
declined to 451 copies per 1000 persons, but was again 544 copies in
2001. Only Norway and Japan boasted higher total circulations in 2001.
Sweden printed 543 newspaper copies per thousand inhabitants, the United
Kingdom 383, Germany 371, the United States only 274, and Italy 127
copies. (Finnish Mass Media 2000, p. 270; World Press Trends 2002, p. 11.)
The oldest continuously published newspaper in the country, Åbo
Underrättrelser, was founded in 1824. Twenty-five other papers of the
21st century have been published since the 19th century. The total num-
ber of newspapers was 85 in 1900 and rose to 122 in 1910. In 1930 it was
176, in 1970 the number was 237, and in 1990 it reached 252. Thereafter
the number declined to 200 in 2001. But obviously this number depends
on how frequently published papers are counted as daily newspapers. In
international comparisons, such as the one above, it is customary to count
only the newspapers that come out four or more times a week. Among
Finland’s 200 newspapers in 2001, only 54 met this definition, but these
accounted for 72 percent of the total circulation, which was 3,208,000.
Among them, seven-day papers numbered 28, and 10 papers appeared
six times a week.
The economic slump on the 1990s had severe consequences for the
sale of newspapers. Having been 4,080,000 in 1990, total circulation sank
to 3,680,000 in 1993. It did not pick up when the economy improved
again but continued to decline to the above-mentioned total of 3,208,000
in 2001. (Finnish Mass Media 2000, p. 200; Suomen Lehdistö 6/2002, p. 6.)
Yet the economic situation of the press as a whole has remained rela-
tively strong. The total turnover of all Finnish mass media amounts to
approximately 3 percent of the gross domestic product; it remained at
this level throughout the 1980s and 1990s, although a slight decline since
the mid-80s can be detected (see Table 6.1). Of this cake of 21 billion
Finnish markkas (3.52 billion euros), the slice of the newspapers was 31
percent in 2001, in other words the same percentage as in 1980. The
newspapers fared better than printed advertising, book publishing, or
magazines through the slump years of the early 1990s, but nationwide
television and radio managed even better than the press. However, com-
mercial television did not do as well as had been expected, and it has en-
countered difficult economic problems at the beginning of the 21st century.
Advertising in the Finnish media has amounted to 1.0 percent of the GDP;
it was FIM 7.1 billion (1.2 billion euros) in 1999 and 1.1 billion euros in
2001. Of that cake, the share of newspapers has remained considerably larger
in Finland than in many other countries. The proportion of all advertising
revenue going to newspapers sank from 65 to 57 percent between 1980 and
1998, but even this was above the European average and much higher than
the 16.5 percent in the United States (Finnish Mass Media 2000, pp. 29),
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Table 6.1.
Breakdown of annual mass media turnover from 1980 to 2000 (in %)
Mass Media Year
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Daily newspapers* 26.5 27.6 27.8 28.3 27.4
Non-dailies 4.1 4.4 4.2 3.8  3.2
Magazines, periodicals 21.8 20.1 18.4 17.9 18.0
Free sheets 1.5 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.4
Books 15.7 12.7 13.7 12.4 12.7
Printed advertising 9.9 11.6 9.7 7.9 8.7
Print media total 79.5 78.6 75.8 72.0 72.4
Nationwide tv & radio 13.2 13.1 12.5 15.3 14.7
Local radio, cable tv  0.2 0.5 3.4 3.2 2.8
Online info. services 0.0 0.5 1.1 2.2 1.8
Electronic media total 13.4 14.1 17.0 20.7 19.3
Recorded media** total 7.1 7.3 7.2 7.3 8.3
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total, FIM million 5,533 10,566 16,102 16,418 20,910
As percent of GDP 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7
Sources: Finnish Mass Media 2000, pp. 26–27; Statistics Finland Mass Media and
Culture statistics.
 * Dailies 7–4 times a week, non-dailies 3–1 times a week.
** Phonograms, videos, cinemas, and CD-Rom.
269).23 In 2001 the newspapers received 56 percent, television and radio
together only 22 percent of Finland’s total advertising revenue (YLE 2002).
Although economic considerations are a necessary element of news-
paper publishing, the Finnish press was started and developed primarily
for ideological rather than business reasons. Increasing nationalist feel-
ings and loosely defined political orientations motivated the founding of
papers in the 19th century, and a party press became quite normal at the
time of the democratic parliament reform of 1906. Political parties tried
to have one of their own newspapers published in each election district,
and political agitation among the people and the selling of newspaper
subscriptions became two interlinked activities that reinforced each other
at the grass roots level. For example, of the 122 newspapers published in
23 Between 1988 and 2001 the share of newpapers of global advertising expenditure
fell from 40% to 31%, while the share of television rose from 33% to 40%; World
Press Trends 2001, p. 2.
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1910, only 25 were non-affiliated while 97 were published as an organ of
one of the five political parties.24
During the latter part of the 1920s the total number of newspapers
grew mainly because small local papers began to complement the na-
tional and regional press. There were 70 non-affiliated Finnish-language
papers in 1930, while 82 were affiliated with one of seven different par-
ties. The latter included the 7 communist papers that ceased publication
soon thereafter, in 1931. In addition, 24 papers that were published in the
Swedish language supported the bourgeois side of the political arena.
Very few party papers were directly attached to the party’s membership
organization, with the exception of the non-profitable regional papers of
the political left; more typically the party organs were published by a
printing company that was owned by a group of individuals or even by a
single family that supported the party (Salokangas 1987, pp. 207, 328).
The pattern of evenly strong regional papers did not last: typically one
paper began to outgrow the others of its area and was aided by the spiral
from broader news coverage, more readers, more advertising revenue,
and improved technical possibilities, to broader news coverage, more
readers, more advertising, etc. Thereby the other papers were weakened,
relatively at least, and many were eventually discontinued. The non-party
press finally emerged as the winners on two fronts: many independent
papers were more competitive than party papers, and they became more
numerous because party-affiliated papers, one after another, detached
themselves from their party connection. No more than 12 Finnish lan-
guage party papers remained in 2001, eight of them supporting the So-
cial Democratic Party, three the Center Party, and one the Left Alliance.
In addition, a few papers defined themselves as “independent centrist”
or “independent left wing.”
Finland continues to be well covered by regional newspapers. The
country is divided into twenty regions (see Table 4.6), and each has at
least one daily paper that is published seven times a week (except Åland,
where the regional papers come out five and four days a week). Table 6.2
has a list of 16 seven-day papers, two afternoon papers (six times a week),
and three largest papers specializing in economy. The biggest newspa-
per, called Helsingin Sanomat, is published in the southern Uusimaa prov-
ince and ranks as the biggest paper of all Nordic countries, with a daily
circulation of 454,000 in 1999 and 446,000 in 2001.
Domestic and international politics get quite good coverage in the Finn-
ish press, but they do not dominate its contents, and the overall balance
of space allocated to different kinds of editorial material has been fairly
stable. Articles (editorials and columns) covered 5 percent of the mate-
rial both in 1991 and 1998, while home news declined slightly from 34 to
24 Among the 97 party papers in 1910, the Young Finns had 34, the Finnish Party 27,
Social Democratic Party 20, Swedish People’s Party 10, Agrarian Union 4, and Chris-
tian Workers’ Party 2 papers (Nygård 1987, p 21).
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32 percent, entertainment rose from 11 to 14 percent and radio and tv
pages from 8 to 10 percent. The relative space for culture (7 %), interna-
tional news (6 %), the economy (8 %), sports (14 %), and letters to the
editor and cartoons (totaling 5 %) hardly changed at all during those
years (Finnish Mass Media 2000, p. 210). What is of significance in this
connection is the attention paid by the newspapers to politics and civil
society in both the articles and the home news section.
Table 6.2
Largest newspapers in 2001: Circulation, readership, founding year, and place and
region of issue
Newspapers Circulation  Readers Year Place (Region)*
(weekdays) founded of issue
Leading morning papers:
Helsingin Sanomat 446,000 1,150,000 1889 Helsinki (11)
Aamulehti 135,000 335,000 1881 Tampere (24)
Turun Sanomat 115,000 288,000 1905 Turku (21)
Other 7-day morning papers:
Kaleva 83,000 224,000 1899 Oulu  (51)
Keskisuomalainen 77,000 194,000 1871 Jyväskylä (41)
Savon Sanomat 67,000 186,000 1907 Kuopio (32)
Etelä-Suomen Sanomat 62,000 148,000 1900 Lahti (25)
Satakunnan Kansa 57,000 146,000 1873 Pori (22)
Ilkka 56,000 148,000 1906 Seinäjoki (42)
Hufvudstadsbladet 53,000 133,000 1864 Helsinki (11)
Karjalainen 48,000 129,000 1874 Joensuu (33)
Lapin Kansa 35,000 96,000 1928 Rovaniemi (52)
Etelä-Saimaa  34,000 89,000 1885 Lappeenranta (27)
Pohjalainen 33,000 110,000 1903 Vaasa (43)
Hämeen Sanomat 30,000 81,000 1879 Hämeenlinna (23)
Kouvolan Sanomat 30,000 77,000 1909 Kouvola (26)
12 others 249,000 – – 12 places
Afternoon papers:
Ilta-Sanomat 219,000 855,000 1932 Helsinki (11)
Iltalehti 135,000 699,000 1980 Helsinki (11)
Specialized newspapers:
Kauppalehti 85,000 318,000 1898 Helsinki (11)
Taloussanomat 31,000 84,000 1997 Helsinki (11)
Maaseudun tulevaisuus  89,000 319,000 1916 Helsinki (11)
* The numbers of regions refer to the map in Figure 4.1 (on page 78).
Sources: Suomen Lehdistö 6/2002; National Readership Survey 2001.
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Generally speaking, the political role of “the fourth estate” has moved
gradually from debating politics and proclaiming policies toward setting
the agenda for more general public discourse and providing a forum for
a broader public debate. At the same time, the mass media’s role as a
critical “watchdog” of politics has become solidly established. Politi-
cians feel uneasy because they cannot control the press, nor can they
anticipate at any given time which issues or details will be brought to the
fore by the newspapers, while the law on the freedom of expression and
the accepted ethical norms of journalism do not protect the privacy of
politicians to the same extent as they protect less known private citizens.
It has even been claimed that the overly critical attitudes of the press
have contributed to the negative mass attitude toward politicians and
politics in general.
On the other hand, democracy needs the attention of its citizens, politi-
cians need constant publicity, and the elections depend much on the amount
of publicity that parties and politicians get in the newspaper’s news pages
and articles. The papers make a conscious attempt to analyze, for the benefit
of their readers, the backgrounds of the events of current interest. Readers,
in turn, send in many more letters to the editor than there is space available
for publication.
Newspapers genuinely get attention from the people. The Finns are
accustomed to getting their newspaper delivered to their homes before
breakfast time. Only 15 percent of papers are bought from newsstands,
and 88 percent of subscribed papers are delivered before 6 o’clock in the
morning. Of all Finns aged at least 15 years, more than 90 percent read a
newspaper every day in 1998, using an average of 42 minutes to do so.25
The older the people, the more time they spent reading: persons between
15 and 24 years of age averaged 26 minutes, while the over 65 year-olds
spent one hour and 20 minutes reading newspapers (Finnish Mass Media
2000, p. 215).
Naturally, the print media include books and magazines. The number
of magazines and periodicals published in Finland was 4400 in 1990 and
rose to 5100 in 1998 (these numbers include newspapers published fewer
than three times a week). 43 magazines came out once a week and 381
once or twice a month. In 1999 Finland’s mail service delivered to sub-
scribers 361 million copies, while single-copy sales totaled only 25 mil-
lion Finnish and 3 million foreign magazines. (Op. cit., pp. 223, 230.)
Most books published in Finland cannot hope for large audiences but
the number of publications is quite substantial. In 1998, 12,900 different
books were published. This number equaled 25 book titles per 10,000
25 According to a Gallup survey in 2000, 86 % of the population aged 12–69 years read a
newspaper during a given day, while tv reached 84 %, magazines 80 %, and radio 66
%. The percentage of concentrated attention varied from 47 % to the newspapers and
37 % to tv, to only 4% to radio listening. The average total time consumed per day was
7 hours and 38 minutes, of which radio and tv combined took 142 minutes, magazines
42, newspapers 38, and the other media 94 minutes. (Virmasalo 2000, p. 18.)
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population, which was the highest among the EU countries and much
higher than 5 titles in Japan and 3 titles in the USA. Finland’s 950 public
libraries and 200 mobile libraries lend out about 100 million publica-
tions each year. (Op. cit., pp. 175, 187.) Some of the books and several
periodicals may also be significant politically. For example, each year
there are memoirs published by retiring politicians, and it is not unusual
for politicians to reinforce their election campaigns by writing opinion-
ated books that outline their goals and visions.
Radio and Television
As was indicated above, the electronic mass media take up more of
people’s time than newspapers and other reading materials. In measure-
ments carried out by the “peoplemeter” system26 and including people
who were at least 10 years of age, 75 percent of people watched televi-
sion and 79 percent listened to radio during an average day in 1999. They
spent about 2 hours and 40 minutes watching, and more than three hours
listening. In 2001 the times had grown to 2 hours 47 minutes watching
and 3 hours 28 listening (Yle 1.7.2002). Again age made a difference:
people over 65 years sat an average of four hours at their tv sets and
added another four hours of radio listening to it, but an average young
person between 15-24 years of age watched television only one hour 40
minutes and listened to the radio about two hours (op.cit., pp. 71, 104).
Nowadays there are plenty of programs to choose from. In Finland,
three tv channels penetrated the whole country in 2000 and a fourth one
covered most of it. Programs originating from Sweden were also relayed
to southern and western Finland (see Table 6.3). Nationally distributed
and local cable tv programs and some local tv broadcasts offered addi-
tional choices, and 14 percent of the people viewed satellite programs
directly. National radio channels numbered about ten, and there were
more than one hundred regional or local radio stations. In Helsinki, radio
receivers could be tuned to 21 different FM stations.
Only recently has the supply of programs become this extensive. The
history of the electronic mass media is naturally much shorter than the
history of the printed press, and many of the advances date from the very
end of the 20th century. There has been a stepwise development both in
new technical possibilities and some keenly contested policy decisions.
Finland’s first wireless signals were transmitted in 1900. Radio broad-
casting started in early 1920s. Amateur radio broadcasts were first trans-
mitted in 1923, and in 1926 radio associations formed the Finnish Broad-
casting Company (Yleisradio, now generally known as YLE). All radio
26  This is a continuous audience survey by Finnpanel Oy, commissioned jointly by the
Finnish Broadcasting Company, MTV3, TV4, and the Federation of Advertising
Agencies.
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stations around the country began to relay its national broadcasts. An
enlarged audience and increased and more varied programming became
possible in 1928, when the state constructed a powerful long-wave trans-
mitter in Lahti. Later technical milestones have included the Pori short-
wave station in 1948, the establishment of one of the world’s first nation-
wide FM networks between 1953 and 1956, public tv transmission in
1955 and regular tv broadcasts by YLE in 1958, completion of the sec-
ond FM network in 1963, regular stereophonic radio transmissions in
1967, regular color tv transmissions in 1969, broadcasted teletext trans-
missions in 1981, and digital radio in 1998. Digital television broadcasts
started in August 2001.
Table 6.3
Availability and average daily viewing of Finland’s national tv channels in 1999
(excluding text-tv)
YLE YLE YLE MTV3 Four TV4/ Total
 TV1 TV2 Total STV
Penetration (%) 100 100 100 100 79 32 100
Weekly program hours 112 80 192 105 83  – >600
Daily reach (%) 58 53 66 64 35 5 75*
Daily viewing (minutes) 37 33 70 68 16  – 161*
Channel shares in % 23 20 43  42 10 1 100*
* Including satellites (14 % reach, 6 minutes and 4 % viewing).
Source: Finnish Mass Media 2000, pp. 55–74.
How the new possibilities were put into practice has depended much
on the government. A complete reorganization in 1934 created a new
stock holding company, and the new radio law stipulated that the state
was the company’s majority owner and that all program distribution was
to be integrated with it. The government granted the single operating
license, usually for five years at a time. This company enjoyed an actual
monopoly of broadcasting for half a century, until the 1980s.
Originally, the question of permitting independent companies to broad-
cast advertising was much debated in European countries. For example,
in the United Kingdom a fierce political controversy preceded the act of
parliament in 1954 authorizing the Independent Television (ITV) net-
work to compete with BBC as a consortium of private companies. Its
broadcasts were subjected to much stricter regulation of advertising than
in America’s commercial television. Sweden and Norway allowed no
commercials at all before the 1990s.
Finland’s unique solution was to allow a commercially based com-
pany, MTV (later renamed MTV3) to broadcast its television program-
ming using transmission facilities leased from YLE’s two channels. MTV
shared program time with YLE and paid enough for transmissions to
provide 20 percent of YLE’s total revenue. In legal terms YLE held the
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one and only operating license. Although MTV functioned independently,
it was formally operating under YLE’s license. The whole picture changed
in 1993, when several licenses were granted for nationwide operations,
and again in 2000, when the government allocated the thirteen digital
channels to be launched in August 2001. The first local radio stations had
been permitted in 1985.
It was apparent already in the 1970s that commercial MTV was not
satisfied with its subordinate role. Its early goal was to become a fully
independent “full-service channel.” In order to move toward the goal, it
lobbied in various ways for permission to start its own news broadcasts.
YLE was irritated even by occasional MTV current affairs programs and
opposed a competing daily news service. The matter became highly po-
liticized until, after much preparation, the administrative council of YLE
voted in 1980 in favor of a two-year trial period. The vote was 12 to 9,
with the non-socialist majority in favor and the Social Democratic and
Communist members against. The competing news service began in Sep-
tember 1981 and soon improved the evening news on both channels.
The monopoly position of YLE, the state-owned Finnish Broadcast-
ing Company, did not mean that its programs were dictated by the gov-
ernment. It aimed from the beginning to be a neutral medium, providing
education, information, and entertainment for the whole nation. The origi-
nal model was comparable to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC),
in which public service broadcasting was concentrated in 1922, or to the
German system, where radio broadcasts to the general public began in
1923 in the hands of the country’s postal authorities (Lyytinen 1996, pp.
14, 20). After the Second World War, YLE’s programming twice slipped
very far to the political left and both times a revised organizational struc-
ture helped to balance the situation. In 1948 the administration of the
company was removed from the shareholders’ (i.e., the government’s)
control and its administrative council became elected by parliament. In
1969 the director general’s authority concerning programming policies
was split among the heads of the various divisions.
Balanced or not, the 1970s were a decade of another kind of
politicization. Party political “quotas” of personnel were the pattern. The
party secretary of the Social Democrats was appointed director general
in 1970, while the former secretary of the Center Party became program
director and head of TV1. Even the journalists’ partisan affiliation played
a role in recruitment and assignments. More recently, professional abil-
ity has again been the foremost consideration.
Undoubtedly the electronic mass media have grown to be an impor-
tant element in the country’s political system, in Finland as elsewhere.
There are times when they help to unify the nation; they inform the pub-
lic; they provide a forum for political discourse; and they provide a di-
rect link from the rulers to the citizenry. As early as in 1932, a rebellious
extreme right-wing movement was stopped by a radio speech by the presi-
dent of the republic. A comparison in 1999 of the audiences of various tv
programs indicates that almost 50 percent of the whole nation gathered
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to watch the president’s independence day reception on channel 1, and
this was even more than the interest shown in Finland’s performance in
the ice hockey world championships (Finnish Mass Media 2000, p. 76).
In its early years the radio distanced itself from politics, but nowadays
ministers and other top politicians may face a reporter and a camera around
any corner, press conferences are frequent, important debates in parlia-
ment are broadcast live, and tv and radio debates are a most central ele-
ment of election campaigns.
Responsible for public service, the Finnish Broadcasting Company
YLE cannot carry advertising. As elsewhere in Europe, its finances have
been based on license fees. The number of radio licenses exceeded 100,000
in 1930 and 1,000,000 in 1955; when they were abolished in 1976 their
number had risen to 2,200,000. In 1969, when the very first color tv
licenses were sold, there were 1 million black-and-white television li-
censes, but in 1980 the number of color licenses (786,000) surpassed
black-and-white ones (752,000). Only 51,000 of the latter remained in
1995, when the distinction was abolished. (Op. cit., p. 61). In 2000, there
were 2 million tv licenses in Finland, in other words 386 licenses per 1000
population, and the average number of tv sets was 1.5 per household.
The annual television license fee was raised in July 2000 from FIM
882 to FIM 982 (€ 148 to € 165). It cost the same in 2002. Elsewhere in
Europe the annual fees varied greatly, from 277 euros in Denmark and
226 euros in Norway to € 107 in Ireland and € 94 in Italy. According to
YLE’s audience research in 2001, 60 percent of the population consid-
ered the fee of 165 euros to be very or rather good value for the money,
and 86 percent were very or rather satisfied with YLE’s television and
radio programming. Almost everybody appreciated having “programs
available to all Finnish people regardless of where they live.” (YLE an-
nual report 2001, p. 29.) A survey in 1999 showed that many more val-
ued “reliable news and current affairs programming” more highly than
entertainment programs, and a large majority was satisfied with the news
of both the YLE and the MTV3 channels. Only the new TV4 Finland had
not grown to the same level of acceptance. Nevertheless, the newspapers
were the main source of daily news for more people than any given tv or
radio news program. (Kytömäki and Ruohomaa 1999.)
In December 1999, digital tv operators published their proposals for “The
launch of digital terrestrial television broadcasting in Finland,” which was
approved by the ministry of transport and communications in March 2000.
The “National Launch Day” was August 27, 2001. It introduced not four but
thirteen tv channels in three groups. YLE’s tv licenses will finance multiplex
A: TV1-D, TV2-D, YLE 24 (non-stop news), Yle Plus (culture), and FST-D
(in Swedish). Multiplex B is financed through advertising: MTV3-D, sports
channel, Citytv (current affairs for three regions), and Wellnet (specialized
topics, also pay-tv). Multiplex C includes the Channel 4 and three pay-tv
channels: 24 hours movies, an education channel, and Canal+ (movies and
sports). At the beginning of 2002, only three huge problems were looming:
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how to find the necessary audiences, how to activate pay-tv subscribers, and
how to provide the equipment for watching digi-tv?
And at least three additional questions needed to be answered: will the
quality of the wider choice of programs be maintained, at a time when tv
companies are cutting, not enlarging, their staff;27 how many new tv chan-
nels will receive permits to start in 2003; and will people be ready to
accept the planned termination of all analogue broadcasting in 2006? In
spring 2002, there were no more than 25,000 digi-tv receivers tuned to
the digital channels.
The New Media
The circulation of news on telset began in Finland in 1980. Telefax was
also used to distribute newspapers that were specially laid out for this
purpose. But technical development provided two additional, more con-
venient types of electronic mass communication, namely, text tv and the
Internet. The former has been available on YLE’s tv channels and on
MTV3 and are updated with news throughout the night, too. The latter
has made it possible for newspapers to publish an electronic version of
the printed paper. By spring 2000, Finland already had 73 Internet news-
papers and 138 internet magazines. In advertising the scope of the Internet
has remained very small in Finland.28
The ministries and various authorities in public administration, as well
as political parties and individual politicians, publish their own material
on their web pages, which have become a natural element of election
campaigns. In connection with the parliamentary election in 1995, YLE
designed a web-based “election machine,” and other media followed suit
during the subsequent elections. Their idea is to record the responses of
the candidates to some twenty or more multiple choice questions,29 to let
the web page reader answer the same questions, and then determine which
candidates are closest to the voter’s own thinking, and who deviate the
most from it. This game became quite popular.
There has also been some discussion in Finland about whether the
Internet could be used as a modern means of voting in general elections
and referendums. Already the nationwide electric register of voters is of
great convenience in the administration of elections in polling stations
around the country. The apparent obstacle to proposed electronic voting
at home, however, is the obvious possibility that such votes might not
27 MTV3 announced in January 2001 that it would dismiss one-quarter of its person-
nel, causing strong spontaneous resistance from its employees.
28 Worldwide, the internet’s share of display advertising total is about 3%; World Press
Trends 2001, p. 2.
29 For an analysis of the 18 answers that the Finnish candidates for the European
Parliament gave in 1999 to the “election machine” of Helsingin Sanomat, see
Paloheimo 2000.
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remain as secret as the ballots cast in booths of public polling places.
It is getting increasingly difficult to draw the line between mass com-
munication and personal communication. For example, mobile telephones
are also becoming miniature-sized tv receivers, and tv channels are plan-
ning ways to combine digital television with internet applications. The
first step will be a simplified two-way interaction between viewers and
the program producers, not only for instant audience reactions, but also
to get immediate responses to commercial offerings. But neither will it
be easy to make a distinction between the printed press and the elec-
tronic mass media. The MTV3 is owned by a group that publishes ten
daily newspapers, owns the one nationwide commercial radio channel,
and is planning various ways to do business as a provider for electronic
communications. The Channel 4 television station is owned by the com-
pany which became Finland’s biggest publisher of both newspapers and
books after a merger in 1999. As a consequence of such groupings and
further plans, the same journalists may soon serve simultaneously quite
different media, although so far the editorial contents of the media have
not been influenced by the mergers.
In democratic societies, the authorities cannot control in advance the
material that is communicated. How this is stipulated in the Finnish con-
stitution was quoted in the beginnig of this chapter, and Article 12 con-
tinues: “More detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of ex-
pression are laid down by an act.” Such an act was introduced in parlia-
ment in spring 2002; the government’s bill aims to replace the separate
acts on press freedom (1919), television (1971), and cable tv (1987). The
new law will apply neutrally to all forms of mass communication, old
and new media alike.
However, the principle of freedom is not applicable to all concrete
situations. A familiar problem is how to protect children from program-
ming that contains undesirable visual images.30 Nor does free expression
mean the freedom to violate another’s legal rights. Sometimes the courts
seem to find it difficult to draw the line between press freedom and the
citizens’ right to privacy. The government bill will continue to place le-
gal responsibility for the contents of mass communication with the edi-
tor-in-chief or responsible program director, and with the publisher. How-
ever, it is not always easy to determine who is responsible in the new
media, as it can be impossible to determine what information was dis-
seminated or to identify the sender of anonymous messages via the web.
The line between private and mass communication can also be unclear.
30 There is advance rating of motion pictures and videotapes and voluntary rating of tv
programs.
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7  People’s Attachment to Politics
...the developments are the result of rising demands for political rights
and influence.
Kaase and Newton 1995, p. 171
I feel as if I’m living in a house where all decisions about our lives are
made on the top floor, beyond the reach of ordinary people.
A young voter in France in spring 2002
Political Involvement
People have a wide range of concerns. Among them, neither their attach-
ment to organizations nor political activity rank very high. But although
most people do not feel that politics belongs to the central areas of their
lives, there are those who have a genuine interest in it. In Finnish survey
studies almost all respondents say that the family is important for them,
80 percent calling it very important, and a large majority also value their
friends, their work, and leisure time, whereas only 45 percent say that
religion is an important area of their lives and no more than 20 percent
find politics very or rather important. 25 percent think that politics has
no importance at all. (World Values 2000.)
However, when people are asked “How interested are you in poli-
tics?” typically about one-half of the interviewees have said that they are
very or rather interested. This share has not changed much over the years,
nor do the Finnish findings differ much from the level of political interest
that is found cross-nationally.31 However, some decline may be occur-
ring, because in one survey in 2000, only 28 percent of Finnish respon-
dents answered that they were very or rather interested in politics and 22
percent claimed to be totally uninterested (World Values 2000).
31 See: Pesonen et al. 1993, p. 170; Bennulf et al. 1998, p. 105; Political Action 1979,
VAR 0013.
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One should keep in mind such differences in people’s political involve-
ment. Because of the variation, scholars like to group citizens according
their political participation and interest in politics. The basic unidimen-
sional picture has consisted of three levels, such as the nation’s apathetics,
spectators, and gladiators (Milbrath and Goel 1977, p. 21), or the levels
of no, some, and active participation (Topf 1995, p. 68). Subjective inter-
est and political activity, in turn, have been combined into four modes of
political involvement, namely, into apathetic, detached, expressive, and
instrumental involvement in politics (Kaase and Barnes 1979, p. 527).
The focus of people’s attention to politics has changed in Finland, as
in many other countries. It has moved to a large extent from mass meet-
ings to private homes and from collective activity to individual attach-
ment, as well as from ideologies to personalities. The expansion of televi-
sion brought about a major change in political mass communication, and
because the citizenry is more educated than before, voters can be mobilized
more “cognitively” than before. Another development is the voters’ gradual
alienation from political parties and the trend toward personalized politics.
Both of them have been observed in Finland and other western democracies
alike, although increasing depoliticization appeared in Finland later than in
the other Nordic countries (Allardt and Pesonen 1967, p. 364).
Elections, and especially participation as voters in elections, link most
citizens to the political system. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Finland’s
level of voter turnout reached its highest levels during the 1960s and
remained comparatively high for some time after. However, only 68 per-
cent voted in the parliamentary elections in 1999 and 56 percent in the
local elections in 2000. Participation in the Finnish elections will be dis-
cussed more in Chapter 8 below.
Naturally, in all political systems there is internal variation between
citizens in how involved they are in the politics of their country, and the
relative sizes of various groups or modes may differ between the coun-
tries. Voter turnout in elections declined quite generally in the 1990s.32
Various other cross-national comparisons are by no means accurate, but
it seems that there have been fewer “apathetic” people in Finland than in
Belgium, Spain, or Italy, while fewer have been “instrumentally” involved
in Finland than in Germany or the Netherlands (Topf 1995, pp. 84–85).
Many general patterns of mass political behavior tend to remain con-
stant. But new patterns of behavior may also appear, and often they spread
cross-nationally. For example, the wave of student radicalism, mentioned
in Chapter 5, started in the United States, soon led to the “Paris revolu-
tion” in France in 1968 and spread unrest and unconventional political
acts elsewhere. During the 1970s, new types of political actions became
a common element in western political cultures, as also in Finland.
32 The median change from the 1950s to the 1990s in the OECD countries was a 10
percent decline in turnout. There was a decline in every country except Australia,
Denmark, and Sweden. The most substantial drop-off happened during the 1990s.
Finland’s decline was somewhat smaller than the OECD average. (Wattenberg 2000,
pp. 71–73.) – See also Dalton 2002, p. 36.
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Table 7.1 summarizes five such political acts. They are called uncon-
ventional because their purpose is to influence political decisions directly
rather than through the conventional route of elections and political par-
ties. Nowadays there is nothing unusual about signing petitions; about
one-half of the Finns have done it and most of the others would do so in
order to advance some political goal. Such was not the case a quarter-
century ago, because then only one out of five Finns had signed a peti-
tion, while one out of four considered such an act unthinkable. Partici-
pating in boycotts has also gained acceptance and more people have joined
in demonstrations.33 On the other hand, illegal political acts were resented
by most Finns just as strongly in 2000 as in 1975.
Table 7.1
Participation and potential participation in five unconventional political acts, in
1975 and in 2000 (in %)
Political acts Have Might Would Don’t Total
done do never do know
In 1975:
Signing a petition 19 53  23 5 100
Joining in boycots 1  32 51 7 100
Lawful demonstrations 6 51 40 3 100
Wildcat strikes 4 25 66 5 100
Occupying buildings – 16 78 6 100
In 2000:
Signing a petition 47 35 13 5 100
Joining in boycots 14 50 30 6 100
Lawful demonstrations 14 41 39 6 100
Wildcat strikes 2 23 67 7 99
Occupying buildings – 14 79 7 100
Source: Political Action Study 1979; The Finnish Gallup, October 2000.
New types of political action also gave rise to new ways of structuring
people’s political participation when analyzing it, such as the two-di-
mensional “typology of political action repertory” which gave the citi-
zens five possible labels: either inactives, conformists, reformists, activ-
ists, or protesters (Kaase and Marsh 1979, p. 155). In the Finnish com-
parison, it seemed preferable to analyze nine different citizen-types, rang-
33 Participation in the same three acts increased also in Great Britain, West Germany,
and the U.S.A. between the mid-1970s and 1995. Finland’s general level of uncon-
ventional participation appeared relatively low in cross-national comparisons. Dalton
2002, pp. 62–65.
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ing from inactives to “fully actives” (Pesonen and Sänkiaho 1979, p.
218). One finding about the Finns was that the citizens who felt they
were politically efficacious were the most likely to rank high on both
dimensions of political participation, on conventional participation and
protest potential. In other words, they were “fully active” citizens who
got involved in things like campaigning and party work, and were at the
same time the most willing to resort to demonstrations, petitions, or even
illegal protest acts (op. cit., p. 254).
During the 1990s there was a further decline in the minority of Finnish
citizens who thought that politics occupies a very important or rather impor-
tant place in their lives. It sank from 28 percent to the above-mentioned 20
percent, which is a very small share of the population when compared with
Sweden where the corresponding figure was 47 percent in 1996.
Comparisons across nations and over time have also been made of
people’s value orientations, and the trends have appeared similar across
many countries. Postmaterialist values are a case in point (Inglehart 1997,
pp. 140, 157). The measure suggested by Ronald Inglehart shows that in
Finland, as in many other countries, such values were assumed increas-
ingly by each new generation. Among the total population, percent mate-
rialist subtracted from percent postmaterialist rose a great deal in two
decades: It was –34 in 1975 but climbed to +18 in 1996. And different
age cohorts have tended to think differently in Finland, too. In 1996 the
figure measuring post-materialism was –7 for persons aged 65 years or
more, but +35 for persons who were twenty-five to thirty-four years of
age. On the other hand, Finnish studies have not confirmed that the young-
est group, aged fifteen to twenty-four years, is the most post-materialist
one (+23 in 1996). It seems that the temporary insecurity of the student
generation counteracted to some extent the general trend toward increased
postmaterialism. (Nurmela et al. 1997, pp. 262–263.)
Trust, Pride, and Resentment
Twice a year the European Commission conducts its general public opin-
ion surveys, the Eurobarometers (already referred to in Chapter 3). Since
1994 many of them have contained the following question: “In the near
future, do you see yourself as: nationality only/ nationality and Euro-
pean/ European and nationality/ European only?” The responses reveal
that not only the Finns (cf. Chapter 3), but all EU citizens have a strong
tendency to remain committed to their own nationality, without feeling
themselves to be genuine Europeans. In autumn 2001, 44 percent described
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themselves as “nationality only,” while no more than 3 percent said they are
“European only” and a further 6 percent answered “European and national-
ity.” The young tend to feel more European than the older age groups, but it
is hardly possible to detect any process of “Europeanization” between 1995
and 2001. On the other hand, people who express a European identity have
been constantly fewer in Finland than in all of the EU. The same is even
more true of Britons, while the citizens of Luxembourg and Italy have felt
the most European. (Eurobarometer 56, pp. 14, B.18.)
Another survey in Finland that offered a broader range of regional
identities to choose from, did not find the Finns internationally oriented
either. The most common choices were the home town and the country
as a whole, while very few identified with either the whole world, west-
ern Europe, or the Nordic countries (Sänkiaho and Säynässalo 1994, p.
113). A more recent study confirmed this. Its respondents were invited to
choose from five alternatives the two geographic areas to which they
mainly belong; 74 percent chose the home town and 68 percent chose
Finland as a whole. Many more Finns also identified with their region or
province than with either Europe (10 percent) or the whole world (7 per-
cent). (World Values 2000.)
National identity means a great deal to people everywhere, but it may
be especially important for the citizens of small countries (cf. Chapter
3). And the Finns not only think of themselves foremost as Finns but are
also proud of their country and many aspects of its political system. They
recall how Finland pioneered female suffrage almost a century ago, and
they learned to trust their political system during the war and through the
central role played by the political-administrative establishment in crisis
situations. During the postwar reconstruction period, the political-admin-
istrative system and the labor market organizations had central roles in
building the foundations for Finland’s growing material well-being.
One generation ago there were those who felt that life might be better
elsewhere, but these views changed by the beginning of the 1980s. When
asked in 1977, 1980, and 1983, “which country provides the best living
conditions?” the proportion choosing Finland rose from less than one-
half to more than two-thirds of the population (see Table 7.2). It even
was fashionable to claim that “To be born in Finland is like winning the
lottery.” Either the Finns were becoming truly pleased with what their
country provides for them, or they made the realistic observation that
other nations, too, are pressed by unsolved problems. Then the over-
heated 1980s “boiled over,” and the severe economic slump of the 1990s
caused serious problems for Finland. Only slowly did the people begin
to get back into a more optimistic mood.
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Table 7.2
Public opinion in Finland on “Which country provides the best living conditions,”
from 1977 to 1983
Country 1977 1980 1983
Finland 47% 53% 68%
Sweden 25 21 10
USA 10 7 5
USSR 4 2 1
Others, Don’t Know 14 17 16
Source: Pesonen 1985, p. 25.
Although the Finnish people are proud of their country, many have
become alienated and skeptical about the role and performance of some
political institutions. Most Finns feel that the political parties and even
the government and the bureaucracy have too much power in society. In
early 1990s people were very antagonistic towards banks and so-called
market forces, both of which use power that is beyond the control of
ordinary people. On the other hand, people have felt for a long time that
families and individual citizens are much too powerless.
A comparison of the evaluations expressed in late 1992 with the opin-
ions eight years previously shows that banks and big business really lost
credibility when the economic depression hit the country. Criticism of
the excessive power of political parties and the government had also in-
tensified. Table 7.3 summarizes how the corresponding opinions were
distributed again in 1999. By that year the extreme criticism of the banks
had mellowed, although a majority of the Finns still considered banks
and big corporations too powerful. During the late 1990s the mass me-
dia, the European Union, and market forces had risen to the top of the list
of influences which people considered exceedingly powerful. The envi-
ronmentalists had also lost a great deal of their popularity.
On the other hand, the desire for more power to the individual has
remained strong and constant. Likewise, the Finns feel that both families
and civil organizations are too powerless. Of the public influences, the
police have become even more popular, and the balance of opinion fa-
vors giving more power to the courts as well. A large majority thought in
1999 that the president had the right amount of power. Also, opinions
were rather balanced on the extent of influence of parliament, municipal
decisionmakers, the church, and, especially, the defense forces.
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Table 7.3
Public opinion in 1999 on the amount of power exercised by twenty-two different
influences (in %)
Influence Too much The right Too little Balance*
power amount power
The media 67 31 1 +66
The European Union, EU 65 33  3  +62
So-called market forces 63 33 2  +61
Big business 57 41 2 +55
The banks 54 45 2 +52
Political parties 50  45 2 +48
The bureaucracy 41 54 5  +36
The environmentalists  46 36 18 +28
Employers’ organizations 30 62 7 +23
The government 28 66  7 +21
The trade union movement 33 53 15 +18
The church 21 65 13 +8
The president 21 64 16  +5
Municipal decision makers 21 57 22  –1
The defense forces 8 78 14  –6
Parliament 14 61 25 –11
The universities 4 71 25 –21
The judiciary 12 42 37 –25
Civil organizations 3 53 43 –40
The police 4 42 55 –51
The family 1 44 55 –54
The individual citizen 1  22 77  –76
* “Too little power” deducted from “too much power.”
Source: Adopted from EVA 1999a, p. 20.
This picture of influential forces does not change much if one com-
pares how much confidence the Finnish people have in the country’s
different institutions. In the early 1990s the undesirable social and eco-
nomic consequences of the depression had an obvious impact on the evalu-
ations. People did not trust the institutions that were mainly responsible
for setting goals and implementing them, but they had faith in the things
and institutions that felt permanent, especially in the institutions that pro-
tect internal and international security.
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The police gained respect quite generally in the western countries dur-
ing the “civic disobedience” protests in the 1970s (Pesonen and Sänkiaho
1979, p. 96). Now, according to the World Values Survey, the Finns are
unusual not only in their willingness to give the police additional power,
but also because they rank the police as their most trusted institution.
Indeed hardly ever do letters to the editor contain criticism of the integ-
rity of the police. Likewise, the defense forces enjoy the confidence of
most people, and even more so in 2000 than two decades earlier. (Nurmela
et al. 1997, pp. 165–172, World Values 2000).
Table 7.4.
Finnish people’s confidence in thirteen institutions in 2000 by age, and change from
1981 (in %)
Influentials Total (Change) Age groups in 2000
18–24 25–34 35–49 50–64 65–
The Police 89 (+1) 90 87 90 91 89
Defense forces 83 (+12) 76 83 80 87 86
The courts 65 (–19) 75 68 63 60 63
The church 57 (+8) 43 54 54 58 73
Trade unions 52 (–2) 59 53 50 49 49
Parliament 43 (–22) 42 35 37  46 54
Major companies 41 (+4) 48 42 42 35 40
The government  41 (+9)** 49 38 34 41 51
United Nations 41 (–10)** 55 49  45 37 33
Civil service 39 (–14) 41 35 35 42 46
Press 36 (+2) 36 39 36 36 35
European Union 24 (–14)* 30 24 22 27 19
Political parties 14 (+1)* 18 8 12 17 21
Note: Percentages of respondents who answered either “a geat deal” or “quite a lot.”
The other alternatives were “not very much,” or “none at all.”
 * Change from 1990 to 2000.
** Change from 1996 to 2000.
Source: World Values 1981, 1990, 2000.
Table 7.4 lists thirteen influences, ordered according to the percentage
of people who had confidence in them. Also, it shows what change has
occurred in two decades or, in some cases, during a shorter period. In
addition to the armed forces, only the church has gained some confi-
dence. Most people continue to trust the court system, although fewer in
2000 than in 1981. Both parliament and the civil service have lost some
confidence, and the European Union, not well trusted as the EC in 1990,
has since sunk to near the bottom of the list. At the very bottom are
political parties. While one-half of the citizenry would like to reduce the
power of parties, only 14 percent has confidence in them. Even parlia-
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ment and the government are under some suspicion, while the court sys-
tem and the church enjoy the trust of the majority of Finns.
In spring 2001 the Eurobarometer also added to its surveys questions
about people’s trust in their country’s media and political and other insti-
tutions. These results cannot be directly compared with the World Values
Survey because the questions were worded differently. The responses
given in the 15 EU countries were distributed more similarly than one
might have expected: a majority of west Europeans trusted the police
and the army, followed by the legal system and the Church, but few trusted
the political parties. The Finns, however, appeared more trustful than
most others. They trusted their government, parliament, and mass media
more than Europeans in general, and, especially, they expressed the EU’s
highest trust in the police, the army, and also the trade unions. Only when
expressing their trust in voluntary and non-governmental organizations
did they express views that were average for Europe. (Eurobarometer 55,
pp. 6–10, B.7–B.9.)34 Interrestingly, a majority of Finns expressed trust
in the mass media when askede separately about radio, television, and
the press, rather than about the media in general.
Finnish opinions within the different age groups are similar in some,
but not in all respects (see Table 7.4). Similarities include the people’s
very high confidence in the police and relatively low confidence in the
press. Age adds to confidence in the church but reduces confidence in the
United Nations. In some cases, including the government, parliament,
and the civil service, one finds a linear relationship: people are more
confident the older they get, with the one exception that the very young-
est show more confidence than the most ‘suspicious’ age group, those
between 25 and 34 years of age. The youngest also differ from the others
in their above-average confidence in the courts, the trade unions, big
business, and the European Union. There were only small differences
between persons with materialist and post-materialist value orientations,
althought the materialists has some tendency to doubt the civil service,
and the post-materialists had below-average confidence in the defence
forces, the church, and major companies (World Values Survey data 2000).
Generally speaking, the Finnish people trusted their institutions al-
ready in 1996 somewhat more than in 1993, although opinions had not
yet returned to pre-slump levels. Thus the nadir of popular confidence in
institutions seemed to be a thing of the recent past in 1996 but, as Table
7.4 indicates, the level of conficence that was typical of the mid-1980s
does not return easily.
Clearly the mass attitudes illustrate that the legitimacy of the Finnish
political system rests on a solid basis. Comparative survey studies also
find relatively more people in Sweden, Norway, and Finland than else-
where who feel that they can trust their fellow citizens. The sense of
34 The subsequent surveys in October-November 2001 again gave similar results, ex-
cept that the Finns’ trust in organizations had declined below the EU average
(Eurobarometer 56, p. B.15).
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subjective well-being of the Finnish people is as high as that of the Ameri-
cans (Inglehart 1997, pp. 173–178) and slightly above the average Euro-
pean level (Eurobarometer 56, p. 2).
A Case Story: Suspected Favoritism
In October 1997, when the nation was struggling with serious political
problems, a small incident grew into a major political issue that almost
precipitated the government’s resignation. Its background was the bank
crisis of early 1990s. After the Bank of Finland liberalized foreign ex-
change controls in the 1980s, Finnish banks began offering cheap loans
and opened an easy flow of money. Business was heated, GDP grew fast,
but the worldwide economic showdown and a devaluation of the Finnish
currency suddenly made it impossible for many businesses and individu-
als to service their loans, and the values of their collateral collapsed.
A wave of bankruptcies followed, but the government rushed to the sup-
port of the banks, especially the savings banks. The credibility of the
Finnish economic system was saved, and Finland’s international credit
rating is again very high but, as mentioned above, public attitudes to-
ward the banks and bank directors were deeply altered.
The board members of some local savings banks were made to pay
compensation for the harm they had caused their banks by granting loans
against inadequate collateral. A special bank was established under gov-
ernment management to manage the real estate that fell in the hands of
the banks as a result of bankruptcies.
One of the banks that was rescued and merged with its former com-
petitors was the Workers’ Savings Bank, a nationwide institution with
about a 3 percent share of all banking business. Three of its directors
were sued for damages. The chief executive officer of the bank had been
appointed to that position in 1982, when he was the chairman of the
Social Democratic Party. The court found him liable to pay 25 million
markkas in damages but, after he appealed to the Supreme Court, the
sum was reduced in September 1997 to 9 million (plus 6 million in inter-
est). He then negotiated a deal with the government’s supervising agency
to pay only 1.2 million. The minister of taxation accepted the deal be-
cause she thought that it was better for the state to get 1.2 million than
nothing.
The agreement was not illegal, and it may have been rational as a
single case, but it was out of line. It was also a bigger political mistake
than the minister and the prime minister, both Social Democrats, first
realized. The case was brought to the attention of parliament during ques-
tion time, the opposition initiated an interpellation – a formal challenge
to the government – on the issue, and within a few days the minister had
lost her support among the other parties in the government coalition and
soon within the parliament group of her own party. Her only escape was
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to resign quickly, before the interpellation was debated. It was the first
time that a minister of the Finnish government had resigned because of
criticism on moral grounds of a single decision or action. The party chose
and announced the new minister at once.
This case illustrates many aspects of Finnish political culture in the
latter part of the 1990s, such as the following:
– In all democracies, small and easily understood political issues may
receive far more public attention than large and important ones.
– Finnish banks and bank directors have lost prestige and popularity,
and the political parties are unpopular.
– Because of the red-white cleavage in Finnish society, separate “red
capital” had been accumulated mostly as the result of two competing
cooperative movements. The Workers’ Savings Bank was one of the
bastions of red capital, which disappeared almost completely in the
1990s.
– A broadly based majority government can steamroller parliament be-
cause of party discipline, but that may cause resentment and a
“backbenchers’ revolt.”
– Typical of Finnish political culture is a very strong demand for fair
and equal treatment of all citizens. It is also difficult to sweep any
cases under the carpet because of the openness of society, including
its very open public administration.
– Corruption is relatively rare in Finnish politics and administration.
When, in 1997, the World Bank commissioned a study of the degree
of corruption in fifty countries, Finland was found to be the second
“cleanest.” On a scale from 0 to 10 Finland scored 9.5 points behind
only Denmark (9.9). Four years later their order was reversed: Fin-
land scored 9.9 and Denmark 9.5 points. Comparable corruption rat-
ing for Sweden was 9.0, for Great Britain 8.3, for the United States
7.6, for Germany 7.4, for France 6.7, and for Italy 5.5; the lowest
ratings in that comparison of ninety-one states were Nigeria’s 1.0
and Bangladesh’s .4 (Shively 2003, p. 14; Transparency International
2001).
Church and Religion
Secularization has been one characteristic of the 20th century. The links
connecting churches and religiousness to political life weakened in West-
ern Europe, where “the religious map... has not changed its basic struc-
ture since the end of the religious wars in the middle of the seventeenth
century” (Lane and Ersson 1995, p. 66). Religious commitment had an
impact on people’s political outlooks despite ongoing secularization.
A generation ago it still was strongly related to partisanship in many
countries, including the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy, while it did not
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explain partisan choice at all in Finland or Sweden (Rose 1974, p. 17).
Although religious awareness of the Finnish people tends to be weak, the
church and religion have had a very important role in Finnish society
(see pages 20, 23-24, 56, and 189), and their influence on the political
culture remains significant.
Like the other Nordic countries, Finland became Lutheran as the re-
sult of the sixteenth century Reformation. The transfer from its Catholic
heritage to Protestantism happened relatively smoothly. Bishop Henry,
who in the 1150s was the first bishop of Finland, is thought of as the
direct predecessor of the later bishops of the Turku diocese, the archbish-
ops since 1817. The country was divided in two dioceses in 1554. Since
1959 the national church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, has had eight
dioceses. The number of parishes was 586 in 2001. The Church Law of
1686 requested all citizens to belong to the Lutheran Church. In the 1860s
local government and church administration were separated, and so were
the schools and the church, and the Church Law of 1869 separated in
principle the church from the state.
Complete freedom of religion was legislated in 1922. In the Nordic
countries, Sweden followed Finland’s example in 2000 and separated
church and state, whereas Denmark and Norway continue to have
Lutheran state churches. Of the Finnish people, 85 percent belonged in
2000 to the Lutheran National Church, making it the world’s third larg-
est Lutheran church. The Orthodox Church, with about 56,000 mem-
bers, is the second largest in Finland. Other significant religious groups
in the country include the Pentecostal movement, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Roman Catholics, Adventists, the Jewish community, Mormons, Bap-
tists, Methodists, and the Islamic congregations.
By and large, Finnish society has a secular character, not least because
of the strong element of individualism in Protestantism. In cross-national
comparisons the Finns appear infrequent churchgoers, comparable to
people in the other Nordic countries and Russia. Only 8 percent attend a
Sunday service at least once a month, while 27 percent have not partici-
pated at any religious services during recent years (Salonen et al. 2000,
p. 55). Church attendance is high only during the most important reli-
gious holidays. However, religious programs on radio and TV have large
audiences. One obvious reason why Sunday services are not better at-
tended is the geographic mobility of the population. It was more natural
to go to church in traditional rural surroundings than in a confusing ur-
ban or suburban environment. A corresponding difference is apparent in
the elections of parish councils. In 1998, 20 percent of church members
turned out to vote in rural parishes, but only 10 percent voted in urban
ones.
One century ago, the challenge of early socialism had an impact on
the trend toward secularizing society, and during the first decades of in-
dependence the church and politically organized workers tended to drift
far apart. Many ministers of the church were even elected to parliament
as Conservative members. The distance became narrower during the war.
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Once considered conservative, the church no longer has this political
image.35 In the 1990s its pronouncements may have received more sup-
port from leftist sympathizers than from conservative sympathizers. There
has also been a religiously based party, the Christian Democrats, founded
as a reaction to secularization in 1958 (Arter 1987, p. 32). It has been
represented in parliament since 1970; in 1999 ten members of the party
were elected. It speaks for Christian values in politics but does not coop-
erate with the Lutheran church.
In private lives, most weddings are church weddings, but divorce rates
have increased and, moreover, the church has not been successful in safe-
guarding the marriage institution, because the lifestyle of unmarried co-
habitation has gained social acceptance and legal recognition. About 88
percent of children born in Finland are baptized and 90 percent of fif-
teen-year-olds are confirmed; 28 percent pray to God every week and a
majority of the people at least once a month.
Despite the secularization of society and freedom of religion, the
Lutheran church continues to have an important position in Finnish life.
Annual sessions of Parliament start with a religious service, the sermon
of which may sometimes sharply criticize politicians.36 The church is
visible although not overtly present in the lives of many ordinary citi-
zens, and its pronouncements are listened to. In 1999 the bishops jointly
published a strong statement in support of the welfare state and launched
a broad discussion on the topic itself and the political role of the church.
Also, the new government program in 1999 contained anti-poverty goals
drafted within the church. Furthermore, the church has tried to influence
political decision-makers by setting an example in its own activity, for
instance in development aid and through very concrete support to needy
persons after the economic slump of the 1990s.
Some remaining links between church and state were discontinued
during the 1990s. Until 1996, the state financed the bishops’ councils,
which are now paid for by the church itself. For traditional reasons, the
president of the republic appointed bishops from three candidates who
were elected within the church (customarily the one who ranked first
was appointed), but this presidential prerogative was left out of the new
Constitution of 1999. However, as the result of effective lobbying by the
church, the cooperation of its synod with parliament when church law is
amended, remains in the new Constitution (Article 76).
The church has also modernized itself, adjusting old traditions to so-
cial change. A tangible example of this was the amendment of the Church
Law that has permitted women to become priests. The first women priests
were ordained in 1988, and in 1999 25 percent of the parish pastors were
35 In its internal activity the church did not permit party labels before the 1990s. In the
parish councils elected in 1998 more than ten percent were Social Democrats and
Conservatives, about one third belonged to the Center Party, and 27 percent were
elected without any party attachment.
36 As of 2000, these services have an ecumenical character.
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women. This percentage will eventually rise above 50%, because 60 per-
cent of theology students were women in 1999. Already during the three-
year period 1996-1999 more women than men became priests of the
Lutheran Church (Salonen et al. 2000, pp. 227, 248).
The Lutheran church has the right to levy taxes (but this is no longer
mentioned on the level of the Constitution). Calculated on income tax-
able by municipal governments, parishes collect between 1.0 and 2.25
percent of their members’ income. The actual collection is done in con-
junction with state taxes, and the church pays a fee to the state for this
convenience.
Government and Opposition
Finland has a multi-party system in which three large parties (the Social
Democratic Party, Center Party, and Conservative Party) and a number
of smaller ones are represented in parliament. Coalition governments
used to be short-lived, averaging about one year, but during the 1980s
and thereafter they have lasted the full four-year term of parliament. The
periods that other parties are in opposition have grown correspondingly.
(See Chapters 8 and 11).
Ordinarily it takes more than two political parties to form a majority
government, but hardly ever has a government included all three of the
largest parties. Because the large parties are not likely to reveal their
preferred coalition partners in advance, the voters cannot base their choice
on a clear distinction between two alternatives, one of which will run the
next government. Neither do voters have a definite idea of the potential
prime ministers fighting for the position. It often happens that the oppo-
sition party has a campaign advantage that helps it to an election victory,
because it has been in a good position to freely criticize the government.
On the other hand, the opposition’s campaign can be muted by the desire
to avoid burning bridges, as the only way to enter the government is to
have a willing partner. Even an election success might not open the gates
to the new government coalition if relations with other parties have been
allowed to deteriorate badly or if “chemistries” are not compatible other-
wise. Earlier, the president’s likes and dislikes were also a significant
factor in government formation.
Therefore, on the level of political elites there are tactical limits to the
sharpness of the overt cleavage between the government and the opposi-
tion. One example is the situation in which the chairman of the Center
Party, leader of opposition, found himself in 1997 and early 1998. It would
have been tempting for him to approach the 1999 election with intense
criticisms of relatively unpopular EMU membership, but he would have
been unwise to disqualify himself as a potential prime minister in the
likely situation that Finland would enter EMU despite the opposition’s
criticism. Such careful political strategies may confuse many voters.
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To some extent the citizens really are divided into government and
opposition supporters. An example of competing loyalties was the presi-
dential election of 2000, in which conservative voters had to make their
final choice between the bourgeois candidate of the Center Party, which
was in opposition, and the female candidate of the ideologically more
distant Social Democratic Party, which was in the coalition government
with the Conservatives (see Chapter 10). As it turned out, more voters
than expected preferred the government partner to the ideologically closer
opposition candidate.
The need for government coalitions capable of united action is by no
means the only reason why there prevails a certain willingness to reach
consensus in the Finnish political system. For a long time, foreign policy
was hardly debated at all. Differences in political ideology have largely
diminished. As was described in Chapter 5, the system is also character-
ized by some neocorporate features. In case of a strike, state arbitration
is an essential element of the negotiating procedures of Finnish labor
market organizations. Also, the organizations may in fact decide national
policies among themselves, outside parliament, thus leaving to parlia-
ment the mere role of ‘rubber stamping’ their decisions. They even re-
quest the government to take a seat at their negotiating table, because
they do not want to settle comprehensive agreements before they know
what the government plans to do about taxation (see page 109).
But the evidence shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 indicates that the Finn-
ish people have some tendency to be in opposition not to a particular
government, but to any government, and not because of the government’s
policies or its political composition, but simply because it consists of
politicians and is formed by political parties. As was shown in Table 4.4,
most Finns feel there is some conflict between the people and politi-
cians. The people’s desire to increase the power of the individual citizen
was actually a driving force behind two constitutional amendments to-
ward direct democracy, first when the possibility of consultative referen-
dums was added to the constitution in 1987, and a second time when
direct elections of the president replaced the electoral college in 1991.
Similar popular pressure was not confined to Finland. The willingness to
use more referendums and initiatives became rather general in demo-
cratic nations, where “strengthened commitments to the democratic ideal,
and increased skills and resources on the part of contemporary publics,
are leading to increased political participation beyond the present forms
of representative democracy” (Dalton 1999, p. 76).
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8  Elections and Political Parties
… the party systems of the 1960s were older than the majority of their
national electorates. Thirty years on, these self-same parties still con-
tinue to dominate mass politics in western Europe.
Peter Mair 1997, p. 90
Politics needs sharper edges. The party must have a mission. It does not
make sense that anything goes as long as one can sit in the government.
Erkki Pulliainen, Green MP, in 2002
The Electoral Systems
Finland’s annual calendar does not name any one day as the year’s elec-
tion day. The national elections follow a full four different cycles, inde-
pendent of each other. Only once, in October 1996, have two different
elections been arranged simultaneously in Finland.
Parliament is elected every four years (1995, 1999, 2003, etc.). Its
election day is the third Sunday in March. Early dissolutions would dis-
rupt the predictable four-year circle but they have become quite unlikely;
the last took place in 1975.
The president of the republic is elected for a six year term (1994, 2000,
2006, etc.). The presidential elections have two rounds, which take place
in January and February with three weeks in between. There is no vice-
president. If the president becomes incapacitated, a successor is elected
for a full, new six-year term (the prime minister serves as interim presi-
dent until the election).
The municipal elections, simultaneous in the whole country, take place
every four years in October (always shortly before the American presi-
dential elections): 1996, 2000, 2004, etc.
The European elections constitute the fourth cycle; the members of
the European Parliament who were elected in June 1999 serve a five-
year term from 1999 to 2004. The first election of Finnish MEPs in 1996
took place at the same time as municipal elections.
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Consequently, the country’s combined election calendar can include
calm periods without any elections, such as the years 1997 and 1998, and
again in 2001–2002, but some other times can be very crowded, as were
1999–2000, which were filled with five separate elections (Parliament,
European Parliament, President in two rounds, and municipal councils).
For the purpose of parliamentary elections the country is divided into
fifteen election districts (also known as constituencies). One of them is a
single member constituency (Åland).The 199 other parliamentary seats
are allocated among fourteen multi-member constituencies in direct pro-
portion to their population.
Some changes in district boundaries may happen occasionally, but
changes in the number of inhabitants are not dealt with by redistricting
but by reallocating the 199 seats between districts. This is done before
each election. In 1999 the representation of election districts varied be-
tween seven and thirty-two. This number of representatives was deter-
mined on the basis of quite fresh information, namely the head count
obtained from the national population register less than six months be-
fore election day. The 1999 decision was rather typical: due to changes
in population, two declining election districts lost one seat and the seats
were added to two growing districts.
In the big parliamentary reform of 1906, Finland adopted the list sys-
tem of proportional representation, which was very rare at the time. If
maximum proportionality had been desired, the country would not have
been divided at all into different constituencies, whereas if the aim had
been close connection between representatives and voters, there should
have been a large number of very small constituencies. The compromise
was to divide the country into constituencies, but to make those large
enough for a fair proportionality of representation.
The d’Hondt rule has been followed when determining how many seats
each party wins in the constituency.37 Although several details have been
altered, the main principles of the electoral system have remained un-
changed. There is no national threshold – a minimum number of votes
needed to gain representation – such as the 5 percent requirement in Ger-
many or the 4 percent requirement in Sweden. This enables nationally
weak but locally popular parties to win seats. The larger the constitu-
ency, the smaller the percentage of votes needed for winning a seat. There
is no pool of national seats for the purpose of evening out nationwide
proportionality. Parliamentary seats are fought for, won, and certified
separately in each election district.
In typical list systems of proportional representation, the voters make
their choice between party lists in which the nominating parties have prear-
37 In order to determine how many seats the parties (or alliances) win in a constitu-
ency, the number of votes cast for each party (or alliance) are divided by 1, 2, 3, etc.
For comparison, the Saint-Laguë rule uses the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, etc.; its modified
method in Scandinavian countries uses the series 1.4, 3, 5, etc. as dividors for dis-
tributing seats.
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ranged the preference order of their candidates. In some countries the voters
are offered the option of changing the order in which the party placed its
nominees, but in Finland individual candidates are emphasized even more.
Uniquely, the Finnish system requires every voter to choose one single per-
son from among the candidates on one of the party lists. Each candidate in
the district has his or her individual number, and the act of voting consists of
writing the number of just one candidate inside a circle printed on the small
ballot paper. The voter then folds the ballot paper, has it stamped, and drops
it in the ballot box. Secrecy of the ballot is guarded carefully and election
fraud has been nonexistent.38
The choices of individual candidates serve two purposes. As in any
list system of proportional representation, the ballots are first counted as
votes cast for the parties. This count determines how many seats each
party is entitled to have in the election district. But, second, personal
votes also rank order the candidates within each respective party. This
method does not grant the nominating parties any power to guarantee
their favorite nominees’ entry to parliament.
Originally Finnish election law made vote-counting somewhat more
complicated. The party lists were called “electoral alliances” (primarily,
because the word party was never used in formal legislation). Within
each “alliance,” voters had to choose between numbered lists of candi-
dates containing up to three names (the weight of the second position
being one-half, and of the third position one-third of the top place on the
list). The maximum number of names on a list was reduced to two in
1936 and to one name since 1954. (See Törnudd 1968, pp. 35–40, 57.) It
was formerly possible to nominate the same person in several election
districts, but after 1962, when the leader of the Small Farmers’ Party ran
in every one of the fourteen multi-member constituencies, the law was
changed to allow a person to be nominated in one election district only.
The district does not need to be the one where he or she resides.
Until the party law was enacted in 1969, each individual candidate
seeking nomination needed the supporting signatures of at least 30 eli-
gible persons, who formed a so-called “voters’ association.” For all prac-
tical purposes such associations were only a formality, because the nomi-
nations and the signature-gathering were decided and managed by the
parties’ district organizations. The new law gave the right to nominate
parliamentary candidates to registered political parties, and to nobody
but the parties. In two elections, 1970 and 1972, the parties had such a
monopoly, but since 1975 it has again been possible to nominate addi-
tional “wild” candidates. A group of 100 signatories can do it. This proce-
dure opened the route to parliament for Finland’s first Green MPs in 1983.
In 1995, the 199 MPs were elected from 2073 candidates (Åland in-
cluded, there were 2083 candidates), and in the following election in
1999 there were 1981 candidates (including Åland, 1993 candidates).
38 Buying votes or or falsifying vote counts would be punishable crimes, but there has
been no offences other than some isolated attemps to vote twice decades ago.
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The maximum number of candidates one party can nominate in an elec-
tion district equals the number of seats to be filled in it, except in small
districts where the maximum number is fixed at fourteen. The relative
share of votes necessary to win a seat in parliament depends on the size
of the election district. In North Karelia with only seven seats, more than
14 percent of the ballots were needed but in Uusimaa with 32 representa-
tives, 3.2 percent sufficed.
The parties, and especially the small ones, can improve their chances,
albeit with obvious risks, if they join forces and form electoral alliances.
If they do, the group of allied parties is treated like a single party within
the constituency in question. The risk in joining an alliance is due to the
difficulty of predicting which party’s candidates will receive the highest
numbers of personal votes within the alliance. A party’s chances within an
alliance are improved if it can persuade its voters to concentrate their votes.
For example, the Christian League (now Christian Democratic Party)
has been a clever user of electoral alliances. With 4.2 percent of the na-
tional vote in 1999 the party won 10 seats, but it would have won only
three seats if it had stood alone in every district. It gained three of the
seats with the help of additional votes cast for various miniparties. In one
district it gained its seat through an alliance with Conservatives and in
three districts through an alliance with Center Party (and in one case, the
Center Party lost to its Christian ally a seat that would have otherwise
gone to itself).
An obvious consequence of the Finnish election system is that, in ad-
dition to typical competition between the parties, there is mutual compe-
tition between the individual candidates of the same party. Personal cam-
paigns are a much more important element in Finnish parliamentary elec-
tions than in other list systems of proportional representation. As will be
discussed later in this chapter, there has also been a growing tendency among
the voters to pay more attention to the choice of individual MPs and, accord-
ingly, to consider the choice of party relatively less important.
The elections of the president of the republic used to follow the pat-
tern of parliamentary elections: an electoral college of 300 (later 301)
members, which met to make the final choice, was elected like parlia-
ment. However, in 1994 this indirect system was replaced with elections
in which the people vote for presidential candidates directly. Unless one
candidate gets over 50 percent of the votes, the two top-ranking candidates
face each other in a runoff three weeks later. France has used similar direct
elections since 1965, but has only two weeks between the two rounds.
When elections are held to the European Parliament, the Finns elect
their sixteen MEPs in the country at large. Originally political parties
had the option of presenting their candidates in four separate districts,
but no party chose to do so in the 1996 elections, and the option was
eliminated in 1998. Among the fourteen other EU countries, there are
only four (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and the UK) that are divided into elec-
tion districts in EP elections.
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In Finland’s municipal elections, even the largest city constitutes one
single election district. This maximizes the proportionality of party rep-
resentation in the city council, but invites the voters to make their one
single choice from a very large number of individual candidates. For
example, when the 85 members of the Helsinki city council are elected,
a party can nominate 127 candidates. Consequently, the city council was
elected in 2000 from the total of 906 candidates; in 1992 from even more:
1077 candidates.
Finland used to have two election days, a Sunday and the following
Monday, until one-day elections were begun in 1991. A new Election Act
became effective in 1998. It did not greatly change the manner in which
the four kinds of elections are administered, but was intended mainly to
simplify legislation by combining the four separate election laws into
one comprehensive act.
Earlier changes in legislation also lowered the voting age step by step
from 24 to 18 years, as was outlined above (on page 36). The age re-
quirements for eligibility and suffrage have always been the same. And
although it is normal in the world that foreign nationals cannot vote in
the country where they live, since 1975 the Nordic countries have al-
lowed the citizens of other Nordic countries to vote in local government
elections. Later, this right was extended to all foreign citizens who are per-
manent residents of Finland. In the European elections of 1999, voting rights
and eligibility were granted to all EU citizens resident in the country.
The Party System
A three-dimensional party system developed in the Diet of the Four Es-
tates. The first political division arose from nationalist agitation about
the language issue. “By the 1880s the language question had emerged as
the most highly charged and salient question in Finnish politics” (McRae
1997, p. 191). The second cleavage concerned Finland’s relations with
Russia: a strict constitutionalist position was championed by the Swed-
ish Party and the Young Finns (since 1904), while the Old Finns pre-
ferred the more careful tactic of compliance and compromise. The third
political front resulted from bad social problems and it was linked with
the new socialist ideologies. (Teljo 1949, pp. 10–13, 29–30.)
The Finnish Labor Party, founded in 1899 and since 1903 called the
Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Finland, organized the country’s first
mass membership party among industrial workers, tenant farmers, and
farm laborers. In the election of March 1907 the party took 80 of the 200
seats, with 37 percent of the vote. The Old Finns, which also had an
extensive social reform program, ranked second with 59 seats and 27
percent. The Young Finns got only a disappointing 26 seats, the Swedish
People’s Party 24, and the Agrarians 9 seats.
In March 1919, in the first election in independent Finland, the SDP
again won 80 seats. But it was not the only party of the political left.
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During the 1920s and after the election of March 1945, it had a chal-
lenger on its own left side. As was described in Chapter 3, the Finnish
Communist Party sought votes under various banners until it was out-
lawed in 1930. The Finnish People’s Democratic League (FPDL, in Finn-
ish SKDL) became the vehicle for communist electoral appeals after the
war. It gained 49 seats with 23.5 percent of the vote in 1945, which made
it relatively the third largest communist party in western Europe, smaller
only than the communist parties in Italy and France. An internal opposi-
tion, called the Social Democratic League, also broke from the SDP in
1958, but it ran out of popular support in the 1970s.
On the nonsocialist side, the Swedish People’s Party was organized in
1906 as a mass political party. The two Finnish parties, the Old and the
Young, were restructured in 1918 as the National Coalition, or Conser-
vative Party (the monarchists of 1918) and the National Progressive Party
(republicans in 1918). The latter lost a splinter group when changing its
name in 1951, until the two merged again in 1965. During the 1930s
there was also a party of the far right, called the Patriotic People’s Move-
ment (IKL). It won 14 seats in 1933 and 1936.
One political division separated the producers and the consumers. Two
agrarian parties were formed in 1906 and fused in 1908, and the Agrarian
Union (since 1965, Center Party) grew to be Finland’s strongest
nonsocialist party in 1919. Only as late as 1979 did it finally – and even
then temporarily – yield that rank to the Conservatives. The election of
1970 reduced Center Party representation by thirteen seats, primarily due
to the success of its former splinter group, the Finnish Rural Party. The
Finnish Christian League (founded in 1958, renamed Finland’s Christian
Democrats in May 2001) entered parliament in 1970. In 1983 Finland
became the second country in Europe (two weeks after Germany) to elect
Green representatives to its national parliament.
The party systems of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway have
had a rather similar composition since the 1920s. They have consisted of
five political parties, ranging from the far left to the social democrats,
agrarians, liberals, and conservatives (see Berglund and Lindström 1978,
pp. 16–20). Those elements continued to exist in Finland in the 1990s,
although by then the Liberal People’s Party had used up its popular sup-
port. In addition Finland has the language-based Swedish People’s Party.
The six parties are the following (the abbreviations refer to Table 8.1):
– The Left Alliance (LEFT) has continued the activity of the SKDL
(1944–1990) since April 1990.
– The Social Democratic Party (SDP) has not quite achieved the domi-
nant position of its Swedish counterpart, but it has been Finland’s
largest party most of the time since 1907.
– The Center party (CENT), having rested in opposition for one 4-year
term, increased its number of MPs from forty to fifty-five in 1991
and, since 1995, has again been the second largest party.
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– The Progressive Party was succeeded by the Finnish People’s Party
in 1951, which was succeeded by the Liberal People’s Party (LPP) in
1965; in 1995 it lost its only seat in parliament.
– The Conservative Party (CONS), officially called the National Coa-
lition, gained increasing support especially in the 1970s and has been
in government since 1987, after twenty-one opposition years from
1966 to 1987.
– The Swedish People’s Party (SPP) is the unique element in Finland’s
party system, and the one representative from Åland typically joins
its parliament group.
Many other parties have gained representation over the years. They have
included populist flash movements such as the Finnish Rural Party (FRP)
in 1970 and in 1983, stable new elements like the Christian Democrats
(CHR), and more recent new parties, notably the Greens (GR) who were
formally organized as a party in 1988, and the Progressive who only
survived from 1995 to 1999. Meanwhile, older political parties have left
the scene. The Patriotic People’s Movement of the right wing was in
existence from 1932 to 1944, and the Finnish Communist Party, founded
in Moscow in 1918, was discontinued in 1990; a very small new com-
munist party has adopted its name.
Parliament was elected eight times between 1907 and 1917, and nine
times between 1919 and 1939. Table 8.1 summarizes the results of the 16
parliamentary elections from 1945 to 1999. The parties of the left received
the majority of the votes once, in 1966. In addition, they won a majority of
the seats in 1958. Their poorest showing occurred in 1991, with only 32
percent of the votes and a minority of 67 seats, out of the total of 200.
Thus, Finland has a truly multiple-party system. It is obvious that so
many parties reflect many more conflict dimensions than the three basic
ones that were represented a century ago.39 However, the basic ideological
dimension from left to right still provides a fundamental base for the order-
ing of the parties, in parliament as well as within the mass electorate.
Consequently, the most obvious way to picture the entire party sys-
tem, as it exists on the level of the mass electorate, is to study how the
supporters of different political parties place themselves on the dimen-
sion which runs from the left to the right. Figure 8.1 illustrates where the
supporters of the large parties placed themselves on a scale of left to
right in 1975 and again in 1991 and in 2000. The figure gives the mean
scores for each group of party supporters, and it shows how the support-
ers of each party were distributed along this basic dimension. For ex-
39 One analysis in the 1970s recognized among the electorate a party space of seven
dimensions: left – right; producers and agriculture – consumers and urban indus-
tries; established parties – temporary small parties; recognized and noted centers –
the “forgotten people;” Finnish – Swedish; communism – anti-communism; and
victorious – losing. Pesonen 1973b, pp. 124–127.
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ample, the very heavy line shows how supporters of the Center Party
were distributed along the left-right dimension. The light dotted line shows
how supporters of the SKDL (1975) or LEFT (1991 and 2000) were dis-
tributed, and so on.
Table 8.1
Parliamentary elections in Finland from 1945 to 1999.
LEFT SDL SDP FRP CENT LPP CHR CONS SPP GR      Other*
Vote (in pecentages)
1945 23.5 – 25.1 1.2 21.3 5.2 – 15.0 7.9 – 0.8
1948 20.0 – 26.3 0.3 24.2 3.9 – 17.1 7.7 – 0.5
1951 21.6 – 26.5 0.3 23.2 5.7 – 14.6 7.6 – 0.5
1954 21.6 – 26.2 – 24.1 7.9 – 12.8 7.0 – 0.4
1958 23.2 1.7 23.2 – 23.1 5.9 0.2 15.3 6.7 – 0.9
1962 22.0 4.4 19.5 2.2 23.0 6.3 – 15.0 6.4 – 1.2
1966 21.2 2.6 27.2 1.0 21.2 6.5 0.4 13.8 6.0 – 0.5
1970 16.6 1.4 23.4 10.5 17.1 6.0 1.1 18.0 5.7 – 1.3
1972 17.0 1.0 25.8 9.2 16.4 5.1 2.5 17.6 5.4 – 2.5
1975 18.9 0.3 24.9 3.6 17.6 4.3 3.3 18.4 5.0 – 3.7
1979 17.9 0.1 23.9 4.6 17.3 3.7 4.8 21.7 4.5 – 1.6
1983 14.0 – 26.7 9.7 16.6 1.0 3.0 22.2 4.9 1.4 0.6
1987 13.6 – 24.1 6.3 17.6 1.0 2.6 23.1 5.6 4.0 2.0
1991 10.1 – 22.1 4.8 24.8 0.8 3.1 19.3 5.5 6.8 2.7
1995 11.2 – 28.3 1.3 19.9 0.6 3.0 17.9 5.1 6.5 6.2
1999 10.9 – 22.9 1.0 22.4 0.2 4.2 21.0 5.1 7.3 5.0
Elected members
1945 49 – 50 – 49 9  – 28 14 – 1
1948 38 – 54 – 56 5 – 33 14 – –
1951 43 – 53 – 51 10 – 28 15 – –
1954 43 – 54 – 53 13 – 24 13 – –
1958 50 3 48 – 48 8 – 29 14 – –
1962 47 2 38 – 53 13 – 32 14 – 1
1966 41 7 55 1 49 9 – 26 12 – –
1970 36 – 52 18 36 8 1 37 12 – –
1972 37 – 55 18 35 7 4 34 10 – –
1975 40 – 54 2 39 9 9  35 10 – 2
1979 35 – 52 7 36 4 9 47 10 – –
1983 27 – 57 17 38 – 3 44 11 2 1
1987 20 – 56 9 40 – 5 53 13  4 –
1991 19 – 48 7 55 1 8 40 12 10 –
1995 22 – 63 1 44  – 7 39 12 9 3
1999 20 – 51 1 48 – 10 46 12 11 1
* Included in “Other” are the Swedish Left (one member in 1945), the Liberal Union
(one in 1962), Constitutional party (one in 1975 and 1983), Unity party (one in
1975), the Progressive Finnish Party (two members in 1995), the Ecological party
(one in 1995), and the Reform Group (one in 1999).
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Figure 8.1
Self-placements on the left-right scale of the supporters of different parties, 1975,
1991, and 2000 (mean scores and distributions)
Source: Adopted from Pesonen, Sänkiaho, and Borg 1993, p. 131, and from World
Values Survey 2000.
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Even on the level of mass support the Finnish multiparty system differs
greatly from any bipolar model. In 1975, the supporters of the four major
parties clearly formed a quadrilateral system. Although there was some
overlap, there were four distinct peaks, one for each party. The mean
scores for the SKDL (FPDL) and the Conservative Party supporters were
quite far apart, with about 6 scale points separating them (the maximum
possible being 9 points).
Sixteen years later the profile of the party system was rather different.
The party space had been shrinking among the electorate and it was get-
ting more diffuse. Furthermore, there were only two peaks, because the
supporters of the Left Alliance had become too few to stand out, and
those of the Center Party were divided into two wings, one left-oriented
and the other one overlapping with the Conservatives. The supporters of
the Left Alliance were now avoiding the most extreme position and had
moved, on average, one step toward the middle point. The Conserva-
tives, in turn, had approached the center of the dimension from the other
side. Consequently, the distance between the Left and the Conservatives
had narrowed to 4.7 scale points. The Social Democrats had also moved
slightly toward the center, although very few of them had crossed the
middle point. The Greens entered the party system without any obvious
place on the left-right dimension.
During the 1990s the picture returned somewhat to what was found in
1975. In 2000 the mean positions of the Left Alliance and the Conserva-
tive supporters are separated by 5.1 scale points; the minor widening
being caused by a slightly increased readiness in both groups to again
choose the extreme position. The voters of Center Party form only one
peak, as they did in 1975, and now their typical self-placement is as close
to the SDP as is possible without either one’s peak crossing the left/right
divide. The mean scale points of these two parties, however, are not closer
than before, because the bulks of their supporters lean in the expected
ideological direction.
The shrinking and the de-ideologizing of the Finnish party system have
had unprecedented parallels on the elite level. First, in 1987, the Conser-
vatives and the Social Democratic Party formed a coalition government
without the mediating Center Party. Then, after the more “natural” Cen-
ter-Conservative coalition, the government formed in 1995 again included
the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, but left out the Center Party.
And now the coalition also included the Left Alliance, heir to the Com-
munists. Such cooperation between the far left and the political right
would have been utterly impossible in the 1980s, not to mention the first
twenty years of Finland’s independence, when even the Social Demo-
crats and the bourgeois parties were unable to govern together. But the
five parties of the “rainbow” coalition formed in 1995 worked quite well
with each other, and a similar government was again formed after the
1999 election (see Table 11.1 below).
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In the real life of all European democracies, political parties had quite
a central role long before their existence was acknowledged in formal
legislation. In Finland, various roundabout expressions were used in or-
der to regulate what was, in reality, done by the parties. This needed to be
changed when the parties were granted state subsidies in 1967, and in
1969 the Party Act was legislated. At the same time a new Election Act
gave registered parties the sole right to nominate candidates for national
elections, until “wild” candidates were again permitted after two such
restricted elections. In practice no wild candidate had ever won a seat in
parliament before the election of 1983, when a party monopoly would
have indeed prevented the election of the first Green MPs.
Party Organizations
The candidates for parliamentary elections are nominated by the district
organizations of political parties, without much interference from the
national leadership. The national boards or councils of the parties, in
turn, choose candidates for the European elections, and party conven-
tions are convened to decide who will be the party’s candidate for presi-
dent. The municipal-level party organizations nominate candidates for
local elections. In addition, temporary citizen groups have the right to
by-pass the parties and to put up their own candidates, if they collect the
required number of supporting signatures (20,000 in presidential, 2000
in European, 100 in parliamentary, and 10 in municipal elections).
The three levels of candidate nomination illustrate the hierarchical struc-
ture of party organizations and, also, the different scopes of their politi-
cal environments. In addition, there is a fourth level below the national,
district, and municipal party organizations. It consists of the basic party
units on the “grass roots” level.
In 1995, eight Finnish parties had a total of 7200 local units in their
membership organizations, of which Center Party alone had 3600. The
Social Democratic Party had 1200 and the Conservative Party 1100. The
aggregate number of card-carrying members, according to the registers
kept by the parties, was 448,000 (13 percent of the electorate), of whom
Center Party had 257,000, the Social Democratic Party 70,000 and the
Conservatives 47,000. In earlier years the party organizations had been
larger: in 1979 there were about 9000 local party units and 600,000 indi-
vidual members, and in the early 1970s the total may have exceeded
700,000 members. (Sundberg 1996, pp. 47, 89; Borg 1997, p. 40.) One
review in early 2001 calculated that no more than 7 percent of the elec-
torate belonged to a party organization.
Thus, the political parties have been losing members, and Finland is
by no means the only country where this has happened. Examples of
dramatic declines between 1960 and 1990 include Denmark, where the
percentage of party members sank from 22 to 7 percent, and Great Brit-
Elections and Political Parties
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 3 28.10.2002, 12:37149
150
ain, where total membership was reduced from 9 to 3 percent. The de-
cline of party members is very much due to the parties’ inability to re-
cruit young persons; only 5 percent of Finns between eighteen and thirty
years of age joined party organizations in the 1990s. The average age of
the total electorate is forty-seven years in Finland, but in 1996 that of the
members of Center Party was fifty years, and of the other parties, fifty-
six years (Borg 1997, p. 45). Furthermore, political parties are losing the
willingness of their members to participate actively: local organizations tend
to meet seldom, and only one-third of the members say they take part.
Although political parties continue to perform very important func-
tions in the society, they are handicapped by negative popular attitudes
toward them and, especially, attitudes toward politicians in general (see
Tables 4.5 and 7.4). Despite this, there are well motivated party mem-
bers, too. In one survey among members of parties, where the respon-
dents were offered a list of various possible reasons why they had joined
the party, almost all said ideological reasons were important. More than
one-half of members also thought that their general political interest, the
desire to be better informed, the desire to influence political decisions,
and the legacy from home were of importance (op.cit., p. 57).
It is possible that the regular public subsidies which fund party organi-
zations have reduced both the need of the parties to recruit many more
active members and the interest of people to volunteer their time for
party work. Direct state subsidies for the parties amount to no more than
.03 percent of the state budget, but especially at the beginning, they pro-
voked much popular criticism (Pesonen 1973). Between 1968 and 1991
the total annual subsidy climbed from FIM 10 million to FIM 71.6 mil-
lion, but due to the state’s difficult financial position, the amount was
reduced to FIM 60.4 million (from $14 to $12 million) in 1994. In 2002
the direct subsidy was 11.8 million euros.
Annual support from the state budget is divided between the parties’
membership organizations in proportion to the size of the parliamentary
groups, i.e. how many members each party has in parliament. In addition
to regular party subsidies, party organizations receive direct support from
the state for their foreign contacts and for the European, national, and
local elections; the amount was 0.7 million euros in the non-election
year 2002. Furthermore, they receive various kinds of covert state support,
earmarked for their youth, women’s, and pensioners’ organizations, as well
as for adult education, the party press, cultural organizations, adult activi-
ties, and temperance societies. (Wiberg 1997.)
According to the Party Act, an association can be registered as a po-
litical party if it meets four requirements: its primary purpose is political
influence on the national level, it has at least 5000 eligible supporters, its
rules guarantee democratic procedures in its internal decision-making
and in its activities, and its political goals are stated formally in a party
program. These requirements rule out parties with only narrow local in-
terest, or without a declared party program. In the event that a registered
Elections and Political Parties
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 3 28.10.2002, 12:37150
151
party fails to win a seat in parliament in two consecutive elections, it is
removed from the official party register (unless it can again show 5000
supporters, as the Liberal Party did in spring 2002).
To some extent these legal requirements combine three different as-
pects of the concept of a political party: they deal with the goals and the
size of the parliamentary parties, with the popular support for electoral
parties, and with the internal processes of membership parties. Indeed,
while political parties are broadly defined actors in the political system,
they can be analyzed and compared from any one of these three angles.
The present description of Finland’s party organizations has concerned
the last-mentioned aspect, the membership parties.
The important roles of membership parties include recruiting people
to political activity, discussing and defining political goals, and provid-
ing a link between people’s desires and governmental decision-making.
Electoral parties will be described in the next section, and parliamentary
parties are primarily dealt with in Chapter 9 below.
On the national level, different political parties also have different rules
and practices concerning the linkage between their membership organi-
zations and their parliamentary or ministerial groups. The ministers and
the parliament groups of the leftist parties have consulted the leading
bodies of their membership organization more than the parties of the
right which, in turn, have given more leeway to their parliamentary party
groups. However, the chairman of the party’s membership organization
has become the focus of attention so that he or she is the most obvious
link connecting all three elements: the chairman is the party’s top candi-
date for a ministerial position while also personifying the entire party in
the mass media and in the minds of the electorate.
Election Campaigns and Voting Behavior
The Election Act of 1998 stipulates that the deadline for nominating can-
didates is 40 days before election day in all four types of elections. In
practice the parties act much earlier. For example, most candidates for
the parliamentary election that took place in March 1999 were nomi-
nated by November 1998.
Primary elections, arranged by party organizations among their mem-
bers, were widely used in the 1980s and early 1990s, but they have lost
some of their appeal and usefulness. Even when the district organiza-
tions invite their members to vote for potential candidates, as for instance
the Social Democrats must always do, some parliamentary candidates
can be left to be named later by the district board.
It is in the tactical interest of the parties to present a balanced list of
candidates, a list appealing to a variety of voter groups and to various
areas of the district. This may include celebrities who have become well
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known outside politics, such as Olympic gold medalists, pop stars and tv
personalities, even former beauty queens. Incumbents usually have the
best chance of renewing their place on the party’s list of parliamentary
candidates. They also have the best chance of getting elected: of the 200
members elected in 1999, 122 were incumbents who returned from the
outgoing parliament.
Election campaigns are costly, although many forums offer free expo-
sure to the parties and candidates. In particular, tv and radio debates and
other coverage, newspaper reporting and interviews, and so on, make the
campaign visible. During the 1990s, it gradually became possible to buy
political advertising on the electronic media. This was first permitted on
local radio stations and cable tv, then on nationwide commercial radio
and tv channels. Newspaper advertisements and outdoor posters have,
naturally, very long traditions. Old-time campaign trails and meetings
have been losing audiences and significance but they have not disap-
peared either.
The campaigns run by political parties are complemented and very
much flavored by the personal campaigning of the candidates. The par-
ties may determine general rules or guidelines, such as a request to make
the party’s name visible in each individual campaign advertisement, but
the aim of the candidates is not only to draw support for their party at
large. They want to attract attention to themselves in order to beat the
candidates of the same party.
While individual candidates are essential for making campaigns lively
and visible, they also carry a significant part of the total financing of
Finland’s election campaigns. In the European elections in June 1999,
the elected Finnish MEPs used an average of 400,000 Finnish markkas
(about 70,000 euros) to run their personal campaign, without receiving
hardly any contribution from the party organization. In the parliamen-
tary elections of 1999, with almost 2000 candidates, the elected repre-
sentatives paid an average FIM 130,000 (€ 22,000) for their personal cam-
paigns and the non-elected candidates about FIM 30,000 (€ 5000) but, of
course, the actual amounts varied greatly (Venho 1999, pp. 12-18).
A new law on campaign finance was enacted in 2000 and became
effective in connection with the municipal elections of that year. Its cov-
erage is narrow: it does not concern the parties and it does not limit the
amount of campaign spending, but it does require successful candidates
to report their campaign expenditures and to make public any campaign
contributions which exceed 1700 euros in parliamentary and local elec-
tions, or 4300 euros in European and presidential elections. In practice
the candidates have long been rather open when interviewed by the me-
dia about their campaign costs.
An increasing number of voters have become more interested in the
individual candidates than in the choice of a political party. In surveys in
connection with the 1983 parliamentary elections and again in 1991, the
voters were asked the following question: “What, ultimately, do you think
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mattered more in your voting, the party or the candidate?” The answers
were distributed almost identically, with 51 percent in 1983 and 52 per-
cent in 1991 replying “the party,” while 42 and 43 percent said “the can-
didate” (Pesonen 1995, p. 118). Since then even more voters have claimed
they focus on the individual candidate more than the party.
When asked, “Outside party affiliation, what was the most important
reason you chose the candidate you voted for?” the respondents gave a
large variety of explanations. The most common reasons concerned the
personal qualifications of their chosen candidates: their reliability, tal-
ent, pleasantness, familiarity, and previous experience. Likewise, a fac-
tor analysis showed “experience” to be the strongest explanations of can-
didate choice, “issue orientation” and “womanhood” being additional
but weaker ones. (Op. cit., pp. 125-126.) Consequently, it seems possible
that when Finnish voters cast their ballot for one individual candidate,
they add an element of confidence to the prevailing images of parliament
and political parties. While politicians as a group are much criticized and
distrusted (see Chapter 7), such negative feelings may be counteracted
by the perceived trustworthiness of the voters’ own representative.
There has been an increase in the volatility of voters, in Finland and
elsewhere. More and more Finnish voters delay making their choice un-
til close to election day, and party loyalty has been declining.40 However,
most voters continue to define themselves as supporters of some party
and, by and large, the results of elections are not very unpredictable. In
Finland the changes in voters’ party preference seem more frequent fairly
soon after the election than toward the end of the term or even during the
next election campaign. Thus, the main function of the campaigns is to
draw people’s attention to the election, to strengthen party loyalties, and
to increase interest in politics and to mobilize less motivated persons to
vote.
The government, too, tries to add something to the mobilizing effect
of campaigns. Not only is the registration of voters automatic, but a re-
minder of the approaching election is mailed to every person listed in the
register. The letter details the location of the addressee’s polling station
and the time when votes can be cast in advance at a post office or in local
government offices. The elections are held on a Sunday. The second elec-
tion day, the following Monday, was eliminated in 1991, but, on the other
hand, advance voting has become so common in Finland that about one-
third of all ballots are cast before election day. Handicapped persons can
even invite the election administrators to visit their home for voting.
Nevertheless, turnout has become a special problem. As was indicated
in Chapter 2, the highest turnout percentages in Finland’s parliamentary
elections were reached in the 1960s and, since 1982, Finnish voters have
40 Majorities of roughly equal sizes voted in accordance with their pre-campaign in-
tentions in the EU-referendum in 1994, as is found in elections; but very late deci-
sions were more frequent in the referendum and opinion changes more frequent in
elections. Pesonen 1998, p. 133.
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been more activated by presidential elections than by parliamentary elec-
tions. Men used to be more active voters than women, until this was
reversed in the 1980s. In all countries, young age groups tend to partici-
pate less than the middle-aged, and the very low involvement, or alien-
ation, of some subgroups of young citizens has caused much concern in
Finland. In the 1980s and 1990s the difference between age groups be-
came even wider within a variety of social backgrounds, so that non-
voting seems to be a permanent feature of young people’s political be-
havior (Martikainen and Wass 2002).
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9  Parliament
...we may say that the British members of parliament are there to talk,
whereas the members of working parliaments are there to do legislative
work.
Esaiasson and Heidar 2000, p. 5
I would like to have more influence, but in the Left Alliance it is not
possible.
MP Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen in 2002
Functions and Workload
According to Section 2 of the Finnish Constitution, “All sovereign power
in Finland belongs to the people, who are represented by Parliament con-
vened in session.” Having said that, the Constitution Act of 1919 out-
lined the separation of powers as follows: “Legislative power shall be
exercised by Parliament in conjunction with the President of the Repub-
lic;” “Supreme executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Republic;” and “Judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts
of law.” Thus the Constitution Act put parliament above all other institu-
tions. In the new Constitution of 1999 the corresponding Section 3 goes
even further: it makes no reference at all to the president’s role in legislation.
Indeed, the new constitution sought to make parliament’s position dis-
tinctly more central than before, for example, by giving it the task of
electing the prime minister. At the same time, the Constitution of 1999
added more efficiency to parliament’s work. Some of its procedures were
expedited and many stipulations were moved from the constitutional level
of the old Parliament Act to the level of ordinary legislation, Parliament’s
Rules of Procedure, thus making them more easily changeable.
As mentioned above (on page 35), Finland’s modern 200-member par-
liament (in Finnish: Eduskunta) was elected eight times between 1907
and 1917. Between the two world wars, from 1919 to 1939, there were
nine parliamentary elections. The “long parliament” that was elected in
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July 1939 served until March 1945. During the post-war period from
1945 to 1999 there have been sixteen parliamentary elections. Their re-
sults were summarized above in Table 8.1.
The parliamentary election term was originally three years, but it was
extended to four years in 1954. Within the four years, the business of the
Eduskunta is organized in annual sessions. According to the Parliament
Act of 1906, the duration of the annual session was 90 days, extended in
1918 to 120 days. These became unrealistic time limits. The increased
workload has gradually made membership of parliament a full time oc-
cupation; since the 1950s annual sessions have lasted more than 220 days,
and during the 1991-1994 term the average number of annual sitting days
was 265. However, MPs manage to take a leave during two months in
the summer and more than one month around Christmas time.41
The wide spectrum of policy areas that the legislature deals with is
well illustrated by the committee structure. There are fourteen perma-
nent committees, namely, the Constitutional, Legal affairs, Foreign Af-
fairs, Finance, Administration, Transport and Communications, Agricul-
ture and Forestry, Defense, Eduction and Culture, Social Affairs and
Health, Economic Affairs, Labor and Equality, Environment, and Future
Committee. In addition, parliament appoints a Grand Committee, which
used to resemble a second chamber because it reviewed all the bills. Since
1990 it has deliberated only those bills that the whole house refers to it.
However, in 1995 it was given the new and laborious role of serving as
parliament’s European Affairs Committee.
Each year the government submits some 200 to 300 bills, and there
are up to 200 private member’s bills. For example, during the parliamen-
tary term of 1983–1986 the total number of government motions was
989 (of which 952 were approved), and the number of private member’s
legislative initiatives was 608 (only 15 approved). But this was not all:
the total number of items on the agenda was 17,884. They included 7975
private member’s budgetary initiatives to amend the government’s bud-
get proposals (870 approved), 4331 petitions (12 approved), and almost
4000 written or oral questions to the ministers (Noponen 1989, p. 218).
The total number of items on parliament’s agenda was only 11, 837 in
1995-1998, due to fewer private members’ budgetary initiatives, peti-
tions, and legistlative initiatives.
Parliament’s workload tends to increase toward the end of each elec-
tion term. Comparisons between the first and the fourth annual session
illustrate the pattern. Calculated for the five four-year terms between 1979
and 1998, the total duration of plenary sessions increased from 352 to
622 hours on average. The number of government bills grew from 218 to
303, and written questions more than doubled from 409 to 921. Only the
members’ petitions followed a reverse pattern: they averaged 1470 peti-
41 Occasionally the Eduskunta needs to break its break, as on 10 January 2002, when it
met to authorize sending Finnish soldiers to Afghanistan. This was the first extra
meeting of its kind since 1962.
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tions following an election, but 665 in the last annual session. (Data source:
http://fakta.eduskunta.fi.)
“Legislative power” defines parliament’s central function. But, in ad-
dition, parliament decides the state’s finances when approving the an-
nual budget. In the area of foreign policy, the president and the ministers
responsible for foreign affairs discuss the most important policy deci-
sions with parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, and parliament can
also instruct ministers on matters that are on the agenda of the European
Council. International treaties need to be ratified by it.
There are some administrative functions as well. The Eduskunta con-
trols the Bank of Finland through the board of supervisors elected by
parliament and, likewise, it has control over the Social Insurance Institu-
tion and the Finnish Broadcasting Company. More important, however,
is the general control that parliament exercises over the entire adminis-
trative branch.
In short, the Eduskunta both determines the direction of national poli-
cies and controls how the country is governed. However, the source of
“all sovereign power,” the people of Finland, have somewhat ambivalent
attitudes toward their Eduskunta. While they respect it they also tend to
feel that it does not meet their expectations.
According to a study carried out in 1975, the Finns considered the
government and parliament equally important institutions in their influ-
ence on people’s lives, far more important than municipal councils, trade
unions, state bureaucracy, etc. And fewer Finns than Americans, Austri-
ans, or Germans thought that politicians occupy an unduly privileged
position in society (Pesonen and Sänkiaho 1979, pp. 52–57, 94). More-
over, most Finns think that the Eduskunta has the right amount of power
and those who do not are more likely to want to increase its power rather
than to decrease it (see Table 7.3). Yet most Finns, not unlike the citizens
of other western democracies, think that “Parties are only interested in
people’s votes, but not in their opinions,” and “Those we elect to parlia-
ment lose touch with the people pretty quickly” (Pesonen et al. 1993, pp.
485–486; Political Action 1979, pp. 178–180). Even so, attitudes have
changed: in 2000 fewer people had confidence in parliament than two
decades earlier (Table 7.4).
Organization and Procedures
At the beginning of each annual session parliament elects its speaker and
two vice speakers. These three are normally from different parties, and
the first speaker cannot vote. It is also customary that the speaker and the
prime minister come from different parties. Members of the fourteen per-
manent specialized committees are chosen for the duration of the entire
legislative term. They must be appointed within seven days of the open-
ing of the first session. Parliament may also appoint ad hoc committees.
In practice, it selects the committee members unanimously and divides
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committee seats among different parties in proportion to the strength of
the party groups. Likewise, all parties get their share when the commit-
tees elect their own chairpersons and deputy chairpersons.
The Grand Committee has 25 regular members and 13 alternate mem-
bers. The Finance Committee has 21 and 19, and the other committees
have 17 regular and 9 alternate members. The speaker of parliament and
the deputy speakers do not belong to any committee; neither do govern-
ment ministers. Because of the relatively large size of the committees,
each member of parliament typically belongs to two of them.
The main task of the Eduskunta is to deliberate and approve new leg-
islation. The scope of bills varies greatly: some government motions may
concern minor amendments to existing laws, but others may involve
important social reforms. The handling of a bill begins with a debate in a
plenary sitting (a sitting of the whole parliament), after which the bill is
assigned to a specialized committee. The plenary can also require other
committees to issue a statement on the bill to the committee that is in
charge of it. In its report the committee can propose that the bill be ap-
proved with or without changes or that it be rejected, and members of the
committee who disagree with the report can have their dissenting opin-
ion appended to it. After the committee stage, the bill returns to the ple-
nary sitting, which may also refer it to the Grand Committee.
Until 2000, bills went through three readings but the reformed constitu-
tion combined the first and second reading and the procedure was condensed
to two readings only. The first reading, after the general debate, examines
the bill item by item, and at this time opposition members generally propose
amendments. The second reading must wait at least three days. Its purpose
is to either approve or reject the bill; the contents can no longer be changed.
Bills lapse if they have not been dealt with before the next election.
If a bill involves amending, interpreting or repealing a constitutional
norm, it must be reviewed by the Constitutional Committee and the ap-
proved bill is left pending until after the next parliamentary election. The
newly elected Eduskunta must then approve the bill by a two-thirds ma-
jority. However, a practical shortcut is possible; a bill involving a consti-
tutional law can be declared urgent by a five-sixth majority of votes, after
which the same parliament can approve it by a two-thirds majority. This
procedure has also allowed exceptions to be made to the constitution
without a constitutional amendment. That is a unique feature of the Finn-
ish constitution.
The annual budget of the state passes through one reading only. The
preliminary debate, usually in mid-September, follows the Finance
Minister’s introduction of the budget proposal. After that the proposal is
sent to the Finance Committee, which normally reports in December.
Parliament deals with it in a single reading that typically lasts several
days. Normally this scrutiny results in nothing more than minor changes
in the government’s budget proposal, because most private member’s
motions are rejected.
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Other types of parliamentary business include annual reports required of
the council of state (i.e. the government) and various state organs. They are
also sent to a committee and subsequently handled by parliament in a single
reading. In addition, the government can submit a report or statement to
parliament on some matter concerning the nation’s administration or rela-
tions with foreign states. These reports are dealt with in a plenary sitting
with or without the committee stage. The relatively few interpellation de-
bates take precedence over all other business (see Chapter 11).
The sittings are held on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Parlia-
ment has attempted to make its plenaries the foremost venue for topical
political discussion in Finland. Some debates are genuinely exciting and
the most important ones also get live coverage on tv and radio, but other
plenaries may degenerate into boring sequences of solo speeches read to
an empty hall (or, at best, to monitors in the members’ offices). All of
them, including interjections, are published quickly in the official min-
utes.42
Actually the agenda for major political discourse in Finland is often
set by the mass media. Parliament, in turn, has several opportunities to
bring matters of current significance before a plenary session. As re-
viewed above, they include oral questions during the weekly question
hour, interpellations (challenges to ministers signed by at least 20 mem-
bers), topical discussions, and announcements by the prime minister.
Which approach is chosen can be influenced by individual MPs and their
party groups, by the Speaker’s Council, and by the government. Indi-
vidual MPs also submit written questions to the minister whose sphere
of competence covers the matter, and the answers to these questions are
also distributed in writing only.
Finland’s constitution makes no reference to political parties, but ob-
viously they form an essential element in the structures and work of par-
liament. In the plenary hall the members are seated as party groups from
left to right (as viewed from the speaker’s podium, see Figure 9.1). Five
traditional party groups have seats extending to the front row, typically
assigned to their senior members. Each party group (faction) decides
jointly on its policies at least once a week, if not more frequently, in the
permanent meeting room assigned to it. Party groups annually elect chair-
persons who perform important functions in the Eduskunta, like their
counterparts in other parliaments. The staffs of the party groups and the
personal assistants of individual MPs are subsidized from public funds.
Legislative Behavior
Parliamentary parties occupy a truly central role in the work of parlia-
ment. They structure its votes to such an extent that it seems more realis-
42 During 2001, ten MPs (not counting government ministers) made between 110 and
200 speeches in the plenaries, while some spoke hardly at all.
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tic to view the Eduskunta as the sum total of its party groups than as an
aggregate of its 200 individual members. In the event that the result of
the vote will determine whether or not the government enjoys the confi-
dence of parliament, party groups tend to be unanimous, whereas in po-
litically less important decisions the parties may tolerate dissent, even
though voting as a block is the normal state of affairs. Different parties
may exercise different degrees of party discipline.
When the communist-dominated SKDL (FPDL) entered parliament
in 1945, its party group was exceptionally well disciplined. This is seen
in Table 9.1, which shows the values for Stuart Rice’s index of cohesion,
calculated for the party groups in open votes during three legislative pe-
riods, from 1945 to 1954. As the index values range from 0.0 to 100.0,
the SKDL’s score (95.1 in 1948-1951) came rather close to unanimity.
However, even the lowest cohesion, that of the Swedish People’s Party,
indicated a fairly strong tendency to vote in unison.
The party system changed after the war, when a large new party of the
left entered the scene. A comparison between all votes and those on SKDL
proposals reveals that Social Democratic MPs were at first somewhat
ambivalent in the new situation: their group tended to be divided on SKDL
proposals, until it assumed the more general pattern of opposing com-
munist proposals with above-average cohesion. However, the Agrarians
and the SDP group were not as cohesive in those votes as were the right
wing parties, possibly because the two parties competed for the same
voters as the SKDL.
Table 9.1
Average cohesion of party groups in the Eduskunta during three legislative periods,
1945-1954*
Years SKDL SDP AGR PROGR CONS SPP
All Open Votes:
1945–1948 92.1 76.6 81.9 83.3 85.7 75.5
1948–1951 95.1 86.6 87.3 82.0 84.0 74.5
1951–1954 94.9 81.7 82.6 86.2 85.5 81.3
SKDL Proposals Only:
1945–1948 95.7 55.0 79.8 82.9 85.4 77.4
1948–1951  99.2 82.0 84.3 91.8 93.6 90.2
1951–1954 97.1 84.7 88.7 91.6 92.7  93.9
* Rice’s index, the values of which range from 0.0 (a 50/50 division) to 100.0 (unani-
mous).
Source: Nyholm and Hagfors 1968.
Indeed, cohesive party groups have become the norm in parliamen-
tary voting. According to a comparison of divisions in final third read-
ings in 1995-1996, the index scores for cohesive voting appeared higher
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than those found four decades earlier. All bourgeois parties (Christian
League, Swedish People’s Party, Conservatives, and Center Party) scored
about 90 on the scale of 0 to 100; the SDP group (84.9) scored also
higher than previously. The only exception was the Left Alliance, whose
score 85.3 indicated that its group was looser than the SKDL group had
been. But although the party groups in the Finnish Eduskunta approach
unanimity, they are not more but less cohesive than party groups in the
four other Nordic parliaments. Such a difference may be caused by the
emphasis which Finland’s election system places on individual candi-
dates. (Jensen 2000.)
One obvious reason why individual MPs do not deviate much from
their party group’s line is their increasingly heavy workload. They sim-
ply do not have enough time to stay abreast of all the issues. Also, party
groups may overcome their internal differences before votes are taken.
When the government’s standing is at stake, it is natural for the govern-
ment parties to come together to support the government, while the op-
position parties oppose it. Moreover, the system of proportional elec-
tions emphasizes the members’ belief in the party as the main focus of
representation.
On the level of the prevailing principles of representative democracy
there is a certain inconsistency in Finland. According to the Constitution
(Section 29), “Each Member of Parliament is obliged to act in line with
justice and truth in the exercise of his mandate. He should observe the
Constitution and is not bound by any other instructions.” Obviously this
means that neither the political parties nor any outside interests should
interfere with the independent legislative decisions of any individual MP.
However, such a principle of uninstructed “trustee” legislators is hardly con-
sistent with the purpose of proportional representation, which aims at a rep-
resentative body that correctly mirrors the distribution of votes cast for each
of the parties or, as they used to be called, each “direction of opinion.”
During the early years of the unicameral parliament, the public really
viewed the ideal representatives of the people as “trustees,” in fact not
unlike the earlier members of the Diet of the Four Estates: “He (or she)
interrupted his regular activity annually and left his place of residence,
where he was a respected, talented, and well-known citizen, in order to
offer his experience and expertise temporarily to taking care of public
affairs.” Such was the ideal portrayed mainly by the bourgeois press of
the time, although by 1907 the first professional politicians had risen to
parliament from the political and trade organizations of the workers. Only
gradually – since the 1940s or even later – has it become generally ac-
cepted that membership of parliament should be treated and rewarded as
a main occupation. (Törnudd 1982, p. 738.)
Even the members of parliament do not think of themselves as elected
only for the purpose of using their own, independent judgment. In their
minds they manage to combine the “other instructions” with their “own”
judgment. A comparison of role orientations illustrates this. Four decades
ago John C. Wahlke and his colleagues distinguished three representa-
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tional role orientations that were characteristic of how American state
legislators relate to their decision-making behavior. Those were called
trustee, delegate, and politico. Most state legislators had the trustee ori-
entation (Wahlke et al. 1962, p. 281). However, about one-half of Ameri-
can congressmen were politicos, an orientation which combines the two
others (Davidson 1969, p. 117). In the Finnish Eduskunta the combining
politico-orientation was held by no fewer than 67 percent. Only 20 per-
cent were trustees and 13 percent thought of themselves as delegates.
(Oksanen 1972, p. 186.)
In the mid-1990s, many Finnish MPs still adhered to the “Burkean”
idea and thought it important to “promote views one personally consid-
ers important.” These MPs were more numerous than those who consid-
ered it important to represent either their own constituency, “private citi-
zens seeking help,” particular economic interests (businessmen, farm-
ers, etc.), or some socio-economically disadvantaged group (youth,
women, etc.). But the widely held independence principle could be re-
garded as a complement to the representation of specific interests, rather
than an alternative to it, and this is true not only of Finland but in all
Nordic parliaments. Characteristic of Finnish MPs was to consider their
mandate less party-bound than their Nordic colleagues did. (Esaiasson
2000, pp. 58–62.)
The professionalization of the membership of parliament and the less-
ening role orientation of purely trustee-type legislators have also had an
impact on how the mass public thinks about parliamentarians. It has be-
come common among Finns to assume tough “employer attitudes” to-
ward members of parliament, meaning an unwillingness to pay high sala-
ries to them and a tendency to scrutinize their attendance, activity, and
accomplishments.
One easy way of observing the working habits of MPs is to examine
how regularly they attend meetings of the whole house and of the com-
mittees. Occasionally newspapers publish counts of attendance, com-
monly doing so at the end of the annual sessions and close to elections.
Hardly ever is everybody present, and some members are absent more
than others. Typically some 30 members do not push their roll call but-
ton, often due to increasing international obligations but also for other
reasons. MPs are supposed to give advance notice of absences and state
why they will not be attending a plenary.43
Although some members may be absent for an extended period, the
43 In order to illustrate such reasons, we might review the count of non-attendance for one
single Friday (Helsingin Sanomat April 7, 2000). On that day, 37 of the 200 MPs were
not present. Four women MPs had been granted maternity leave. Five other MPs were
ill. Eight members were on their way home from the parliamentary assembly meeting
of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and five ministers of the government were
taking part in meetings or consultations abroad (China, USA, Portugal etc.). One min-
ister simply entered the unusually short session too late. Other reasons, given by 14
absentees, included meetings of three European-level parties in Brussels, one tv inter-
view, meetings of various non-political organizations, and private business.
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Finnish parliament has not solved the problem of substitution in situa-
tions when an MP obtains a long leave of absence. Only those elected to
the European Parliament were temporarily replaced in 1995 by their depu-
ties (the candidates of the same party who were closest to being elected
in the previous parliamentary election).
A much publicized case of long leaves occurred in 1970, when three
young MPs vacated their seats temporarily in order to do their military
service. Maternity leaves of one year’s duration have not been uncom-
mon either. Election to parliament is a serious commitment, and it re-
quires parliament’s approval and a very good reason to terminate mem-
bership before the end of the four-year term. Temporary leaves of long
duration became a heated issue in March 2000, when Esko Aho, the de-
feated presidential candidate of the Center Party, was invited for one
academic year to lecture and study at Harvard University. Parliament
simplified its rules just enough to make the leave possible, but the basic
problem of temporary duties remained unsolved.
The Members of Parliament
Once elected, members of parliament have a good chance of being re-
elected at least twice. In 1999 there were 78 who had not been in the
outgoing parliament, among them fifty-eight “freshman” legislators. Most
of the others (127) had already served two or more four-year terms, al-
though only eight had been in parliament for twenty years or more.44
The members of the Finnish parliament come from a wide spectrum
of social backgrounds. Of the 200 MPs elected in 1999, more than 130 are
university graduates, including 20 holding a law degree, 13 physicians, and
9 with a Ph.D. Thirty-five have master’s degrees in the social sciences and
seven in agriculture. There are nine other farmer MPs. The number of MPs
with blue-collar jobs was down to five in 1999, and eight others had been
working full time as trusted representatives of their co-workers.
Over the years, the social background of Finnish MPs has changed
much, as has society in general. The number of farmers elected to parlia-
ment was 58 in 1958, but declined to 12 in 1987. During the same period
the number of civil servants in parliament rose from 35 to 100, and the
number of MPs with at least an masters-level university education rose
from 67 to 106 (Noponen 1989, pp. 127, 131). What is unchanged is the
general tendency of Finnish (and other) voters to select candidates whose
social status is higher than their own.
Almost all Finnish MPs have participated actively in local government
and about two-thirds have had active roles in their party organizations. Both
forums have provided important training grounds for parliamentary candi-
44 Very long lasting memberships have gradually disappeared. Earlier, eleven MPs had
served more than 40 years. (Noponen 1989, p. 160.)
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dates. Trade unions have also been an important background for many MPs
of the left, and a variety of producer’s and businessmen’s organizations have
added to the background, especially of non-socialist members. In addition, a
very important source of the accumulating qualifications of any MP’s has
been parliament itself. (Op.cit, pp. 134–138).
For many, although not all, election to parliament involves an eleva-
tion in social status. On the other hand, distinguished service in parlia-
ment may open gates to other careers. It is common during each election
term for a few members to resign because they are appointed to high civil
service positions, and there are others who do not seek re-election, be-
cause they have more attractive private positions waiting. Naturally, there
are also some who remain in a political career and may rise to the gov-
ernment or become leading politicians of the opposition.
Retired MPs are paid a pension after they reach 65 years of age (full
pension if they have served 15 years or more). The law also guarantees a
leave of absence to government officials who are elected to parliament,
and most municipal governments act accordingly. Consequently, about
one-quater of the MPs have a “frozen” public post waiting; the longest
leaves still effective in 2002 had been granted in 1983.
There have been women among Finnish legislators from the very be-
ginning of the unicameral parliament; in the election of 1999 their num-
ber rose from sixty-seven to seventy-four. The election of 19 woman
MPs back in 1907 was a unique aspect in the history of the Eduskunta,
because at that time no other country in Europe had even given their
women the right to vote. In 1908 the number of women in parliament
rose to 25, then declined somewhat but began to rise again in 1951, reach-
ing 45 in 1970 and 62 in 1983 and peaking at 77 in 1991. The first woman
to be a government minister was the social democratic Miina Sillanpää,
appointed in 1926, and the first female speaker of parliament was the con-
servative MP Riitta Uosukainen, elected for the first time in 1994. Once, in
1996, both of the two deputy speakers also happened to be women. More-
over, woman MPs of different parties began to pull together in 1991 and
launched regular cooperation within the “Network of Women in Finland’s
Parliament.”
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10 The President of the Republic
... a qualitative change from ruler and policy-maker to mediator, opinion
leader and interpreter of popular feelings.
Nousiainen 2000, p. 350
The presidency is a bloody awful post.
President J.K. Paasikivi in 1949
The Presidency
The president of the republic is Finland’s head of state, but in the 21st
century he or she can no longer be called the head of government. The
role of parliamentary government has been strengthened consistently since
the 1980s and the president’s independent powers have weakened ac-
cordingly.
Two quotations from the constitution illustrate this change. The Con-
stitution Act of 1919 (Section 2) stipulated the following: “Supreme ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic. In addi-
tion thereto, for general government of the state there shall be a Council
of State, consisting of a Prime Minister and a sufficient number of Min-
isters.” But the new Constitution of 1999 (Section 3) no longer pictures
such a supreme presidency. According to it, “Governmental powers are
exercised by the President of the Republic and the Council of State, the
members of which shall have the confidence of the Parliament.”
Moreover, parliamentarians also wanted to remove the president’s re-
straints on the approval of new legislation. Whereas the constitution of
1919 had given legislative power to “ Parliament in conjunction with the
President of the Republic,” the new constitution prescribes merely that
“legislative powers are exercised by the Parliament, which shall also de-
cide on State finances.”
The desire to emphasize parliament and parliamentary government
was one of the main reasons why Finland’s eighty-year-old constitution
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was replaced by the new one in 1999. During the first seventy years of
the Constitution Act, Finland had applied the innovative principle of dual
executive power. It combined the presidential system with parliamentary
government, a concept that France has also applied since 1958. But even-
tually the phrase “normal parliamentarism” was taken more and more
seriously, until it became the generally accepted norm.45
The notion that parliamentary government is somehow more demo-
cratic than presidential power may have been a reaction to the very strong
position that President Urho Kekkonen acquired during his long term in
office from 1956 to 1981. But obviously members of parliament also felt
that the new direct mandate from the people (since 1994) would strengthen
the president too much at the cost of parliament. His or her term of office
is also rather long. As in Austria, the Finnish president is elected for six
years. The term is one year shorter than in Italy (and in France until
2002), but it is two years longer than in the United States or Iceland.
Only one consecutive re-election is now permitted in Finland.
For a long time the political left wanted to abolish the president’s in-
dependent popular base completely and simply move his election to par-
liament. The Social Democrats changed their position on this issue in the
1980s, after their own candidate won the election for the first time. The
parties were not eager to reverse their position completely, by replacing the
electoral college with direct elections, but eventually they could not resist
the growing pressure of public opinion urging more direct democracy.
The first direct elections in 1994 showed that the parties had had good
reason to be reluctant. Certain obvious candidates of the party leadership
were rejected in the party primaries, some dissident party members were
nominated as independent candidates, and there were some unexpected
opinion changes during the campaign. The Social Democratic candidate
Martti Ahtisaari, who was elected president in 1994 (see below), had
never held an elected office before. He had made his reputation as an
accomplished diplomat. Six of the nine presidents that preceded him had
been prime ministers at the time they were elected to the presidency.
After the election, the new president inaugurates his (or of course her)
term on March 1st in parliament, facing “the representatives of the people
of Finland” (the president of the supreme court having no role when the
oath is taken). Otherwise he makes personal visits to parliament only to
declare the annual parliamentary sessions open or to close the four-year
term.
The president still continues to be involved in the passing of new leg-
islation, because he signs government bills sent to parliament and con-
firms the laws passed by parliament. But only a trace remains of his
45 Max Jakobson made reference to the monarchical origins of the strong presidency
prevailing in Finland since 1919 and to the Swedish constitution of 1809, when he
wrote: “The whole legacy of King Gustav IV was at stake. In Finland the counterac-
tion against the coup d’état by the Swedish king in 1772 did not start until more than
two hundred years later.”
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earlier suspensive veto - that is, the right to slow down the enactment of
a law. Earlier, the president’s veto, which was used slightly more often
than once a year (Jansson 1982, p. 153), could be overturned by a newly
elected parliament and, since 1987, by next year’s session of the same
parliament, but under the new constitution, parliament can readopt, without
delay, any bill that the president has returned for additional consideration.
The weakening and near abolition of the veto power is a concrete ex-
ample of the strengthening of parliamentarism in the Finnish constitu-
tion. Another step in the same direction was the amendment, in 1991, that
removed the president’s right to dissolve parliament unless the prime minis-
ter requests him to. When the entire constitution was rewritten in 1999, the
touchiest point was again the relative powers of the president and the prime
minister, both in government formation and in certain policy decisions.
The government proposed the new Constitution Act in February 1998,
seven years after a broadly based government commission had begun to
work on the revision. Parliament needed one more year before the new
constitution was passed in February 1999. The new parliament elected in
March 1999 accepted the act expeditiously by the required two-thirds
majority and it became effective on March 1, 2000, the day when the
eleventh president took office. The new Constitution Act combined and
replaced the four constitutional laws that Finland had had since 1922
(the Constitution Act, the Parliament Act, the Ministerial Liability Act,
and the High Court of Impeachment Act).
Although the parties were in considerable agreement, one particular
detail in the reform was very difficult to resolve: who would choose the
prime minister and how? This is, of course, a critical decision. In two-
party systems and even in the two-bloc multiparty system of Sweden,
voters in a parliamentary election usually have a clear notion as to which
two potential prime ministers are competing for the position. But in Fin-
land there are more than two potential prime ministers. The composition
of the coalition government and, consequently, the opposition, are deter-
mined in inter-party negotiations held after a parliamentary election.
The Constitution of 1999 minimizes the independent role of the presi-
dent quite explicitly. It stipulates that “Parliament elects the Prime Min-
ister, who is thereafter appointed to the office by the President of the
Republic. The President appoints the other Ministers in accordance with
a proposal made by the Prime Minister.” (Section 61). The same section
stipulates that the “groups represented in the parliament” negotiate about
the government program and the composition of the government, and
that the president is to consult the speaker of parliament and the parlia-
mentary groups before he formally announces to parliament the nominee
for prime minister.
Only the future will show how much political power the Finnish presi-
dent actually can and will wield under the new constitution. Much will
depend on the prestige and personality of President Tarja Halonen and
her successors, and on her working relationship with the prime minister
and other ministers. What the constitution really emphasizes is the need
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to maintain close communication between the president and the minis-
ters. In her inauguration address on March 1st 2000, Ms Halonen also
spoke of the president’s direct contact with parliament.
The president continues to direct Finland’s foreign policy, although
now “in co-operation with the Council of State.” However, matters re-
lated to the European Union are excluded from the president’s sphere of
influence. Obviously the distinction between EU-related matters and more
general foreign policy decisions is not quite clear. Among the details that
needed to be settled at the very outset in March 2000 was the question of
who would chair the meetings of the ministerial committee on foreign
and security policy: is it the president or the prime minister? The com-
promise agreed was that the committee would be chaired by the prime
minister, but whenever the president attends the meeting she holds the
gavel and summarizes the discussions.
The Finnish president also continues to have constitutional powers in
domestic affairs, appointing high civil servants and judges, and acting as
supreme commander of the armed forces. But, in addition, the president
is expected to assume quite a meaningful informal role as a visionary, a
voice of national conscience, and an initiator of new policies.
Two Direct Elections
Originally the election of the Finnish president was indirect, taking place
in two stages. First the people elected an electoral college of 300 (later,
301) members, and then the college assembled to choose the president.
This happened ten times: in 1925, 1931, 1937, and seven times between
1950 and 1988. The meeting of the electoral college was by no means a
pure formality and there could be a great deal of partisan maneuvering
behind the scenes. Both in 1931 and in 1956 the college, in its third and
final ballot, chose between the two remaining candidates with the slim-
mest possible majority, 151–149. And in 1937 it ultimately rejected a
candidate (who had been Finland’s first president) who received 150 votes
in the first ballot.
Direct elections of the president were held for the first time in January
and February 1994. Table 10.1. shows what happened. There were eleven
candidates, and public opinion polls showed the Social Democratic nomi-
nee, Martti Ahtisaari, to be the apparent frontrunner. The important ques-
tion was who would win the second place and thus eliminate the nine
others from the decisive run-off election. This appeared to be a contest
between the candidates of the two other big parties, until the campaign of
Elisabeth Rehn, the candidate of the Swedish People’s Party, suddenly
snowballed and eliminated both of them. During the second campaign
she “ran out of steam”, handing Martti Ahtisaari a victory in the decisive
second ballot three weeks later.
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Table 10.1
Presidential elections, January 16 and February 6, 1994
Candidates Number of Votes
Advanced* Election Day Total Total %
1st Ballot
Martti Ahtisaari (SDP) 369,400 458,600 828,000 25.9
Elisabeth Rehn   (SPP) 210,400 491,800 702,200 22.0
Paavo Väyrynen  (CENT) 295,100 328,300 623,400 19.5
Raimo Ilaskivi  (CONS) 230,500 254,500 485,000 5.2
Keijo Korhonen (Center/Ind) 87,500 99,400 186,900 5.8
Claes Andersson (LEFT) 49,500 73,300 122,800 3.8
Pertti Virtanen (Ind.) 40,700 55,000 95,700 3.0
Eeva Kuuskoski (Center/Ind) 40,000 42,500 82,500 2.6
Toimi Kankaanniemi (CHR) 15,600 15,900 31,500 1.0
Sulo Aittoniemi  (FRP) 13,600 17,000 30,600 1.0
Pekka Tiainen (Communist) 3,600 3,700 7,300 0.2
Total 1,355,900 1,840,100 3,196,000 100.0
2nd Ballot
Martti Ahtisaari (SDP) 780,900 942,600 1,723,500 53.9
Elisabeth Rehn   (SPP) 712,600 763,700 1,476,300 46.1
Total 1,493,500 1,706,300 3,199,800 100.0
* Mail-in votes cast on January 5–11, and on January 26 – February 1.
Table 10.2
Presidential elections, January 16 and February 6, 2000
Candidates Number of Votes
Advanced* Election Day Total Total %
1st ballot
Tarja Halonen (SDP) 511,300 713,100 1,224,400 40,0
Esko Aho   (CENT) 522,600 528,600 1,051,200  34,4
Riitta Uosukainen (CONS) 185,300 207,000 392,300 12,8
Elisabeth Rehn (SPP) 96,700 145,100 241,900 7,9
Heidi Hautala  (GR) 27,900 72,800 100,700 3,3
Ilkka Hakalehto (BASF) 12,800 18,600 31,400 1,0
Risto Kuisma   (REF) 5,600 11,300 16,900 0,6
 Total 1,362,200 1,696,600 3,058,900 100,0
 2nd ballot
Tarja Halonen (SDP) 772,700 871,800 1,644,500 51,6
Esko Aho   (CENT)  737,300 803,500 1,540,800 48,4
Total 1,510,000 1 ,675,300 3,185,300 100,0
* Mail-in votes cast on January 5–11, and on January 26 – February 1.
BASF = Basic Finns; REF = Reform group.
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Nevertheless, the success of Elisabeth Rehn was a breakthrough that
encouraged other parties to nominate woman candidates in 1999. At that
time four women and three men ran for the presidency. Table 10.2 shows
the results of Finland’s second direct presidential election in January and
February, 2000.
The direct electoral system functioned differently in the two elections.
Whereas in 1994 the two top-ranking candidates received only 48 per-
cent of the votes on the first ballot, six years later the first round made it
very clear which two candidates the voters wanted to move on to the
second round. Together, Tarja Halonen of the Social Democratic Party
and Esko Aho of the Center Party received three-quarters of the votes,
leaving only one-quarter for the five other candidates.
The campaigns in Finland’s presidential elections have changed much
over the years. Between the two world wars it would have been consid-
ered quite improper to have the hopefuls openly seek the position. The
candidates who ran for the electoral college campaigned on their behalf,
and in some cases political parties did not even name their candidate for
the presidency. It was not until 1956 that all presidential candidates made
public campaign speeches.
The style changed much more. The direct elections were preceded by
quite professionally organized campaign activity. Furthermore, they in-
cluded highly personalized elements, publicizing candidates (and even
their spouses) not only in political but in various other roles and appear-
ances. The mass media provided much visibility for the candidates and
their messages. After the election, it is the custom in Finland for the
president to formally sever party ties and “turn in” his party membership
card, because the presidency is thought of as being non-political, or “above
politics.”
As mentioned above, the Social Democratic candidate Martti Ahtisaari,
who was elected president in 1994, had never held elected office. This
was a time of strong anti-party feelings in many western countries, and
in Finland the people also had a general desire to use their newly ac-
quired direct power to the full. The mood was again different in the elec-
tion of 2000. This time there was very little “interference” from the rank
and file of party members during the nominations, and the two candi-
dates with the most governmental experience were the voters’ favorites
for the second round; largely, because tv debates had revealed their expe-
rience and solid factual knowledge.
The multi-party system and the subsequent large number of candi-
dates favors clean and carefully worded campaigning in Finland, because
attacking rivals or taking extreme political positions during the first round
could backfire during the second round, when the two most successful
candidates are trying to attract new support from the voters of the elimi-
nated candidates. Also, in their campaign appearances the candidates like
to emphasize their personal qualities and to avoid narrow party labels.
Voters, in turn, are more volatile in presidential than in parliamentary
elections. Before the elections, public opinion ratings of the candidates
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fluctuated a great deal, and the results of published opinion polls had an
apparent influence on the voter’s decisions. In January 1994, late polls
showed growing support for Elisabeth Rehn and this snowballed rapidly.
She ranked only fourth in the advance votes cast in post offices twelve to
five days before the election, but she rose to be the most popular candi-
date on election day. Somewhat similar dynamics occurred during the
first round in 2000. The male candidate of the Center Party ranked first
in the advance ballots, but on election day he was overtaken by the fe-
male candidate of the Social Democrats.
Eleven Presidents
The following eleven people have been presidents of the republic:
– 1919–1925: K.J. Ståhlberg (1865–1952), doctor of laws, president
of the Supreme Administrative Court, Progressive Party (elected by
parliament)
– 1925–1931: Lauri Kr. Relander (1883–1947), PhD, district gover-
nor, Agrarian Union
– 1931–1937: Pehr Evind Svinhufvud (1861–1944), judge, prime min-
ister, regent in 1918, Conservative Party
– 1937–1940: Kyösti Kallio (1873–1940), farmer, prime minister,
Agrarian Union, resigned in 1940
– 1940–1944: Risto Ryti (1889–1956), master of laws, prime minister,
director general of the Bank of Finland, Progressive Party (elected in
1940 and reelected in 1943 by the 1937 electors, resigned in 1944)
– 1944–1946: C.G. Mannerheim (1867–1951), Marshall, supreme com-
mander of the armed forces, regent in 1918-1919 (elected by parlia-
ment, resigned in 1946)
– 1946–1956: J.K. Paasikivi (1870–1956), doctor of laws, prime min-
ister, Conservative Party (elected by parliament to complete
Mannerheim’s term, reelected in 1950 by electoral college)
– 1956–1981: Urho Kekkonen (1900–1986), doctor of laws, prime min-
ister, Agrarian Union (elected in 1956, 1962, 1968 and 1978, third
term extended by parliament from six to ten years, resigned in 1981)
– 1982–1994: Mauno Koivisto (1923–), PhD, prime minister, director
general of the Bank of Finland, Social Democratic Party (elected in
1982 and 1988)
– 1994–2000: Martti Ahtisaari (1937–), teacher, secretary of state at
the ministry for foreign affairs, Social Democratic Party
– 2000– : Tarja Halonen (1943–), master of laws, minister for foreign
affairs, Social Democratic Party
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The ten presidents of the 20th century served, of course, during quite
different circumstances. Posterity also tends to label them with different
personal characteristics. Ståhlberg, who had been professor of adminis-
trative law, senator, and speaker of parliament, is remembered as the fa-
ther of the Finnish constitution and as a symbol of political consensus.
Relander, who was elected as a surprise candidate in 1925, kept a low
profile in office but is thought of as the president who opened up per-
sonal contacts with the Nordic and Baltic countries. Svinhufvud, in turn,
was known as the nationalist who, in the years before Finland’s indepen-
dence, had been exiled to Siberia and who had led the “Independence
Senate” in 1917–1918. He is remembered for his strong personal cha-
risma, which helped him to block authoritarian moves by the extreme
right wing movement.
Kallio was a moderate and realistic farmer who built his entire career
in politics: as party chairman, speaker of parliament, and prime minister.
He helped to launch the “red-green” political co-operation between the
Social Democrats and the Agrarian Union in 1937, thus bridging the
nation’s deep red-white cleavage. Ryti, a skillful banker, was a cool and
rational thinker. He gained the people’s grateful respect for having car-
ried heavy war-time responsibilities. Mannerheim, who had had an excep-
tional military career in tsarist Russia and in Finland, guided the nation back
to peace and became a respected symbol of Finnish independence.
Paasikivi, old enough to have been effective in politics before Finland’s
independence, had been a high civil servant, party chairman, and chair-
man of a private bank. He made foreign policy the president’s important
prerogative, and also remained a central actor in domestic politics. He
laid the foundations for Finland’s post-war foreign policy and helped to
guard democracy against communist threats. Kekkonen, a five-time prime
minister, served as president for the unprecedented period of one quar-
ter-century. He skillfully continued Paasikivi’s foreign policy which, in
political rhetoric, was named the “Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.” Its primary
goal was protection of Finland’s neutrality. At the same time he concen-
trated much domestic power in the president’s own hands and, in using
his constitutional power to appoint ministers, his personal likes and dis-
likes played an important role in government formation.
The actual role of the president was not strictly fixed in the written
constitution: the powers he used depended on his personality and politi-
cal power base, and on the country’s external situation, or, more gener-
ally, on how the president’s constitutional powers were interpreted and
implemented at any given time. President Ståhlberg acted very indepen-
dently as a regulator and arbiter, but did not initiate policies. President
Kallio was an even weaker counterforce to the parliamentary govern-
ment. After the war, the position of parliament and parliamentary gov-
ernment was again strong in domestic affairs, but President Paasikivi
interpreted to the very letter the constitution’s article which made the
president responsible for Finland’s relations with foreign powers. He
clearly established that “foreign policy precedes domestic politics.” Presi-
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dent Kekkonen went even further: not only did he make himself indis-
pensable in the area of foreign policy, but he acquired the upper hand in
domestic politics as well, and made the prime minister and his cabinet
dependent on the will of the president.
Koivisto, while maintaining the integrity of the office, launched a con-
stitutional “counteraction” in the 1980s. He started a gradual move to-
ward the new balance of executive power, in which the parliamentary
type of government was emphasized. As an individual, he is remem-
bered as the man who had fought the Russians with a light machine gun
in the war and who earned his PhD as a longshoreman. Later he used
broad popular support to circumvent the political elite of the Kekkonen
era, and remained an independent thinker throughout his presidency and
afterwards. Ahtisaari had a civil service career in the ministry for foreign
affairs and also held high positions in the United Nations Organization.
He spent much time abroad and was a skillful negotiator in international
conflicts, while attempting to cultivate a direct touch with ordinary people.
The eleventh president of Finland, Tarja Halonen, is the third to come
from the Social Democratic Party and the first born in the capital city.
More importantly, she is Finland’s first woman president. Only four other
countries had female presidents in 2000, namely, Ireland, Latvia, Panama,
and Sri Lanka. Is March 1st 2000 a more important landmark as the date
when the new constitution took effect or when the first woman became
president?’ The latter seems to be the better answer. The reform of the
constitution had become timely and it greatly reduced the powers of the
president, but it also was regarded as a mere “maintenance check-up”
whereas having a woman as president entails significant symbolic and
practical consequences throughout Finnish society.
The eleven presidents were not “born” to their high position. To the
contrary, many rose from rather humble backgrounds. However, attached
to the presidency has been the traditional prestige that is to some extent
the legacy of the old monarchies. Developments during the 1990s and
the new constitution have made the presidency much more prosaic to-
day. Presidents are expected to uphold their prestige and position con-
stantly through their own actions and public appearances.
During the election campaign of 2000, all the candidates obviously
understood that most voters desired an influential president rather than a
weak one. Before the campaign, a large majority of Finns also were sat-
isfied with the amount of power the president had and were unwilling to
reduce it (see Table 7.3). Moreover, there is some evidence that a person’s
expectations regarding the president’s role are related to how politically
powerful he feels. A strong president is most important for citizens who
are alienated and feel powerless in the political system, whereas the em-
phasis on parliamentary government seems to appeal most to politically
efficacious citizens and, naturally, to the political elite (Pesonen and
Sänkiaho 1979, pp. 441–443; Pesonen 1994, p. 181).
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11  The Executive
As seen from the opposition’s side, this government’s greatest weakness
is its great strength.
MP Risto Kuisma in 2001
Personnel savings have been slight. The... reason for this has been the
implementation of reforms by simply dressing the old administration in
new clothes.
Savolainen 1999, p. 144
The Council of State
In common usage the word “government” refers in Finland to the coun-
cil of state or, as the governing body can also be called, the cabinet. It
consists of the prime minister and the “appropriate number” (no more
than seventeen) of other ministers. Most of them, and sometimes all, are
also members of parliament, although this is not a formal requirement.
As was described above, the dualistic constitution enacted in 1919
placed the government in a tricky position between the president and
parliament, because Finland was either “semi-presidential” or “semi-par-
liamentary,” as it combined the presidential system of government with
the parliamentary one. In other words, the president of the republic was
elected independently and had strong powers of his own, but the cabinet
must also enjoy the confidence of parliament. The Constitution of 1999
expresses the idea of parliamentarism in the following two phrases: “The
Ministers are responsible before the Parliament for their actions in of-
fice” (Section 60), and “The President shall in any event dismiss the
Government or a Minister, if either no longer enjoys the confidence of
Parliament...” (Section 64).
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Table 11.1
The presidents and governments of Finland from 1944 to 2003
The Presidents Party affiliation of Cabinet Members        Seats
and Prime Ministers LEFT SDP CENT LPP SPP CONS Other Ind
C.G. Mannerheim
8/44: Antti Hackzell – 5 4 1 2 3  – 1 190
9/44: U. J. Castrén – 5 4 1 1 2 – 2 190
11/44: J. K. Paasikivi II 4 4 4 1 2 – – 3 165
4/45: J. K. Paasikivi III 5 4 4 1 1  – – 2 171
J.K. Paasikivi
3/46: Mauno Pekkala 6 5 5 – 1  – – 1 162
7/48: K. A. Fagerholm I  – 15  – – –  –  – 1  54
3/50: Urho Kekkonen I – – 10 2 3  – – – 75
1/51: Urho Kekkonen II – 7 7 1  2 – – – 129
9/51: Urho Kekkonen III – 7 7  – 2  – – 1 119
7/53: Urho Kekkonen IV – – 8 – 3 – – 3 66
11/53: Sakari Tuomioja – –  – 3* 2* 4*  –  6  –
5/54: Ralf Törngren – 6 6  – 1  – – 1 120
10/54: Urho Kekkonen  V – 7 6 –  – – – 1 107
Urho Kekkonen
3/56: K. A. Fagerholm II – 6 6 1 1 – – 1 133
5/57: V. J. Sukselainen I – – 6 3 3 – – 1 79
7/57:  - “ - – – 9 4 –  – – 1 66
9/57:  - “ - – 5* 6 2 –  – – 2 66
11/57: Rainer von Fieandt – – 4*  – – – – 10  –
4/58: Reino Kuuskoski – 4* 5* 1*  – – – 4  –
8/58: K. A. Fagerholm III – 5 5 1 1 3  – – 147
1/59: V. J. Sukselainen II – – 14 – 1*  –  – –  48
7/61: Martti Miettunen I – – 14 –  – – –  – 48
4/62: Ahti Karjalainen I – – 5 2 2 3 – 3 112
12/63: Reino Lehto – 1*  – –  – – – 14 –
9/64: J. Virolainen – – 7 2 2 3 – – 112
5/66: Rafael Paasio I 3 7 5  – – – – – 145
3/68: Mauno Koivisto I 3 7 5 – 1  – – – 164
5/70: Teuvo Aura I  – 4* 3* 1* 1* 1* –  3  –
7/70: A. Karjalainen II 3  5 5 2 2  – – – 144
3/71:  - “ - – 8 5 2 2 – – – 108
10/71: Teuvo Aura II –  3* 4* 1* 1* 1*  – 5  –
2/72: Rafael Paasio II – 17 – – – –  – – 55
9/72: Kalevi Sorsa I – 7 5 1 2 – – – 108
6/75: Keijo Liinamaa  – 5* 3* 1* 1* 1* – 6  –
11/75: M. Miettunen II 4  5 4 1 2  –  – 2 152
9/76: M. Miettunen III –  – 9 3 3  – – 1 58
5/77: Kalevi Sorsa II 3 4 5 1 1  – – 1 142
3/78:  - “ - 3 4 5 2 – – – 1 132
5/79: M. Koivisto II 3 5 6 – 2  –  – 1 133
Mauno Koivisto
2/82: Kalevi Sorsa III 3 5 6 – 2 – – 1 133
12/82:  - “ - – 8 6 1 2 – – 1 98
5/83: Kalevi Sorsa IV – 8 5 – 2 – 2 – 123
4/87: Harri Holkeri – 8  –  – 2 7  1 – 130
4/91: Esko Aho –  – 8  – 2  6 1  – 115
Martti Ahtisaari
4/95: Paavo Lipponen I 2 7  –  – 2 5 1 1 145
4/99: Paavo Lipponen II 2  6  – – 2 6 1 1 140
Tarja Halonen
5/02: Paavo Lipponen II 2 7  – – 2 7 –  – 129
* Without explicit backing of own party.
  Prime Minister’s party in bold type.
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The best guarantee for enjoying parliament’s confidence is, naturally,
to have a government coalition consisting of political parties that together
have a majority in parliament. What has happened in practice is seen in
Table 11.1, which summarizes the compositions of the cabinets of twenty-
three prime ministers during six presidencies. There have been forty-one
governments between 1944 and 2003, but the prime ministers have been
fewer, because five persons have become prime minister more than once,
as the table’s roman numerals indicate. Earlier, between 1917 and 1944,
Finland had twenty-seven different governments and eighteen prime
ministers (see Vaarnas 1976, p. 8; Numminen 1999, p. 83).
For half a century, from 1937 to 1987, the basic pattern was known as
the “red earth” coalitions, i.e. governments formed jointly by the Social
Democrats and the Agrarian Union/Center Party, and possibly including
smaller parties, most often the Swedish People’s Party. During the war
the model was expanded into grand coalitions of all or almost all the
parties, and after the war it was broadened to the “popular front” model,
which included the communists but excluded the conservatives (1944–
1948, 1966–1971, and 1975–1982). In addition, there has been one large
coalition without the communists (1958–1959), three one-party minor-
ity governments (1948–1950, 1959–1962, 1972), two minority coalitions
of parties of the center (1950–1951, 1976–1977), and three majority coa-
litions of the bourgeois parties (1962–1963, 1964–1966, 1991–1995).
On occasion, when a political crisis kept the parties from working
together, the temporary solution was to appoint caretaker, non-party cabi-
nets of civil servants without a parliamentary base (1953, 1957, 1963,
1970, 1971, and 1975). They sometimes included politicians, but mainly
as experts and without the explicit backing of their party. (See Pesonen
and Thomas 1983.)
As was mentioned in Chapter 8, a completely new coalition type ter-
minated the “red earth” era of 1937–1987, when the chairman of the
Conservative Party formed a “blue-red” government. Now the Center
Party became the outsider, first in 1987–1991, then again since 1995,
when even the Left Alliance and the Greens were included in the five-
party “rainbow coalition.” The second such government of Paavo
Lipponen, appointed in April 1999, had the backing of a broad 140–60
majority in parliament; the base of his first government in 1995–1999
was even broader (see Tables 11.1 and 8.1).
Although a broad political base may cause internal tensions within a
government coalition, it is obvious that the broader its parliamentary sup-
port, the stronger the government vis-à-vis the opposition. In Finland
majority governments have been much more common than in the other
Nordic countries (cf. Arter 1999, p. 201) and have now become normal
practice. Among the 37 new governments appointed between 1948 and
1999, there were 23 majority governments (plus 7 minority and 7 non-
party as shown in Table 11.1). Of the 23 majority coalitions, eight faced
an opposition smaller than 67 MPs. This is an important threshold be-
cause constitutional amendments need the backing of a two-thirds ma-
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jority. A more frequently used advantage of the opposition was, until
1995, the right to delay a bill if one-third of MPs so voted. There is also
the larger qualified majority, five-sixths, needed to declare urgent a deci-
sion to amend the constitution, another threshold that might occasionally
obstruct the government’s intended policy.46
The constitutionally defined procedure of government formation
changed in 2000 when President Tarja Halonen took office (see Chapter
10 above), but, because governments no longer resign when the presi-
dent changes, her first chance to participate in forming a new govern-
ment was due to occur after the parliamentary election of March 2003.
The Constitution of 1999 (Section 61, quoted in the preceeding chapter)
does not leave her much to say about it: “The Parliament elects the Prime
Minister.” The election of the prime minister takes place in parliament, and
it does not happen before the parliamentary parties have agreed on the com-
position of the government and on the government’s political program. The
president has the formal role of informing parliament about the nominee for
prime minister, but it is parliament that then elects him or her.
There are twelve ministries in the Finnish government (the ministries
for foreign affairs, justice, interior, defense, finance, education, agricul-
ture and forestry, communications, trade and industry, social affairs and
health, labor, and environmental affairs), and often the responsibility for
some ministries is divided between two ministers (thus, the government
appointed in 1999 also has ministers responsible for foreign trade, taxa-
tion, regional administration, culture, and basic services). The prime
minister’s office has significant duties of its own and could be counted as
the thirteenth ministry. The maximum number of ministers is not deter-
mined by the constitution itself, but is limited by law to eighteen. The old
constitution required that all ministers must be native-born Finnish citi-
zens and two must have a law degree, but these qualifications were omit-
ted from the Constitution of 1999.
The president exercises her or his constitutional powers in the weekly
presidential sessions of the council of state which she chairs: bills to be
sent to parliament and laws to be promulgated, the issuing of decrees,
and the appointment of high civil servants. She is free of any formal
political responsibility, whereas parliament holds the cabinet politically
responsible for governmental policies and for the central administration.
The cabinet (council of state) also makes decisions without the president
in its weekly plenary meetings, normally on Thursdays, which are pre-
ceded by an unofficial “evening school” on Wednesday nights. The ple-
nary meeting of the council of state is competent when a quorum of five
ministers is present.
46 One noteworthy example was the extension of President Kekkonen’s six-year term
1968–1974 to ten years, passed in January 1973. All major parties supported this
proposal, but it also needed to receive a five-sixths majority over the opposing con-
stitutionalist MPs from different parties. The bill was declared urgent by a 170–28
majority.  Six more no-votes would have been enough to block it.
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The Council of State Act of 1994 limited the scope of the cabinet’s
plenary sessions to important questions of principle, and the new consti-
tution permits the council of state to issue decrees without the president’s
signature. Decision-making has also been decentralized, so that lower-
level decrees can be issued on behalf of the government by individual
ministers, and in each ministry by the civil servants to whom such au-
thority has been delegated.
Of increased importance in the working of the government have been
specialized cabinet committees. The four statutory ones deal with for-
eign and security policy, finance, economic policy, and European Union
affairs. They are chaired by the prime minister and have from five to nine
other ministers as members (the president chairs the meeting of the com-
mittee on foreign and security policy if she attends it). There is also the
cabinet’s “neighboring-areas” committee. In addition, there are ministe-
rial working groups of five to ten ministers that are chaired by the rel-
evant minister.47
Parliamentarism
As stated above, the council of state can govern only as long as it enjoys
the confidence of parliament. Interpellations (challenges to ministers)
are the most powerful method parliament can use to test whether the
government enjoys its confidence. This tool has been used in Finland
only about twice a year (but averaged 5.5 per year in 1990–1995), and
less for “purely propaganda aspects” than might have been expected
(Isaksson and Helander 2001, pp. 25, 122). Of the 36 government resig-
nations between 1948 and 1999, only two were forced by a vote of no-
confidence, and two others were due to a decision by parliament against
the will of the government. The communist minister of the interior who
was appointed in 1945 had to resign after a personal vote of no confi-
dence in 1948.
The concrete issues of the two successful interpellations concerned the
manner of changing the government’s composition in 1957, and reduction
of subsidies for agriculture in 1958. More often, in seven cases, the govern-
ment resigned because of internal conflicts within the coalition. Fourteen
resignations were the result of parliamentary and five of presidential elec-
tions. (Nousiainen 1998, p. 251; Jansson 1982, pp. 139–140, 149.)
Some governments have changed their political composition without
actually resigning (1957, 1971, and 1978). The average lifespan of gov-
ernments was approximately one year until President Koivisto made it
the accepted norm that a government stays in power during parliament’s
47 For example, in January 2001 there were seven ministerial working groups dealing
with administration and regional development, social policy, communications policy,
the Kyoto climate protocol, immigration policy and ethnic relations, education, and
the Natura 2000 network.
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entire four-year election term. A major political change occurred, as was
mentioned above, when the long-lasting pattern of Social Democratic-
Center cooperation was replaced in 1987 by broad majority governments
without the Center Party (1987–1991 and 1995 onward). In 1987 the
election victory of the Conservative Party was one reason for the politi-
cal change, leading to the appointment of the party’s chairman Harri
Holkeri as prime minister. The subsequent premierships in 1991 and 1995
of the Center Party leader Esko Aho and the Social Democratic leader
Paavo Lipponen, in turn, followed their parties’ election victories.
Small parties, and possibly individual ministers of large ones, can also
express their disproval of the government through stepping out of the
government which, nevertheless, continues to govern as a majority coa-
lition. Examples include the leader of the Christian League Toimi
Kankaanniemi, the only minister from that party since 1991, who re-
signed in June 1994 because he did not approve prime minister Esko
Aho’s request for a unanimous decision in favor of Finland’s EU member-
ship; or Satu Hassi of the Green League, whose party was opposed to grant-
ing permission to build additional nuclear power facilities (see Chapter 4).
When stable four-year-long governments became the pattern in the
1980s, amendments to the constitution gradually strengthened par-
liament’s power to control not only the performance, but also the first
steps of governments. In 1987, it was stipulated that the president must
listen to the parliamentary parties before appointing the government. An
amendment in 1991 required the government to inform the Eduskunta
about its program “without delay” and stated that significant changes in
the government’s composition can take place only when the Eduskunta
is in session.
The Constitution of 1999, which reduced the president’s role in gov-
ernment formation, also includes a formal reference to the negotiations
which take place before the appointment of a new government: “Before
the Prime Minister is elected, the groups represented in the Parliament
negotiate on the political program and composition of the Government.”
(Section 61:2). The period of approximately four weeks that follows the
election is of crucial importance for the whole term of the Eduskunta. This is
when policy goals are outlined and when the cards are dealt for a period of
four years, offering either influence or a weak role in the opposition.
Ministers are constantly in the limelight. They make political initia-
tives and they defend the government’s policies both in parliament and in
the mass media. They are criticized by the opposition and they are re-
peatedly interviewed and asked for their intentions and explanations by
television and the daily press. They have also become increasingly vul-
nerable within their own parliamentary party groups.
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When parliament started the 2001 legislative session, Prime Minister
Lipponen selected “parliamentarism and the new constitution” as the
theme of the opening discussion.48 One could conclude from the debate
that, in the opinion of MPs, the new constitution had been less successful
in its aim of strengthening parliament’s position than in making the prime
minister and his government more powerful. Also, day-to-day coopera-
tion of the five coalition parties received less attention than the relations
of the parliamentary groups of the governing parties with their own min-
isters in the government. Members of the opposition parties even spoke
of two different oppositions, the large “real opposition” that often pub-
licly criticizes the government, and the smaller opposition that also op-
poses the government formally when actual votes of confidence are taken.
Central Administration
In the planning of new policies and new legislation, as well as in the
execution of policies, the council of state is obviously very dependent on
the civil servants who work in the ministries permanently. Their num-
bers have reflected the increased responsibilities of the executive branch
of government. The numbers of civil servants working in the ministries
grew more than tenfold during the course of seven decades. They were
480 in 1925 and 730 in 1939, but 1350 in 1956, 4540 in 1988, and 5240
in 1994 (Numminen 1999, p. 76).
However, the total number of state employees is much higher, more
than 200,000. Many civil servants work in specialized offices and agen-
cies of the state’s central administration, operating in their own fields of
expertise outside the ministries, although directed by the council of state.
Since the 1970s the total number of such governmental units has been
about seventy. In recent years the total number of civil servants has been
reduced because functions traditionally run by the state have been reor-
ganized so that they are now counted as part of the private sector.
It would be too broad a task to list here all the offices of central gov-
ernment. For illustration, however, let us review the general structures of
four of the twelve ministries (without claiming that these are more interest-
ing or important than the eight others: justice, interior, defense, education,
agriculture and forestry, trade and industry, labor, and environment).
In the second government of Prime Minister Lipponen, the responsi-
bilities of the ministry for foreign affairs were divided among four min-
isters. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja of the Social
Democratic Party (since 2000), was in charge of the departments for po-
48 The opening discussion was added to parliamentary procedures in 2001. The theme
of the first discussion was a surprise, because it was generally expected that the
debate would deal with the government’s plans for new legislation. The theme of the
second such debate in February 2002 was, more predictably, the government’s pro-
gram for the fourth and final annual session of this legislature.
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litical, administrative, judicial, protocol, and press and culture affairs.
The second minister, Kimmo Sasi of the Conservative Party, handled
matters covered by the department of foreign trade, while the department
of development cooperation was assigned to the government’s Minister
of the Environment Satu Hassi, leader of the Green League. In addition,
the Minister of Defense Jan-Erik Enestam, chairman of the Swedish
People’s Party, coordinated policy with regard to neighboring areas. The
most important outside offices directed by this ministry are the 76 Finn-
ish embassies and numerous consulates around the world.
Political responsibility for the ministry of finance, semi-enviously
named “the superministry,” has long been divided between two minis-
ters. In 1999–2003 the budget was the responsibility of the Conservative
Party chairman Sauli Niinistö, and taxation was under Suvi-Anne Siimes,
chairperson of the Left Alliance. The six departments of the ministry
deal with the national economy, the budget, taxation, personnel, the de-
velopment of administration, and financial markets. The national level
institutions under this ministry include the state treasury, customs board,
office of inspections, the national board of taxes, the statistical office,
and the center for economic research. On the regional and local level the
custom offices and tax bureaux are visible representatives of this branch
of public administration.
The ministry of communications was directed by one minister, who
was, until 2002, Olli-Pekka Heinonen of the Conservative Party. Its four
departments deal with traffic economy, road traffic, telecommunications,
and general affairs. Two very significant government services under this
ministry, services run by the post and telegraph board and the railroad
board, have been transferred to corresponding stock holding companies
owned by the state (see Chapter 15). What remains of them directly in
the state’s hands, are the centers for tele administration and rail adminis-
tration. The biggest office under this ministry is the road office; the oth-
ers include the navigation office, aviation office, center of motor vehicle
administration, marine research institute, and meteorological institute.
Our fourth example is the ministry of social affairs and health. Its six
departments are the departments of administration, insurance, social wel-
fare and health services, preventive social welfare and health policy,
economy and planning, and labor protection. State-wide offices outside
the ministry include the center for social and health research and devel-
opment (STAKES), the product control agency for welfare and health,
the insurance supervision authority and the centers for radiation and
nuclear safety, public health, medicines and medico-legal affairs. Again,
a great deal of state administration takes place in regional offices, and it is of
major political importance that much responsibility for the implementation
of policies was transferred in the 1990s from the state to local self-govern-
ment. Maija Perho of the Conservative Party directed the ministry, but some
areas were hived off, to be dealt with by the minister of health and social
services, whose portfolio was divided (two years each) between Eva Biaudet
(Swedish People’s Party) and Osmo Soininvaara (Green League).
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In the early years of independence, each ministry had one of its senior
civil servants appointed as the chief civil servant, or permanent secre-
tary, responsible for the general supervision and coordination of the
ministry’s work. Only during the 1960s did ministries gradually intro-
duce full-time permanent secretaries (who are called state secretaries in
some ministries). They manage the operations of the ministry under the
political leadership of the minister or ministers. The civil servants in the
council of state “have adopted a loyal and professional attitude to serv-
ing successive governments irrespective of their political complexion”
(Numminen 1999, p. 78). Nevertheless, many appointments to high civil
service positions had been political and, in the 1970s, membership of
either the Social Democratic or the Center Party became a de facto quali-
fication for many civil service positions. This trend toward further
“politicization” was reversed in the 1980s.
Over two centuries, Finland has weighed two different principles of
decision-making in the central units of public administration. Within
ministries the situation is clear: each minister has monocratic authority,
whereas the plenary sessions of the council of state make their decisions
collectively. But back in the 19th century all decisions in the senate were
collegiate and the individual senators (later ministers) had no indepen-
dent decision-making powers before 1917. Many national boards also
adopted the collegiate principle, which was inherited from Sweden. It was
practiced to some extent until November 1993, when the final session of the
last remaining collegium in Finnish public administration, that of the na-
tional housing board, “marked the effective end of a tradition in Finnish
administrative history dating back to 1643” (Savolainen 1999, p. 139).
The development of administrative decision-making has to be observed
in connection with another contrast of organizational principles: should
the specialized tasks of central government be performed by the admin-
istrative departments of the senate (later the ministries of the council of
state), or should they be trusted to national boards and agencies that func-
tion outside the ministries? In the Nordic context, the ministerial system
is applied in Denmark and Norway, whereas the central administrative
boards are traditional in Sweden. In the grand duchy of Finland there
were even some Russian plans to make the district governors into power-
ful administrators and to link them to the emperor, bypassing the Finnish
senate.
Finland has not made a clear choice between the ministerial system
and separate national boards and offices. In the early 19th century there
was an attempt to avoid the incoherence and inefficiency of the Swedish
system, but ultimately the increasing responsibilities of the state necessi-
tated new departments in the senate and new administrative offices or
boards that were closely subordinated to the senate. By 1881, there were
24 national boards or other separate offices, and “there had been an en-
forced retreat from the principle of concentrating all governmental af-
fairs in the Senate” (op.cit., p. 123). More national boards and smaller
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offices were soon introduced. The restructuring of administration in the
1920s involved the merging of some national boards with the ministries,
but new boards and offices were also established. After the Second World
War, there was again a declared policy to strengthen the ministries, but at
the same time it became the practice to entrust more expert preparation
to national boards.
From 1986 onward, Finland has made a special effort to eliminate
overlapping administration between the national boards and the minis-
tries, and to improve the quality of public services. Also, a wave of cen-
tral government reform swept widely over Europe in the 1980s, and sev-
eral countries, including Finland, adopted performance budgeting and
restructured parts of their central government as market-oriented state
enterprises. By the end of 1995, around 60,000 people worked in such
market-oriented units. Together with other reforms, this cut the head count
of government employees from 208,000 in 1991 to some 122,000 in 1996.
Only the latter remain in the state budget. The activities of the Finnish
state as a business operator will be discussed below, in Chapter 15.
What had been a clear demarcation between the private and the public
sector has become more diffuse since the 1990s, when public services
became more market-based and customer-oriented. However, according
to a government resolution of spring 1998, it is not important who pro-
duces public services, as long as the services match the wishes of the
citizenry. The public do not suspect bureaucratic misconduct but they are
not happy about all the public services they receive and also tend to be
dissatisfied with how services are provided. In 1992 about half of the
Finns thought that both the government and the bureaucracy had too much
power in society; by 1998 critical opinions had mellowed, but differ-
ently, so that the role of the government was accepted more generally
than the role of its bureaucracy (EVA 1999a, p. 27).
Naturally, the administrative functions of the state are not limited to
the national level. They are also performed in the regional and local of-
fices of state administration. The provincial governors have been tradi-
tional representatives of central government in the administrative prov-
inces. Their number was six when Finland was annexed to Russia in
1809 and rose to eight in 1831; in 1960 the number of provinces became
twelve. These multisector regional arms of central government also be-
came an object of their inhabitants’ regional identification, but this as-
pect was ended by the new Provincial Administration Act of 1997. Only
Lapland, North Ostrobothnia (the province of Oulu) and Åland remained,
while the nine other provinces were condensed into three artificially formed
major provinces (different from the major regions shown in Figure 4.1).
The provincial state offices are under the Ministry of Interior, but they
handle matters under the purview of many other ministries as well. The
list of their regular functions is extensive: “social welfare and health ad-
ministration, police administration, the rescue services, transport, con-
sumers and competition, food administration, veterinary services and
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animal welfare, judicial administration, and sport and youth affairs”
(Selovuori 1999, p. 154), and the central government sets demanding
goals for all these functions (cf. the government’s budget proposal for
2002, pp. 115–117). Many of these functions are practiced at the level of
the state’s 90 local districts, such as police departments, register offices,
employment offices, and tax offices. In addition, the provincial state of-
fices take part in some regional planning and they “supervise and evalu-
ate” functions of the self-governing municipalities.
Simultaneous with the reform of provincial state offices in autumn
1997 was the establishment of 15 employment and economic develop-
ment centers. They assumed tasks of a large number of separate district
offices for the purpose of promoting business and regional development.
Administratively these centers come under the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, but they are also subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry, and the Ministry of Labor. The areas they cover are identi-
cal with those of the regional councils.49 The Ministry of the Environ-
ment works through a separate network of regional environment centers,
and there are many other district authorities working in their own fields
of administration.
National Defense
The central aim of Finland’s security policy is to expand cooperation and
maintain a stable situation in northern Europe and the Baltic area. The
official policy line from the end of the second world war into the 21st
century has been that this aim is best promoted by maintaining a credible
defense capability, remaining outside military alliances, and participat-
ing in international cooperation in order to strengthen security and sta-
bility. The country’s security policy and international cooperation will
be discussed below in Chapter 16. Military defense capability is the duty
of the armed forces, but total defense also includes economic and civil
defense, dependability of the society’s technical systems, measures in
social welfare and health care, public law and order, and national de-
fense information.
According to the Constitution Act of 1919 and, again, the Constitution
of 1999 (Section 127), “Every Finnish citizen is required to participate
or assist in the defense of the fatherland, as provided by an Act.” Finland
has a conscription army; the conscription of the male population is stipu-
lated in the Conscription Act and only the residents of Åland are ex-
empted from it. On grounds of ethical conviction a conscript may be
directed into unarmed service. The duration of the conscripts’ military
49 The 19 regions of continental Finland, listed in Chapter 4 (Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1),
were reduced to 15 by joining Uusimaa with Itä-Uusimaa, Häme with Kanta-Häme,
Kymi with South Karelia, and Pohjanmaa with Keski-Pohjanmaa.
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service is 6, 9, or 12 months depending on the type of training. Women
can also volunteer for military service (some 400–500 do so annually).
The president of the republic issues military orders and appoints the
officers of the defense forces in his or her capacity as the supreme com-
mander (Section 128). He or she may relinquish this task to another Finn-
ish citizen, as President Kyösti Kallio did in 1939 when he invited Marshall
Mannerheim to take over the responsibilities of supreme commander.
But according to the new constitution this can happen only if the govern-
ment proposes it. In other ways, too, the Constitution of 1999 brought
the government, and especially its minister of defense, into closer coop-
eration with the president in military decisions. The mobilization of the
defense forces would require a proposal by the government, and the presi-
dent now “makes decisions on matters relating to military orders in con-
junction with a Minister” (Section 58).
The council of state is responsible for total defense, and its ministry of
defense has a central role in coordinating the activities of different min-
istries in this area. The government’s committee on foreign and security
policy, which is chaired by the president or the prime minister, is the
consultative and planning organ for total defense.50
Matters of military command are proposed for the president’s deci-
sion by the commander-in-chief of the defense forces, who is directly
subordinate to the president in these matters; military command also in-
cludes operational planning and training. The Finnish forces are orga-
nized into the defense staff, in which the army staff also functions, three
supra-regional commands with 12 military districts, plus the air force
and the navy. The administration of the defense forces is under the min-
istry of defense. However, the border guard is separate and its senior
command and control are subordinated to the ministry of the interior.
About 27,000 conscripts, approximately 80 percent of the relevant age
group, complete their military service each year. The total number of
salaried staff is some 16,500. These are rather small numbers but, if nec-
essary, Finland would be able to mobilize 22 wartime brigades, with
490,000 trained and adequately equipped men, because commissioned
officers and NCOs remain in the reserve until aged 60, and other ranks
do until 50. Conscripts must participate in refresher training if asked to
do so.51 The use of the traditional conscription system has the support of
a very large majority (79 percent in October 2001) of the people, while
13 percent would prefer selective service and only 7 percent favor a pro-
fessional army (MTS 2/2001).
People feel high confidence in the defense forces (see Table 7.4) and
also are, in principle, very willing to defend the country. “If Finland is
50 In March 2000 this committee replaced the former defense council, which was the
highest consultative planning organ and also advised the president in defense mat-
ters.
51 The government plans to reduce wartime manpower to 350,000 by the end of 2008
(VNS 2/2001, p. 9).
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attacked, do you think the Finns should take up armed defense under all
circumstances, even if the outcome seems uncertain?” has been an annu-
ally repeated survey question, to which respondents have reacted affir-
matively. In the 1990s more than three-quarters said yes and less than 20
percent said no. An even bigger majority (85 percent) would be willing
to participate personally in national defense to an extent their skills and
ability permit, although a smaller majority (56 percent in October 2001)
actually believe that Finland could emerge successful from a conven-
tional war. (Kekäle 1999, pp. 11, 14, 27; MTS 2/2001.)
Despite such favorable public opinion it is quite demanding for a small
nation to maintain a credible defense capability. Because of the large
territory, Finland’s strategy needs to include a readiness to organize sepa-
rate regional defenses. Nowadays it is not always easy to get those sum-
moned to participate in refresher training, one reason being tougher com-
petition in the economy, which has made employers reluctant to release
their skilled employees for weeks in the military. The defense forces must
also operate, modernize, and plan for the future within narrow fiscal lim-
its. Decisions to close up military bases due to rationalization have caused
critical local reactions.
Finland’s defense expenditures amounted to 1.3 percent of the GDP in
2000, the same as Spain’ and more than Austria and Ireland (1.0%), but
less than Germany (1.5%), Sweden (2.0%), Great Britain (2.4%), or
France (2.7%) (VNS 2/2001, p. 91). However, when making cross-na-
tional comparisons one might add that a conscription army with trained re-
serves provides defense capability less expensively than a professional army.
Finland has also had a role in international peacekeeping operations.
It can take part in operations if they are implemented by the UN, the
OSCE, the EU, or NATO, and if they are under a UN or OSCE mandate
and consistent with the Finnish Act on Peace Support Operations. Fin-
land participated in the First United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai in
1956-1957, since when it has been one of the leading peacekeeping coun-
tries under the flag of the UN. In 2001, there were 1600 Finnish peace-
keepers participating in ten operations. In total, Finland has placed more
than 40,000 peacekeepers at the UN’s disposal.52 Finland also maintains
a UN training center, and since 1996 volunteering conscripts have been
selected for training for the special Finnish Rapid Deployment Force.
This force went into the field for the first time in 1999 as part of Kosovo’s
KFOR operation.
52 The operations have included UNEF II in Sinai in 1973–1979, the UN Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus since 1964, the UN Disengagement Observer Force in Golan in
1979–1993, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon since 1978, the UN Transition Assis-
tance Group in Namibia in 1989–1990, and several operations since 1991 in the
Balkans (in Kroatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo).
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12 Local Self-Government
More and more matters which the municipalities had decided quite inde-
pendently began to be regulated by legislation.
Halila 1965, p. 219
...this  conception of local government as an autonomous local arm of
the State.
Pulma 1999, p. 168
The Self-Governing Municipalities
As described in Chapter 11, the state’s central offices are mostly located
in the capital city and state administration also functions through various
regional offices. But there is no self-government at the intermediate level.
Finland is a unitary state without a federal arrangement like that of the
states of the USA, Germany, or Austria. Neither are there any self-gov-
erning regional units between the central and the local level, as there are
in Sweden and many other countries.53
On the other hand, self-government serves very important functions at
the local level. The country is divided into 448 municipalities (in Finn-
ish, “kunta”), which complement the central government. They make
their own policy decisions and they have special responsibilities to imple-
ment national policies. Thus, it is local self-government that actually
manages the services provided by the welfare state, while the functions
of the municipalities also include the planning and maintenance of the
people’s living environments.
It seems fair to call Finland’s local government modern and efficient.
On the other hand, it can be viewed as the result of very old traditions.
53 The Constitution Act of 1919 (Section 51), as well as the Constitution of 1999 (Sec-
tion 121), made intermediate-level self-governing units possible, but such have never
been established, except in Åland.
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To-day’s local self-government has grown from distant, even prehistoric
roots, although the standards of democratic government were not fully
realized in the municipalities before the country became independent.
When the state government of Sweden-Finland was centralized from
the 16th century onward, it “secured its legitimacy by guaranteeing the
people at least some measure of participation and influence over the pro-
cess of government” (Pulma 1999, p. 162). Thus the parishes of the
Lutheran church, with their parish councils, became the cornerstone of
local government autonomy. In practice it depended much on the atti-
tudes taken at the local level whether or not various national policies,
including the educational and poor relief legislation of the 18th century,
were really implemented.
In the Grand Duchy of the 19th century, it became both necessary and
possible to reform the system of local self-government. Again the main
inspiration came largely from Sweden’s local government reforms of 1842
and 1862, and not from Russia. The most significant step of the 19th
century was the severing of institutional connections between local gov-
ernment and the parishes of the church. This was enacted in 1865. Vil-
lage councils became the decision-making organs of local government.
The Town Government Decree of 1873 obliged towns with a population
of over 3000 to have an elected town council and allowed smaller towns
to make a choice between having an elected council or holding town
meetings. The franchise in local government remained property-based
even beyond 1906, when universal and equal suffrage was introduced in
parliamentary elections.
The next obvious step was due as soon as Finland became indepen-
dent: local self-government was organized on an entirely representative
basis and the inhabitants of municipalities were given the equal right to
vote in local council elections.54 On the other hand, the grip of the central
government, which had already started in the 1880s, became tighter and
tighter, adding nationally determined responsibilities and central super-
vision to local affairs. In the 1990s, local autonomy was again empha-
sized and the municipalities became more responsible for determining
their own policy preferences, naturally within the limits set by the re-
sources available.
There used to be a difference between the legal status of rural com-
munes (“maalaiskunta”) and towns (“kaupunki”), the towns having ad-
ditional rights but also more responsibilities and being under closer cen-
tral supervision. Industrialization created densely populated localities with
a status somewhat in-between, and those were called townships
(“kauppala”). The Municipal Administration Act of 1976 finally gave all
local authorities the same legal status, although the name “kaupunki”
(town, city) remains in use, now as a kind of ‘status symbol’ of an in-
creasing number of municipalities.
54 Universal and equal suffrage was first stipulated in 1917 in the separate laws on
rural communes and towns.
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According to the Constitution of 1999 (Section 121), “Finland is di-
vided into municipalities, the administration of which shall be based on
self-government by their inhabitants.” The same section also guarantees
the right of municipalities to levy taxes, but all further preconditions
concerning administration and the tasks of municipalities are stipulated
at the level of ordinary legislation and not in the constitution.
Table 12.1
Finland’s largest cities: Population in December 2000,
growth (in %) in 2000, and location (region)
Cities Population Growth Region
Helsinki      555,500 0.8 (11) Uusimaa
Espoo 213,300 1.7 (11) Uusimaa
Tampere 195,500 1.2 (24) Pirkanmaa
Vantaa 178,500 1.2 (11) Uusimaa
Turku 172,600 0.3 (21) Varsinais-Suomi
Oulu 120,800 2.6 (51) North Ostrobothnia
Lahti 97,000 0.3 (25) Päijät-Häme
Kuopio 86,700 0.1 (32) North Savo
Jyväskylä 79,000 1.4 (41) Central Finland
Pori 76,000  –0.3 (22) Satakunta
Lappeenranta 58,000 0.8 (27) South Karelia
Vaasa 56,700 0.1 (43) Ostrobothnia
Kotka 54,800 –0.7 (26) Kymenlaakso
Joensuu 51,800 0.5 (33) North Karelia
Mikkeli 46,700 0.1 (31) South Savo
Hämeenlinna 46,100 0.3 (23) Kanta-Häme
Porvoo 45,000 0.8 (12) East Uusimaa
Hyvinkää 42,500 0.5 (11) Uusimaa
Rauma 37,200 –0.6 (22) Satakunta
Kajaani 36,100 –0.8 (34) Kainuu
Järvenpää 35,900 1.3 (11) Uusimaa
Kokkola 35,500 0.1 (44) Central Ostrobothnia
Rovaniemi 35,400 –0.8 (52) Lapland
Note: For location of regions, see the map in Figure 4.1 (on page 78).
Source: SYF 2001, pp. 78–96, 118.
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The number of Finland’s self-governing municipalities was reduced
gradually during the latter part of the 20th century. They numbered 549
in 1951, but 448 in 2001.55 Each of them has its own scope of activities,
its own administrative authorities, and its own taxation. The member-
ship of a municipality comprises all who are domiciled in it according to
the Census Register Act. The size of municipalities varies greatly: in 2000,
six of them had more than 100,000 inhabitants while twenty-two had
fewer than 1000 (nine of those in Åland). Their land areas and popula-
tion densities are also quite different. For example, the city of Helsinki
with 555,000 inhabitants covers 185 square kilometers (72 sq. mi), but
only 7000 inhabitants populate the 15,173 square kilometers (5927 sq.
mi) of the most spacious municipality, Inari in Lapland. Table 12.1 lists
Finland’s largest cities.
As was mentioned above, the autonomous municipalities both decide
policies of their own choosing and carry out the duties which national
legislation prescribes for them, but the Municipal Administration Act of
1995 (Section 2) does not list any more specific municipal tasks. It only
states very generally that “the municipality strives to advance the well-
being of its inhabitants and sustainable development within its area” (Sec-
tion 1). Other state legislation makes local government responsible for
the schools, the hospitals, the health centers, and social welfare, and gives
it responsibility for technical infrastructure and local planning. As in other
countries, the various other functions of Finland’s towns and most other
municipalities include the maintenance of streets and parks, water and
sewage, and protection against fire. Several cities also operate their pub-
lic transportation systems and provide electric power, district heating,
and a variety of cultural services.
Many responsibilities of local self-government exceed the capacity of
single municipalities. Intermunicipal cooperation is necessary. About 250
joint municipal authorities have been established by two or more mu-
nicipalities. Some were founded voluntarily to advance mutual interests,
but the most important joint functions are statutory. They include district
general hospitals and central hospitals that take care of the municipali-
ties’ responsibility for public health work and specialized medical care.
There is care for the mentally disabled as well as districts for special care
services. Other joint authorities operate emergency services, vocational
schools, and so on. The Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council was set up
by special legislation.56
Already in the 1930s there were ten regional councils and others were
founded in the 1950s to develop common cultural and economic activi-
ties within their area. In 1994 the Regional Development Act connected
55 Sweden proceeded quite differently: there the number of municipalities was reduced
from 2498 in 1950 to only 278 in 1974. Denmark now has 272, having had 1388 in
early 1960s.
56 This council represents Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, and Kauniainen with a total of
956,000 inhabitants.
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them to the regional planning associations, which had previously func-
tioned separately, and also transferred to them the planning functions of
the state’s provincial governments. Their borders were fixed by the na-
tional government (see Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1). The statutory task of
the 20 regional councils is to plan and promote their region’s develop-
ment and general policy. Their delegates also represent Finland in the
EU’s Committee of the Regions. They act according to the principles of
local self-government; their members are elected by the municipal coun-
cils and, consequently, the regional councils substitute to some extent for
the intermediate level self-government that Finland does not have.
The primary sources of revenue are local income tax and the fees the
municipalities charge for services, and they collect some tax on real es-
tate. Municipal taxes have amounted to about 22 percent of all taxes
collected in Finland. The central government also contributes to munici-
pal budgets. This has happened in two ways: via state subsidies for local
activities, and by income transfers that level out differences in local gov-
ernment revenue. During the 1990s there were two significant changes.
Annual state grants were reduced dramatically and they were paid in
lump sums, no more earmarked for specific purposes.
These changes were characteristic of the overall transition from tradi-
tional bureaucracy to New Public Management and self-management,
which was first introduced into Finland’s public administration in the
program of the “red-blue” coalition government in 1987. It is reminis-
cent of this aspect of “Thatcherism” in the UK, or “Reaganism” in the
USA. (Haveri 2000, pp. 7–14.) As far as local government is concerned,
the cornerstones of the reform were the comprehensive change in the
system of central government grants, effective in 1993, and the Munici-
pal Administration Act, in force since 1995. This new legislation has
loosened state regulation on the administration, finances, and activities
of municipalities, while emphasizing the responsibility that the munici-
palities have for their own affairs.
Local decision-making power is vested in municipal councils, which
are elected for four-year terms at the same time throughout the country.
Councils vary in size between seventeen and eighty-five members, de-
pending on the number of inhabitants in the municipality.57 The council
elects its chairmen and the municipal board for two-year terms, and also
appoints standing committees, which exercise considerable delegated
power of their own. Administration is of the city-manager type. The
municipal manager and possible assistant managers are appointments
made by the council and they work subordinate to the municipal board.
Typically these are tenured positions, although some recent appointments
have been made for a fixed term of five or seven years.
57 Very small municipalities may be granted the right to elect a council of fifteen or
thirteen members.
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Local elections are proportional and, in other respects too, they are
comparable to parliamentary elections. The biggest difference lies in the
fact that municipalities are not divided into election districts. The num-
ber of candidates each party can nominate is one and a half times the
number of members to be elected. As mentioned in Chapter 8, in Helsinki
this amounts to the maximum of 127 candidates per party. For the elec-
tions of 2000, no fewer than 906 candidates were actually nominated in
the capital city. Altogether the country’s 432 municipal councils have 12,300
members, and in 2000 the members were elected from 39,700 nominated
candidates. These councils are serving a four-year term from January 2001
to December 2004.58 A majority  of their members (56%) had also served
during the preceding term from 1997 to 2000.
Because the size of councils is not proportional to the number of inhabit-
ants, the nationwide count of council seats shows an ‘overrepresentation’ of
the Center Party, which is strong in small rural municipalities. In the 2000
election it received 23.8 percent of votes in the country, but won 37.7 per-
cent of council seats and became the largest party in 301 municipalities (70
percent of all). Counted this way, the Social Democrats were slightly
underrepresented while the Conservatives, with 20,8 percent of the national
vote, won 16,5 percent of seats and became the largest party group in only
22 municipal councils.
 Local Government in Action
Many Finnish municipalities faced serious financial difficulties as a con-
sequence of the recession of the early 1990s and because the state re-
duced its financial support. The grants that the state allocated to munici-
palities in 1999 were less than 20 percent of their gross expenditure.
More than eighty municipalities had budget deficits in that year. In 2000,
the financial status of 252 municipalities deteriorated and it improved in
only 111. As many as 192 were operating with a budget deficit. How-
ever, there were also many municipalities in which the situation was quite
satisfactory and, taken as a whole, municipal finances were becoming
stronger.
Municipalities constitute a major factor in the national economy. In
2000, local government expenditure totalled 140 billion markkas (23.5
billion €), amounting to about 18 percent of Finland’s gross domestic
product. Together with the joint municipal authorities the municipalities
employ about 400,000 people, or approximately 20 percent of the total
workforce. Altogether, tax revenue of the municipalities amounted to
13,900 markkas (2340 euros) per inhabitant in 1999, and they received,
58 In the province of Åland the timing is different, as will be described later in this
chapter.
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in addition, FIM 3700 (€ 620) per inhabitant as state subsidies. The rates
of local income tax averaged 17.5 percent. Two years later, in 2001, the
average rate was 17.7 percent. It varied between 15 percent in Kauniainen
(with taxable income of FIM 166,900 or € 28,000 per inhabitant) and
19.75 in Karkkila (with FIM 65,900 or € 11,080 per inhabitant), both of
which are located rather close to the capital. Helsinki itself collected 16.5
percent (from an average taxable income of FIM 129,900 or € 21,850).
The rates in Lapland’s municipalities varied between 17.5 and 19.25 per-
cent, the mean being 18.6 percent (on FIM 64,200 or € 10,800). Gross
taxable income in Finland’s municipalities in 1999 was FIM 414 billion
or € 70 billion, which consisted of primary income (FIM 332 billion or
€ 55 bn.) and the municipalities’ share of taxable corporate income (FIM
82 billion or € 14 bn.). The general tax rate imposed on real estate aver-
aged 0.7 percent, and the rate on permanent residential buildings aver-
aged 0.26 percent. (SYF 2001, pp. 327, 346–356.)
Of their net operating costs, which totaled € 2875 per inhabitant in
1999,59 the municipalities spent 61 percent on social welfare and health
care services (12% for primary health care, 19% for special medical care,
11% for child day care, and 8% for care for the elderly and handicapped).
Education and culture was the other large area of local expenditure. Its
net share was 29 percent of total operating costs (including 16% for com-
prehensive schooling, 3% for upper secondary general schooling, 3% for
vocational schools, and 3% for libraries and recreation). Various other
municipal services cost 6 percent, and general administration 4 percent.
(Op. cit., p. 357.)
Thus, the municipalities provide a wide range of services for their
inhabitants. In addition to the obligatory and most costly operations and
services, their cultural activities deserve special mention. They maintain
libraries and museums; several cities have permanent symphony orches-
tras on their payroll; and many support permanent theaters. Almost all
municipalities provide sport facilities and other opportunities for recre-
ation. Business premises and leasing services, water supply and sewage
services, and energy supply have actually yielded some revenue above
their operating costs.
Citizens have become accustomed to the availability of such local ser-
vices and they expect high standards. Any cuts and reductions in services
make people very critical. Unsatisfactory care for the aged became the
most salient nationwide issue in the local elections of October 2000, and
during the campaign every party promised to pay more attention to this
problem.
59 Gross operating costs were FIM 119.4 billion or € 20.1 bn., which was FIM 23,100
or € 3885 per inhabitant.
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By and large, the people in Finland are satisfied with their local gov-
ernment. According to an opinion survey conducted in 2000, almost all
agreed that a Finnish municipality “is the central provider and guarantee
of the citizens’ wellbeing,” and a very large majority agreed with state-
ments such as the following: “Local government provides social justice
and equality; ..has been subjected in recent years to excessively severe
cuts; ..is ruled too heavily by the central government.” Furthermore, a
sixty percent majority disagreed with the statements that local govern-
ment “overprotects its inhabitants and makes them too passive” and that
“many of its services ought to be privatized.” (Kansalaismielipide ja
kunnat 2000, p. 39.)
In a parallel survey the members of municipal councils reacted to the
statements even more favorably than did citizens at large, while a major-
ity of both groups thought that local taxes were too high. What really
pleased local decisionmakers in the summer of 2000 was the public’s
response to the following statement: “If necessary, it would be better to
increase local tax than to cut municipal services.” As many as 69 percent
of respondents agreed, a figure 14 percentage points higher in 2000 than
in 1996 (op.cit., pp. 40, 43). Also, 91 percent of the people agreed, to
some extent at least, with the statement that local services were good
enough to satisfy existing needs (see Table 12.2).
When more focused opinions were invited on the quality of listed lo-
cal services, some ninety percent said that municipal libraries, sports fa-
cilities, and schools were good enough. The greatest dissatisfaction con-
cerned the care that their municipality was giving to the aged. The
decisionmakers looked at the services somewhat differently. Members
of the municipal councils were more satisfied than the public with
children’s day care and the care provided for the old, as well as with poor
relief and local health care centers, whereas they were more anxious than
their voters to improve streets and to increase cultural offerings.
As was mentioned above, many municipalities are too small to pro-
duce all the necessary services by themselves. Therefore, they cooperate
through joint municipal boards and they purchase services from each
other. All participating municipalities are represented on the governing
boards of cooperative organizations, but in a sense they lose some of
their independent power when they function through joint municipal au-
thorities. The strengthening and formalization of Finland’s nineteen re-
gions in 1994 was motivated, among other things, by attempts to im-
prove their ability to draw and lobby for benefits from the regional poli-
cies of the European Union.
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Table 12.2
“How sufficiently are needs satisfied by the municipal services that your home town
provides?” Responses by the people and the members of municipal councils (in %)
+2 +1 0 –1 –2 Score*
Local services as a whole
    The people 19 72 1 8 1 +100
    The council members 18 77 1 4 0 +109
Library services
    The people 58 34 2 4 1 +144
    The council members 60 32 1 5 1  +145
Sport and Exercise possibilities
    The people 54 37 1 7 1  +136
    The council members 41 49 1 7 1 +122
The schools
    The people 49 39 1 7 1 +128
    The council members 53 38 1 6 1 +136
Cultural services, e.g. theater
    The people  44 37 3 13  3 +104
    The council members 29 36 3 23 9 +53
Children’s day care
    The people 30 45 9 13  2 +88
    The council members 55 39 1 4 0 +145
Health care centers
    The people 29 42 1 23 6  +65
    The council members 29 55 1 13 2 +98
Streets and street lights
    The people 26 45 0 21 7  +62
    The council members 17 51 1 26 5 +49
Social support, poor relief
    The people 14 40 20 21 5 +37
    The council members  36 50 4 9 1  +111
Care of the aged
    The people 11 37 9 33 10 +6
    The council members 20 55 1 20  4 +67
*) +2 = fully sufficiently; +1 = fairly sufficiently; 0 = can’t say; –1 = fairly insuffi-
ciently; –2 = completely insufficiently.
The satisfaction score is the sum total of positive and negative percentages, the val-
ues +2 and –2 being dublicated.
Data source: Kansalaismielipide ja kunnat 2000, pp. 81–83.
In order to further their own nationwide interests, the municipalities
act through their own interest organization, the Municipal League. It was
formed in 1993 by combining the three existing central organizations,
namely the League of Rural Communes, the League of Finnish Cities,
and the League of Swedish Rural Communes in Finland. However, the
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most direct political link between local government interests and the na-
tional legislature is the fact that a majority of the members of parliament
are themselves members of a municipal council.
Local politics are important in their own sphere, and in various ways
they also prepare the ground for national politics. Visible political ca-
reers typically originate in local politics and, later, nationally significant
politicians continue to need and nourish their local strongholds. In the
membership activity that takes place in party organizations, the munici-
pal level is quite essential. And although it is not easy for the political
parties to declare national programs which are relevant in all local situa-
tions, the results of local elections often suggest important conclusions
on the national level.
Despite the fact that Finns are rather satisfied with the functions and
accomplishments of their own municipality, local democracy has its prob-
lems. One has been declining voter turnout in local elections, down from
78 percent in 1980 to only 56 percent in 2000. Another is the growing
role of local bureaucracy in political decisionmaking and the seemingly
declining impact of elected members of municipal councils. However,
the majority of citizens do not consider that their trustees or local politi-
cal parties should be given more power. Rather, the people would like to
exert more direct influence: to attend more issue-related meetings with
local authorities and to have local opinion surveys and referendums (Borg
1998, p. 127).
Åland’s Regional Autonomy
Åland is an offshore province and has 25,000 inhabitants. It consists of
6500 islands, more than 100 of which are inhabited. It was separated in
1918 from the administrative district of Turku-Pori and obtained the sta-
tus of an autonomous province, with a special language status. The extra
conditions were defined in the Autonomy Act of 1920 and the act’s supple-
ment of 1922.
A second Autonomy Act was passed in 1951 and the present Åland
self-government law has been in effect since 1991. Within the Nordic
context, Åland could be compared with the position of the Faeroe islands
and Greenland in Denmark. These three self-governing island regions
also have had independent representation in the Nordic Council since
1971 and one of them, Greenland, even left the European Community in
1985 although Denmark was a member.
In 1917 a movement, supported by Sweden, was launched in Åland
demanding that the area become part of Sweden. A movement for inde-
pendence also developed. In more recent years symbolic benefits have
generated various kinds of compensating psychological satisfaction for
the Ålanders: the province has had its own flag since 1954, postage stamps
since 1984, and passports additionally designated “Åland” since 1991
(McRae 1997, p. 328).
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Since 1951 it has been possible to speak of a specifically defined Åland
citizenship, the so-called resident’s rights. Åland’s citizens have a privi-
leged right to own land in the region. Residential rights run in the family
or can be granted by the provincial government to Finnish citizens who
have moved to Åland permanently, have lived there at least five years,
and have a “satisfactory” ability to speak Swedish.
Because of their location, the Åland islands have been of obvious mili-
tary interest. In the early 1800s Russia began to fortify them, but this was
stopped by an international agreement in 1856. Later, Åland’s demilita-
rization was again recognized by international treaties in 1921, 1940,
and 1947. The male inhabitants of Åland have been exempted from the
compulsory military service required of other male citizens of Finland;
they are trained instead in pilotage and the lighthouse service.
The Autonomy Law of 1920 reserved a long list of enumerated pow-
ers to the central government and left other matters to Åland’s new re-
gional parliament. It is obvious that regional powers were circumscribed
and not very important, but the element of self-government was increas-
ingly underscored. The second Autonomy Act of 1951 included a specified
list of regional powers and narrowed the president’s power to veto Åland
legislation. In 1991 the regional authorities were also assigned responsibil-
ity for administration of some fields over which legislative competence re-
mained with the Finnish parliament. Moreover, intergovernmental consul-
tation with the regional authorities – the right to be heard, joint negotiation,
or even approval by the Åland executive – was specified for 23 listed topics
before decisions could be taken (McRae 1997, pp. 322–327).
Finnish political parties are not active in Åland’s regional politics. The
province has developed its own party system, which is most visible in
elections to the provincial parliament. This parliament has 30 members
who are elected, together with Åland’s 16 municipal councils, one year
ahead of the mainland’s local elections. The regional parliament elects,
in turn, a seven-member regional government to implement the
parliament’s decisions and, increasingly, to administer a range of national
legislation. The courts in Åland are national only.
12,045 votes were cast in the election of October 17, 1999. This meant
a 65.9 percent turnout, up from the 62.5 percent recorded in 1995. Six
regional parties gained representation, none of them getting as many as
one-third of the 30-member parliament. The two biggest ones, with 9
elected members each, were the victorious Liberals (28.2% of the vote)
and Åland’s center (27.3%). Two parties got 4 seats: the declining League
for Tolerance (14.5%) and the winning Independent Åland coalition
(12.7%). The Social Democrats (11.9%) went down from four to three,
and a new progressive group (4.8%) won one seat. Parliamentarism func-
tioned in government formation; the center was, for the first time, pushed
into opposition and the Liberals took over. Together with the indepen-
dents and the Social Democrats, the Liberals formed a majority coalition
backed by 17 members in the regional parliament.
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When the Ålanders gained their special citizen status in 1951, they did
not lose their right to participate fully in Finnish politics. Åland’s main
Swedish political organization, designated as the Åland Coalition, has
presented its own separate list in every parliamentary election since Åland
was established in 1948 as a single member constituency. This party has
always won the one seat in the Finnish parliament. Åland’s turnout in the
parliamentary elections has been about 20 percentage points lower than
in all of Finland and 10 percentage points lower than turnout in the elec-
tions of Åland’s own parliament.
Because Finland is not divided into constituencies in the presidential
and European elections, Ålanders then need to take a stand on national
politics just like other Finnish citizens. Most voters in Åland favor the
Swedish People’s Party. In the European elections in October 1996, 80
percent of those who voted in Åland cast their ballot for the SPP and 10
percent for the Center Party; in the 1994 presidential elections the favor-
ite of the region was the SPP candidate Elisabeth Rehn. She received 79
percent of Åland votes in the first round and 82 percent in the second
round of the election, with 70 and 74 percent of Åland’s electorate par-
ticipating. Thus the turnout of voters in the province was only about ten
percentage points lower than the 82 percent recorded for the whole country.
In 1994 the voters in Åland were consulted twice on the issue of mem-
bership of the European Union. In the national referendum on October
16, the yes-votes from Åland were a narrow 52 percent, with 61 percent
of the region’s electorate participating. Five weeks later, when Åland’s
own membership was the issue, the proportion of yes-voters was much larger,
74 percent, but only 49 percent turned out in the regional referendum.
In membership negotiations with the EU, completed in June 1994,
Finland obtained full recognition of Åland’s special constitutional sta-
tus, including a special accession procedure and a special protocol con-
cerning Åland in the accession treaty itself. The protocol also provided
customs exemptions for ferry traffic to and from Åland. (McRae 1997,
pp. 356–357). Consequently, as long as the ships make a brief stop in
Åland, the closing of Europe’s tax free stores in 1999 for all inter-EU
travel did not inconvenience the two million passengers who sail annu-
ally between Finland and Sweden and desire some inexpensive alcoholic
beverage.
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13 Law and Order and Public Control
The Law, born long before me, will remain firmly after me.
Governor Wibelius in 1808, in a poem by J.L. Runeberg 1804–1877
A new ideology of the law is also about to emerge, an ideology with a
welfare state as its central aim.
Yrjö Blomstedt 1985, p. 38
The Legal System
The Finnish legal system is a part of the continental European system
and also has developed as part of it. Back in the Middle Ages, the legal
traditions and customs of the Finns were gradually superseded by Swedish
common law, and in the 14th century the great reforms that began to replace
the provincial laws of their time were influenced by the direct contacts that
Scandinavia in those days had with the French and Italian law schools and
canonical law. The emerging Scandinavian conception of the law had three
solid cornerstones, namely, the powers of the ruler, the rights of the people,
and the sanctity of the law. (Blomstedt 1985, pp. 29–30.)
King Magnus Ericson’s National Code of Laws of the 1350s and the
National Code of 1442 are past history now, whereas some aspects of the
General Code of 1734 – the oldest common codification for a whole
country in Europe – still remain effective in today’s Finland. The early
decades of the Russian era did not change the laws much; one change in
criminal law was the manifest of Emperor Nicholas I in 1826, which
meant that capital punishments were no longer carried out.
“The Golden Age of Finnish Legislation” began when the Diet of the
Four Estates was summoned in 1863, and it continued until the 1890s.
During those decades liberalism had an impact on extensive reforms in
almost all fields of law. The modernized penal code was passed and con-
firmed in 1888 in line with the new German theories of criminal law; in
the area of family and probate law men and women were made equal in
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1878 with regard to the right of inheritance; and reforms in the area of
trade law and economic law portrayed the gradual transition to freedom
of trade (op. cit., pp. 32–34). As free enterprise and the freedom of con-
tract became the leading principles in Finland’s civil and commercial
law, “the legal framework for a market economy was established at this
time” (Kekkonen 1999, p. 177). Social legislation, however, lagged be-
hind the other Nordic countries.
The first steps to protect labor against some unwanted consequences
of economic liberalism were also taken during that period. In 1879 the
use of child and female labor was limited and an act on laborers’ indus-
trial injuries insurance was passed in 1895. More extensive new social
legislation became effective in 1917 and between the two World Wars,
when the values and legal traditions were still typical of an agrarian cul-
ture (Aarnio 1993, p. 7). As was described in Chapter 2, the birth of the
Finnish welfare state really took place after World War II, generally fol-
lowing the Nordic approach and also influenced by Nordic cooperation.
In the 1970s there emerged a new type of goal-oriented legislation in
Finland as a consequence of the then-prevailing strong faith in planning
and in the power of legislation as a means of directing social change. The
set of principles that characterized the 1980s included internationaliza-
tion, deregulation, competition, cost cutting, and efficiency (Kekkonen
1999, p. 181). Because Finland joined the European Union in 1995, a
great deal of national legislation has been and will be adjusted to the
EU’s union-wide requirements60 but this does not imply major changes
in the principles of law in Finland.
Unlike the Common Law tradition of Great Britain, the German-Ro-
man system of pandect law emphasizes the primacy of written laws and
general legal concepts. Finland has a statutory law system. In theory,
citizens are presumed to know the contents of all laws as soon as they are
published in the Statutes of Finland. However, there is no comprehensive
law code. For practical purposes, existing legislation and relevant refer-
ences to earlier decisions are compiled in the massive two-volume book
Suomen laki (The Law of Finland), which the Association of Finnish
Jurists updates and publishes every second year for the benefit of the
legal profession. Public law is compiled in the book’s volume I61 and
civil law is covered in volume II62. Tax laws and customs regulations are
published in a separate volume.
60 The applicant countries that negotiated EU membership in 2001 needed to change
their domestic legislation to satisfy some 80,000 requirements of the EU.
61 The volume is outlined to cover the following ten fields: constitutional law; general
administrative law; administrative districts and self-government; international rela-
tions and foreigners; security and general order; education and culture; environment
and housing; agriculture; social and health care; pensions and accident insurance.
62 Including the following eight fields: basic and human rights; civil law; business
enterprises; financing and insurance; communication and transport; labor relations
and service; criminal law; legal procedure.
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It is not possible here to point out many detailed characteristics of the
Finnish approach to law. Guarantees of freedoms and rights of the citi-
zens will be discussed below, in Chapter 14. For instance, capital punish-
ment is not permitted in Finland, nor in most other established democra-
cies. Finland’s most significant trend has been from formalistic jurisdic-
tion to “signs indicating the changing role of the rule of law in the Wel-
fare State” (Aarnio 1993, p. 20). This implies a move toward material
justice, toward more goal-oriented and flexible legal norms. The process
of internationalization and European integration has also strengthened
the role of the courts as the final arbiter in solving social conflicts
(Kekkonen 1999, p. 181). The rising importance of precedents by the
European court strengthens the position of the courts, as the difference
between legislation and the application of law becomes less clear. The
exact content of laws is also becoming less predictable than it has been in
the formalistic Finnish approach (cf. Ojanen 2000).
The hierarchy of legislation consists of several levels. At the top in
Finland is the Constitution of 1999, which cannot be contravened by the
very large body of ordinary acts, passed by parliament and signed by the
president. Next, “The President of the Republic, the Government, and a
Ministry may issue decrees on the basis of authorization given to them in
this Constitution or in another Act... Moreover, other authorities may be
authorized by an Act to lay down legal rules on given matters... The scope
of such an authorization shall be precisely circumscribed.” (Constitu-
tion, Section 80.) The last-mentioned level of legislation also includes
municipal by-laws.
The Judiciary
Two principles are fundamental to the functioning of Finnish courts of law:
the judiciary is independent and the courts are permanent. There cannot be
temporary courts, and Finland has career judges who cannot be removed
from office and whose decisions are not influenced by outsiders.
Finland, like many other countries, has three levels of courts of law for
civil and criminal cases. First, there are sixty-eight general courts of first
instance. They vary in size: the smallest courts have only three judges
and the largest in Helsinki has seventy-three. The second level consists
of six courts of appeal, and the supreme court is the highest level. What is
more unusual, however, is Finland’s parallel court system for adminis-
trative cases. All cases that concern administrative matters, such as taxa-
tion, social welfare, health care, and local government, were tried by the
county courts until they were replaced by the eleven provincial adminis-
trative courts in November 1999. From them appeal is to the supreme
administrative court.
Until 1993 the first level consisted of two different kinds of courts:
city courts in most towns, and district courts mainly in rural areas. The
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latter were chaired by a judicially trained chairman and had a lay board
of at least seven laymen. The members of the city courts were generally
judicially trained judges who functioned mostly in divisions of three
members. The reform of 1993 made all lower general courts uniform in
structure and named them district courts. They also continue to have lay
members, so-called lay assessors, who participate in deciding criminal
cases and civil suits under family law.
In 1999 Finland’s district courts handled a total of 138,000 civil cases and
57,300 criminal cases, plus 605,000 petitions and registrations. In the same
year the courts of appeal handled 4600 cases and the supreme court, 3000
cases. The county courts, meanwhile, made 18,200 decisions, and the su-
preme administrative court handled 4700 cases (SYF 2001, p. 527).
Most decisions made by the courts of appeal are final, because a re-
form of the system of appeal in 1980 limited the right of appeal to the
supreme court to only the cases that the supreme court agrees to hear. No
more than about one case in ten passes this threshold. According to the
law, appeals may be granted for cases that are important for similar cases
or are in pursuit of uniformity in legal practice, or seek to correct a pro-
cedural error. The supreme court can also grant leave to appeal if it sees
other important grounds. The purpose of this reform was to gain more
efficiency and, especially, to strengthen the role of the supreme court in
guiding legal practice and due process. However, precedents are not le-
gally binding in Finland so lower court judges have the right to decide
ambiguous cases against a precedent.
In addition, Finland has established various special courts. They in-
clude the labor court that hears disputes concerning collective agreements
on employment relationships, the market court that can prohibit mislead-
ing advertising and unreasonable contract terms, the insurance court, the
four land courts, and the prison court. The three water courts were dis-
continued in 1999 and their cases transferred to the environmental per-
mit authorities. There is also the High Court of Impeachment, which has
been convened only four times (in 1933, 1953, 1961, and 1993).63
The president of the republic appoints the presidents and the members
of the two supreme courts and the six courts of appeal, as well as all the
judges for the courts of first instance. Normally this is done according to
nominations made by the supreme court. The judges cannot be removed
from office before they reach the compulsory retirement age, 67 years.
On the other hand, it is quite possible for career judges to take an active
part in political life; some may become members of parliament and even
government ministers.
An occasionally debated aspect of the Finnish constitution is the lack
of a separate constitutional court. Legislation’s constitutionality is ex-
63 The cases of “unlawful conduct in office” have not been so serious as to ruin the
convicted minister’s political career: the former minister of finance who was con-
victed in 1961 became minister of justice in 1966, and the former minister of trade
and industry who was convicted in 1993 was re-elected to parliament in 1995.
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amined in parliament by the Constitutional Committee, and parliament
is required to refrain from enacting laws that violate the constitution.
Alternatively, if the Constitutional Committee finds that a law would
make an exception to the constitution, it can be enacted if supported by a
majority of two-thirds. One example is a one-year tax law that is found
to be in conflict with the strict property rights guaranteed by the constitu-
tion. But neither the supreme court not the supreme administrative court
has the right to interpret the constitutionality of acts of parliament.
The duties of the ministry of justice include the drafting of new legis-
lation, the administration of the courts, and carrying out the prison sen-
tences. In 2000 the daily average number of prisoners in Finland was
2855 (including 144 women). This equals 55 prisoners per 100,000 in-
habitants, a rather low number when compared with some 460 prisoners
per 100,000 people in the United States (see page 209 below). The pow-
ers of the president of the republic include the right to grant pardons,
having first consulted the supreme court.64
The Supervisors of Legality
“Attached to the Government, there is a Chancellor of Justice and a Deputy
Chancellor of Justice, who are appointed by the President of the Repub-
lic, and who shall have outstanding knowledge of law” (Constitution of
1999, Section 69). The chancellor of justice attends the meetings of the
council of state and ensures that the authorities, including the president
and the ministers, observe the laws and fulfill their duties. He is the high-
est law officer in the country and because he is a permanent official, his
position is not dependent on the government of the day. He also was the
highest public prosecutor of the country until a state prosecutor’s office
was established in 1997.
Parliament, in turn, appoints for four-year periods the counterpart of
the chancellor of justice, the parliamentary ombudsman and the two deputy
ombudsmen. They, too, ensure that the courts and civil servants observe
the law. Individual citizens have the right to complain to either the chan-
cellor of justice or to the ombudsman if they feel that they have suffered
injustice at the hands of public authorities. There is therefore an obvious
overlap in the roles of the two high supervisors of legality.
However, the roles are not identical. In particular, the chancellor of
justice supervises the legality of the work of the president of the republic
and the council of state, also participating in their meetings, and must
advise them and the ministries on legal questions when asked to do so.
On the other hand, only the ombudsman deals with the defense forces
and prisons.
64 Approximately every eighth application has led to a pardon.
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The chancellor of justice receives some 1000 to 1300 complaints from
the public each year and the ombudsman about twice as many; in 1999
the numbers were 1240 and 2640. Both of them can also handle cases at
their own initiative, and they perform inspections of public offices. Only
about ten percent of the initiated cases have actually led to action. In
1999 there were no prosecutions and only a very few admonitions were
given; the most common outcomes were pronouncements of opinion and
guidance. (Härmälä and Tala 2000, pp. 132–147.)
The parliamentary ombudsman is a typically Scandinavian office; Swe-
den established it back in 1809 and the Finnish one was started in 1920.
Denmark followed suit later, adapting a somewhat different model. In
recent years the office has become well known internationally and also
the European Parliament established such an office in 1995. The roles of
the ombudsmen are not identical in different countries: in some, such as
the French médiateur, the ombudsman attempts to mediate between the
citizen and the public administration, in Latin American countries he
emphasizes the protection of human rights, whereas in Sweden and Fin-
land the ombudsman watches over the legality of all public administra-
tion and is required to prosecute in cases of serious wrongdoing.
In addition to the two general supervisors of legality, Finland has sec-
tional ombudsmen whose function it is to provide specialized safeguards
for individual citizens, and to protect them not only against public au-
thorities but also within the private sector. Such offices have been estab-
lished since the late 1970s in the central state administration, under four
different ministries.
The consumer ombudsman has protected consumers since 1978 against
poor quality and unfair business practices, and he also directs the state’s
consumer agency. The agency comes under the purview of the ministry
of trade and industry which cannot, however, direct its decisions. The
number of cases referred to it has been increasing (from 1430 in 1994, to
2180 in 1998). Most of them have been about marketing, and many also
about contract terms and advice. There has been an emphasis on the ad-
vance prevention of unfair practices, and negotiations have been the most
common type of action of the consumer ombudsman’s office. (Op. cit.,
pp. 148–158.) For example, in 2001 the office warned businesses against
rounding up their prices too much when Finnish markkas were due to be
converted to euros.
The data protection ombudsman, since 1987 connected to the ministry
of justice, watches and guides the various registers of individuals so that
personal information remains confidential and different registers are not
combined. In 1987 the equality ombudsman was connected to the minis-
try of social affairs and health to oversee the implementation of anti-
discrimination laws, both in public administration and in businesses. The
ombudsman for aliens, in turn, took over the job of the curator of aliens
in 1991 and works in connection with the ministry of labor. His duties
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have included statements of opinion on asylum seekers (619 cases in 1998)
and deportations of aliens (176 cases); giving advice has been the most time-
consuming task of this office. (Op.cit., pp. 158–178.) There is also the na-
tional center for medical care, which protects the rights of patients.
In the control of public offices the trend has been toward increased
internationalization. A variety of controlling bodies can already be used
for the protection of human rights: never before have citizens had so
many channels available for their complaints as today. The growth of the
control machinery seems quite justified, because public functions have
increased and the people have become in many ways more dependent on
public administration. Finland’s sectional ombudsmen for their part are
also internationally oriented, maintaining close contacts with their for-
eign counterparts.
Like all public administration, the legality of the work of the sectional
ombudsmen is supervised by the chancellor of justice and the parliamen-
tary ombudsman. Moreover, their term of office is fixed and not perma-
nent, and they (except the consumer ombudsman) are appointed by the
council of state and not by the president of the republic. They, too, serve
as supervisors of legality, but they also function as specialists regarding
the material substance of their field of legislation. Thus, they advise the
government both in the implementation of laws and in the planning of
new legislation, and their advice to citizens and businesses helps to inter-
pret new laws and to prevent breaches of law. Actually, the roles of the
high-ranking supervisors of legality seem to be changing in the same
direction as those of the sectional ombudsmen (Lehtimaja 1999, p. 900).
The People and Law and Order
The citizens of any democracy can expect that “Everyone has the right to
have his or her case dealt with appropriately and without undue delay by
a legally competent court of law or other authority, as well as to have a
decision pertaining to his or her rights or obligations reviewed by a court
of law or other independent organ for the administration of justice” (Con-
stitution, Section 21). In other words, the purpose of the courts is to pro-
vide legal security for the people.
“Everyone” and “without undue delay” are important statements, but
such words may not always describe accurately what happens in reality.
Court cases take time. In the district courts the simplest civil processes in
writing last an average of two months but the more complicated pro-
cesses almost 15 months; the appeal courts average 6.6 months, and the
supreme court, 16 months (Ervasti and Teittinen 2000, pp. 84–89). The
provincial adminisrative courts decide tax complaints in about 11 months,
and the average time for decisions by the supreme administrative court is
nine months (Härmälä 2000, pp. 113, 125). The time span is expanded
significantly whenever the supreme administrative court invites the Eu-
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ropean Court of Justice to decide a precedence, because the average time
taken to get a reaction from Luxembourg is over 20 months (Ojanen 2000,
p. 179). Besides, in criminal cases the suspect may have had to wait a
long time before the prosecution was ready to go to court.
About 30 percent of respondents who were interviewed in a survey in
1999 recalled some legal problem during the 1990s. The most common
problem areas had been the family, loans, crime, and work. Two-thirds of
these people had solved the problem by themselves, although in most cases
after having asked for guidance, and one-third had relied on a lawyer. Only
a few dropped their problem unsolved because of the cost, typically being
unaware of the availability of legal aid. (Litmala 2000, pp. 13–25.)
Naturally, most people have never attended a court session in person;
only 27 percent of the Finns have had any contact with a court of law as
parties, witnesses, etc. (14 percent in a criminal case, 8 percent in a civil
case, and 5 percent in both types of cases) (Lappi-Seppälä et al. 1999, p.
45). One might even say that the procedures of Finnish courts are less
familiar to the Finns than those of American courts, due to the constant
flow of American tv shows staged in a courtroom setting. But the opin-
ions people have about their legal security are not necessarily linked to
any concrete personal experiences, nor to the persons’ own need to rely
on the courts. More important for the feeling of security is the belief that
the courts are trustworthy.
Courts belong to society’s most trusted institutions in western Europe,
although more so in the northern than in the southern countries of Eu-
rope (op. cit., p. 73). During the 1980s there was a decline in many coun-
tries in the percentage of people who said they had confidence in the
courts; in Finland the drop was bigger than in most other countries, from
80 to 65 percent. Nonetheless, the latter percentage still is relatively high
and it has not changed during the 1990s. Even more Finns say that they
trust two other institutions which provide security, namely, the police
and the defense forces, while fewer people trust the country’s political
institutions: parliament, the government, and, especially, the political
parties (see Table 7.4).
The police became popular in other western countries, too, particu-
larly during the 1970s, which was a decade of many protest actions. One
experience that Finland had in 1976 was a police strike of two weeks’
duration. In such a situation it was feared widely that the lack of police
protection would cause serious disorder. There was an increase in petty
theft and traffic violations, but in general life continued as orderly as
usual (Takala 1979). Apparently social pressures served as effective con-
straints, and many felt it would have been unfair to break the law when
there was no risk of getting caught.
But it is obvious that crime exists in every society. Table 13.1 summa-
rizes the incidence of various offences in Finland in 1980, 1990, and
2000. It indicates some increase in violence and theft in the 1990s, and it
shows an alarming increase in offences involving narcotics. If one makes
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a comparison with the United Sates, the Finnish rate of robbery appears
very low. Also, the rate of manslaughter and murder in Finland is only
about one-half, and rape about one-third the American one. On the other
hand, recorded cases of assault and theft are no less frequent in Finland
than in the USA.
What mainly explains the big difference in the rates of prison popula-
tions, is the length of punishments. In general American statistics, it is
not customary to summarize sentences of under one year at all, but of the
11,560 unconditional prison sentences in Finland in 2000, only 689 were
for one year and only another 626 for two or more years (including 7 for
life). 1520 sentences were between 6 and 11 months and the large major-
ity, 8720 sentences, were even briefer imprisonment ranging from a few
weeks to 5 months (SYF 2001, p. 525). As one might expect, the general
public in Finland would often like to see stricter punishments than the
legislators are first willing to stipulate and the courts are then willing to
impose.
Table 13.1
Selected offences in 1980, 1990, and 2000 (the numbers and rates per 100,000 in-
habitants)
Numbers Rates per 100,000
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Manslaughter, murder 111 145 146 2 3 3
Attempted man-
slaughter, murder 140 244 333 3 5 6
Assault 13,964 20,654 27,820 292 413  537
Rape 367 381 579 8 8 11
Robber 1,869 2,627  2,600 39 52 50
Theft, petty theft 97,793 158,839 189,112 2,042 3,178 3,650
 Aggravated theft 3,362 4,800 4,297 70 96 83
Motor vehicle theft 7,808 18,233 26,391 163 365 509
Drunken driving 20,436 29,759 22,783 427 595  439
Offences involving
narcotics 955 2,546 13,445 20 51 260
Data source: SYF 2001, p. 518.
Order also concerns public behavior. Finland has not experienced the
kind of large and violent demonstrations that have taken place in some
countries during important international meetings, even forcing summits
of world leaders into remote, non-accessible locations. On the level of
individual public behavior there have been some unsatisfactory trends
and excessive festivities, possibly due to too lax policing and weakened
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parental authority. In the 1990s a few cities issued local ordinances that
regulate behavior in public areas, for example, prohibit drinking in pub-
lic. This was standardized in 2002 with a government bill that attempted
to set natiowide guidelines for public behavior, limiting the use of alco-
hol on the streets, although not necessarily in public parks. Sale of alco-
hol to persons under 18 years is prohibited, but somewhat unsuccess-
fully. Fortunately, the use of drugs is not spread in Finland as widely as
in many other countries, but the seriousness of the problem is increasing.
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14  Materialization of Values and Goals
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-
hood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948. Article 25
Freedoms and Rights of Finnish Citizens
The Parliament Act of 1906 granted to Finnish men and women alike the
right to vote and the right to participate as a candidate in general elec-
tions. Naturally, both universal and equal suffrage and universal eligibil-
ity are essential rights in a democratic political system. Likewise, any
democracy must guarantee for its citizens various additional rights to
participate freely in its political life. Such political rights include both
the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, and the freedom of
assembly and association. They were stipulated in the Constitution Act
of 1919 (Section 10) but, like several other fundamental rights, they had
in fact been observed in Finland before national independence was
reached.
The original Chapter 2 of the Constitution Act listed the fundamental
rights of Finnish citizens. Only much later, in 1995, was a comprehen-
sive list of social and cultural rights added to it. Chapter 2, as it was
adopted in 1919, was not very innovative. It contained a brief, fairly self-
evident list of fundamental rights, including the following protections of
the individual citizens (Sections 5-13, 60; see Uotila 1985, pp. 64–66):
– equality before the law;
– protection of life, honor, personal freedom, and property;
– unhindered right to be in the country, and freedom of residence and
movement there;
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– freedom of religion;
– freedom of speech, assembly, and association;
– the privacy of the home;
– the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephone communications;
and
– prohibition of any temporary courts of law.
In addition, the Constitution Act of 1919 guaranteed some fundamental
social and cultural rights: the right to use the citizen’s native language,
either Finnish or Swedish, in an administrative agency or in a court of
law (Section 14), and the right to have free basic education (Section 80).
The protection of labor was added to it in 1972.
Certain other civil rights, which the Constitution Act itself did not
mention, ought to be added to the above list. They included the follow-
ing:
– access to public documents;
– freedom of trade (a separate act in 1919); and
– the right to strike (Finnish labor law).
The new comprehensive list of fundamental economic, social, and cul-
tural rights was added to the Constitution Act when its Chapter 2 was
expanded in July 1995. Furthermore, now these rights covered not only
“Finnish citizens” in particular, but “persons” more generally. In other
words, the protection of fundamental rights was extended to cover all
persons within the jurisdiction of Finland. All the sections of the revised
Chapter 2 were, in turn, moved unchanged to the new constitution that
was enacted in 1999. The added rights included the following:
– prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender, age, origin, lan-
guage, religion, conviction, opinion, health, or disability;
– prohibition of torture and capital punishment;
– the right to more than basic education, without restraints caused by a
lack of financial resources;
– the government’s responsibility for a healthy environment;
– the right of any minority group to maintain and develop its own lan-
guage and culture;
– the government’s responsibility to try to guarantee full employment;
– the right to a decent standard of living and to receive personal care,
and the right to receive social security, health care, and child care.
Many of these principles had actually guided Finnish legislation for a
long time. Therefore, the amended list of citizens’ rights did not add much
to the contents of existing legislation or to parliament’s policies, nor did
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the formal expression of additional social rights actually change the life
situation of individual Finnish citizens. The reform was significant, first
of all, because it outlined clearly the individuals’ social and educational
rights and raised them to the level of constitutional law. Therefore, it
illustrated the ongoing change from the paradigms of the law society to
those of the welfare state. Also, the rights now covered aliens as well as
Finnish citizens. The reform had its particular Finnish aspects but it was by
no means unique. Comparable clauses had been written into other constitu-
tions since the Second World War, for example in Italy already in 1947.
Finland, for its part, had ratified about 60 international conventions
that can be characterized as human rights conventions. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which were adopted within the
United Nations in 1966, entered into force for Finland in 1976. The Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms was ratified by Finland in 1990. It was incorporated by an
act of parliament and motivated several amendments to existing Finnish
legislation.
On the other hand, a new approach was added to the constitution itself
in 1995, particularly because people’s social rights were now included in
the list of fundamental rights. Now, next to strictly binding stipulations,
there are policy declarations in the constitution that either can or cannot
become fully implemented in reality, depending on the will and the avail-
able resources of future parliaments.
What makes such fundamental rights even less concrete, is the fact
that Finland does not have a constitutional court that could interpret the
constitution in individual cases, in order to rule whether or not a citizen’s
constitutional rights have been violated. The unique idea of the Finnish
constitution and Finnish practice is that court cases are decided only on
the basis of ordinary legislation, because parliament is presumed not to
pass any legislation that would contravene the constitution. For that pur-
pose the Finnish parliament has its Constitutional Committee to which
bills are referred whenever there are fears that the law might contravene
the constitution, including the fundamental rights guaranteed by it (see
pp. 158, 205 above).
Nevertheless, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
was placed at the same level as other acts of parliament when it was
incorporated by parliament already in 1976, and there have been several
examples of direct application of the Covenant before Finnish courts.
And the signatories, including Finland, have agreed to observe many other
international declarations that concern human rights. Their contents might
not have brought anything particularly new to existing Finnish rights and
practices, but they have offered Finnish citizens the possibility of taking
their individual grievances to international courts. The rulings of these
courts, in turn, are binding in Finnish courts of law.
In any political culture the individual citizen also has rights that are
not formalized in the constitution or in ordinary law, and much depends
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on how the formal norms are implemented in actual practice. In reality
the implementation of civil rights may differ greatly between countries
that have signed the same international declarations, and in any one coun-
try there may be contradictions between the formal norms and the reality
of actual practice.
Furthermore, the citizens have learned to assume some basic values
and expectations so firmly that political decision-makers need to con-
vince their followers of their best efforts to pursue whatever expecta-
tions the people perceive as their legitimate rights. And vice versa: po-
litical decision-makers need to communicate to the people not only their
political promises, but also what they think is and what is not realisti-
cally achievable.
Chapter 2 (Sections 6 to 23) of Finland’s new constitution covers a
very wide range of “Basic rights and liberties,” both fundamental and
social. The following text will not review how all of them are imple-
mented. This chapter will focus primarily on the area that is the topic of
the constitution’s Section 19: “The right to social security.” The materi-
alization of “Educational rights” (Section 16) will also be reviewed. [PP]
Goals of the Welfare State
The concept of welfare state surfaced during the Second World War, as
noted in Chapter 2. Lord Beveridge’s advice was to fight the five giants
of want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness (unemployment), and
gradually such aims were accepted, particularly in West European coun-
tries. The motives of social policy have included solidarity and humanity
towards underprivileged people, and it is not possible to separate the
goals of a welfare state from more general policies and popular demands.
Another aim has been to strengthen the legitimacy of the social sys-
tem. The legitimation motive was strong especially during the Cold War,
when Western democracies wanted to make the foundation of their so-
cial system stronger against the threat of communism (Riihinen 1992).
Political parties have had different emphases in their policies, the Left
stressing solidarity, the Right national unity. The aims of welfare states
were gradually considered on a more abstract level, because achieved
aims lead to new problems. The new themes included universalism and
decommodification.
In a universal system all citizens have an equal right to certain ben-
efits. The equal right entitles all persons to receive benefits as far as they
meet the prescribed conditions and it means that the benefit is the same
for all beneficiaries. Finland, as well as the other Nordic countries, em-
phasizes the idea of universalism.
There are only a few areas that are completely universal. The most
common ones are comprehensive schooling and child allowance. In Fin-
land, as in many other countries, every child is entitled (and required) to
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receive education for a certain number of years, and child allowance is
the same for all families regardless of their incomes. In several countries
health care is also universal to a large extent: the services are financed by
public funds and the users pay part of the costs only. Some of these costs
are compensated through health insurance that covers all citizens.
However, national health insurance does not cover all health care ser-
vices. For example, dental health care in Finland is only beginning to
cover people of all ages. The forms of social insurance that cover all
citizens, such as the national pension systems in the Nordic countries,
also mainly meet the criteria of universalism. Health care and national
pension systems are, however, not as universal as comprehensive school-
ing and child allowance. It is for experts, mostly doctors, to decide whether
a citizen is ill or incapable for work, so the realization of universalism
depends on experts’ opinions.
It has been claimed that one of the aims of welfare states is decommodifi-
cation, that is, citizens’ liberation from market dependency. Decommodifi-
cation weakens the absolute power of the market and employers, and in-
creases the power of employees. Different types of models of a welfare state
can be distinguished on the basis of decommodification although there are
no countries purely representing any single model.
The least developed welfare states in terms of decommodification are
those in which the core of social policy is typically based on needs tests
and social assistance. Employees are dependent on the market and the
aims of the state are mostly the same as those of the market. The Anglo-
Saxon countries are closest to this model. Another model, pioneered in
Bismarck’s Germany, typically has compulsory social insurance with
considerable entitlements. In such a system the benefits are almost en-
tirely dependent on contributions and, therefore, work, employment, and
ultimately the market determine the fates of beneficiaries. The realiza-
tion of decommodification is very limited in a welfare state of this type.
In the third model equal benefits are available for all, regardless of ear-
lier earnings, contributions, and performance. This Beveridge-type so-
cial policy is characterized by solidarity but not necessarily by de-
commodification since the level of benefits does not usually offer a true
option for earnings from work.
In a perfect decommodification system the citizens would be given the
option between working and other means of livelihood. Thus, for ex-
ample, sickness insurance should fully compensate citizens’ earnings and
medical expenses. So far such benefits have been available only for some
academics, officials, and professionals in high positions of the private
sector (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp. 21–23). In practice, perfect social
decommodification is not possible.
The Nordic welfare states, which have adopted the ideal of universal
social policy, have taken the realization of decommodification the fur-
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thest. These states emphasize not only general civil liberties but also the
opportunity of all individuals to obtain extensive freedom: it is not suffi-
cient that the legal system guarantees the right to freedom of speech and
similar freedoms; every citizen has to be able to acquire the tools with
which these rights are realized. For example, they need to be able to sub-
scribe to newspapers. Thus, being free from something, such as oppression
or discrimination, is not enough; one has to have access to something, that
is, freedom of pursuing those opportunities important in one’s culture.
In the political life and policies of the Nordic welfare states, equality
of opportunity and equality of result are emphasized simultaneously.
Equality of opportunity is best seen in the education system, which is
practically free of charge all the way to higher learning. Equality of re-
sult represents egalitarianism. Finland’s unusually equal distribution of
income represents a high degree of egalitarianism (see Chapter 17). Still,
equality of result is always relative and it remains unattainable in an
absolute sense.
The concept of decommodification introduces some problems that have
been widely discussed in Finland, too. It has been argued that significant
income transfers have a negative effect on the incentives of working life
and that they weaken productivity. This argument, favored by neo-liber-
als, conflicts with the historical goals of social policy, which have al-
ways included rehabilitation and activation of people in general, as well
as normalization of living conditions of those whose circumstances are
poor. The neo-liberal claim is especially difficult to justify in Finland,
since the country’s productivity is at one of the highest international lev-
els. Still, Finnish social policy experts worry constantly about the work-
ing motivation of long-term unemployed people.
Certain changes in economic and social structures have influenced the
broader criticism of the welfare state. An important change is that society
is becoming more and more middle-class as a result of the rising education
level and of the change in the industrial structure, illustrated by the growing
proportion of service industries and, especially, intellectual work (see Table
2.1). The disintegration of the old working class can be seen in both national
and local politics and in the structure of the trade union movement. The
middle class calculates matters of its own interest and of common interest
differently from the working class (Riihinen 1984, pp. 2–6).
Globalization has increased doubts about the welfare state. In the opin-
ion of the critics, tougher international competition puts the competitive-
ness of businesses to an increasingly hard test, which makes it impos-
sible for them to endure the high costs of the welfare state. These critics
ignore the welfare state’s emphasis on the essential precondition of com-
petitiveness, namely, human capital, which requires investments in edu-
cation and health care. The current high competitiveness of Finland’s
national economy makes the critics’ arguments seem ideological rather
than fact-based.
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When Finnish politicians have justified cuts in social expenditures or
their reluctance to expand them in recent years, they have generally
pleaded that they wish to maintain the sustainability of the Nordic wel-
fare state. Finland’s low national debt increased significantly in the se-
vere slump in the early 1990s. Now the big issue concerns the allocation
of government revenue: should the debt be reduced or should social con-
ditions be improved. Those in favor of social income transfers argue that
Finland’s national debt in proportion to national income is one of the
lowest in the European Union, whereas the other side argues that the
change in age structure will cause pension costs to increase substantially
in the near future, which will pose a threat of another recession. There
hardly is an objective solution to the dispute.
A large majority of Finns are in favor of maintaining the welfare state.
In four surveys since 1992, Finnish respondents have been presented
with the following statement: “Although maintenance of good social se-
curity and other public services is very costly, the Finnish welfare state is
worth the cost.” Judging from the increasing size of the middle-class,
from globalization, and from certain ideological changes, one would have
expected the responses to become more and more negative. However,
the trend has been the opposite: in 1992, 61 percent agreed with the claim
fully or to some extent, in the autumn of 2000 the percentage was 84
(EVA 2001a, pp. 48–49). The Finns value the security of the system,
being aware of the fact that, among other things, health care is signifi-
cantly cheaper as a public than as a private service. They value the wel-
fare state although a majority votes for non-socialist parties. [OR]
Social Welfare and Social Insurance
Social policies have been built on the foundation of social welfare. As
welfare states have developed, social policies have, however, expanded
beyond the limits of social welfare. The growth of social policy is mainly
due to the expansion of social insurance and its transformation into an
important factor that enhances social security and makes a large eco-
nomic contribution to society.
Although all members of the Finnish society have a statutory right to
social welfare, the universality of social policy is restricted: it is pro-
vided and paid for according to the principle of need, especially as the
means are tested individually. While municipal day care for children is
part of the most universal part of social policy, the main methods of so-
cial welfare are preventive social welfare, social services, and last-resort
income support (also called living allowance, supplementary benefit, or
means-tested income support). With the help of different social services
the public sector supports individuals and families in need of help, such
as the elderly, children, families with children, intoxicant abusers and
persons with disabilities. In some cases the services are directed at com-
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munities and called community work. The help offered may or may not
be purely financial.
The main goal of social welfare is to prevent social problems, to in-
crease social security, and to encourage independence and initiative. The
aim is to offer the services in as “normal” a way as possible in order to make
it easier to use them and to avoid stigmatization. The law also requires con-
fidentiality: social welfare personnel have an obligation to maintain the con-
fidentiality of any and all information concerning their customers.
The responsibility for organizing social services lies with the munici-
palities. The central government tries to respect the autonomy of the mu-
nicipalities and the law does not regulate in detail the scope, content, or
method of organizing the services. There are several ways possible: most
services are organized independently by the municipalities as their own
functions; some services are offered in cooperation with other munici-
palities or by inter-municipal unions; and others are taken care of by
private companies and non-governmental organizations. The municipali-
ties’ varying abilities to meet their responsibilities are a problem that
might be eased by merging neighboring municipalities, but the idea has
been resisted by the inhabitants of almost all municipalities.
A new social and health care planning system came into effect in 2000;
the government’s four-year program (for 2000–2003) is called the Social
Welfare and Health Care Target and Operating Plan. Each new govern-
ment will prepare such a plan65 and the government will report to parlia-
ment every two years what progress has been made (Järvelin 2001, p.
81).
The role of civil society in organizing social welfare should be empha-
sized: voluntary organizations supplement municipal services in a hu-
mane way. Activities they organize for unemployed people and after-
noon clubs for schoolchildren are important because of the large number
of single-parent families and families where both parents are working.
The organizations are partly funded by public funds and by Finland’s
Slot Machine Association (cf. Chapter 5). Lutheran congregations, which
in the early 19th century were responsible for most of the charity work,
carry on the social work of the church, and other churches have also
assumed an active role.
Social work is an essential part of the realization of social welfare.
Finnish social workers are required to have a masters-level degree, with
five to six years of university studies. The range of their work has ex-
panded from services for individuals and families and traditional com-
munity work to cooperation with health care authorities and even to so-
cietal planning. Important partners also include authorities in education,
town planning, building, housing, employment, culture and leisure, and
public transport.
65 The Ministry of Socil Affairs and Health prepares the plan with representatives of
municipalities, nongovernmental organizations, and health care employees and pro-
fessionals. The municipalities are not bound to follow it.
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One expensive form of social welfare is municipal day care for chil-
dren. In Finland, all children of pre-school age have an absolute right to
municipal day care after the mother’s or father’s period of entitlement to
a parental allowance has ended. This right does not depend on the par-
ents’ assets or working status. Parents pay for the day care according to
their income and family size. In 2002, the maximum monthly payment
was 200 euros per child and the minimum was 18 euros. In autumn 1999,
there were 190,000 children below school age in municipal day care,
equaling 46 percent of the total number of pre-school children.
Other major forms of social welfare are child welfare, welfare and
support services for older people, welfare and services for persons with
disabilities, welfare for intoxicant abusers, and income support. Income
support, the second largest expense of social welfare, has awakened par-
ticularly lively debate concerning which families and persons truly need
it and on what grounds it should be granted. Also, it has been debated
whether the social expenditures system could be simplified and the work
incentives for low-income people strengthened by creating a new kind of
basic income system concerning all working-age people below a certain
income limit.
Services for older people have become a major challenge, not the least
because the age structure of the population will change faster in Finland
than in any other European country. There is a wide variety of services
available for the elderly (see Table 14.1). The most pressing need for
such services concerns very old people. Of all Finns aged 75 and over,
three-quarters still manage by themselves or with the support of their
families, while relatively few make use of even the drop-in services, such
as home care. The elderly and their relatives are generally satisfied with
the municipal services; complaints have referred mostly to insufficient
home care, the quality of institutional care, and the exhaustion of the
personnel (Vaarama et al. 2002, pp. 3, 13).
Table 14.1
Coverage of services for the elderly in Finland in 1999
Services Clients, Clients,
% of population % of population
aged 65–74 aged 75 and over
Regular home care services 6.7 12.4
Service house for the elderly 2.7 4.7
Old people’s homes 2.8 5.5
Health centers, long-term inpatients 1.8 3.5
Psychiatric wards, long-term inpatients 0.1 0.1
Other heath care, long-term inpatients 0.1 0.1
Source: Statistical Yearbook on Social Welfare and Health Care 2000, p. 62.
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An extensive social insurance system provides aid and security in case
of an accident, illness, work incapacity or unemployment, and upon re-
tirement. The principles of the insurance systems are not identical. Some
systems are based on the principle of joint national responsibility, the
aim of which is a universal and equal basic level of compensations. This
principle is most clearly represented by the idea of a national insurance.
An example from Finland is the national pension scheme. The earnings-
related systems represent another kind of principle, namely, the equiva-
lence between premiums and benefits.
In Finland the national pension scheme was created first (1937). The
wage earners did not consider it fair enough, noting, among other things,
that they also had to pay for farmers’ pensions. This speeded up the statu-
tory earnings-related pension scheme (1962). Applying different prin-
ciples of justice the systems complement one another. The need prin-
ciple is followed by the national insurance, which also covers those not
participating in the labor market and guarantees income support for ev-
eryone living in Finland with an emphasis on human dignity. The desert
(merit) principle is followed by the earnings-related insurance, which
takes into account people’s own efforts.
By the late 1980s the creation of the national social insurance system
accomplished a transfer from weak to stabilized basic security in Fin-
land, and the work pension system provided income security (Jäntti et al.
1996). It seems that the concurrent application and balance of the two
principles increases the societal system’s legitimacy (Hellsten and
Riihinen 1985, pp. 38–39).
National insurance and the earnings-related pension scheme have dif-
ferent organizations and different relationships to the state administra-
tion. The Social Insurance Institution (KELA) operates under the super-
vision of parliament, independent of the government. Its board (director
general and five directors) are appointed by the president of the republic
and its administration and operations are supervised by a supervisory
council of twelve members elected by parliament.
The Central Pension Security Institute is the statutory central body of
the earnings-related pension scheme. Its managing director has not rep-
resented any political party as visibly as the director general of KELA,
although political views do sometimes play a role when electing the
managing director. The operations are supervised by a body of represen-
tatives of 27 members, the majority of whom come from labor market
organizations so that employers and employees have an equal number of
representatives. The representatives also include members of trade asso-
ciations and pension insurance companies and an insurance medicine
specialist. The central government has only two representatives.
The operations of KELA are based on a pay-as-you-go system: most
of the funds distributed as benefits are received as regular payments from
various sources. In contrast, the earnings-related pension scheme is a
funding system: it aims at long-term investment of its funds in order to
be able to fulfill its obligations in the future.
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The programs administered by KELA include minimum pension se-
curity, general health insurance, rehabilitation, basic unemployment se-
curity, basic income security for families with children, general housing
allowance, financial aid for students, school transportation subsidies and
conscript’s allowance.66 KELA has a nation wide network of 341 local
offices. In 2000, its total expenditure was 55.3 billion markkas (€ 9.3bn.),
of which the benefit costs were 53.6 billion markkas (€ 9 bn.), that is 6.8
percent of GDP. The highest proportion (30%) of the expenditure was
spent on national pension, the second highest (23%) on health insurance
and the third highest (15%) on child allowances. Unemployment benefits
also formed a large part (11%) of the total expenditure. KELA had 1,061,000
pension beneficiaries, of whom 773,000 were on old age pension.67
The operations of the Central Pension Security Institute are covered
by several acts on the earnings-related pension. The most important acts
involving the private sector are the Employees’ Pensions Act, the Tem-
porary Employees’ Pensions Act and the Self-Employed Persons’ Pen-
sions Act. Civil servants have a long tradition of both tenured positions
and secure pensions. Since 1964 and 1966 there are two acts in the pub-
lic sector governing employees’ pension benefits: the Local Government
Employees’ Pensions Act and the State Employees’ Pensions Act.
The legal age for old-age pension is 65. However, only a minority of
employees continue to work up to this age. Many retire years earlier and
may receive disability pension or partial disability pension. Cash reha-
bilitation benefit is payable to employees who have an injury or illness
from which they are expected to recover, and individual early retirement
pension has been available for persons with a long work history. Unem-
ployment pension can be granted to a long-term unemployed person who
has reached the age of 60. The death of a family provider can entitle the
widow or widower and children to survivor’s pension. Early old-age pen-
sion is available for persons aged 60, but in comparison with the ordi-
nary early-age pension its amount is reduced.68
66 For example, under national health insurance, some medical expenses are refunded
regardless of the length of the illness. 60% of the doctors’ fees and 75% of the cost
of examinations and treatments ordered by a doctor exceeding 13.45 euros are re-
funded. For costs over € 8.40 a 50% refund is granted for prescribed medicine.
Sickness allowance represents a compensation for lost earnings. The maximum daily
amount is € 50.45, which is paid for up to one year. The employer pays a full wage
for the first day of work incapacity and the following seven weekdays.
67 Statistical Yearbook of the Social Insurance Institution 2000, p. 24. – The other
pensions included unemployment pension, spouse pension, orphan’s pension, change-
of-generation pension, and front-veteran’s pension.
68 In the private sector the statutory earnings-related pension is provided by private
pension institutes. Earnings-related pensions are always protected against possible
insolvency of a pension institute: in such a case the institutes are jointly liable. In the
public sector, the State Treasury and the Local Government Pensions Institute are
responsible for implementing pension insurance.
Materialization of Values and Goals
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 3 28.10.2002, 12:37221
222
The number of non-retired persons covered under statutory earnings-
related pensions was 1,485,000 in the private sector and 635,000 in the
public sector at the end of 1998. At the same time private sector pension
funds totaled FIM 222.6 billion (€ 37.4 bn.) and public sector funds FIM
70.9 billion (€ 11.9 bn.). The coming decades give rise to great concern:
the number of pensioners will increase considerably faster than the people
who will pay for future pensions. The question is whether the funds will
increase fast enough so that future pensions can be paid without unrea-
sonable effort.
The pension system has greatly reduced poverty. In 1980 the poverty
rate was clearly higher in Finland than in the other Nordic countries, the
Netherlands, or Germany, but by the mid-1990s Finland was, with Swe-
den and Norway, one of the countries with the least poverty (under 5
percent). The rate was about 7.5 percent in central Europe and consider-
ably higher in the English-speaking countries (Canada about 10%, UK slightly
over 12 %, and the United States 17.5%). (Ritakallio 2001, pp. 13–14.) [OR]
Health Care
In a welfare state, health care is one of the essential sectors of social
security. Accordingly, when the chapter on “Basic rights and liberties”
was added to Finland’s constitution in 1995, the following promises were
included: “The public authorities shall guarantee for everyone, as pro-
vided in more detail by an Act, adequate social, health and medical ser-
vices and promote the health of the population.”
The organization and financing of health care have long been consid-
ered a public responsibility in Finland. The Mannerheim League for Child
Welfare, founded in 1920, deserves the credit for initiating the interna-
tionally first-rate health care for mothers and children from the 1920s
onwards. In the 1940s, the authorities joined in developing this sector of
health care. Pregnant women and children of pre-school and school age
began to have regular health check-ups. One of the world’s lowest infant
mortality rates has been a good illustration of how this action has ben-
efited Finland in the long term; the figure was 3.6 per thousand in 1999.
Systematic health care for all adults did not start until the 1960s, but the
development has been fast since then (cf. Chapter 2). The burgeoning
development of a network of district and central hospitals was started in
the 1950s, and 1963 saw the creation of a general health insurance, an
integral part of a welfare state.
The Primary Health Care Act from 1972 has been the basis of the
primary health care system. The act obliges municipalities, alone or jointly,
to provide primary health care services and preventive health care. There
are usually several general practitioners along with public health nurses
and clerical staff working at the health centers. Patients in need of sec-
ondary care are referred to specialized care in a hospital. The country’s
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270 health centers usually implement the municipalities’ responsibilities
described by the Primary Health Care Act: medical care, ambulance ser-
vice, home nursing, health promotion and prevention of illnesses, work
in schools and other educational institutions, family planning services,
occupational health care, rehabilitation services, and dental health care.
They participate in prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, smoking, and
obesity, and take part in community planning and environmental health
care together with other authorities.
Specialized care is also the responsibility of the municipalities (the
Secondary Level Care Act, 1989). Each municipality must belong to an
inter-municipal union, which owns and governs district hospitals with
specialist doctors and equipment; the number of such hospital districts is
21. All the medical services under the Public Health Acts were produced
publicly until 1992, but since then the municipalities have also been able
to opt to purchase the necessary medical services from the private sector.
There are some 11,000 doctors employed in health care services pro-
vided by the public sector. The costs of using the private health care
services are partially refunded under the national health insurance. Ap-
proximately 4000 doctors are actively working in the private sector and,
in addition, many employed in the public sector have private patients.
The number of dentists is about 5000.
Health policy pays special attention to the economically active popu-
lation. Under the Occupational Health Care Act (1979), employers are
obliged to provide occupational (but not other than occupational) health
care services for their employees. The services can be purchased from
either municipal health centers or the private sector. Occupational health
care covers over ninety percent of employees and is provided for them
free of charge. Half of the expenses incurred by the employer are cov-
ered under the national health insurance.
Health insurance covers the whole population, and health insurance
payments are made by everyone paying municipal tax; recipients of other
than pension income pay 1.5 percent and pension recipients have paid
3.2 percent of their taxable income (both age groups 1.5 percent in 2003).
Daily sickness allowance is paid on account of an illness for a period of
no longer than 300 working days. As with health insurance payments,
the allowance is also determined on the basis of the recipient’s earnings.
As a consequence of the recession in the 1990s, cost-containment was
applied and earnings-related benefits were also cut. For the same reason
the waiting period for sickness allowance was changed from seven to
nine days in 1993. Thus, the total expenditure on the allowance dropped
from FIM 3.5 billion in 1991 to 2.4 billion in 1997. To the wage earners
this has little significance, because the collective labor agreements guaran-
tee to almost everyone full pay for the first nine days of work incapacity, too.
After prolonged incapacity for work, that is after the first 300 days, all
working-age people are entitled to disability pension and those between
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58-64 years of age also to individual early retirement pension. In 1996,
the latter was revised so that pensions are replaced by rehabilitation al-
lowance for a specified time. Thus, decision-makers hope that work in-
capacity is only temporary.
Health services organized by local authorities have become more and
more expensive in recent years. However, the prices paid by the patients
are still low. In 2001, customers paid FIM 100 to 150 (€ 16.80–25.25)
per year for their health center visits and approximately FIM 100 for
each visit to a hospital out-patient clinic and FIM 125 per each day of
admission. Many services, most typically preventive ones such as well-
mother clinics and school health care, are free of charge and the same
applies to the dental services of under-18-year-olds.
The recession of the 1990s increased the citizens’ responsibility for
their health care. Cost-containment had to be taken into account in de-
veloping and applying the health insurance, which had an impact espe-
cially on the refunding of private health services and medical drugs. At
the same time, heavy cost cuts were made. In 1991, the government de-
cided that tax deductions on medical costs would no longer be approved.
As the prices have risen, compensation levels been lowered, and tax de-
duction rights removed, the share paid by the patients of the total costs of
health care stands now at 21.5 percent, after approximately 13 percent in
the late 1980s. This change adds to social inequality because those with
the biggest financial difficulties are forced to compromise the most in
terms of necessary health services and medicines.
In 1993 the central government’s subsidies to the municipalities were
changed. Earlier, state support was earmarked for specific purposes, in-
cluding health care, but since 1993 state support for the social sector has
been undifferentiated. The central government lacks the authority to in-
terfere with local priorities and, when given a free choice, many local
governments tend to rank other needs higher than developing their health
care. A very notorious problem has been the increasingly long waiting
time for specialized care.
The total cost of health care in Finland in 1999 was 49 billion markkas
(€ 8.2 bn.) and distributed in the following way: municipalities 43 per-
cent, private households 20 percent, the central government 18 percent,
the Social Insurance Institution 15 percent, and other private funding 4
percent. These costs formed 6.9 percent of GDP in 1998. (Statistical Year-
book of the Social Insurance Institution 2000, p. 55; SYF 2001, p. 467.)
Despite the cost-containment of the 1990s, the positive long-term re-
sults of improved health care in the second half of the 20th century can
be seen in longer life expectancies. However, this development is largely
due to overall improvements in living conditions, and there has been no
success in the reduction of health differences among various socio-eco-
nomic groups. But determined efforts to reduce major public health prob-
lems, above all cardiovascular diseases, have yielded many good results.
[OR]
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Financing Social Policy
In welfare states, government expenditure tends to be high and the fi-
nancing of social protection clearly forms the largest part of it. The Finn-
ish state alone paid FIM 44 billion (€ 7.4 bn.) for social security and
health care in 1998. This amounted to 23.4 percent of all state expendi-
tures (see Table 15.3 on page 253).
However, the main responsibility for financing Finland’s social wel-
fare belongs to the municipalities. A major part of the financing comes
from local taxes, and these proceeds vary greatly in different municipali-
ties. The local needs are also different because of, for example, differ-
ences in age structures. Therefore, a government grants system was de-
veloped to reduce the strain of operational costs. At the end of the 1990s,
the share of municipal taxation in total financing was on average 64 percent,
while state subsidies represented 24 percent and client fees 12 percent.
The share of public expenditures in GDP rose in nearly all EU coun-
tries between 1980 and 1995. In Finland, the rise was as high as 20 per-
centage points (from 39% to 59%). Yet in 1995, public expenditure in
Sweden and Denmark was higher than in Finland (67% and 61% respec-
tively). The 1995 figures in Belgium (55%) and the Netherlands (54%)
came close to those of the Nordic countries although they were among
the few countries where the proportion of public expenditure of GDP
had decreased in 1980-1995. Norway stood out from the other Nordic
countries with its public expenditure at only 48% of GDP, although its
public expenditure had risen strongly in the 1980s. While government
expenditures in relation to GDP increased in most European countries
studied, they nevertheless converged in terms of standard deviation
(Kautto 1999, p. 74).
The proportion of welfare services (education, health, rehabilitation,
housing and social services) in GDP was distinctly higher in the Nordic
countries than elsewhere in western Europe (except for Norway) in 1995.
The percentages were 15.4 in Finland, 18.7 in Denmark, 18.5 in Sweden,
and 13.2 in Norway. In Belgium and the Netherlands they were only 7.8
and in 6.7 respectively.69
The social policies in the European countries show certain consistency
when income transfers received by households, consisting of social se-
curity benefits such as pensions and sickness benefits, are compared with
welfare services. In Figure 14.1, fourteen countries are divided into two
groups on the basis of the medians of both variables. Three Nordic coun-
tries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) and also Austria are in the quad-
rant that lies above both medians. In contrast, the Mediterranean coun-
69 Social services as part of these welfare services include social work, municipal day
care for children and families, family counseling, etc. The cost of welfare services,
however excluding education, is one part of the total social expenditure which uses
public funds to finance social and health policy (see Table 14.2).
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tries (Greece, Italy and Spain) plus Portugal lie below both medians. In
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands income transfers rank above, but
welfare services below the median, while Germany, Norway, and the
United Kingdom are placed in the opposite quadrant.
Figure 14.1
Welfare services and income transfers to households in 1994–1995 in fourteen Eu-
ropean countries.


































Source: Kautto 1999, p. 78.
Social policies are financed by three sources: the government (includ-
ing the state and the municipalities), employers, and insured. The Nordic
countries follow the principle of universalism in their social policies,
more so than welfare states in general, and this increases further the pub-
lic sector’s contribution to the financing of social policy. Characteristic
features of Finland, typical in the other Nordic countries too, are an equal
income distribution, a low poverty rate, and women’s high participation
in working life, which has increased income transfers for family policy.
The Nordic countries do not have as uniform a system of financing their
social policies as is often assumed, nor do they differ from other welfare
states as much as might be expected (Kautto 1999, p. 76).
In the European Union, social expenditure in relation to GDP remained
at approximately 26 percent through almost the entire 1980s. The pro-
portion increased slightly more in the Nordic countries than in the EU
countries on average. During 1991–1993, the increase was strongest in
Finland (from 30% to 35%) due to both the decrease in GDP and an
increase in social expenditure, particularly for unemployment (cf. Chap-
ters 15 and 16). However, in Sweden the proportion of social expenditure
in GDP remained higher than in Finland (see Table 14.2). In the late
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1990s, Finland’s economic growth was exceptionally fast and cost-con-
tainment was applied in social policy. This reduced the proportion of
social expenditure in GDP to 27 percent already by 1998. There was a
clear convergence of the GDP proportions of social expenditure in the
EU countries in the 1990s, although the countries did not harmonize their
social policies.
Table 14.2
Social expenditure as percentage of GDP in the EU countries from 1980 to 1996
Countries 1980 1985 1990 1991 1993 1996
Finland 20 24 25 30 35 32
Austria – – 27 28 30 30
Belgium 28 29 27 27 29 30
Denmark 29 28 29 30 32 32
France 25 29 28 28 31 31
Germany 29 28 25 27 29 30
Greece  – – 23 22 22 23
Ireland 21 24 19 20 21 20
Italy 19 23 24 25 26 25
Luxembourg 27 23 24 25 25 25
Netherlands 30 32 33 33 34 32
Portugal 13 14 16 17 21 21
Spain 18 20 20 22 24 23
Sweden 33 33 31 34 39 36
United Kingdom 22 24 23 25 29 28
EU (15) – – 27 28 29 28
Source: Eurostat and NOSOSCO.
The financing sources of social policies can be divided into four cat-
egories: central and local authorities, employers, insured, and others in-
cluding property income and social security funds. The proportions of
these categories vary significantly in the EU countries, giving a good
characterization of the financing policies that different countries pursue
over a longer period of time.
As is shown in Table 14.3, the share of the central government and
local authorities in 1996 was large in Denmark and Ireland and small in
the Netherlands and Greece. The employers paid a large share in Spain
and Italy, and very little in Denmark. Other EU countries with a rela-
tively small employer share included the Netherlands, Great Britain, and
Luxembourg, while the share of the insured was clearly the largest in the
Netherlands and smallest in Sweden. The Netherlands also reported the
largest share of other financing sources, with Portugal closest behind. In
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Ireland such other sources cover very little. This comparison places Fin-
land among the Nordic welfare states and those other EU countries, where
the share of public funding is large.
Table 14.3
Financing of social expenditure in the EU countries in 1996 (in %)
Countries State Employers Insured Other Total
and local
authorities
Finland 45 35 13 7 100
Austria 36 37 26 1 100
Belgium 20 45 26 9 100
Denmark 69 10 15 6 100
France 20 50 28 2 100
Germany 30 39 29 2 100
Greece 20 38 23 8 99
Ireland 63 22 14 1 100
Italy 30 49 18 3 100
Luxembourg  47 26 23 5 101
Netherlands 16 23 44 16 99
Portugal 42 26 17 15 100
Spain 28 52 18 3 101
Sweden 45 40  7 8 100
United Kingdom 48 25 15 12 100
EU (15) 31 39 24 5 99
Source: Eurostat
A statistical analysis of the EU countries from 1980–1995 resulted in
three different financing clubs: the Nordic oriented (Ireland and the United
Kingdom in addition to Denmark, Finland, and Sweden), the corporative
oriented (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portu-
gal, and Spain), and the single-member club of the insured oriented, con-
sisting of the Netherlands (Hagfors 1999, pp. 49–52).
Thus, the financing of social protection can be organized very differ-
ently, even in countries of about the same level of welfare. The differ-
ences are probably due to at least two factors. Firstly, the final costs of
social policies may be relatively similar from the point of view of the
payers, although the employers’ costs would be divided differently into
taxes and direct employer contributions. Secondly, the financing systems
reflect to some extent the different distribution of power between the
state and civil society. In Finland and Sweden, the financing of social
protection is distributed very similarly, but in Finland the earnings-re-
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lated pension scheme is mainly controlled by employer and worker orga-
nizations, which is illustrated by the larger relative share of the insured.
It should also be emphasized that conclusions drawn from the financing
shares are somewhat uncertain, primarily because the definitions of tax
and contribution may vary across countries.
Different countries not only finance their social policies in different
ways but also allocate their resources differently. Table 14.4 shows that
the proportions, for example, of health care and illness of total social
expenditure vary substantially. In 1996, Denmark used for this purpose
about one-half of what was used by Ireland and Portugal. Italy spent on
old age almost twice as much as Luxembourg. Finland’s most significant
deviations from the EU averages were its relatively low share (30%) on
old age and relatively high (14%) on unemployment. The proportion spent
on health care and illness in Finland was also below the EU average.
Table 14.4
Social expenditure by functions in the EU countries in 1996 (in %)
Countries Sickness Dis- Old Sur- Family Un- Hous-    Other
and ability age vivors and employ- ing
health children ment
Finland 21 15 30 4 13 14 1 2
Austria 25 8 38 11 11 6 0.3 1
Belgium 26 6 32 11 8 15 0 2
Denmark 18 11 39 0.1 12 14 2  4
France 29 6 37 7 9 8 3 2
Germany 30 7 39 2 9 10 1  2
Greece 26 9 41 8 8 4 2 1
Ireland 34 5 20 6 13 17 3 2
Italy 22 7 54 12 4 2  0 0
Luxembourg 26 13 30 14 13 4 0.2 0.3
Netherlands 28 15 33 6 4 12 1 0.4
Portugal 33 12 36 7  6 6 0 1
Spain 29 8 41 4 2 15 1 1
Sweden 22 12 36 3 11 10  3  3
UK 25 12 35 5 9 6 7 1
EU (15) 27 9 39 5 8 8  2 2
Sources: Eurostat and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
The different ways of resource allocation are the result of not only
different kinds of needs – for example, differences in age structures - but
also, and possibly even more so, of the different values emphasized in
each nation. It is likely that within an institution such as the European
Union, the values will converge in the long run, but so far the differences
have seemed clear.
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Finland, for example, places strong emphasis on families and chil-
dren. Recently there has appeared growing criticism of the scarce re-
sources directed to health care, while at the same time the efficiency of
the country’s health policy has been emphasized. The welfare effects of
the distribution of social policy costs have not been studied, which makes
it impossible to estimate the “right” distribution. In addition, the right
distribution is difficult to find and define because of the wide influence
of the various contributions. [OR]
Regional Policy and Development
The welfare state cherishes equality and is expected to help citizens by
leveling their inequalities. This concerns individuals, but a similar prin-
ciple can be applied to inequalities between regions. That is the purpose
of regional policy. Expressed in EU phraseology, “every effort is made
to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various
regions.” Equality of regions is a valuable goal, but it can be in conflict
with another important policy goal, namely, allocative efficiency. The
leveling of regional inequalities needs to be adjusted to whatever ben-
efits the national economy.
Chapter 4 pointed out some differences between Finland’s regions.
Geography explains why different parts of the country have different
characteristics. There are areas where industry developed because of for-
est resources, waterpower, or mining, but the most important causes for
regional variation are the country’s northern location and its great di-
mension from north to south. The growing season lasts only 60–90 days
in the north, but 180 days in the south (in central Europe 260 days, in
southern Europe over 300 days). Distances to foreign markets can be
illustrated by a circle using Helsinki as the focus and Finland’s length as
the radius. It would encompass Sweden, Denmark, and the Baltic States,
as well as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, Oslo, and Germany’s north-
ern harbors. Even Berlin and Hamburg would be close to it. Moreover,
Finland’s southern and western coastal towns have direct access to the
sea, while other parts of the country depend on more expensive land and
air transportation.
Regional disparities are amplified by the character of markets and
people’s attraction to centers. In late 1950s Gunnar Myrdahl presented
the theory of cumulative growth in which he outlined the spectrum and
interrelationships of economic and social factors that cause regional dif-
ferentiation. The system is not approaching equilibrium; on the contrary,
its internal mechanisms favor disequilibrium. A positive thrust starts spi-
ral growth. An enterprise attracts movers to the region, or at least im-
proves employment, thereby encouraging services that in turn attract more
people and again make the region more appealing to industry and ser-
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vices. Furthermore, migration is selective: fast developing regions re-
ceive well educated, healthy, and young inhabitants. This strengthens the
financial base of public services and reduces public expenditures.
In the Nordic countries where local taxes are very important, public
resources depend greatly on the inhabitants’ income level. If a region is
losing people, the structure of its population and its public finances de-
velop unfavorably. Myrdal called such a development the backwash ef-
fect. Widening differences in infrastructure and cultural services make
the declining regions less attractive (Myrdal 1957). This kind of inevi-
table trend was already apparent in Finland half a century ago (Riihinen
1965). Understandably, positive thrusts occur more frequently and more
effectively in the south than in the north.
Urbanization economies facilitate effective division of labor. Indus-
trial enterprises create demand for specialized service and repair busi-
nesses. A competitive economy also needs swift cooperation, another
advantage of urban regions (Riihinen 1973, pp. 151–156). The concept
of networking economies refers largely to the same economic factors as
the advantages of urbanization. Concentration enables even small firms
to utilize external economies and benefits of scale. The advantages of
networking economies include monitoring and disseminating informa-
tion and opportunities for effective training. Firms and their personnel
may also have influence in local government and help to improve infra-
structure.
While Finland is seeking to develop an increasingly efficient post-
industrial society, it also finds large inequalities of regions unacceptable.
The premises of regional development reflect traditional values both in
culture and in attitudes to security. A sustainable rural environment and a
fully inhabited land area have been considered necessary for self-suffi-
cient food production, availability of timber resources, national defense,
and even the maintenance of rural culture (Eskelinen 2001, p. 17). Such
premises can be debated, but they have an influence on policy decisions.
Finland’s modern regional policy developed in three stages: first, the
industrialization of developing areas until the mid-1970s; second, a re-
gional planning stage until the late-1980s; and third, regional develop-
ment based on programs (Vartiainen 1998). It is not possible to distin-
guish these stages clearly, but they outline the general trend.
Finland, Sweden, and Norway, where geographic differences are com-
parable, all started proactive regional policy in the mid-1960s. Capital
subventions were used. Labor force subventions were added in Finland
in the 1970s. The central government began to complement investment
support with subsidies for employment, training, and transportation, as
well as offering tax exemptions and advice. Support was directed not
merely at industrial activity but also to tourism, fur farming, fish farm-
ing, horticulture, and turf production. The first support areas were de-
fined in 1966, then enlarged twice in the 1970s. Industrial employment
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in the developing regions improved greatly at the beginning of the 1970s,
but it is difficult to estimate to what extent this was the result of public
subsidies. In 1975 a scheme was introduced to assist the launching of new
businesses in slowly developing areas. It was an era of planning optimism
when designers of the policy believed strongly in their methods. (Nordiska
arbetsgruppen för regionalpolitisk forskning 1978, pp. 101–125.)
The planning stage from the mid 1970s onward involved attempts to
diversify economy and to strengthen industrial enterprises in slowly de-
veloping regions. Loans and tax exemptions were still used, regional
policy contributions were launched. Other forms included regional de-
velopment programs and assistance in the search for sites. The term rural
policy was also introduced. Differences became smaller, but the policy
was not being targeted accurately at the most problematic areas. Thus,
Lapland and north-eastern regions became so-called project areas. The
Regional Policy Act for 1982–1989 added a “special areas” policy to
deal with declining industry and mining, and the most problematic rural
areas. (Komiteanmietintö 1986:6, pp. 31–39.)
Nevertheless, nothing could halt the cumulative process: central areas
grew and backwash effects continued. Between 1970 and 1980 Finland’s
urban population increased from 51 to 60 percent. Without successful
regional policy the differences would have become even larger.
The latest stage reflects the economy’s changing premises: more open
competition, unification of commodity markets, expansion of markets,
increasing importance of information and skills, and pressures to form
larger enterprises, while networking and requirements for flexibility open
up opportunities for small and mid-sized firms. Globalization and the
internationalization of companies set the framework for domestic regional
policy.
Now large companies can select new locations from an almost-global
range of possibilities, the home country being but one alternative. Con-
sequently, regional development necessitates increased concern for the
preferences of enterprises. Despite all the changes, the strategies of re-
gional development remain based, to some extent, on the principles fol-
lowed 30 to 50 years earlier, when decisions were made on the location
of state-owned companies, universities, and investments in infrastruc-
ture. (Talousneuvosto 2000, pp. 26–27, 138–139.) One apparent change
in attitudes deserves mentioning. During the two earlier stages the aim
was to overcome results of urbanization, whereas the latest stage involves
some conscious utilization of them.
The new orientation in regional policy transferred responsibility for
regional development from the central government to the level of re-
gions (see the map in Figure 4.1). This is served by two overlapping
organizations. One consists of the 20 regional councils mentioned in
Chapter 12 that were established by the municipalities as regional devel-
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opment authorities. In 1994 they were restructured, with the aim of mak-
ing them participants in the EU’s “union of regions.” The other organiza-
tion, set up in 1997, consists of the 15 employment and economic devel-
opment centers mentioned in Chapter 11. They function under the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry, but combine administrative tasks of several
ministries for business services and technological development, local
employment offices, and agricultural districts.
The backgrounds of the regional authorities have slightly different party
flavors: the regional councils are closer to the Center Party which is rela-
tively strong in municipal government, while the employment and eco-
nomic development centers became a tool of the central government run
by the Social Democrats and the Conservatives (Sandberg 2000, p.187).
The regional councils make plans but lack resources. The state offices
are the primary distributors of public subsidies.
The EU’s structural funds finance a part of EU regional policy. From
2000 to 2006 Finland is receiving 2.1 billion euros to help finance the
Objective Programs; in 2002 Finland’s annual budget authorized com-
mitments to new programs worth 139 million euros. The same year’s
“matching funds” from the Finnish government amounted to 151 mil-
lion. The map in Figure 14.2 shows how Finland is divided into two
support areas; they concern the EU’s Objective 1 “promoting the devel-
opment and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lag-
ging behind” and Objective 2 “supporting the economic and social con-
version of areas facing structural difficulties.” The additional transitional
areas are also entitled to modest support. Objective 3, implemented in
the whole country, supports “policies and systems of education, training
and employment” initiated and planned in Finland and screened and ap-
proved by the EU.
The central government determines national goals for regional policy.
They include the regional center development program that was launched
in autumn 2001; 34 functional regions around the country were selected
to receive support for their planned strengthening of the urban center
through cooperation between municipalities, educational institutions, and
civil organizations. Another idea is the centers of expertise program.
Eleven such centers were named in 1993, and from 1999 to 2006 their
number is fourteen.70 There are also two national centers for networking
expertise, one for wood products the other for food sector. (www.intermin.fi.)
Regional policy emphasizing center programs is reminiscent of the growth
pole policy that was quietly abandoned in the 1970s because of the fear
of unequal impacts.
70 Jyväskylä (in Central Finland) and Tampere (in Pirkanmaa) are examples of exper-
tise centers. The former specializes in information technology, management of pa-
per production, and energy and environment techniques, the latter in machine con-
struction and automation, information and communication techniques, health tech-
nology, and communication.
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Figure 14.2
EU objective areas in Finland, from 2000 to 2006. (Objective 1 areas cover 21% of
Finland’s population).
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The Act on Regional Development concerns the planning and imple-
mentation of nationally funded regional development. The law requires
the ministries to pay adequate attention to regional development in their
own plans, underscores the role of the regional councils, and emphasizes
interaction between regions and the central government. The state will
continue to fund regional development by subsidizing programs of fixed
duration.
Regional policy covers only a part of all regional leveling that takes
place in the welfare state. More leveling is motivated by the uneven re-
sources available to the municipalities to implement basic services. Re-
alization of the citizens’ social and educational rights necessitates equal-
ization of local government funds. The central government’s transfer of
resources for the purpose of fulfilling municipal responsibilities is not an
actual part of regional policy, but it equalizes differences in regional
welfare and regional development.
Thus, one can distinguish between actual and major regional policy.
The latter covers all government measures having a regional impact. Such
measures include promoting entrepreneurship, improving labor relations,
and developing communication and other infrastructure. Employment
policy has a considerable regional impact because unemployment afflicts
regions very differently (see Table 4.6). Naturally, major regional policy
had its greatest impact when the welfare state was enlarged from the
1960s to late 1980s. That is when the growth of employment in the pub-
lic sector benefited peripheral regions the most.
The allocation of state subsidies since the late 1980s has been named
the system of state grants to local authorities. Earmarked grants were
converted into lump sums to each municipality and joint municipal au-
thority. In 1999 the central government paid FIM 19 billion (3.7 billion
euros) in state subsidies. The regional impact is clearly revealed by dif-
ferences in support paid to different groups of municipalities: 400 euros
per person to urban municipalities, 740 euros per person to semi-urban,
and 1070 euros per person to rural municipalities (SYF 2001, pp. 68, 358).
According to the central government’s own summary, appropriations
worth 2.3 billion euros (FIM 13.7 billion) were used to influence re-
gional development in 2001. Table 14.5 summarizes the impact of major
regional policy in 1998: how regional distribution of taxes collected by
the central government compared with the distribution of central govern-
ment expenditure. The small East Uusimaa region in the south paid the
most, while North Karelia and Kainuu in the north-east received the most.
The overall picture is obvious: two major regions, Uusimaa and Southern
Finland, paid relatively more in taxes, while government expenditures were
directed relatively more to Eastern, Mid-, and Northern Finland.
Materialization of Values and Goals
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 3 28.10.2002, 12:38235
236
Table 14.5
Taxes and expenditure of the central government by region in 1998 (in %)
Major Regions Taxes Expenditure Ratio
and Regions
Uusimaa 33.4 27.6 1.2
  11. Uusimaa 31.6 26.4 1.19
  12. East Uusimaa 1.8 1.2 1.51
Southern Finland 34.2 32.2 1.1
  21. Varsinais-Suomi 8.6 8.1 1.06
  22. Satakunta 4.3 4.1 1.06
  23. Kanta-Häme 3.1 3.6 0.84
  24. Pirkanmaa 8.5 7.9 1.07
  25. Päijät-Häme 3.5 2.9 1.22
  26. Kymenlaakso 3.6 3.3 1.07
  27. South Karelia 2.6 2.5  1.04
Eastern Finland 11.0 14.8 0.7
  31. South Savo  2.7 3.5 0.77
  32. North Savo 4.2 5.2 0.80
  33. North Karelia 2.6 3.9 0.68
  34. Kainuu 1.5 2.2 0.69
Mid-Finland 11.3 13.5 0.8
  41. Central Finland 4.6 5.3 0.87
  42. South Ostrobothnia 3.1 3.7 0.85
  43. Ostrobothnia 3.1 3.2 0.97
  44. Central Ostrobothnia 1.1 1.3 0.85
Northern Finland  9.7 11.7 0.8
  51. North Ostrobothnia 6.2 6.9 0.89
  52. Lapland 3.4 4.8 0.71
Source: Statistics Finland; cf. Talousneuvosto 2000, p. 141.
A comparison with Table 4.6 (on page 79) reveals that the two ‘fiscally
supporting’ major regions were the country’s most urbanized and eco-
nomically best performing part, and the government paid relatively the
most to Eastern Finland, the least urbanized major region with the small-
est economic growth and quite high unemployment. A comparison made
separately of the 19 regions shows only a few exceptions to the general
picture: obviously the central government aimed for equalization when
allocating its expenditure.
Despite all regional policies the power of cumulative growth has had a
decisive influence on Finland’s regional development. Even during the
economic slump of early 1990s the concentration of population contin-
ued, and it became stronger again during the recent years of rapid growth.
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Figure 14.3 compares the growth of population in four groups of sub-
regions.71 The cumulative process reflects the important role information
has in the new economy, as the fastest growth has taken place in university
towns. A similarly differentiated development happened in employment af-
ter the slump years of the early 1990s: employment grew the most in those
sub-regions where universities are located (Talousneuvosto 2000, p. 74).
Figure 14.3
Population growth in different sub-regions 1988–1999 (ind. 1988=100)
Source: Talousneuvosto 2000.
 Recent economic growth also intensified the familiar exodus from
peripheral areas. In regions that depend on agriculture and forestry there
was continuous erosion of the workforce from primary production, and
employment opportunities in the public sector deteriorated simultaneously.
Reduced population led to the closure of primary schools, and basic health
services became more problematic because of the unwillingness of health
personnel to move to declining regions.
Nevertheless, a comparative study of the Nordic countries published
in 2002 called Finland the model country of regional policy. This was
justified by Finland’s active attempts to develop means of reflecting na-
tion-wide the success of large urban areas. Regional support reaches 41
percent of the population in Finland, more than in the other Nordic coun-
tries (38% in Iceland, 25% in Norway, 18% in Denmark, and 16% in
Sweden). Expenditure on actual regional policy is 335 euros per capita
in Finland, while the comparable expenditure is 259 euros in Sweden
and 83 euros in Denmark. The biggest challenge to Finland’s regional
Helsinki sub-region
Other large university sub-regions
Other region center sub-regions
Other sub-regions
Whole country
71 The 19 regions of continental Finland are divided into 79 subregions (in EU terms,
NUTS IV regions).
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development is the modest growth of job opportunities in the peripher-
ies. (Hanell et al. 2002.)
The pessimists predict that some peripheral areas of Finland will actu-
ally become empty during the decades ahead. Such a development might
be a meager problem for the national economy, but it would breed many
social and individual problems and it conflicts with values of many
Finns.[OR]
Education
The right and the duty of everybody to receive basic education is stated
in Section 16 of Finland’s Constitution Act, and basic education is prom-
ised free of charge. In addition, “the public authorities shall, as provided
in more detail by an Act, guarantee for everyone equal opportunity to
receive other educational services in accordance with their ability and
special needs, as well as the opportunity to develop themselves without
being prevented by economic hardship.” The freedom of science, the
arts, and higher education is also guaranteed.
Emphasizing the importance of education is nothing new. In Finland,
the philosopher J.V. Snellman stated already in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury that the power of a small nation lies in education. He did not refer
solely, hardly even primarily, to technological knowledge. But since the
late 20th century, globalization has put all education systems under a
great deal of expectations and pressure. Different nations wish to main-
tain the best possible economic competitiveness (cf. Webster 2000, pp.
312–315), while the pace of scientific development has accelerated as a
result of research and global communication. In order to secure their
competitiveness, nations need to direct more and more funds to maintain
the up-to-the-minute skills and knowledge of their citizens and their na-
tional research capacity. Technological know-how has proved itself es-
pecially important.
Concerned about the continent’s competitiveness, the European Com-
mission presented a White Paper by the name of “Teaching and Learn-
ing: towards a Cognitive Society” in the Madrid summit in 1995 and
declared 1996 to be the year of European Life-long Education and Train-
ing. In the Lisbon summit in 2000, the Union set the goal of making
Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
by 2010. As a countermove, president George W. Bush proposed a bill
on extensive school reforms three days after his inauguration in 2001.
And three weeks from Bush’s proposal the British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, announced that the Labour Party would change its education policy
in a way that, unlike the old comprehensive school system, would em-
phasize the needs of the most talented children. Instead of real capital,
human capital has become the central resource of the new economy (cf.
EVA 2001b, pp. 1–3).
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Together with globalization, changes in ideologies can explain the em-
phasis on competitiveness and the primacy of markets. Neoliberalism is
of particular importance. The resulting emphasis on deregulation and de-
centralization was applied to the school system, too. As described in
Chapter 12, Finnish municipalities decide for themselves what portion
of their available resources are used for schools, and since 1993 they
have drawn up the curricula of the schools. The central government re-
tains only the power to determine general national goals for education
and to regulate the basic structure of the curricula. The decentralized sys-
tem concerns comprehensive and upper secondary schools (grade schools
and high schools), as well as vocational schools and polytechnics.72
The school reforms coincided with the slump of the 1990s and the
necessary budget cuts. In 1990–1994 the operating costs of the school
system were reduced by about FIM 2.3 billion (11 percent). Because of
the growing number of students, the available expenditure per student
was actually cut more, by 17 percent. Larger classes, fewer electives,
and various other means were used to save money. The workload of teach-
ers also became heavier. In higher learning the operating cost of univer-
sities were reduced by some 10 percent. Although the pre-slump level
was regained by 1998, available resources have not covered the costs of
expanded teaching and the many more degrees awarded; severe savings
have limited, in particular, library acquisitions and purchases of new equip-
ment. (Cf. Poropudas and Mäkinen 2001, pp. 13–26.)
Nevertheless, Finland seems to have been successful in international
competition: according to a technology achievement index, Finland was
the most developed country in the world at the turn of the millennium,
with the United States, Sweden, and Japan in the following places. Fin-
land also allocates a substantial proportion (7.5 percent) of its national
income for education: Of the developed industrialized countries, only
the contribution of the Nordic countries (Sweden 8.3, Denmark 8.1, and
Norway 7.7 percent) was greater than that of Finland in 1995–1997 (Hu-
man Development Report 2001, pp. 48, 170).
The indicators describing technological development do not reveal how
successful the countries have been in developing and distributing hu-
manistic knowledge. Especially when outlining the content of university
education, it has been debated in Finland how the resources ought to be
allocated between vocational education serving practical objectives and
education promoting knowledge as such in the spirit of Humboldtian
university ideals. The creation of a net of polytechnics must be seen as a
partial answer to this debate (see Figure 14.4) as it launched vocational
education above secondary level, yet outside universities. In this way
72 The new concept of schooling was certified in five new laws in 1998: the acts on
comprehensive school, upper secondary school, vocational schools, vocational adult
education centers, and free education.
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vocational and humanistic education were partially separated in the post-
secondary level. However, the education of doctors, teachers, and MBAs,
for example, still belongs to the universities’ territory. Disagreements
between the two trends are still continuing, which is illustrated in its
name alone by a 2001 publication Mestareita vai maistereita (“Masters
of Skills or Masters of Arts”) (EVA 2001b).
The school system as a whole reflects the values and objectives a na-
tion sets for itself. The Finnish education system follows the familiar
three levels: (1) primary and lower secondary (compulsory schooling),
(2) upper secondary, and (3) tertiary education. The following three com-
plete the picture: pre-primary education, post-graduate education, and
adult education.
The age of compulsory education in Finland is from seven to sixteen
years. After these nine years it is possible to voluntarily continue in com-
prehensive school for one more year. Pre-school education for six-year-
olds was started in 2001 and is voluntary. The extensive day-care sys-
tem, which all children are entitled to, has for its part replaced pre-school.
The comprehensive school carries out the task of compulsory educa-
tion. Its costs are mainly covered by the municipalities with the state also
participating. Some schools are financed chiefly by various organiza-
tions and private persons, for example, schools in which the tuition is
given in a foreign language (English, German, French, or Russian). In
the common comprehensive school system, tuition and school supplies
are free of charge for the pupils and there is a free hot meal once a day. In
addition, the pupils are entitled to free school transport when the dis-
tance between their home and school is more than five kilometers.73 Spe-
cial tuition is arranged for children with learning difficulties. The school
year has two semesters and lasts 190 school days.
The general educational objectives of comprehensive schooling are
defined by the government. One distinguishing feature of the Finnish
school system is the large number of languages taught. This is partially
due to the fact that the country has two official languages: Finnish speak-
ers study Swedish although the percentage of Swedish speakers in the
country is less than 6 percent, and the Swedish speakers study Finnish.
The very small Sami minority is given the chance to receive comprehen-
sive school education in their own language. English is the most popular
non-domestic language. In most cases, its popularity surpasses that of
the second domestic language in schools in which it is possible to choose
foreign languages before the second domestic language. German and
French follow, Russian is studied by very few due to historical preju-
dices, and several other languages can be offered.
73 In practice, most municipalities apply shorter maximum distances.
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Figure 14.4
The education system of Finland
Almost all comprehensive school pupils - in 1999, 99.7 percent of the
age group – finish their compulsory education successfully. When com-
pared internationally, the Finnish school system succeeds very well in
teaching the basic knowledge and skills (cf. Linnakylä et al. 2000, pp
21–25). One of the most interesting issues debated in Finland concerns
the emphasis of different subjects in the curriculum: mathematics, natu-
ral sciences, the native language and other languages, history and social
studies, music and arts, and physical education. In addition, the dispute
on the necessity of compulsory Swedish is never-ending: would it be
appropriate to direct some of its resources to other subjects, for example,
the major languages of the world? The dispute over the curriculum con-
tent applies rather similarly to the upper secondary level, too.
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After the compulsory comprehensive school the pupils have a chance
to choose upper secondary education: either the upper secondary general
school or vocational schools and colleges. The upper secondary school
normally lasts three years. It ends with a national matriculation examina-
tion, which includes tests in the native language, the other domestic lan-
guage (Swedish or Finnish), the first foreign language (in most cases
English), humanities, mathematics, and natural sciences. In addition, it
is possible to take a test in an optional foreign language. The final evalu-
ation of every test paper is made by the Matriculation Examination Board
appointed by the Ministry of Education, so the grades of secondary school
graduates are nationally comparable. Over 50 percent of pupils choose
the upper secondary school after comprehensive school. In 2000, the
number of students passing the matriculation examination was 35,700;
of them 59 percent girls and 41 percent boys.
The Finnish matriculation examination corresponds roughly to junior
college level in the US education system. After matriculation a student
has the possibility to apply for university or polytechnic. Admission re-
quires, almost invariably, good grades in the certificate of matriculation.
Another option after comprehensive school is the three-year vocational
school. Secondary school graduates can also enter these schools; their
training period is shorter than that of comprehensive school graduates.
Almost one-fifth of the studies of those from comprehensive school are
subjects similar to those in the upper secondary school, such as math-
ematics and languages. Approximately three-fifths of the studies deal
with the chosen occupation and the rest, just under one-fifth of the stud-
ies, is on-the-job-learning. There were approximately 55,000 places for
new students in vocational schools in 2000, and about 45 percent of com-
prehensive school graduates continue their studies in these schools. Thus,
there are places left for secondary school graduates and more mature
students as well.
The polytechnics offer courses similar to the vocational schools, but
on a deeper theoretical level. They are either municipal or private institu-
tions and financed by both the state and local authorities. Alongside edu-
cation they carry on research and development that supports working
life, but not basic research. Neither do they offer postgraduate education
or corresponding degrees. At the beginning of the new millennium there
were 29 polytechnics in Finland. Approximately 70 percent of the en-
trants were secondary school graduates and 30 percent came from voca-
tional schools.
Originally the universities were prejudiced against the polytechnics,
fearing that these would lead to the kind of easy degrees that would weaken
the traditional respect and salaries connected with academic learning.
This seems not to have happened and the polytechnics have apparently
facilitated Finland’s recent technological success. They offer places for
38 percent of the relevant age group, while the universities offer for 29
percent and, accordingly, all of higher education for 67 percent.
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The University of Helsinki was originally the Royal Academy of Turku,
founded in 1640. It was transferred as a university to Helsinki in 1828
and was the only university until 1920. At the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury the country has twenty universities: ten multi-faculty universities,
three universities of technology, three schools of economics and busi-
ness administration, and four art academies. University-level education
is also given in the National Defense College, which operates under the
Ministry of Defense. Higher education has expanded very rapidly: in the
academic year 1950–1951, there were under 15,000 students in the Finn-
ish universities, in 1985–1986 over 92,000, and in 1999–2000 approxi-
mately 152,500. The last-mentioned figure includes some 20,000 postgradu-
ates but not the 33,000 students in the polytechnics. The quantitative aim of
higher education, about 65 percent of the age group, is nearing.
It was intended that completing a graduate degree should last four
years, but in reality the time taken ranges on average from five to seven
years. When the degree system was reformed in the 1990s, one aim be-
ing to make it more suitable for international comparison, ideal norms
were set for the degree completion times. A bachelor’s degree was esti-
mated to require about three years (120 credits) and a master’s degree
about five years (160 credits) of studies. In fact, the average study times
in Finland are still significantly longer due to the requirements, the fact
that many students also hold other jobs, and so on. The number of aca-
demic degrees has, however, increased rapidly; for example, the annual
number of degrees increased from 9300 to 14,400 in the 1990s.
The increase in degrees on postgraduate level was even faster. There
are two different degree levels in the Finnish postgraduate system: licen-
tiate and doctorate. The Finnish doctorate degree is demanding in inter-
national comparison, which is symbolized by the time taken but also by
the fact that doctoral dissertations are almost invariably published as
printed books.74 Postgraduate education has been significantly expanded
since the beginning of the 1990s, and in some fields universities cooper-
ate in maintaining national graduate schools. The state sponsors those
admitted to graduate schools by paying their salaries. Outside these
schools postgraduate degrees are often financed with grants and income
from work.
The state takes care of about 70 percent of the funding of universities.
The universities negotiate their target outcomes with the Ministry of Edu-
cation. The general lines of university budgets are also defined on the
basis of these agreements. The universities choose their students; if the
number of students needs to be restricted, as almost always is the case,
consistent grounds must be applied. Admissions are normally based on
the entrance exam scores and matriculation examination grades. Those
who make their way into a university study without tuition fees. Ap-
74 A published book (a monograph) has been the requirement, but since the 1970s a
collection of reprinted articles can also be accepted.
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proximately 75 percent of all students over the age of sixteen years re-
ceive student financial aid. Despite the emphasis on equality of opportu-
nity, the education level of the students’ parents is visible in the student
selection and study success.
Values and aims of universities are stated in the law: they are to pro-
mote free research and scientific and artistic education, offer the highest
education based on research, and educate the youth to serve their country
and mankind. In recent decades it has been feared that freedom of re-
search would narrow, as the aims of economy and technology push aside
free research and the educational ideals related to it. The most worrying
scenario is that selfish aspirations without regard for common interests
will strengthen in the thinking of young academics.
Due to global economic and technological competition, free research
and scientific and artistic education are under threat of sliding into the
shadow of values that emphasize international competitiveness. The
change has been described by researchers of intellectuals such as Alan
Bloom and Carl Boggs: “Nowhere has the impact of modernization been
more deeply felt than in the higher education, where the traditional intel-
lectuals (classical scholars, philosophers, clerics, literary figures, etc.)
have been increasingly replaced by a technocratic intelligentsia organi-
cally tied to the knowledge industry, the corporate economy and the State.
While conventional (liberal, conservative) wisdom views the university
as an autonomous sphere where truth and knowledge can be dispassion-
ately sought, in modern society higher education has become fully inte-
grated into a matrix of institutionalized power relations.” (Boggs 2000,
pp. 299–300; cf. also Bloom 1987.) It is hard to determine to what extent
the ties of the Finnish university institution to the state protect it from the
extreme effects of globalization. The state must also conform to market
forces if it is to look after its citizens’ material well-being.
The administration of universities was, for centuries, the responsibil-
ity of collegial bodies formed by professors. In the 1960s and 1970s,
demands for a system of “one man, one vote” were turned down (as
noted in Chapter 5) but since the 1970s the university law has made not
only professors but also other members of the university community ac-
tive participants of the administration. The University Board is chaired
by the rector and includes representatives elected by three categories of
the university community: (1) professors and associate professors, (2)
other teachers, researchers, and staff and (3) students. A corresponding
tri-partite pattern is followed in the faculties and departments. The stu-
dents are no longer ideologically similar to those who demanded radical
changes. During the past twenty years or so, there has been a transfer of
power to the rector and other administrators such as faculty deans; uni-
versities have changed towards a more authoritarian model.
In a world where intellectual requirements are continually and rapidly
changing, the capacities of the population must be advanced also by means
of adult education. The 1980s were a time of especially strong growth
for adult education and the request for and necessity of life-long learning
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was more and more widely accepted. At the beginning of the new millen-
nium, Finland has over 1000 institutions that provide adult education.
They are organized by universities applying the idea of an open univer-
sity, by polytechnics, public and private vocational schools, municipal
adult education centers, summer universities, upper secondary schools,
study centers, sports institutes, music institutes, the traditional folk high
schools, and even the Finnish Broadcasting Company. Much of this ac-
tivity is based on the tradition of the folk high schools, which also con-
tinue their educational functions. The Ministry of Education has annu-
ally allocated about 3.5 billion markkas (€ 588 m.) to adult education.
According to a recent study, Finland leads the OECD countries in organiz-
ing life-long learning possibilities (OECD: Education Policy Analysis 2001).
The goals set for the Finnish education system at the end of the 1990s
reflect the search for a compromise between competitiveness and values
emphasizing civilization. The goals were far from being modest. They
included the principle of life-long education, internationalization of edu-
cation, responding to changes in the workplace and creating jobs, intro-
ducing a more varied language syllabus at all levels of education, imple-
menting the information strategy for research and education, improving
mathematics and science skills, emphasizing the cultural mission of uni-
versities and schools, providing basic educational security, rewarding
centers of excellence and upgrading the training of researchers, and
strengthening the status of evaluation as an integral part of steering and
development (Higher Education Policy in Finland 1996, p. 33).
There is no free market within the school system itself. Private schools
are very few and tuition fees are not charged. Most costs of education are
paid from public funds and the goals are centrally determined and na-
tionally evaluated. It is also possible that municipalities have been able
to direct resources to the most important aspects in the local school sys-
tems. However, reduced resources have obviously limited the
decisionmakers’ freedom of action while responsibility has been trans-
ferred to the local level. There may be differences in the quality of edu-
cation offered in different areas, and even neighboring schools may not
always be of the same quality.[OR]
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15  The State and the Economy
So-called market forces will always pull development in their own di-
rection, disregarding the wishes of states and citizens’ organizations.
Pihkala 2001, p. 284
A temporary increase in revenue should not be used as a justification
for a further increase in spending.
Bank of Finland, 2001
Performance of the National Economy
As was described in Chapter 2, Finland became industrialized rather late.
Only around 1960 could it be called an industrial society. But its further
transition to a post-industrial economy proceeded swiftly. The economy
entered the post-industrial stage and the society late modernism during
the last two decades of the 20th century.
There were times after the Second World War when the growth of
Finland’s economy was called a “Cinderella story,” and the country itself
the “Japan of Europe.” Indeed, according to the World Bank, only seven
countries in the world had a gross national product per capita that was
higher than Finland’s in 1988; in 1990 Finland’s GDP per capita was the
third highest in Europe, below only Luxembourg and Switzerland. How-
ever, this ranking may have been exaggerated, because in those years the
Finnish markka was overvalued. And soon an unforeseen slump disrupted
the positive trends of the economy. In January-October 1991, industrial
output sank 8.9 percent below that of 1990. Growth of the country’s total
output halted in 1990, and a steep decline (–7.1 percent) followed in
1991. Negative growth continued for two more years. Despite the rapid
upturn that then followed, it took three more years until the country’s
economic performance was back at the level of 1990.
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Figure 15.1
Gross domestic product in Finland, EU, USA, and Japan:
Annual changes fom 1988 to 2001 (in %)
Source: ETLA.
Figure 15.1 outlines the story and also suggests some comparisons.
Among the member countries of the EC/EU, GDP grew faster than in
Finland only in Luxembourg and Ireland. In 1991 the economic growth
of the EU members, taken as a whole, also began to slow down and in
1993 it became slightly negative (–0.4 percent); GDP had already been
falling in Sweden and Great Britain in 1991 and 1992. However, the fate
of these two countries was nothing like Finland’s: –10.7 percent in the
same two years.
The oil crisis of 1973, which caused an international recession, had
not hurt the Finnish economy very much: Finland’s economic growth
was halted for one year but it did not become negative. On the other
hand, between 1991 and 1993 total output fell 12 percent and unemploy-
ment rose from 3 to almost 20 percent. The obvious question is: What
went wrong in Finland? Figure 15.1 offers one partial answer: the economy
did not fare well in the outside world either, and the Finnish economy is
very dependent on foreign trade. Another reason was likewise beyond
Finland’s control. More than ten percent of exports were sold to the So-
viet Union, and that market was lost at a time that was the worst possible
one for Finland’s economy.
But such external reasons offer only partial explanations for the mag-
nitude of the recession of 1991–1993. The Finnish economic policies
may also have contributed to it. The public sector had expanded greatly
during the 1970s and 1980s. The Bank of Finland made two liberalizing
decisions in 1986–1987 that did not fit well with the economic situation:
both interest rates and the movement of foreign capital were deregulated.
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houses and securities, and motivated excessive rises in salaries. The Bank
of Finland reacted to the overheated economy by pushing up interest
rates, which handicapped businesses by adding to their costs and lower-
ing their earnings. Monetary policies became even tighter, more and more
bankruptcies took place, and record unemployment followed. A devalu-
ation of the Finnish currency helped exporters but burdened others who
had borrowed money from abroad. (Ahtiala 1997.)
On the other hand, something must have gone right after the slump,
because Finland’s economy was revitalized rapidly. In 1997, for example,
aggregate output increased by 5 percent. To quote the governor of the
Bank of Finland: “The Finnish economy performed well in 1997, as
growth continued at a robust pace and unemployment declined mark-
edly... The central government budget deficit was reduced substantially
but was still large in light of present cyclical conditions” (Hämäläinen
1998, p. 3). The people became more optimistic, too, and so did their
predictions for the future performance of the economy.75 Starting from
1994, GDP grew each year faster in Finland than in the EU as a whole,
although not as fast as in Ireland.
In 1997 Finland’s gross domestic product equaled USD 23,309 per
capita. It was higher than EU average, but did not rank higher than eighth
among the 15 EU members. Rapid growth continued during the years
that followed. “Finland’s faster economic growth than in the euro area on
average has been driven by strong export demand since the middle of
1999, when the export markets started to recover from the effects of the
Asian and Russian economic crises,” explained the Bank of Finland (Bank
of Finland Bulletin 1/2001, p. 8). In 2000 the growth of the economy
reached the “robust” level of 5.7 percent while growth in the whole EU
was 2.5 percent, but soon it became slower again.
The economies of small countries depend greatly on foreign trade,
and that is very true for Finland too. In 1999, when the country’s GDP
was FIM 724 billion (122 billion euros), the export of goods amounted to
FIM 233 billion (€ 39 bn.). The balance of trade became positive back in
1992, and it has remained favorable since then; in 1999 imports totaled
FIM 212 billion, which was FIM 57 billion less than the exports. And
“the year 2000 crowned the outstanding export success that started in the
1990s,” declared the ministry of finance (Taloudellinen katsaus 2001, p. 22):
exports reached FIM 294 billion (€ 49 bn.), imports FIM 219 billion (€ 37
bn.), and the trade surplus was FIM 75 billion (€ 13 billion).
More than one-half of Finland’s trade is with other EU countries (58
percent of both exports and imports in 2000), the biggest single partners
being Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the relative importance of Russia in exports declined,
75 The “consumer barometer” indicated unusually big changes in people’s perceptions
and expectations: Recent improvement in the economy of the country was perceived
by only 9 percent in 1993 but 40 percent in 1994; a better coming year was predicted
by 31 percent in 1993 but 55 percent in 1994 (Trends 2001, p. 57).
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Table 15.1
Finland’s top ten export partners in 1990, 1995, and 2000
(countries and percent of total exports)
1990 1995 2000
   Sweden 14 Germany 13 Germany 13
   USSR 13 UK 10 Sweden 9
   W.Germany 12 Sweden 10 UK 9
   UK 11 USA 7 USA 7
   France 6 Russia 5 France 5
   USA 6 France 5 Italy 4
   Netherlands 4 Netherlands 4 Russia 4
   Denmark 4 Denmark 3 Netherlands 4
   Italy 3 Norway 3 Estonia 3
   Norway 3 Belgium 3 China 3
   All others 34 All others 34 All others 38
   FIM million:101,327 174,660 294,221
Data source: SYF 1991, p. 178; SYF 1996, p.226; SYF 2001, p.239.
but it remains one of Finland’s three big import markets (next to Ger-
many and Sweden). Of non-European countries, the USA has been an in-
creasingly important export and import partner for Finland (see Table 15.1).
In 2000 exports were 26 percent higher than in 1999 and amounted to
almost 43 percent of GDP. However, the growth of exports was rather
one-sided: during the fourth quarter of that year output of the electronics
sector was almost 50 percent higher than it had been the previous year,
while other Finnish exporters grew by 5 percent. Such a comparison il-
lustrates the general trend of the 1990s. Between 1995 and 1999, when
Finland’s total industrial production increased by 30 percent, the manu-
facture of electrical equipment increased by 220 percent and communi-
cation equipment by 363 percent, but paper products by only 17 percent.
Naturally wood and paper production has remained important and been
strengthened through foreign investments, but within Finland it has be-
come secondary to the metals and engineering sector. This, in turn, has
been caused by the strength of the electronics sector. Figure 15.2 illus-
trates the rapid expansion of engineering.
  More specifically, the strength of the electronics sector was due to
the growth of a single company called Nokia. Having been a conglomer-
ate of a number of unrelated activities, in 1992 it sold off most of its
businesses and concentrated on mobile communications. Soon it out-
ranked its competitors and became the world leader in mobile telephones.
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Figure  15.2
Trends in Finland’s industrial output from 1970 to 2000
(volume indexes, 1995=100)
76 Examples of concentrated production, in addition to Nokia, include Ahlström (wood
processing and engineering in the 1980s, now fiber solutions) and Huhtamäki (food
products, medinine, and plastic in the 1980s, now packaging).
The State and the Economy
Source: SYF 2001, p. 205.
Its share of all Finnish exports was 6 percent in 1995, rising to 26 percent
in 2000. It accounted for 70 percent of Finland’s information technology
exports. The entire Finnish IT cluster contained more than 3000 compa-
nies, 300 of which were Nokia’s suppliers. (Pihkala 2001, p. 291; Castells
and Himanen 2001, pp. 11–18.)
Despite its good performance since the recession, Finland’s national
economy is vulnerable for two reasons. First, domestic markets are not
big enough, so the economies of the countries that buy Finnish products
have a strong influence on Finland. For the same reason Finnish compa-
nies need to expand abroad. Secondly, international competitiveness in
an increasingly globalizing economy requires specialization which may
be risky.
The industrial companies listed in Table 15.2 illustrate the internation-
alization and specialization of Finnish industry.76About 60 percent of the
production of key Finnish industrial companies is performed outside the
country. In 1980 Finnish companies employed only some 20,000 per-
sons abroad, but by 2000 the number had grown to about 200,000. This
was countered by the activity of some 1500 foreign companies in Fin-
land, employing about ten percent of the private sector’s labor force. Until
1993, but not afterwards, foreign subjects needed the government’s per-
mission to own companies and real estate in Finland. (Cf. Pihkala 2001,
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Table 15.2
Largest Finnish industrial enterprises in 2001: sector, personnel (total and % abroad),
and turnover (in € million)
Name Sector Personnel Turnover
Total Abroad € mill.
Nokia Mobile phones and networks 53,800 59 31,190
Stora Enso Forest products 42,900 66 13,510
UPM-Kymmene Forest products 36,000 44 9,920
Metso Process industry machinery,
systems, and services 30,200 63 4,340
Kone Elevators and related services 22,900 95 2,820
Metsä-Serla Pulp and paper 21,500 72 6,920
Outokumpu Metals and related technology 19,400 66 5,320
Huhtamäki Packaging 16,400 96 2,380
Fortum Energy 14,800 47 10,410
Rautaruukki Steel 13,000 42 2,910
Partek Engineering 12,400 63 2,740
Wärtsilä Metal industry 11,000 71 2,360
Kemira Chemicals 10,200 52 2,500
Ahlström Fiber solutions 7,700 83 2,050
Source: The companies’ annual reports.
Finland’s growth in 1999–2000 was possible because of the strength
of the American economy and also the improving performance of the big
EMU countries, whereas in the summer of 2001 when the government
was finalizing its budget proposal for 2002, it was already apparent that
slower economic growth in the United States, Germany, and others, had
made the prospects for the coming year less promising than the Finns
had believed only a few months earlier. Consequently, growth predic-
tions were lowered. That helped the government rebuff many demands
for higher state spending.77
Even during the years of rapid growth, high unemployment remained
a persistent legacy of the recession. Finland’s rate has been lower than
Spain’s, but consistently higher than that of the whole EU. In 1993 the
ILO definition of unemployment, used by EUROSTAT, showed 11 per-
cent for the EU, and 19 percent for Finland. Since that year Finland has
been gradually approaching but not quite reaching the EU average. In
1999 the rates of unemployment were 9 percent in the EU and 10 percent in
Finland; in 2000 Finland’s rate was 9.6 percent. (Eurobarometer 54, p. 8.)
When eleven countries started Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union
in 1999, the value of the Finnish markka was irrecovably bound to the
euro. Its rate was fixed at 0.1682 euros or, in other words, one euro be-
77 In the spring of 2001 the government predicted a 4 percent growth for 2001, but in
September, when the budget proposal was presented, its prediction was lowered to
1.5 percent. The final fact was 0.7 percent.
The State and the Economy
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 4 28.10.2002, 14:18251
252
came worth 5.946 markkas. Subsequently, when the euro became weaker
against the dollar, the Finnish currency was also automatically devalu-
ated. One euro cost 1.18 US dollars in January 1999, but the all-time low
was $0.84 in October 2000. During a good part of 2001 the exchange
rate was $0.88, and in July 2002 the weakening of the dollar pushed the
euro to $1.00. The final set in EMU was taken in 2002 when the national
currencies of twelve EU countries were lost and gone forever.
The Public Purse
Obviously, the slump of 1991–93 strained the finances of the Finnish
state. Tax revenue declined, bailing out banks was very expensive, and
high unemployment was a burden on the budget. Despite these prob-
lems, both the government and the Bank of Finland tried hard to ensure
Finland would qualify for the common European currency, due to be
launched in 1999. A comparison of the 15 EU countries in 1997 showed
that, at that time, Finland, France, and Luxembourg were the only ones
that met all the convergence criteria set for participation in economic and
monetary union. The criteria were the following:
(1) Inflation must not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points the
average calculated for the three lowest inflation rates in the EU.
Finland’s 1.2% was the 2nd lowest.
(2) The public sector’s budget deficit must not be more than 3% rela-
tive to GDP. In Finland it was 1.6% (ranked 4th lowest).
(3) The gross public debt must not exceed 60% relative to GDP. In Fin-
land it was 58.5% (ranked 4th lowest).
(4) Long-term interest rates must not exceed by more than 2 percent-
age points the average level prevailing in the three countries with
the lowest inflation (6.2%). Finland’s rate was 6% (6th lowest).
The fifth EMU criterion was to keep the currency within the “normal”
fluctuation band of the Exchange Rate Mechanism during two years.
(The Finnish Economy 4/1997, pp. 7–8).
The economy’s later performance would have met the EMU criteria
even better. This was especially true in 1999, when there was a surplus in
central government and substantial debt payments reduced the central
government’s debt to 48 percent of the GDP. That was the second lowest
in the EU after Luxembourg. Long-term interest rates have fallen quite
widely across the EU. Inflation has been higher in Finland than the EU
average, once reaching 4 percent for a short while in 2000, but the differ-
ence has not been as high as the 1.5 percentage points that was the origi-
nal EMU limit.
Attempts to meet the EMU criteria after the recession were one reason
why Finland’s fiscal policy became tight and taxes remained high. Al-
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though the economy began to perform well again, unemployment re-
mained a sore point, but unemployment was not one of the EMU conver-
gence criteria. The government appointed in April 1995 promised to cut
unemployment by one-half in four years, but the target was too optimis-
tic. Unemployment came down to 14.5 percent in 1997 and reached the
10 percent level in 1999. Because of the accepted principles of the wel-
fare state, the unemployed persons are supported financially, which, in
turn, has necessitated cuts in other expenditures. Table 15.3 summarizes
how the state allocated its expenditures in 1990, 1995, and, according to
the budget, in 1998 (because of a different budget structure, a similar
comparison cannot be made with more recent years).
Table 15.3
State expenditure by function in 1990, 1995 and 1998 (FIM billion), and change in
percent from 1995 to 1998
State functions 1990 1995 1998 % Change
1995–1998
General Administration, etc. 9.9 10.6 11.2 6
European Union – 4.8 5.9 23
Public Order and Safety  4.8 6.1 6.7 9
Defense 6.4 8.3 10.0 21
Education, Research, and Culture 23.1 27.1 25.9 –4
Social Security and Health Care 34.7 49.1 43.8 –11
Housing and Environment 6.4 5.1 3.9 –23
Labor Force, Employment 3.7 12.2 12.9 5
 Agriculture and Forestry 9.9 15.1 12.0 –21
Transport and Communications 10.9 8.1 7.0 –13
Manufacturing and Other Industries 4.3 8.3 5.7 –31
State Debt 9.4 24.6 25.6  4
Pensions Paid by the State 5.5 12.1 13.6 12
General Contrib. to Municipalities 1.4 6.8 2.7  –60
Total 129.5 198.3 186.9  –6
Source: Adapted from SYF 1992, pp. 265-266; and SYF 1998, pp. 298-299 (1990
and 1995 according to balance sheet, 1998 according to budget proposal).
Within the three-year period 1995-1998, the state’s total expenditures
were reduced by FIM 11.5 billion (1.9 bn. euros), although expenditure
on public debt servicing and labor market measures was more than be-
fore. The most dramatic cuts concerned the central government’s general
contributions to the municipalities. Other substantial savings hurt social
security and health care, agriculture, and education. There was much criti-
cism and frustration among the people but, on the other hand, there was
also a general consensus, especially among the elite, about the need to
balance the budget and to keep the inflation low. For that reason, trade
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union leaders agreed in December 1997 to relatively modest, although
real, rises during 1998 and 1999, when a comprehensive wage settlement
was negotiated. Equally realistic rises were again accepted in the com-
prehensive agreement signed in December 2000 for the two-year period
ending in February 2003. The government helped with its promise to
lower taxes.
The last budget ever to be decided in Finnish markkas was that of
2001; the budget for 2002 was prepared in the new euro currency. The
government’s proposed expenditures for 2001 amounted to FIM 196.6
billion (€ 33.1 bn.) and an unusual extraordinary proposal added FIM
0.5 billion; parliament boosted expenditures by only another 0.5 billion
markkas. In addition, the 2001 budget showed a surplus of FIM 14.6
billion (€ 2.5 bn.), to be used for repaying state debt. The highest annual
expenditures so far had been FIM 211 billion in 1995 (then 37 percent of
the GNP). In 1999, when state spending was 191 billion (€ 32 bn., 28
percent), the government was also able to pay down debt more than an-
ticipated, namely, by 22 billion markkas. In the following year central
government income and expenditure ultimately showed a record surplus
of FIM 27 billion (€ 4.5 bn.).
Table 15.4
Taxes in Finland in 1991, 1995, and 2000
Type of tax In FIM billion In %
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
State taxes and levies:
Income and property tax 43 40 85 21.7 15.8 23.2
Taxes on turnover 47 44 66 24.2 17.4 18.1
Excise duties 17 22 26 8.8 8.6 7.2
Taxes on imports 2 - - 1.1 -  -
Other taxes and levies 11 10 17 5.9 3.3  4.6
 Total state taxes 121 117 194  61.1 46.2 53.1
Municipal taxes 51 56 77  25.4 21.9 21.1
Social security contrib.
to the Social Insurance
Institution 24 22 20 11.7 8.6 5.6
Employment pension
insurance contributions - 45 64  - 17.8 17.4
Other social security
contributions  - 13 9 - 5.1 2.6
Taxes, levies to the EU - 1 1  - 0.4 0.2
Total all taxes 196 253 365 100 100 100
As % of GNP 37.3 44.1 46.6
Source: SYF 1992, p. 294; SYF 1997, p. 294;  SYF 2001, p. 324.
The State and the Economy
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 4 28.10.2002, 14:18254
255
Naturally the central government covers most of its expenditure through
tax revenue. In 2000 it collected FIM 194 billion (€ 32.6 bn.) in taxes.
This was more than one-half of the country’s entire tax burden, which
amounted to FIM 365 billion (€ 61.4 bn.), or 46.6 percent of the GDP
(see Table 15.4). More than one-fifth of the total consisted of municipal
taxes, and the rest included various compulsory social payments that are
comparable to taxes.
 The income tax payable to the central government is graduated. The
rate for earnings beyond 315,000 markkas (€ 53,000) was 37.5 percent
in 2000. Taxes were reduced both in 2001 and 2002.78 Interest earnings
and capital gains are taxed a flat rate, 29 percent. The government low-
ered income taxes a little in the ‘good years’ in order to respond to politi-
cal pressures and to make wage negotiations easier. Thus, in 2000 the
government offered a total income tax reduction of FIM 9 billion, but
also an additional FIM 4 billion conditional on the outcome of the cen-
tral wage agreement. Turnover tax is the other major source of state rev-
enue. The general rate of Finland’s value added tax is 22 percent, which
is the EU’s second highest after Denmark. For food purchases the Finns
pay 17 percent VAT, and for medicine, hotels, bus and taxi rides, and
books, 12 percent.
Thus, Finland’s tax burden appears high in cross-national compari-
sons. At its peak total taxation reached 50 percent of the GDP; in 2000 it
was almost 47 percent, and the estimate for 2002 was 43 percent.
The State as Economic Policy-Maker
Voters in democracies tend to hold their government responsible for the
performance of the country’s economy, much beyond the government’s
actual possibility to influence it. Naturally, the voters are not entirely
wrong. The state sets the stage for economic activity through its fiscal
and economic policies, the infrastructure, and, especially, through the
large body of legislation which regulates and sometimes aids economic
activity. The international environment, in turn, increasingly restrains the
state’s possibilities to act freely.
In many countries the central bank occupies a rather independent po-
sition. Also the Bank of Finland makes policy decisions without being
formally linked to the government. The bank was founded in 1811 and
came under parliamentary scrutiny in 1867. According to Finland’s Con-
78 In 2001 the lowest central government tax on income was 50 markkas for earnings
of 66,000 markkas (€ 11,000) plus a marginal rate of 14 percent on income above it;
for earnings of 325,000 markkas (€ 55,000) the tax payable was FIM 66,850
(€ 11,243) plus a marginal rate of 37 percent. In 2002 all tax rates were lowered by
one percentage point. These rates understate the full marginal rate of tax on income,
because of the extra flat rate of local government income tax – about 17% (see
Chapter 12).
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stitution of 1999 (Section 91), the bank “operates under the guarantee
and supervision of Parliament,” and “For the purpose of supervising the
operations of the Bank of Finland, Parliament elects its supervisors.” The
central bank is thus separated from the government in order to safeguard
its independence and, indeed, there have been situations in which the
government and the Bank of Finland have disagreed, although most of
the time they tend to liaise and attempt to coordinate their policies. The
nine supervisors (the parliamentary supervisory council), who are elected
by parliament for four years, both supervise the bank and make some mon-
etary decisions, whereas the governor and the other members of the board of
the Bank of Finland are appointed by the president of the republic.
When the European Central Bank was launched in Frankfurt, Ger-
many, in January 1999, the Bank of Finland and its counterparts in the
other EMU countries lost a great deal of their traditional independence,
becoming dependent on the ECB’s policy decisions. In some situations
this may involve big risks for a small and specialized economy such as
Finland.
In all economic activity, a vast amount of the legislation of the country
regulates working conditions and competition practices, and numerous
sharp-eyed public controllers from different offices monitor companies.
For example, Finland’s first law on labor protection was passed in 1889,
the work day was reduced to eight hours in 1917, and the 40-hour week
became the law in the early 1970s. Children have been increasingly pro-
tected: persons under 16 years of age cannot be offered employment, and
full working days cannot start before 18. Competition between businesses
must be genuine. The list of requirements and controls imposed on all
kinds of economic activity has grown vastly, and the European Union
adds more.
As was described in Chapter 14, responsibility for social welfare of
the citizens requires public spending on health, pensions, family allow-
ances, other social transfer payments, services, and unemployment ben-
efits. Before the recession, such expenditures in Finland amounted to 26
percent of the GDP. Within two years, rapidly growing needs pushed
those expenditures up to 36 percent in 1992, and they have remained
around 32 percent of the GDP. The distribution of spending, not counting
unemployment benefit, has been rather similar in all Nordic countries:
25% going on health, 54% for pensions and disablity, 15% for family allow-
ances, and 6 % for the rest (Piekkola 1996). Table 14.3 (on page 228) shows
that 35 percent of public social welfare expenditures is paid by the employ-
ers, and a smaller portion by the insured themselves.
     The normal pensionable age in Finland, for both men and women,
is 65 years, although in many occupations the age is lower. Because of
various arrangements, most people retire so much earlier that the aver-
age age of retirement has been 58 years. Extensive education also re-
duces the number of years spent actively working. Furthermore, Finnish
legislation requires plenty of leisure in each year worked. In 1995, the
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average length of vacations in manufacturing was 37.5 workdays in Fin-
land, but only 25 days in Sweden and 12 days in the United States. There
was a corresponding difference in regular annual working time. It was
1716 hours in Finland, 1808 hours in Sweden, and 1896 hours in the
United States.
     Naturally, the government does not only regulate and tax economic
activity. In some sense, most legislation and budget decisions affect the
economy, and many political decisions are motivated by economic inter-
ests. Not only the infrastructures, but also regional policies and a large
variety of more direct political decisions aim at improving the environ-
ment for enterpreneurship. Also, economy is guided through international
agreements, both multilateral and bilateral. Some of them will be dis-
cussed elsewhere in this book (see page 277).
The State as Entrepreneur
All states have a very direct presence in the economy, because they func-
tion as entrepreneurs and investors. Some of their economic activities are
thought of as common elements of the country’s infrastructure: these
have included postal services and airport operations, and in Europe they
have ordinarily extended to the railroads, broadcasting and telecommu-
nications, and energy supplies. Local governments, in turn, take care of
businesses of their own, for instance local transit systems.
     Many advances in the Finnish economy required such heavy in-
vestments or such a complex organization, that,in a country short of capi-
tal, only the government had the necessary resources. For example, the
state has run Finland’s postal services since 1638, telecommunications
since 1855, the railroads since 1862, a copper mine since 1910, an airline
since 1923, national wheat storage since 1928, an electric power com-
pany since 1932, broadcasting since 1934, oil refinery and distributor
since 1948, a computing center since 1964, and a nuclear power plant
since 1977.
There were several possible ways to organize such enterprises. The
government agencies running the state railways and postal and telecom-
munications services were part of the ordinary state administration. An-
other arrangement was to establish state-owned companies to function
like any private company. Some, like the state liquor company, had a
monopoly, but many functioned in the competitive market like any other
businesses, the only difference being that they had no or very few private
owners. In most European market economies, the state became a large
owner of businesses; in Finland its share of industry rose to about one-fifth,
which was below the level of state ownership in France and Germany.
Frequently public ownership has been viewed purely from the eco-
nomic point of view. However, state-owned industries have also served
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regional policy goals and, in particular, nationalized industries have been
an ideological issue. In Britain, for example, Labour nationalized and
Conservative governments then denationalized coal mines after World
War II. In Finland, state ownership was one of the ideological goals of
the Social Democratic Party and it remained an element of the leftist
party programs until the 1970s. In the 1980s the mood began to change
world wide. Privatization became the neo-liberalist policy goal. Even the
leftist parties in Finland have dropped the idea of socialization, assuming
instead a pragmatic approach to ownership: state-owned companies or
parts of them have been offered for sale to private shareholders, and the
state has benefited from such new revenue. But the mass public has not
quite forgotten the ideological approach: the supporters of the Left Alli-
ance and the Conservative Party still have quite different opinions on
privatization (see Table 15.5).
Table 15.5
“Our country ought to privatize a great deal of public services, in order to provide
the services more efficiently:”  Responses related to party preference in December
1994 (in %)
LEFT SDP FRP CENT CHR CONS SPP GR Total
Agree 16 33 30 55 58 73 54 39 47
Disagree 74 50 42 21 21 15 24 37 32
Can’t say 10 17 28 24 21 12 22 24 19
Source: Adapted from EVA 1995, p. 20
In 1997, the Finnish government controlled 36 large companies through
majority ownership. They employed 149,000 persons, had a total turn-
over of FIM 169 billion, and earned a profit of 7 billion. In some of them
the state was interested purely as an investor (e.g., a paper mill and a
steel plant), others involved both an economic and a public policy inter-
est (e.g., an oil company, railways, airline, power plant, and motor ve-
hicle inspection), and, in addition, there were four state-owned compa-
nies that had been established to serve a significant public interest (li-
quor, gambling, broadcasting, and army supplies).
Many state-owned companies have been created in the 1990s. For ex-
ample, the railroads were governed by the central administration until
1989, and in the manner of a corporation since 1990, but since 1995 have
been operated by a state-owned company. The general public hardly no-
tices the difference. The Post and Telegraph Office was reorganized in
1994 and to a large extent privatized after that (see following section). In
addition, the state was a minority owner in nine companies, and indi-
rectly in many others. In 1996 the state earned FIM 0.4 billion in divi-
dends from minority shareholdings, and dividends from state-controlled
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companies brought in 1.1 billion. More substantial income, however, came
from the sale of shares, the limits for which have been set by parliament
for each company.
In 2002 the government’s dividends rose to 911 million euros, about
3.5 times higher than in 1996, and 475 million euros were budgeted for
2002. In the meantime, the state had sold more of its shares had been
sold to private owners. There was some political debate concerning fur-
ther privatization, and in spring 2002 parliament turned against the Min-
istry of Trade and Commerce refusing the government’s request to sell
Kemira to its Swedish competitor. Three ministers also debated on the
virtues of having all state ownership concentrated under one ministry
and, if so, under which one.
No fewer than eight ministries were in charge of the state’s interests in
2002. The government controlled 32 companies, being the sole owner of
21 and a majority owner of 11. In addition, it had a minority share in 17
companies.  Seven industrial enterprises listed in Table 15.2 belonged to
the sphere of the ministry of Trade and Commerce - the government had
a 61 percent majority in Fortum (a combination of the electric power
company and the oil company since 1998), and 56 percent in Kemira;
also, 40 percent remained of ownership of the metal companies
Outokumpu and Rautaruukki, and a smaller share was held in Kone and
the two large paper companies. Seven smaller companies were also con-
trolled by this ministry. But eight companies were under the Ministry of
Communications, including the Finnish Broadcasting Company (100%),
Finnair (58%), motor vehicle inspection (100%), the two large descen-
dants of the Post and Telegram Office (100% and 53%), and the state
railways (100%). In addition, 13 state-owned companies were under the
Ministry of Finance, including the former Government Printing Center,
since 1993 Edita Ltd. Five other ministries had a company or two under
their control. (Cf. Helsingin Sanomat 11.8.2002.)
Another pragmatic process has been that of introducing the principles
of corporate governance to the traditional areas of state administration,
thus adding more flexibility, better public relations, and also new charges
for services. The necessary legislation became effective in 1988, and
corporate governance started in 1989. However, many reformed state
agencies, such as the Railway Board, were further transferred into state-
owned companies. The most important administrative agencies that re-
main governed as corporations are the former Forestry Board, the Avia-
tion Board, and the National Road Administration. A real estate office
was established to charge rents to the state from the state.
State-owned companies participate in the employers’ interest organi-
zations, like any other companies. Civil servants who work in traditional
public administration are unionized as well: in addition to government-
owned enterprises, the state itself and the municipal governments even
more so, are the employer side in labor contracts, facing the employee
side consisting of workers who, once upon the time, were supposed to be
the government’s devoted and obedient servants. In fact, many labor con-
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flicts occur between public employees and their governmental employer.
At the beginning of 1998, firemen and the drivers of the Helsinki city
transit system were on strike and judges also threatened industrial ac-
tion; in 2001 doctors working in the public health care system organized
a partial strike that lasted five months; and in all such cases the strikes
were directed against democratically controlled state or local govern-
ment and not against any “capitalist exploiter and class enemy.”
A Case Story: Telecommunications
In Finland, as in many European countries, telecommunications well il-
lustrates the development of government enterprises from a public ser-
vice or a monopoly, run by state bureaucracy, to a business corporation
that operates in an open and competitive market.
In the 19th century, all European countries declared telegraph opera-
tions the exclusive right of the state and many applied the same principle
to the newer innovation, the telephone. In Finland the senate’s proclama-
tion in 1886 concerning “Those terms by which telephone lines can be
placed in the earth and used,” separated the two activities: telegraph traf-
fic remained with the Finnish branch of the Russian Empire’s Telegraph
Office, but telephones were operated by private companies subject to
Finnish administrative control.
In 1927 Finland’s Telegraph Office was attached to the Post Office.
The Post and Telegraph Office started its telephone networking in thinly
populated Lapland, while numerous private companies and cooperatives
were building telephone networks in densely populated areas. Gradually
it acquired both long-distance telephone operations and the equipment
of hundreds of small local telephone companies; in 1980 there were 61
telephone companies left in the country. Demands to nationalize the en-
tire telephone network never received sufficient support.
The Post and Telegraph Office was at odds with the private compa-
nies, because it was not only an operator, but also the supervisory author-
ity since 1949. There were disputes in connection with purchases and
with the regulation of data transmission. The state office viewed data trans-
mission as an advanced version of the telegraph and demanded that data
transmission be subject to telegraph legislation, while private telephone com-
panies considered data transmission to be a part of telephony. A compro-
mise solution in 1970 granted both camps the right to transmit data.
The rapidly developing telecommunications field remained subject to
the Telephone Statute of 1886, until the Telecommunications Act of 1987
finally consigned the 100-year old statute to history. Supervisory func-
tions were transferred from Posts and Telecommunications (this name
adopted in 1981) to the new telecommunications administration center
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in the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
The 1980s were characterized by efforts to foster competition. One
example of such “Thatcherism” was the deregulation of Britain’s tele-
communications industry. Competition also started in Finnish network
services. Data networks and GSM were opened to competition in 1990,
and competitive licenses were granted to both long-distance and local
telecommunications in 1992. The Telecommunications Market Act of
1997 replaced the act of 1987. It abolished license requirements, except
for the construction of mobile communications networks; required tele-
communications companies to separate their network and service opera-
tions; and also subjected the companies to more stringent obligations.
In 1990 the Post and Telegraph Office had begun to function as a state
enterprise, free from the commitment to annual state budgets. In 1994 it
was structured as a limited company called PT Finland Ltd. Within this
corporation, postal services and telecommunications became two sepa-
rate companies, one of which was named Telecom Finland. (Cf. Turpeinen
1997; and www.telegalleria.fi.) The next step was taken in 1997, when
parliament approved the partial privatization of Telecom Finland, which
was artificially renamed “Sonera.”
The parent company Sonera Group was listed on the Helsinki Stock
Exchange in November 1998, when the government sold 22 percent of
the company’s shares to domestic and international investors. Trading in
the Nasdaq National Market started in October 1999. In June 2000, the
government obtained parliament’s permission to sell all of it, “when nec-
essary.” At that time the state owned a 53 percent majority of the com-
pany, having sold 47 percent. The best-timed sale had taken place in March
2000, when the state sold a 3 percent slice for the price of FIM 12 billion
(€ 2 bn.). In theory a full privatization at that price would have produced
enough revenue to pay all central government expenditure for one year.
But within three months the shares had lost 50 percent of their market
value, and by 2001, 97 percent had vanished.
Optimistic expectations concerning telecommunications and informa-
tion technology lead to frustrations around the world. Among others, the
British Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, France Telecom, and Spain’s
Telefónica faced severe difficulties. Sonera had also overextended itself
when paying FIM 20 billion to Germany for the right to be one of the six
“third generation” operators within that country (in March 1999 the Finn-
ish government had distributed four corresponding UMTS79-licenses quite
free of charge; in 2000 Great Britain, Germany and Italy auctioned off
their licenses for the total of € 93 billion).
Sonera considered internationalization the only road to success. “A
leading provider of fixed-line, mobile, data and media telecommunica-
tions services,” it acted in 14 countries and had equity stakes in compa-
79 UMTS = Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, enabling the “third gen-
eration” mobile communication.
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nies that have UMTS licenses in Spain and Italy, in addition to Germany.
Although burdened by heavy debt and public criticism, Sonera was effi-
cient in the competitive market80 but there were problems with the
company’s management. Between 1997 and 2001, Sonera had four dif-
ferent CEOs. Criticism of the first of them even led to the resignation of
the government’s minister of communications.
The surprise finale in March 2002 was the announcement, soon ap-
proved by the Eduskunta and the EU, that Sonera had decided to merge
with its Swedish competitor Telia, which had made a rather unsuccessful
attempt to gain a slice of the Finnish market. Of the new company, the
Finnish government owns 14 percent and the Swedish government 36
percent. The new CEO is a Swede. In July 2002 Sonera wrote off its
German and Italian UMTS investments and acknowledged that it had
paid 4.3 billion euros for nothing, thus acknowledging the largest invest-
ment failure in Finland’s economic history.
Various general conclusions might be drawn from the telecommuni-
cations experience:
– In European countries in general, and in small countries in particular,
only the state has been in strong enough position to invest in big
economic activities that have been essential for the development of
the national economy.
– The concept of public interest has changed. Serving  the people and
building the necessary infrastructure was the unquestioned responsi-
bility of the state, until “market forces” took over and productivity
and competitiveness became overarching values.
– Traditional bureaucratic procedures do not allow for the kind of flex-
ibility and quick action that is required in the business world, and the
politicians do not always understand all aspects of business culture,
including the greed of some business executives.
– Public opinion does not easily grasp the difference between the state’s
own functions and the functions of state-owned corporations. At least
as long as the state remains a majority owner, the government or its
individual ministers may be held politically responsible for decisions
taken by managers, where the shareholders in fact have no direct say.
– If a state-owned company makes wrong business decisions, it is vir-
tually impossible to determine who is responsible for violating the
taxpayers’ interests. Business secrets can cover state-owned compa-
nies while public administration is transparent.
– In today’s globalized world, a business-like approach involves not
only activity abroad, but also foreign owners, international mergers,
and joint ventures.
80 For example, in the fall of 2000 the World Communication Awards event in Cannes
named Sonera the best wireless/mobile telephone operator, and the ISP Forum in
Rome, the best European provider of internet services.
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16  The International Environment
Finland continues to have its own goals and does its best to present them,
but most major matters are handled through Brussels according to an
EU script.
Lappalainen 2000, p. 32
Deeper practical cooperation with NATO has not placed the issue of
NATO membership on the acute decision-making agenda.
Sivonen 2001, p. 92
The European Union
No country can change its geopolitical location in the world, but the sur-
rounding social, political, and economic environments are constantly
changing. At the end of the 20th century changes were exceptionally
dramatic: the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, globaliza-
tion accelerated, and Finland took its place in the core of West Europe’s
deepening integration.
In November 1994 the Finnish parliament followed the advice given
by the consultative referendum and approved the country’s accession to
the European Union, effective since January 1st, 1995. This was Finland’s
most important political decision in the 1990s. The most important single
decision of the next parliament, elected in March 1995, again concerned
the EU. The Eduskunta accepted the government’s report on Economic
and Monetary Union in April 1998, thereby sealing Finland’s participa-
tion in EMU since January 1, 1999. This replaced Finland’s national cur-
rency with euros from the beginning of 2002. The parliamentary opposi-
tion voted against the report but was not strong enough to challenge the
majority government. Earlier, the government had rejected any requests
to hold a referendum on the EMU issue.
Thus Finland first became one of the 15 members of the EU, and then
the only Nordic country to belong to the EU’s “inner circle.” Obviously
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this implied some change in the customary marching order, because hith-
erto Finland had typically been the slowest rather than the quickest Nor-
dic country to approach any structures of West European integration, such
as EFTA, the Council of Europe, or the EC/EU itself. The new urge to
take a recognized place at the core of the EU seems to correspond to
Finland’s attempt to emphasize its western identity and strengthen its
national security in the international environment of the post-Cold War
era (see Chapter 2, pages 52-53).
The coalition government headed by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen
aimed at EMU membership from the day the government was formed in
1995. In that it was still doubtful whether the third stage of EMU would
be launched at all according to the established schedule; the most likely
prediction was that EMU would begin in 1999 with very few key states.
What was obvious in Finland at the time was the fact that the country’s
public finances were not in good enough shape to fulfill the strict conver-
gence criteria laid down for participation in the single currency, unless
drastic measures were taken to meet the criteria (see Chapter 15 above).
By 1997 these problems were solved, and in March 1998 the European
Commission announced that altogether eleven countries met the EMU
criteria.
The European Union of 12 states, which was in 1995 enlarged to 15
when Finland, Austria, and Sweden joined it, was quite different from
the original European Economic Community of “the Six.” There had been
enlargements as well as plenty of “deepening” in 35 years. In its own
accession treaty Finland agreed to accept the pre-existing norms and the
future decisions and policies of the EU. The latter included full partici-
pation in the EU’s foreign and security policy. The forthcoming EMU
was also implied in the accession treaty, albeit not very overtly. The bulk
of EU legislation thereby imposed upon Finland was enormous. Even a
very condensed version of EU laws, and one which does not cover the
norms concerning agriculture, is a book of some 2700 pages.
One problem with the EU laws is their somewhat uneven character:
they are massive and they cover a wide variety of topics, but they do not
constitute a balanced legal system, nor are they always free of internal
inconsistencies. Fortunately, by and large they fit well with Finland’s
own legislation. But there is always the potential of a “jack-in-a-box,” as
Thomas Wilhelmsson has called it: When applying existing national leg-
islation a court may face a strange EU creature that suddenly springs out
of the box when the court opens the lid (Letto-Vanamo 2000, p. 68).
A great deal of EU rules and procedures would have concerned Fin-
land even without membership of the EU. As a member of the European
Economic Area since January 1994 Finland had already committed itself
to the norms of the single European market. Even as an outsider Finland
would have needed to adjust its policies to developments in the EU. One
of the advantages of membership is the right to take part in the EU’s
decision-making. This has been emphasized constantly in Finnish dis-
course, although Finland’s numerical weight in the EU institutions is
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small: it got 3 out of 87 votes in the Council of Ministers, one member in
the Commission and one in the Court of Justice, 9 out of 222 members in
both the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions, and 16 seats in the 626-member European Parliament.
It has been difficult to convince the voters that they exert real influ-
ence on the EU’s or even on the European Parliament’s decisions when
they fill Finland’s meager 2.6 percent of EP seats.81 This explains to some
extent why interest in the European elections has declined. In Finland’s
first EP elections in 1996, 60.3 percent of the electorate turned out to
vote, but in the European elections of 1999 turnout dropped to 31.4 per-
cent (only Great Britain and the Netherlands having lower scores). The
drop was dramatic in comparison with the entire EU’s decline from 58
percent in 1994 to 53 percent in 1999.
In Finland’s EP election in 1999 the Conservative Party was the win-
ner, with 25 percent of the votes (having had 21 percent in the parliamen-
tary election of March 1999); yet a loss of 44 percent of its voters can
hardly be called a victory. But the SDP lost 64 percent, Left Alliance 61
percent, and Center Party 56 percent of the votes they had received three
months earlier. The Greens lost only 11 percent.
Finland’s 16 MEPs joined five different party groups in the European
Parliament. The Conservatives (who belong to the European People’s
Party) and Center Party (the EP’s Liberal, Democratic, and Reformist
Party) each had four members elected, the Social Democrats (Party of
European Socialists) three, and the Left Alliance (European United Left/
Nordic Green Left) one. The other Finnish winner, the Greens, now re-
ceived two seats, the Swedish People’s Party (ELDR) one, and the Chris-
tian League (now Christian Democrats, EPP), also one. Individual dis-
tinctions in the parliament included Ms Heidi Hautala’s election to the
co-chair of the Green group and Ilkka Suominen’s vice-chairmanship of
the Conservative EPP group.
The EU employs altogether more than 25,000 people, of whom 16,500
work for the Commission and 4100 for the Parliament. In 1997, the EU’s
employees included 626 Finns.82 The most visible one was Jacob
Söderman, Finland’s former parliamentary ombudsman, whom the Eu-
ropean Parliament elected in 1995 to serve as EU’s first ombudsman. His
duty is to handle EU-citizens’ complaints and to monitor administrative
behavior by bureaucrats. His office has enabled him to request more open
or ‘transparent’ administrative procedures, something the Finnish gov-
ernment and Finnish MEPs also constantly demand of the EU. In a few
81 In December 2000 the European Council decided in Nice that Finland will elect
only 13 out of 535 MEPs (the treaty’s ratification was delayed by a referendum in
Ireland); when 12 new member states enter the EU, the size of the European Parlia-
ment will rise to 732 and Finland’s share will be 1.8 percent.
82 The Commission targeted in 1995, that by 1999 it would employ 250–350 Finns and
400–500 Swedes. In 2000, its employees (grade A1 to grade D) included 396 from
Finland and 447 from Sweden.
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cases Söderman’s criticism has brought him into open conflict with the
commission, for instance in 1999 with its new Italian chairman Romano
Prodi. The performance of the Finnish member of the Commission since
1995, Erkki Liikanen, has been reviewed sometimes very favorably.83
The EU’s 15 member states finance the Union in three ways. They
collect customs duties for the EU, and they pay from their own tax rev-
enue both a portion of their value added tax and a resource based on their
GNP. However, the EU’s “own resources” are not allowed to exceed 1.27
percent of the entire Union’s GNP. Finland’s payments to the EU budget
increased from FIM 5.8 billion in 1995 to FIM 7.5 billion (€ 1.3 bn.) in
2000 (see Table 16.1). Of the revenue that Finland receives from the EU,
more than one-half supports agriculture. In total, Finland does not get
back as much as it contributes (with the exception of 1995); in 1998 and
1999 net payments to the EU were unusually large. The amounts sum-
marized in Table 16.1 do not account for the EU’s additional contribu-
tions to various Finnish projects, an estimated 0.4 or 0.5 billion markkas
(€ 65–85 million) each year.
Table 16.1
Payments to and revenue from the EU in 1995–2000
(in FIM million, according to balance sheet)
Payments to the EU: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Collected customs and
agricultural levies 953 976 951 910 847 940
Value Added Tax 3,027 2,948 3,085 2,945 3,128 3,243
Resource based on GNP 1,272 1,791 2,292 3,041 3,341 3,304
Capital payments 484 506 249 70 32 32
Other 44 45 12 – – –
Total 5,779 6,266 6,519 6,966 7,348 7,519
Received from the EU:
Transitional support 2,701 859 380 198  –  –
Customs administration 87 99 94 93  85 94
Agriculture 2,135 2,939 3,349 2,802 3,044  4,868
Regional fund 174 212 450 661 966 507
Social fund 379 285 945 142 442 649
Other to state budget 25 49 90 109 178 175
Outside state budget 407 728 877 795  809 815
Total 5,907 5,171 6,185 4,800 5,528 7,108
Net Payments –128 1,085 334 2,166 1,820 411
Source: Ministry of Finance.
83 See, for example, evaluations in The Economist, August 30th 1997, p. 24.
The International Environment
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 4 28.10.2002, 14:18266
267
Naturally, membership in the EU influences Finnish economy far be-
yond the mutual exchange of public money shown in Table 16.1, but
there has been no comprehensive analysis of the total impact of the EU
on Finland’s national economy. One estimate, made before joining the
EU, concluded that membership of the EC/EU would add about 4 per-
cent to GDP, due to more efficient allocation of resources in agriculture
and other industries, various positive impacts of EMU membership, and,
to a lesser extent, the elimination of some practices that inconvenienced
exports and direct investments (Alho et al., 1992). In their campaigns
supporting EU membership both the business organizations and most
trade unions used economic arguments, and the people discovered dur-
ing the first year of EU membership that food prices really came down
some 10 percent.
Finland’s approach to the Inter-Governmental Conference in 1996–
1997 can be traced to two identities: first, a country with Nordic political
and cultural traditions, and second, a small country on the border of the
EU (Kivimäki and Tiilikainen 1998, p. 112). The former explains why
Finland has aimed at more efficient and transparent administration in the
EU, and the latter why Finland consistently emphasizes equality between
small and large member states and attempts to gain recognition of the
concept of Europe’s northern dimension. The Amsterdam treaty in 1997
already adopted such Finnish goals as the emphasis on employment, the
environment, and the social dimension, all of which can be counted as
aspects of Nordic cultural identity. The nothern dimension was acknowl-
edged formally in 1997,84 but so far it has not been widely implemented.
The Finnish people do not identify themselves as Europeans,85 but they
have learned during a short period of time to take their country’s EU
membership for granted, and they want to get the most out of it. In addi-
tion, they desire an increasingly global orientation in foreign trade, be-
cause they do not think that the EU can be sufficient by itself. And they
want to protect Finland’s national sovereignty.
In one survey at the end of 1996, Finnish respondents were asked to
express their opinions on 31 national decisions concerning the country’s
international position (EVA 1997b, p. 39). Typically, they viewed the EU
from the domestic point of view and rejected a stronger union. Of the list
of different policy orientations, the following five were supported by the
largest majorities:
– Take an active part in developing the EU and thereby benefit the coun-
try (supported by 85%, opposed by 4%);
84 In December 1997 the European Parliament accepted Finland’s suggestion to add a
statement on the northern dimension to its pronouncement on the results of the sum-
mit meeting held in Luxembourg.
85 In late 2001, 59% of the Finns identified “with nationality only” and 36% were
“Finnish and European;” only 4% placed European before Finnish identity. The
corresponding EU averages were 44%, 44%, and 9%. (Eurobarometer 56, p. 14.)
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– Carefully protect Finland’s national sovereignty (85/5%);
– Increase cooperation with the Nordic countries, for instance with Swe-
den (83/4%);
– Strongly champion Finland’s own interests in the EU, get all pos-
sible benefits out of it (77/9%); and
– Be more active at the United Nations (68/9%).
As an example of opinions that were almost evenly divided, one could
mention responses to the suggested need to “slow down rather than speed
up the major development projects of the EU” (30/35%). On the other
hand, federal developments in the EU were clearly opposed (12/57%).
Important international goals that the Finnish people want their gov-
ernment to pursue in the EU include the fight against international crime,
environment policies, employment policies, and relations with Russia.
In these respects public opinion reflects the government’s policy goals.
Concerning the EU itself, the people, like their government, want more
transparency and less bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the
people are not keen on enlargement, which is supported by the govern-
ment. Many have even found it difficult to formulate an opinion on EU
membership by neighboring Estonia, and those who did express an opin-
ion tended to be against it. The “northern dimension” is also very unclear
to most Finnish people. (EVA 1999b, p. 31.)
There is big variation in how different people estimate Finland’s influ-
ence on the decisions of the EU: those who view membership positively
tend to think that Finland has been influential, whereas EU opponents
think that Finland has not been heard in EU decision-making. The gov-
ernment has made it clear that many Finnish goals have advanced in the
EU, but there have also been some disappointments. An unexpected one
was in December 2001 when the European Council meeting in Laeken,
Belgium was unable to decide on the location of the new European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA), which Finland was prepared to host when it
was started in January 2002.86
The distribution of Finnish opinion on the country’s EU membership
has remained almost constant over the years. In the referendum in Octo-
ber 1994, 42 percent voted “yes,” 32 percent voted “no,” and 26 percent
did not vote. Table 16.2 shows the corresponding distributions of opinion
on EU membership one month before the referendum, and seven years
thereafter. Only a very small shift toward negative opinion can be de-
tected and differences between the supporters of different political par-
ties have also remained. Of the big party groups, the Conservatives have
86 None of the EU-offices was located in Finland and the country was ready to house
the EFSA in the “biocity” of the University of Helsinki. Finland’s first disappoint-
ment was the postponement of the decision during Sweden’s presidency, the second
occured in Belgium when an otherwise unanimous decision in favor was vetoed by
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who wanted the new office placed in Parma.
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positive feelings and the Center Party supporters negative ones. The sup-
porters of both leftist parties had become more positive toward EU mem-
bership, while only the Christian Democrats and Swedish People’s Party
supporters had become more critical. Consequently, it seems that the slight
move toward negative opinion in Finland has largely occurred among
people with no party preference.
Table 16.2
Opinions on EU membership related to party preference in September 1994 and in
November – December 2001 (in %)
Party preference
LEFT SDP CENT CHR CONS SPP GR ALL
In 1994:
Yes 20 42 20 10 68  71 35 39
No 50 18 52 60 12 12 39 29
Undecided 30 40 28 30 20 17 26 32
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
In 2001:
Positive 28 52 25 9 62 49 42 37
Negative 48 16 44 69 14 31 34 31
Neutral 22 30 31 22 24 20 34 30
Don’t know 2 2 0 – – – 1 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Pesonen 1994, pp. 57, 60; EVA 2002, p. 13.
When Finnish people are compared with the citizenry of the entire
EU, the Finns show two distinct characteristics: they tend to be more
critical of the EU than average EU citizens, and they are better informed
about it. According to the Eurobarometer surveys in October–November
2001, only 37 percent of the Finns thought that EU membership was a
“good thing” (while the EU average was 54%), and 39 percent said Fin-
land had “benefited” from its EU membership (EU average was 52%).
On the other hand, the Finns paid relatively great attention to EU news,
showed the second highest awareness of the EU institutions, felt the most
informed about enlargement, and were, together with the Dutch, the best
informed about the single currency. (Eurobarometer 56, pp. 88, 98–99.)
In fact the people in all three new EU members have relatively nega-
tive feelings about the Union, although not as negative as the British.
Among the three, the Swedes generally appear to be the most and the
Austrians the least critical, but opinions are in all three countries more
critical than EU average. The three peoples do not tend to support EU
membership or to find it useful. They are proud of their own nationality
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and want relatively many decisions made on the national level. They tend
to dislike the policy matters of the EU and do not want the EU to inter-
fere with their daily lives. Among them only the Finns have a tendency to
trust various EU institutions, notably the Ombudsman and the Court of
Justice, more than EU citizens do on the average. On the question of
enlargement, public opinions deviate; the Swedes, contrary to the Austri-
ans, tend to support the inclusion of new members while the distribution of
Finnish opinion is in the middle. (Cf. op. cit. and Eurobarometer 54.)
It is also tempting to compare how Finland and Sweden have per-
formed in the EU. Both countries have held the council presidency, Fin-
land in 1999 and Sweden in 2001. At the beginning it was customary to
say that “Sweden entered the EU to teach, Finland to learn,” and many
concluded that Finland’s style has produced better results. The Swedish
observer Karl Magnus Johansson wrote in 1999 that the Finns “were
praised for everything,” while “the Swedes were thought of as squabblers...
The Finns can play the game. They can give and take. They do not have
opinions on everything, but rather, they aim at getting attention when-
ever they open their mouth” (quoted in Raunio and Wiberg 2000, p. 287).
In fact, Finland and Sweden have shared many goals and often cooper-
ate. The Finnish people are frequently reminded by political leaders that
their country has gained genuine influence in the EU and that EU mem-
bership and policies have benefited Finland. This, however, does not
seem to bridge the gap between the Union’s institutions and the people’s
perceptions. [PP]
Globalization
The coverage of globalization extends, by definition, far beyond the gradu-
ally deepening integration of Europe. Although there has been world-
wide economic activity, foreign trade, and other kinds of international
contacts for a very long period of time, current globalization illustrates
quite a recent expansion of contacts and an unforeseen time-space com-
pression. It is most visible in how improvements in communication have
eliminated delays in data transmission. Communication is becoming non-
stop, and an up-to-the-minute information flow affects lives almost ev-
erywhere. Internet enables worldwide personal communication and an
unprecedented acquisition of information.
The rapid strengthening of international dependencies is most appar-
ent in the economy. Companies and capital lose their national connota-
tions and there is growing financial interchange and dependency between
countries. Networking of companies is part of this change, not only do-
mestically but also internationally. The risks caused by technological
development, such as environment changes, are not altogether a new
phenomenon either, but they too become more international and have
worldwide consequences.
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Finns have had some contacts with distant peoples since ancient times;
in modern times the small size of the country and its specialized economy
make international contacts especially important. Due to Finland’s late
industrial development, remote location, and distinctive language its in-
ternational relations diversified at a later stage than those of many other
European countries. On the other hand, the change in Finnish society
became very rapid in the second half of the 20th century. At least since
the 1990s Finland’s industrial structure has been one of the most modern
in the world (cf. Table 2.5); technologically Finland has been classified
as the world’s most developed country (see Chapter 14).
Therefore, one might well ask to what extent postmodern Finland is a
globalized country and what does globalization mean for Finland. To be
able to say that globalization touches a country as a comprehensive phe-
nomenon, it must concern not only the economy but also the government
and civil society.
From a small northern state’s point of view, the prehistory of global-
ization contains various bilateral trade agreements and, especially, agree-
ments made with international organizations (see page 276 below). Fin-
land has built much of its economy on the tradition of foreign trade from
the 18th and 19th centuries, and the liberation of international trade was
one of the basic preconditions that allowed small countries to turn in-
creasingly to world markets. Now states are forced to release some of
their power to the markets run by large international corporations. It
seems that small states, the very states that are most dependent of
international markets, are losing power more than the large states
(cf. Held and McGrew, 2000).
The changes that have taken place, communication especially, broaden
the range of people’s thinking from a local frame of reference to more
global perception, in the direction of ‘world citizenship.’ However, people
in welfare states are also well aware of the potential disadvantages of
globalization: intense competition may lead to the exclusion of those
with low education and to heightened social differences. The threats also
bring together citizens of different countries and give rise to global citi-
zens’ organizations such as Greenpeace and Attac.
During the post-war decades, Finnish civil society has also, through
central organizations, joined international non-governmental organiza-
tions. There are hundreds of examples of this. One worth mentioning
here is the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW), which has
had a national committee actively operating in Finland since 1948.
Through this council hundreds of Finnish social and health organizations
communicate with international and foreign organizations while many
of them are also members of the international organizations directly, in
their special fields. The global nature of ICSW is illustrated by the fact
that its member organizations represent 75 different countries.
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The number of annual congresses held by various international orga-
nizations has increased and Finns have been eager participants. The big-
gest citizen organizations also have continuing contacts with the Euro-
pean Union through their representatives and lobbyists. The global con-
nections of citizen organizations bring international contacts increasingly
to the grass-root level, as Finland is among the top countries in the world
in association memberships.
Reacting to the internationalization of business corporations, the large
interest organizations have established their own permanent international
connections. Finland’s central labor organizations belong to the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTY), the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC), and the Council of Nordic Trade Unions
(NFS). They also participate in the work of the OECD’s Trade Union
Advisory Committee, the Finnish ILO Committee, and the European
Economic and Social Committee. They even have plans to launch a joint
forum for international issues. Similarly, the Union of Industrial Em-
ployers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) has its own office in Brus-
sels and it, too, has permanent ties to the OECD, ETUC, and ILO. Obvi-
ously, Finnish interest organizations will strengthen their international
activity still further.
The other types of international organizations in which the Finns par-
ticipate work in the areas of economic activity and professions, research
and culture, social and charity work, athletics, etc, and they really are too
numerous to be listed here. The European-level organizations of political
parties include the Socialist International (SI), founded in 1951, and the
European Democratic Union (EDU), founded in 1978. Individual citi-
zens have frequent foreign contacts: tourism is popular, and more and
more tours are sold to very distant places. In 2000, eight million passen-
gers departed (and equally many arrived) on ships, however, sailing mostly
only between Finland and neighboring Sweden and Estonia. At Finnish
airports the total number of embarked and disembarked international
passengers reached seven million. (SYF 2001, pp. 296–297.)
Index numbers can provide concrete illustrations of the decades of
internationalization. Table 16.3 shows how rapidly international traffic
through Finnish ports and airports increased in four decades. In 2000
passenger traffic through airports was almost 26 times the number of
passengers in 1960, international goods traffic through airports was 35
times higher than in 1960. International goods traffic through Finnish
ports quadrupled. Furthermore, Table 16.3 indicates that the take-off phase
of Finland’s internationalization occurred already in the 1960s. This co-
incided with the period of Finland’s fast economic growth: if the gross
domestic product in 1950 is given the value 100, the corresponding in-
dex number rose to 162 in 1960 and was no less that 259 in 1970 (Vartia
and Ylä-Anttila 1996, p. 65).
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Table 16.3
Index numbers of exchange between Finland and foreign countries from 1960 to
2000 (1980 = 100)
Year Net tonnage Air Air Air
by sea passengers freight mail
(weight) (weight)
1960 39 13 9 15
1965 49 22 22 28
1970 66 43 49 49
1975 64 84 60 61
1980 100 100 100 100
1985 105 147 148 134
1990 119 261  228 158
1995 144 246 305 194
2000 163 335 320 239
Data source: SYF 2001, pp. 294–298.
The different speed of development in shipping and air transportation
describes the change in Finland’s foreign trade: the transition from heavy
raw material cargo to lighter end products. At the same time, globaliza-
tion required ever faster delivery times. For example, there is a very dif-
ferent  price-weight ratio for lumber, important historically, and mobile
phones, important today. In moving from material products to informa-
tion technology products such as computer software, the value may be
transferred without mass. International data transmission is to certain
extent, if in a very imperfect way, described by passenger and postal
traffic between countries. By 2000 passenger traffic had increased to al-
most 26 times and postal traffic to 16 times that of 1960; between 1980
and 2000 the volume of air freight more than tripled and air mail more
than doubled.
The Internet represents the latest and fastest-expanding stage in the
history of globalization. In 1998, there were 88 Internet connections per
1000 inhabitants in Finland; by summer 2000, this number was 135. In
1998, approximately 24 percent of Finns, including children and the eld-
erly, used the Internet at least once; in 2001 the percentage was 47. The
development illustrates an astonishing change in terms of globalization,
too, although not all Internet users are internationally connected.
Because globalization is essential in international competition, but
because it also poses certain dangers, Finland faces a basic dilemma:
how can it be successful in the essential arenas of globalization while
managing to reject its negative aspects?
One of the important manifestations of globalization is the new
economy, based on information technology and intensive utilization of
know-how. To a significant degree, the new economy has adopted the
principles of market economy and free trade, something that favors the
internationalization and networking of companies. There is a big gap
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between the old and new economies. While the old economy invests in
the manufacture of goods, the new economy primarily invests in increas-
ing the productivity of information.
As stated in Chapter 14, Finland’s emphasis on education is at a high
international level, which is also reflected on how the country ranks in
productivity comparisons and competitiveness. Know-how and competi-
tiveness are buffers that a small nation can use to acquire operating pos-
sibilities in a globalizing world. In the new economy, making use of know-
how is not restricted to domestic circles alone. One of the most successful
new economy companies in the world, Nokia, is an example of worldwide
utilization of know-how and networking: at the beginning of 2001, Nokia
had 55 cooperating research and development laboratories in 15 countries.
However, the emphasis of research and development is still in Finland: less
than 3 percent of Nokia’s sales revenue comes from Finland but 45 percent
of its basic research units and 65 percent of its total research and develop-
ment operations are located in Finland (Castells and Himanen 2001, p. 21).
In the 1990s, especially after joining the EU, Finland has continued
removing restrictions on foreign investments and free competition. The
growth of investment by foreign companies is, however, best explained
by increasing emphasis on technology and know-how and by a high stan-
dard of infrastructure. According to comparative studies, Finland also
has high quality social capital: in comparisons concerning trust between
citizens Finland belongs to the world leaders. The results show that as
parties to agreement, Finns tend to be more trustworthy than other na-
tionalities in average (Inglehart 1997, p. 174), which may somehow com-
pensate the disadvantages of the country’s remote geographic location
and climate.
Figure 16.1
Direct Investments between 1980 and 1999 (FIM billion)
1 = To Finland
2 = From Finland
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Know-how and competitiveness are reflected both in Finnish compa-
nies’ investments abroad and foreign companies’ investments to Finland.
Since the end of the 1980s, with the exception of the slump years in the early
1990s, direct investments to and from Finland have increased very rapidly,
as seen in Figure 16.1 (Pajarinen and Ylä-Anttila 2001, p. 12).
A typical aspect of the globalization of Finnish economy is the grow-
ing use of foreign labor. In 2001 Finnish companies employed 212,000
persons abroad. Between 1997 and 2001, their personnel grew by 3 per-
cent in the home country, but persons working abroad increased by 28
percent, in other words from 26 to 33 percent of all employees of indus-
trial enterprises. The growth of R&D personnel working abroad was
slower, from 19 to to 22 percent. This indicates a willingness of Finnish
industry to retain experts in the home country. (www.tt.fi/arkisto/
getoriginal.pl)
In its industrial policy, Finland has aimed at making the country an
appealing location especially for high technology companies, both from
Finland and abroad. A look at the growth of foreign investments by sec-
tors on industry may give an idea on the success of that policy. When a
distinction is made between the traditional (i.e., resource-intensive, la-
bor-intensive, and scale-intensive) sector on the one hand and the new
specialized-suppliers and science-based sector on the other, certain bases
of Finland’s rapid globalization become clear. From 1980 to 2000, the
employment of the science-based sector increased by almost 60 percent
whereas employment in the labor-intensive sector decreased by approxi-
mately 40 percent. Correspondingly, employment in high technology in-
creased by 80 percent while low technology lost 40 percent of its em-
ployment. This development illustrates on a general level the qualitative
change of Finland’s employment. The rapidly rising level of know-how
has attracted increasing numbers of foreign companies to Finland, which
shows in their investments’ emphasis on high technology (Pajarinen and
Ylä-Anttila 2001, pp. 2–4, 15–20).
Traditionally, the location of industrial production has been determined
by three key factors: the search for raw material, markets, and labor force.
However, this situation has changed as a consequence of the lighter weight
of raw material and products, and improved transportation techniques.
Also, the closeness of markets has lost some importance. On the other
hand, it seems that both the skills and the costs of labor have become
more important. An additional consideration may be the cultural envi-
ronment and other infrastructure available to the personnel.
The problems faced by the welfare state are often mentioned as the
downside of globalization (Cf. e.g. Esping-Andersen 1996; Julkunen
2001b, pp. 48–56). Multinational corporations can transfer their produc-
tion wherever the production costs – above all labor costs – are the low-
est. This creates unemployment and brings down wage levels in the de-
veloped countries which are no longer able to execute independent social
policies but must listen to the demands of multinational corporations.
These corporations demand a competitive level of capital taxation and,
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frequently, less progressive personal taxes. For example, Nokia CEO
Jorma Ollila’s remark on Finland’s high taxation levels and the possibil-
ity of moving the company headquarters out of Finland caused a stir in
November 2001.
A relatively even income distribution is, however, one of the charac-
teristics of welfare states and they cannot function without fairly pro-
gressive tax rates. They may also offer many advantages. The education
system in Finland, free of charge, tax-funded and of a high standard, and
the efficient yet inexpensive health care system are examples of the ad-
vantages not within reach of the developing countries. In addition, devel-
oped infrastructure, stable political climate and a high level of social
capital (trust) speak in favor of welfare state. However, welfare states,
too, have begun competing in taxation and this may well lead into some
social dumping. The extent to which the Finnish welfare state took the pres-
sures of globalization into account is discussed in the following Chapter 17.
Finland is a globalized country, dependent on world markets. Its busi-
ness fluctuations promptly follow whatever changes occur in larger econo-
mies, especially in the USA and Germany. So far the internationalization
of Finnish companies has not advanced as far as the internationalization
of companies in many other industrial countries, but the process has been
very rapid at the turn of the millennium. Finland has also become global-
ized in another sense: in cross-national comparisons it ranks among the
most developed countries in the world, and there are abundant tools for
communication, such as Internet connections. Contacts on the level of
civil society are numerous as well. It would be tempting but is not yet
possible to conclude what impact globalization has had on the welfare
state. Only the coming years will prove whether or not Finns need to
sacrifice some of their earnings and social security in order to meet pres-
sures from the outside. [OR]
Foreign Policy
“Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of
peace and human rights and for the development of society.”
The sentence may sound like a quotation from a government program,
but it is actually another example of the new approach to constitutional
law (see Chapter 14). It belongs to Section 1 of the Constitution of 1999
which, first of all, defines Finland as a sovereign republic. Perhaps one
might interpret the final words “development of society” to imply that
Finland also attempts to act in the world for its own benefit, in order to
protect and further its national interests, which is the most obvious goal
of any country’s foreign policy.
Transnational organizations are essential for the role that governments
have assumed in globalization. Forty years ago the Yearbook of Interna-
tional Organizations already listed over 1200 such organizations, of which
150 were intergovernmental. In Chapter 2 (page 53) references were made
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to Finland joining such organizations. Between the two world wars the
League of Nations was considered very important, and since the Second
World War Finland, too, has been active in several world wide and re-
gional organizations. Their emergence and activity have reflected glo-
balization and, on the other hand, they have played an important role in
facilitating the process of globilization. Indeed, and perhaps for the first
time in history, they have proved that nations have become aware of com-
mon interests and that their shared problems can only be solved through
some solidarity and cooperation.
The international institution with the broadest global coverage is the
United Nations Organization, founded in 1945 and joined by Finland in
1955. Already in 1956 Finland participated in the First UN Emergency
Force in Sinai, and an active role in UN peace keeping operations has
continued ever since (see Chapter 11, page 188) Twice, in 1970–1972
and 1989–1990, Finland was member of the United Nations Security
Council, and in 2000–2001 former prime minister Harri Holkeri chaired
the 55th General Assembly. In its own UN policy Finland has stressed
consistently “the protection of peace and human rights” which are cen-
tral goals also in the UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Finland has attempted to strengthen the United Nations
Organization in many ways because of its goals and because it is consid-
ered particularly valuable for small countries.
The liberation of international trade was one of the basic precondi-
tions permitting even small countries to turn increasingly to world mar-
kets. As described in Chapter 2, Finland became an associate member of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1961 and a full member
in 1986. Before that, Finland had strengthened its intergovernmental re-
lations in several functional organizations joining the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBED, the World Bank) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1948 and the General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade, GATT (since 1994 the World Trade Organization
WTO) in 1949. It has belonged to the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) since 1969, and a free trade agree-
ment with the EEC was made in 1973.
A regional multinational forum of great significance for Finland has
been the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
which became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) in 1995. Finland also took part in the activities of the Council of
Europe long before joining it as a member in 1989.
The Nordic Council, which Finland joined in 1955, supplemented by
the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971, represents close cooperation
within a smaller region. It continues to act as permanent reminder and
initiator of cooperation, and it can be thought of as a pioneer of many
practical achievements in integration: abolishing passports within the
Nordic area (1952), agreeing on an open labor market (1954), social se-
curity (1955), and non-citizens’ right to participate in another Nordic
country’s local elections (1973).
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However, from Finland’s point of view, one multinational organization is
more important than any of the others. “The European Union is the most
central field of action of our foreign policy,” declared Dr. Erkki Tuomioja,
the minister for foreign affairs, and the ministry’s annual report certified that
“the European Union is the cornerstone of Finland’s international activity.
The EU is an umbrella, under which most European political and economic
cooperation takes place. Finland wants to develop the Union to be a safer
anchor of Europe” (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2001, pp. 4, 8).
In other words, Finland no longer acts alone on the international scene.
Brussels has become the venue of many contacts that would have been
dealt with directly in earlier years and that would have been discussed
bilaterally rather than as a part of the EU’s policy.
When the Cold War ended, Finland’s neutrality lost its most essential
content. The original purpose of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization, was also lost and soon it began to invent for itself new tasks in
the less divided world. An innovative new idea was the launch of the
Partnership for Peace program (PfP) in 1994. Finland joined the program
already in May 1994. In 2000, NATO’s 19 members could count 27 other
countries as their “peace partners,” extending from Ireland and Albania
to Russia and Kyrgyzstan (Heikkilä 2000, pp. 154–157). Finland’s bilat-
eral cooperation with NATO has been deepened not only in practical
military cooperation for crisis management purposes (see Chapter 11),
but also in participation in the Intensified Dialogue with NATO and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) since it was established in 1997.
An ambassador was also accredited to NATO in 1997. (See Sivonen 2001.)
None of this cooperation, however, is supposed to lead Finland to NATO
membership. Non-alignment has remained the government’s official
policy line, while applying for NATO membership has been reserved, at
most, as one policy alternative, applicable in that event that circumstances
change and make membership justifiable. Sweden’s policy has been simi-
lar, or even more cautious than Finland, and NATO membership has re-
mained a non-issue in Austria, Switzerand, and Ireland. If the govern-
ments opt for membership in NATO, one difficulty they will face is the
need to convince the very resistant public opinion. The Finnish people
have ruled out NATO membership constantly. Opinions turned even more
negative as a consequence of the war in Kosovo in 1999 and, again, dur-
ing the 2001 war in Afghanistan. In late October 2001, military align-
ment had the support of no more than 16 percent of the Finns, while non-
alignment was supported by 79 percent (MTS 2/2001).87
It is somewhat tricky to belong to the core of the EU while remaining
outside NATO and being only an observer in the Western European Union.
However, this did not prevent the election of Finland’s commander-in-
chief Gustav Hägglund to the chair of the EU’s Military Committee, which
began to function in April 2001.
87 One month later, another survey found that 11 percent favored and 65 percent op-
posed NATO membership “under the present circumstances” (EVA 2002, p. 65).
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Generally speaking, the Finnish people have been accustomed to ac-
cepting the country’s official foreign policy: a national consensus has
been typical of both the elites and the people. During the Cold War, com-
munists were the only important opposition to the country’s security policy
(Törnudd 2001, p. 259). Also membership of the EU and EMU are ac-
cepted by the opponents as unavoidable facts of life. Opinion surveys
have indicated that a very large, albeit flexible, majority of the people
(87 percent in 2001) have been satisfied with how Finland’s foreign policy
has been conducted (MTS 2/2001).
Foreign and security policy covers a broad range of tasks; on the one
hand the stregthening of human rights, democracy, development, and le-
gal order, and on the other crisis management, arms control, and preven-
tive diplomacy. Furthermore, the tasks include the prevention of environ-
mental hazards and the fight against terrorism, crime, and drug trade.
Trade policy takes care of the preconditions of the nation’s wellbeing. It
thus furthers internationalization through agreements and cooperation,
and it helps Finnish exports, opening doors for businesses.
The broad range of foreign policy is also evident in the fact that within
the government appointed in 1999, political responsibilities of the minis-
try for foreign affairs are divided among four ministers. In addition to the
minister for foreign affairs and the minister for foreign trade, the minis-
ter of defense handles Nordic cooperation, and development aid was the
task of the minister of environmental protection (since 2002 of the min-
ister of taxation). Because European Union affairs concern all ministries,
their coordination was transferred in 2000 from the ministry for foreign
affairs to the office of the prime minister. The personal role of the prime
minister in foreign policy making has also become quite central.
In 2001 Finland maintained diplomatic relations with 170 countries.
There were 950 persons working in the ministry for foreign affairs and
1590 persons in the 98 missions on five continents. About 400 honorary
consulates complete the picture. There has been some pressure, for fiscal
rasons, to reduce some missions, while the ministry for foreign affairs
has wanted to strengthen the network of Finnish missions abroad.
The developing countries have been supported by Finland politically
and financially in UN policies, through other organizations, through the
EU, and directly. However, development aid has also met fiscal limita-
tions. In 1990 Finland spent 0.7 percent of its GDP on aid to developing
countries. That was the share agreed among the Nordic countries. How-
ever, due to the economic crisis it was lowered to 0.35 percent by 1994
and has remained on that level since then, only slightly higher than the
average aid paid by other EU countries. Since 1994 development aid has
increased only as the result of Finland’s growing GDP, but not as a per-
centage. In 2002 it amounted to 479 million euros. The government’s
aim in 2002 was to raise it in five years to 0.4 percent of the GDP.
Globalization and the enlargening EU area also leave room for re-
gional emphasis, such as the “northern dimension,” which the EU ac-
knowledged in 1997. Finland’s neighborhood strategy focuses on north-
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eastern Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad. This is the
area that Finland has supported financially, concentrating mainly on en-
vironmental protection, nuclear safety, energy, and forestry. Also, Fin-
land has supported the efforts of the three Baltic countries toward EU
membership and cultivates close bilateral relations with Estonia and the
two others.
Naturally one should not forget the great regional importance to Fin-
land of well established Nordic cooperation. The five Nordic countries
have been traditionally an important reference group in Finland’s inter-
governmental relations and they remain important even though the EU
has replaced them as Finland’s primary refence group. The prime minis-
ters of the three Nordic EU members also meet to discuss how to coordi-
nate their EU policies. Cooperation with Sweden has been especially
close and practical. [PP]
A Case Story: Boycotting Another EU Member
On Sunday evening, 30 January 2000, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen
received a telephone call from his Portuguese counterpart Antonio
Guterres inviting Finland to join the boycott that 14 EU countries would
declare against Austria, a fellow EU member, if the Freedom Party were
included in that country’s new government. Lipponen agreed, and on the
following Monday he approved the final text which was communicated
on the same day to Austria’s president Thomas Klestil. Austria would be
punished if it adjusted its government formation to the result of the par-
liamentary election of October 1999, where the voters had strongly en-
dorsed Jörg Heider and his anti-immigrant Freedom Party, which did not
“share joint Europan values.” Formally the boycott was not decided by
the EU, but it contained 14 separate but coordinated governmental deci-
sions.
The action did not have the intended effect: on February 4th, Austria
formed a government with Freedom party as a coalition partner. Prime
Minister Lipponen then advised the Finnish administration on how to
avoid contacts with Austrians, as was done in the 13 other EU countries.
Austrian diplomats were to be ignored in international meetings, hands
were not to be shaken with them. Perhaps the hasty decision of the 14
governments was unwise but there was no easy way to call off the boy-
cott either. Finally, a group of “wise men” chaired by Finnish ex-presi-
dent Martti Ahtisaari was sent to Vienna and reported that there was noth-
ing wrong with Austria’s European attitudes. They reached their conclu-
sion in one day, although normally their findings would have required quite
extensive social science research. In the autumn the boycott was ended.
A comparable, even clearer case of a breach of “joint European val-
ues” took place when a new Italian government was formed in 2001. The
conservative Silvio Berlusconi became prime minister and he included
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in his government Umberto Bossi, leader of the anti-immigrant Lega
Nordia. This time the other EU states did not react, although Bossi con-
tinued to demand policies contrary to “joint European values,” including
his proposal to build a wall along the border between Slovenia and Italy.
The Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel called Bossi “an anti-immi-
grant fascist.” Ahtisaari’s report had concluded that the ministers of the
Austrian government had not used unacceptable racist and anti-immi-
grant language, whereas it would not have been possible to draw such a
conclusion a year later from the speeches of all Italian ministers.
In Finland the opposition reacted to the Austria boycott as follows: “In
taking its position Finland has interfered with the formation of another
country’s government... Such an important decision should be made with
the participation of the central government members and the government’s
Committee on Foreign Affairs.” And further: “It has not been revealed
how the guidelines of sanctions against Austria were decided.” To this
the prime minister answered that the procedures were “decided on the
basis of an informal discussion within the government.”
Later, Prime Minister Lipponen was reprimented by Finland’s chan-
cellor of justice for overstepping his powers, because an agreement to
Portugal’s proposal, according to the Constitution Act, required Presi-
dent Ahtisaari’s decision; only later was Ahtisaari asked his opinion and
gave his approval to Lipponen’s decision. It is possible that Lipponen
already had in mind the new Constitution of 1999, although it became
effective one month later.
This incidence warrants a few general observations:
– Situations may arise that call for instant foreign policy decisions at
any time.
– A small country can hardly stand alone against the unanimous opin-
ion of its reference group. Foreign policy decisions depend not only
on their actual content, but also on the image they create outside the
country.
– The members of the European Union do not treat each other equally;
the small ones are more vulnerable to pressure from others than the
big ones.
– European policies can be motivated by domestic policy considerations;
in this case the socialist governments of most EU countries may have
been motivated by their worry about conservative trends in Europe
or by alarming right wing populism in their own country.
–  Legally correct procedures are important; great care must be taken
about exactly when new legislation enters in force and changes deci-
sion-making procedures.
–  Finland’s chancellor of justice makes his decisions independently of
the country’s political leadership. [PP]
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17  Finnish Vitality
The new liberal stance in economics and economic policies has assessed the
role and scope of the public sector much more critically than was the case
with the dominant Keynesian economic policies during the era of the wel-
fare state expansion.
Harrinvirta 2000, p. 187
Finland shows that a fully fledged welfare state is not incompatible with
technological innovation, with the development of the information so-
ciety, and with a dynamic, competitive new economy.
Castells and Himanen 2001, p. 114
New Features in Democracy
Many governmental institutions in to-day’s Finland have their roots in
the period 1809–1917 when Finland was an autonomous state within the
Russian empire, and the Finnish political system has shown considerable
continuity throughout its 85 years of independence. There are only twelve
other countries that have had an uninterrupted democratic government
during this period. The new constitution, passed by the Eduskunta in
1999 and effective since March 1, 2000, did not introduce deep changes
either, although it revised Finland’s Constitution Act of 1919 and Parlia-
ment Act of 1906/1928 far beyond a simple “maintenance check-up.”
In the 1980s, popular pressure began to demand more direct democ-
racy. At the same time, political pressure was pushing toward a more
consistently parliamentary system of government. As a consequence, di-
rect presidential elections replaced the electoral college in 1994 and a
consultative referendum was arranged in the same year on the important
issue of joining the European Union. Other amendments to the constitu-
tion had already reduced presidential power: in 1987 the power of veto
was weakened and in 1991 the president’s power to dissolve parliament
was made conditional upon the prime minister’s initiative. Such changes
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were justified as a counterbalance to the additional strength that the head
of state gained when his/her mandate was drawn directly from the people.
It became customary to argue that parliamentarism is more democratic
than presidential power, despite the fact that the president, too, obtains a
mandate from the people. Obviously such an argument well suited the
political elite, who want efficient and centralized procedures in national
decision-making and a firm role for the political parties. It also suited the
politically active citizens who feel efficacious and capable of acting
through conventional party channels, whereas stronger parliamentary
power at the cost of a less powerful president did not appeal so well to
alienated and non-efficacious citizens. The government justified its pro-
posal with an increase in democracy; parliament’s own constitution com-
mittee went further than the government bill toward reducing presiden-
tial powers; and the mood continued in parliament’s plenary debates. At
this stage the president’s independent powers were weakened in the ar-
eas of government formation and foreign policy.
Much of the actual content of the new constitution will be formulated
when it is implemented in concrete situations in the future. Therefore,
the actions of the first president under the new constitution and her rela-
tions with other governmental institutions are going to leave an espe-
cially strong mark. President Halonen seems to have stretched her pow-
ers in the direction of keeping the president an important political actor;
perhaps she has also been helped in this by mutual trust strenghened
during her previous political cooperation as an SDP minister in the gov-
ernments of Prime Minister Lipponen, who has wanted to avoid the im-
pression of challenging her.
Membership of the European Union since 1995 has had very impor-
tant consequences in Finnish politics. According to the new constitution,
“The Government is responsible for national preparation of the decisions
to be made in the European Union and decides on the concomitant Finn-
ish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of the Parliament”
(Section 93). The EU connection has influenced Finnish legislation and
it has multiplied the foreign contacts of almost every ministry of the gov-
ernment, also forcing ministers and high civil servants to travel frequently
to various meetings of the EU. Parliament’s grand committee was con-
verted to a new role when it became the committee on European affairs.
In other ways, too, the Finnish parliament monitors approaching EU de-
cisions more closely than the parliaments of other EU states. The mem-
bers and entire committees of the Finnish parliament also maintain for-
eign contacts by traveling to other countries (and willingly to very dis-
tant ones).
Parliamentary procedures have been streamlined in various ways. Until
1995 Finland’s Parliament Act was exceptional in granting a suspensive
veto to minorities of one-third: the agreement of at least 67 members
could send a bill pending until a new parliament was elected. This right
added much to the negotiating power of the opposition and, accordingly,
its termination weakened the parliamentary opposition. As was described
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in Chapter 9, the Constitution of 1999 expedited the handling of bills by
combining the first and the second reading and making the grand committee’s
review optional. The efficiency of individual MPs was increased, among
other things when parliament began to pay for their assistants.
Despite the procedural reforms and the aim of the reformers of the
Finnish constitution, it seems that parliament’s role in decision-making
is not as central as was intended, while both the government and the
bureaucracy have gained in power. The real winner is the prime minister.
His position is quite comparable to the other heads of government in the
EU.88 The era of short-lived and often unstable Finnish governments ended
after the 1970s; once formed, the government has occupied an increas-
ingly firm leadership position throughout the entire four-year election
term. The new constitution and Finland’s EU membership have strength-
ened the government and its prime minister, and very seldom has the
government been frustrated by the will of parliament.
The development of the entire public sector has been characterized by
the principle of more efficient public management. And because the scope
for expanding public expenditures is politically very limited, it has been
necessary, in Finland as in other OECD countries, to attempt to improve
public services through results-oriented budgeting systems. Demands for
efficiency have lead to privatization of public businesses, fees for the use
of public services, and less government intervention in the market
economy (cf. Harrinvirta 2000, pp. 186–190). While strengthening its
position in political decision-making, public administration has become
more transparent and service-oriented.
Democratic governance presupposes not only well functioning and
well interacting political institutions, but also an active civil society, le-
gitimacy of the political system, and channels for citizen participation in
it. These prerequisits exist in Finland, and they too changed a great deal
during the last decade of the 20th century. Information communicated in
the mass media reaches more people in Finland than in many other na-
tions, and international comparisons indicate that the Finnish people are
relatively well aware of public affairs.
The linkages, even overlaps, between the state and civil society have
made the Finnish system “a governmental civil society and a civil soci-
etal government.” A majority of the Finnish people has felt that popular
movements transmit citizens’ opinions to decision-makers better than
political parties do (EVA 2001a, pp. 42–43). As far as the large old move-
ments are concerned, three of them have become especially strong, namely,
the trade unions, the sports movement, and the cooperatives.
Labor market organizations in particular have acquired much power
in Finland’s political decision-making. The influence of the trade union
movement has left its mark in labor legislation and economic legislation,
88 During his second government Paavo Lipponen also became the longest serving EU
prime minister.
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and its representatives are continuously present when economic policy
decisions are made. An unusually high proportion of the Finnish labor
force belongs to trade unions, and large numbers obviously add to the
movement’s power. The ordinary members are hardly active at all inside
the unions, but they trust the leadership to take care of their interests. In
their attachment to their union the rank and file members are becoming
less communitarian; the young tend to be pragmatic and approach their
union membership more instrumentally. (See Chapter 5, page 95).
The sports movement has a broad base among the population and it
can also count on influence through political friends, because one-fifth
of the members of parliament are themselves active leaders within the
movement. They belong to the sports network of MPs. Being on good
terms with sports obviously improves their chances in elections. The ex-
pansion of the cooperative movement, in turn, could be interpreted as a
reaction to the victorious rise of capitalism and market economy since
the 1980s, in Finland as well as abroad. The cooperative movement has a
solid national base. It is easy for Finnish consumers to believe that coop-
eratives further people’s interests better than large international compa-
nies that are entering Finnish markets.
Finland has its political tensions and conflicts. Nevertheless, consen-
sus and corporatism are typical features of the political system. Nation-
alism and democratic values are deeply rooted, but declining voter par-
ticipation has become a serious problem in Finland, as it has in many
other western democracies.
A trend away from communitarian solidarity, comparable to what is
happening in the trade unions, can be seen in people’s class identifica-
tion: fewer and fewer people identify with any social class. This makes
the traditional description of the leftist parties as workers’ parties seem
rather obsolete, and it has made the old time “class struggle” a less and
less realistic description of the social situation. The disappearing class
identity is naturally related to a more general social change. The class
differences have been diminishing in objective terms as well, while it is
possible that new class structures are emerging, such as a tripartite divi-
sion into “the successful, the persevering, and the ignored” (Silvasti 2002).
The citizens’ political participation has become more individualistic
and the mobilization of the electorate is more cognitive than before, in
Finland and in other countries. New single cause movements appear, but
such movements seldom organize large mass demonstrations any more.
They have learned to make use of the publicity which the mass media
provide for them. While the rising level of education has broadened cog-
nitive mobilization within the electorate, emphasis on education has also
been an essential precondition for Finland’s new economy and economic
growth.
In elections the Finns want to vote for individual candidates whom
they trust, but politicians as a group are subject to much criticism and the
people’s trust in government is low in Finland. This may be a result of
stable times with no particular external threats. The country feels more
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secure and also more influential than ever before; survival is no longer at
stake, although national defense is strongly endorsed by the citizens. On
the other hand, many feel that sovereignty is threatened by the increasing
power of the EU and by the Union’s gradual deepening toward federalism.
After more than seven years of membership the people of Finland re-
ally do not embrace the European Union, but it has had a deep influence
on their legislation and political institutions. Globalization has been an-
other essential aspect of the economy and it has influenced the political
system and its various institutions. On the other hand, popular support
for political and governmental institutions is very much directed toward
those domestic institutions that provide order and security, while people
are cool toward politics in general and politicians in particular. The same
tendency is largely true of most other EU countries.
In its chapter on the basic rights of citizens, the new constitution lists
general values and political goals that are similar to prestigious interna-
tional declarations but which, therefore, differ from the more strictly le-
gal-formal approach of the old constitution. In reality some of the basic
social rights of the citizens may not be fully met and some are not even
achievable. There also exists a built-in structural tension in the imple-
mentation of social services, although this is not the case in social insur-
ance, which is handled on the national level. Namely, the state has given
primary responsibility for implementing the people’s social welfare and
basic education to the self-governing municipalities, but local govern-
ments often lack the resources to comply to the extent the state and the
citizens expect.
Changes in the Finnish political system have been caused both by in-
ternal and external reasons. Many developments, such as lower electoral
participation, declining party activity, the personalization of politics, and
the country’s new approach to public sector management, are shared with
other western countries, although some changes may have been faster in
Finland than in many other countries. The party system represents fair
stability in the country: although it has not remained “frozen,” it has not
changed as fast as the society around it. [PP]
Testing the Finnish Welfare State
In the end of the 1980s, Finland climbed to the welfare state level already
reached in Sweden and Denmark. This achievement was a result of de-
cades of development; social policy had been systematically improved
especially since the beginning of the 1960s (see Chapter 2). The expan-
sion of social policy was made possible by the country’s economic
progress: in the period from the early 1950s to the end of the 1980s the
annual growth of gross domestic product averaged well over 3 percent.
However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Finnish welfare state was
harshly tested. It had to justify its existence in the hardship of a difficult
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economic recession by attempting to secure its citizens’ welfare. “How
did the welfare state survive the consequences of the serious recession?”
was a crucial question asked in the early part of this book (page 51).
The threats lay mainly in the unexpected downward turn of the economy
(see Chapter 15), although ideological reform pressures directed at the
welfare state have also been mentioned. Its consequences included ac-
celerated inflation, currency overvaluation, and major indebtedness of
both households and firms. The situation became acute in the years 1989
to 1992 as the central bank continued to maintain a fixed exchange rate
by raising interest rates. The rates fluctuated between 12 and 18 percent
while inflation was reduced from 6 to 2 percent. This made the real inter-
est rate rise radically in a short time, and many firms and households
ended up in great difficulties. Seemingly insuperable problems accumu-
lated for thousands of citizens of the welfare state. Many faced unem-
ployment, bankruptcy, or long-term debt burden, some even two or all
three of these personal disasters.
It has been said that “Finland fell from the heavens.” Demand for ex-
port products decreased, the country’s competitiveness weakened, and
asset prices collapsed. In four years, from 1990 to 1993, the economy’s
output fell by over 10 percent (cf. Figure 15.2) while unemployment in-
creased from 3.1 percent in 1989 to 17 percent in 1993. The depth of
Finland’s crises can be readily seen in the comparisons with other coun-
tries shown in Figure 15.1 and in Table 17.1. Furthermore, the exception-
ally high unemployment was linked to numerous other social policy prob-
lems that the welfare state had to assume responsibility for. The conse-
quences of bankruptcies and over-indebtedness were not as clearly des-
ignated the responsibilities of the welfare state as those of unemploy-
ment. A widespread banking crisis forced the government, in other words
the tax payers, to rescue a significant part of the banking system (cf.
Kalela et al. 2001, pp. 3–4; SYF 2001, p. 362). All these factors contrib-
uted to problems faced by the welfare state at the same time as rapidly
growing public debt threatened the financing of social policy.
Due to budget deficits the fiscal balance worsened alarmingly. Some
observers began to doubt the sustainability of the welfare state. They saw
that the problems were results of excessively generous social benefits,
labor market rigidities and high taxes, factors that, in their opinion, dis-
couraged investments and job creation (Kalela et al. 2001, p. 7).
The entity of factors leading to the severe slump has been called “bad
banking, bad luck, and bad policy” (op. cit., p. 4). The state did facilitate
the solution of the banking crisis, and while not much could be done
about bad luck, that is the international recession and the timing of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland alone was responsible for its own
policy. One of the most important reasons for the depression, the over-
valuation of the Finnish markka and the consequent lack of competitive-
ness, was removed when the markka, together with many other curren-
cies in the European Monetary System (EMS), was first floated and, in
autumn 1992, significantly devalued.
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Table 17.1
The economic crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Finland, other Nordic
countries, EU, and USA
Countries Years of Increase of Relative Largest Change of
recession unemployment employment output gap* inflation
(%-points) change (%) (% of GDP)   (%-points)
Finland 1990–93 14.9  –18.8  –11.3  –6.0
Sweden 1991–93  6.5 –14.7  –5.3 –9.5
Norway 1988–90 3.9 –8.7 –4.3  –7.3
Denmark 1987–93  4.5 –6.5 –5.5  –3.5
EU 1992–93 3.7  –4.0  –2.9  –3.1
USA 1990–91 2.2  –1.0  –2.5  –2.8
*OECD estimate
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2000); cf. Kalela et al. 2001, p. 5.
The recovery, which began in 1993–94, had made Finland one of the
most competitive countries in the world by the end of the 1990s. Lower
interest rates, a rise and stabilization in asset prices, and the solution to
the banking crisis were important ingredients in the recovery (op. cit., p.
8). Budget deficits were turned into surpluses which ended the emer-
gency in fiscal balances (see Table 17.2). In any case, even at its worst,
Finland’s public debt had ranked second lowest in the EU, and its growth
slowed down in 1997 and 1988. These factors eased economic concern
for the welfare state.
Table 17.2
Fiscal balance in the crisis (percent of GDP)
Countries Surplus Surplus Surplus Change Change
in boom in bust in year from boom from bust
1987–90 1991–95 2000 to bust to 2000
Finland 6.3 –7.9 4.0 –14.2 +11.9
Sweden 5.4 –12.3 3.4  –17.7  +15.7
EU –2.5 –6.5 0.3 –4.0 +6.8
USA –4.1 –4.7 1.7  –0.6 +6.4
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2000); cf. Kalela et al.2001, p.7.
The quick recovery of the economy was apparently facilitated, not
only by political corrections and improved economic trends, but also by
two factors connected to the welfare state that have not yet been men-
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tioned. Firstly, education, having become more efficient in the last de-
cades of the twentieth century and now recruiting talent reserves effec-
tively from all social classes and groups, provided high-level human capital
(see Chapter 14). This made it possible to quickly adopt and create new
technology, something that was illustrated by the very rapid growth in
the IT sector (cf. Castells and Himanen 2001). Secondly, firms were of-
fered a favorable environment thanks to high-level social capital. The
level of Finnish social capital is visible in studies comparing trust be-
tween citizens and occurrence of corruption around the world. When the
shift to the new economy required the creation of networking economy,
rather than hierarchic corporate structures, social capital was of great
significance.
The survival of social capital and social moral, and of legitimacy,
through the slump years was backed by the welfare state structures that
had been set up in the second half of the twentieth century. These struc-
tures were intended to help all citizens and especially those who face
difficulties as a result of recession or similar misfortune. But did the struc-
tures also endure the pressure of attacks directed at the welfare of citi-
zens and especially the least well-to-do? Despite the quick recovery of
the economy, there has been much discussion in Finland about whether
or not the recession left its mark on welfare state. Many think that Fin-
land has still been unable to rid itself of certain problems that emerged
then, despite the country’s extraordinary economic rise; problems mainly
concerning unemployment, the distribution of wealth, poverty, and ex-
clusion. Although they are not independent of the economy, improving
the economic parameters alone will hardly solve them.
Unemployment figures illustrate the extremity of the change caused
by the recession. In October 1990, there were 90,000 unemployed; ex-
actly three years later the number was 460,000 (Bulletin of Statistics 1990–
1994; cf. Ritakallio 2001, pp. 426–427). Such a drastic development was
thought to deeply influence the distribution of wealth and the nation’s
well-being. Studies on disposable income show that the inequality of the
population had decreased remarkably between 1966 and 1976, the early
stage of the development of welfare state, but then remained almost con-
stant until the 1990s.
Despite the manifold growth of unemployment, inequality measured
by disposable income increased only slightly during the slump and shortly
after it (1990 to 1994). However, the distribution of wealth has changed
very rapidly since 1994. Measuring by factor income, the distribution of
wealth started to become less equal already in the second half of the
1970s and the trend accelerated distinctly at the beginning of the 1990s.
Until the mid-1980s, building the welfare state and the related income
transfers (see Chapter 14) were enough to flatten down the difference
between population groups in gross income (factor income + transfers)
and disposable income. A steady stage followed, lasting until the end of
the recession, when the differences between gross incomes and dispos-
able incomes started to increase rapidly (Riihelä et al. 2001, p. 386).
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The social policy safety net managed quite well in taking care of house-
holds where the breadwinner had become unemployed. The most direct
and severe impact was experienced by small entrepreneurs who had gone
bankrupt, and by over-indebted households (cf. Ritakallio 2001, p. 426).
The welfare state had largely been built on the assumption of full em-
ployment and it included the idea of a work society, the utopian nature of
which has been emphasized critically (cf. Rahkonen 1990, 650–653;
Riihinen 1985). A deep, long-term depression may be a problem endured
better in welfare states than in other types of states, but one which never-
theless leaves its scars.
The reasons for unemployment have, understandably, been widely dis-
cussed in Finland. One theory is that technological development has in-
creased unemployment; after all, it is precisely this factor that has been
especially significant in Finland. However, scholars do not generally ac-
cept such an interpretation (Pohjola 1998, p. 8; Riihinen 1998, p. 31) and
the increase in unemployment especially in the 1990s is mainly attrib-
uted to rising real interest rates and tougher taxation - that is, mistakes
made in financial policy (Kiander and Pehkonen 1998, pp.172–175).
The recession seems to have expedited certain social changes. For one,
the proportion of household income from work in relation to capital in-
come started to decrease, although the majority of Finnish households
(85.8 percent) still received more income from earnings in 1998, that is,
from labor income plus entrepreneurial income. However, the propor-
tion of capital income had increased from 6.6 percent in 1990 to 15.1
percent in 1998. Researchers have not been able to show any single rea-
son for the distributional changes, but it has been argued that the redis-
tributive role of the state budget has weakened (Riihelä et al. 2001, pp.
386–387). The new role has been justified by the aim of reducing public
debt as quickly as possible. The importance of this aim is reinforced by
the rapid change in the age structure and the consequent rise in pension
expenditure from about 2010. Those who disagree cite the fact that
Finland’s public debt in proportion to its national income is one of the
lowest in the EU.
The fact that unemployment is still at a high level is problematic, es-
pecially as the proportion of long-term unemployed has also increased.
The government’s goal of halving unemployment between 1995 and 1999
was not reached: the unemployment rate remained as high as 10.2 per-
cent in 1999 (SYF 2001, p. 362). When unemployment was beginning to
increase in 1991, the proportion of the long term unemployed (people
out of work for more than a year) was only 2.5 percent of the total num-
ber. But this share grew rapidly, peaking at 30.5 percent in 1997. Since
then, the proportion has not declined much; in 2001 it was 27.4 percent
(www.mol.fi/tiedotus). Finland has started to resemble the majority of
OECD countries and especially the EU countries in which, since the mid-
1980s, almost 50 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for
more than a year (Pehkonen 1998, p. 241).
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The slump’s effects were dampened by the fact that a significant part
of the unemployed were entitled to earnings-related unemployment ben-
efit at the beginning of the recession. Thus, low-income poverty, surpris-
ingly, did not start increasing during the recession but remained at a low
international level. In this respect, the fortifications of the welfare state
endured very well. The extent of unemployment of course meant impov-
erishment, but due to the unemployment benefit system only a few fell
below the poverty line. Poverty, however, is a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon: there are several other criteria besides low-income poverty
(Ritakallio 2001, p. 427).
The content and development of poverty has been studied exception-
ally closely in Finland by using five different measuring methods: (1)
relative income – income less than 50 percent of the median; (2) consen-
sual deprivation – the proportion who involuntarily forgo items ranked
necessary by the majority of the people; (3) the subjective feeling of
meager subsistence; (4) the subjective feeling of over-indebtedness; and
(5) receipt of social assistance. Comparative studies made in 1995 and
2000 yielded interesting results: poverty increased using the relative in-
come method but decreased using the other methods. Between 1995 and
2000, the proportion of those who were poor according to at least one
indicator decreased from 28 to 21 percent and the proportion of those
who were poor according to at least two indicators decreased from 13 to
8 percent.
In this light poverty seems to have decreased in the second half of the
1990s. When the data were divided according to various background fac-
tors, the same trend was visible quite consistently. There was one excep-
tion, however: the unemployed. In the 1995 study, the unemployed al-
ready formed the worst-off group, according to all the indicators. But by
2000, the gap between the unemployed and the others had widened. In
1995, a large proportion of the unemployed received earnings-related
unemployment benefit but since this form of benefit is temporary in na-
ture, an increasing number have been left with the minimum assistance
(op. cit., pp. 420–422). Thus, long-term unemployment becomes a poverty
problem for a group of people in a society that grows wealthier around them.
Long-term unemployment and poverty as its consequence do not af-
fect all age groups similarly. They are clearly more common in the older
age groups. Age itself does have some influence on employability, but
what probably has more weight is the strong negative correlation of age
and level of education. In 1995, 14 percent of the population aged 25 to
34 lacked post-primary level education while the percentage among people
aged 55 or more was as high as 53. In Finland, the education level dispar-
ity between the youngest and the oldest age groups is one of the widest
among the OECD countries (Rajavaara and Viitanen 1997, p. 55). This
special feature is due to the strong education policy, a policy that has also
led to international success (see Chapter 14.6). It has, however, also wid-
ened the gap between age groups. As stated before, the changes in the
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structure of the Finnish economy have been exceptionally dramatic. In a
society like this, aging people with a low level of education are easily
excluded.
Consequently, it would seem that Finnish society now tolerates phe-
nomena such as poverty and exclusion better than before the recession.
Did the recession really bring a new approach towards welfare state?
Years earlier it had already been predicted that a part of the middle-
class population might change their attitude towards the welfare state
when it calculated that its own interests would be better served and its
own welfare better realized if social policy income transfers were re-
duced (Riihinen 1983). Since then the growth of the middle class and the
collapse of the neighboring communist superpower have laid the way for
possible welfare state reductions without fear of weakening the legitimity
of state and society (Riihinen 1992). This way of thinking has spread in
the organs of both state and local government: they wish to limit the
costs of the welfare state. The majority still disagrees with this although
the population is becoming more middle-class. In the 1990s, support for
the welfare state has steadily and significantly increased (see Chapter 14,
page 217). The recession, having concerned not only the disadvantaged
but a part of the middle class as well, has apparently taught citizens to
value safety mechanisms more than before.
The post-recession attitude change, characterizing the thinking of the
ruling elite rather than the majority of the people, has been interpreted in
the light of certain international ideological and economic changes. The
objectives set in the EU include an active welfare state, investment in
human capital, productive social policy, employment-friendly social policy
and taxation, inclusion (e.g., preventing and decreasing marginalization),
efficiency of services, cost awareness, and quality. This program does
not have deregulative features although it aims at limiting costs. It is,
however, more market friendly than the building stage of the welfare
state (Saari 1999; cf. Julkunen 2001a, p. 285).
It has been argued that blocking cost increases has become the central
political goal. Reductions have begun in both the level of benefits and
what they cover, and the availability and level of the services, while the
citizens’ own responsibility has been emphasized. This involves the aim
to re-build incentive structures and control systems. Whereas the con-
cept of decommodification was attached to the expansion of welfare state
(see Chapter 14), the term now is recommodification, strengthening so-
cial security’s dependency on labor and finance markets. In other words,
the aim is to prune the part of social security that clashes with working.
In pension policy, the new approach is being realized by strengthening
the benefits’ dependency on working history and insurance contributions.
More means-testing, activity, compensation, and sanctions will be ap-
plied (Mestrovic 1997; Rodger 2000, pp. 143–163; Myles and Pierson
2001; cf. Julkunen 2001a, pp. 287–288). This development as a whole
can also be studied from the viewpoint of globalization and its competi-
Finnish Vitality
Dynamic Finland taitto osa 4 28.10.2002, 14:18292
293
tiveness requirement (see Chapter 16), and it is often claimed that
neoliberal ideology has spread even to the left-wing parties.
“Can the welfare society maintain its goals under the pressure of global-
ization and increased international competition?” was another question asked
at the beginning of this book (page 48). The Finnish experience suggests a
positive answer. Although inequality seems to have increased in Finnish
society after the recession, the equity index, a comparison based on numer-
ous indicators and covering practically all the countries of the world, ranks
Finland the second most equal country after Sweden. Furthermore, the Hu-
man Wellbeing Index, also based on numerous indicators, ranks Denmark,
Finland, and Norway as the three countries with the greatest wellbeing
(Prescott-Allen 2001, pp. 150–153, 177–180). [OR]
Unsolved Political Issues
While the Finnish people consider the existing safety mechanisms of the
welfare state an essential element of their governance, political decision-
makers are under great pressure to find solutions for many crucial prob-
lems: what are the sustainable standards and the eventual preferences of
social policy goals in the changing society; how can the policies agreed
be most efficiently implemented; and how will the necessary resources
be provided? As was implied above, there is a particular need to find
new, innovative solutions to the country’s problems of unemployment,
wealth distribution, poverty, and exclusion, and to attempt to define the
desirable distribution of wealth.
Unemployment and the changing age structure deeply touch the basic
values of the welfare state as well as the economy of the country. The
future wellbeing of the Finns depends much on how well these problems
can be solved. Politicians and other citizens have conflicting opinions on
the allocation of resources between the alleviation and elimination of
unemployment, age-related services, and the reduction of government
debt. Naturally, much will depend on the speed of economic growth. The
government’s predictions of future growth have been cautious since the
1990s rather than optimistic.
In this context, taxation requires decisions that concern both its level
and its structures. The time has come to make serious plans for a compre-
hensive tax reform. As mentioned above, the CEOs of certain large Finn-
ish companies that operate inrternationally have begun to warn about the
dangers of excessively high taxation. Pressures to lower taxes have been
appearing from various directions, while the minister of finance has
warned about reducing state revenues too rapidly.
It is now generally accepted in Finland that the changing age structure
will soon cause increasingly heavy financial burdens on the working popu-
lation. Higher retirement ages are being planned and they will ease the
situation somewhat, but the changing age structure would be tackled more
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comprehensively by looking at the question of population renewal. This
problem is shared by all EU countries. Families are small and the present
renewal rate is far below 2.1 which would at least keep the population
constant. Therefore, there is need to scrutinize family policies, although
this will not suffice unless social attitudes also change. It is already too
late to raise the birth rate soon enough. Problems connected with immi-
gration will need to be solved in Finland, a country that has received
relatively few foreigners so far.
In the international context Finland belongs to the countries of West-
ern Europe. The one issue that became salient at the beginning of the
21st century concerns Finland’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. During the Cold War Finland, together with Sweden, Aus-
tria, Switzerland, and Ireland, abstained from cooperation with either
NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Neutrality was the basic foreign policy line.
In the 1990s, the Warsaw Pact was discontinued and NATO broadened
its functions. Finland, like numerous other non-members, began to coop-
erate with NATO as a peace partner and as a participant in joint peace-
keeping missions (see Chapters 11 and 16).
However, membership of the organization remained out of the ques-
tion and non-alignment was the accepted policy line. In the new millen-
nium the president of the republic and the government’s ministers began
to treat NATO membership as one possible option for the future, although
by no means a timely question. Public discourse on this issue intensified.
Some opponents even feared that the political elite intended to “smuggle”
Finland into NATO despite the strong opposition of mass opinion.
The government has not taken any stand beyond nonalignment. It is
reviewing what is happening in the international environment and how
NATO itself is changing, and will wait at least until NATO makes its
decision on the membership of the Baltic countries. As of spring 2002
Finnish political leaders seemed to be aiming at a tactic that sounds in-
consistent but could potentially help to bypass the unwilling electorate:
they agreed that after the parliamentary election in March 2003 the new
government program will only confirm the traditional policy of nonalign-
ment, which might keep this issue out of the election campaign, whereas
the new government will take a stand, possibly in favor of membership in
2004, when it is due to present to parliament its long-term plans in the
second review of the government report “European Security Develop-
ment and Finnish Defence.”89 The report was submitted to parliament in
1997 and covers Finland’s defense development up to 2008. The first
review, approved by parliament in 2001, dealt largely with the structures
and the equipment of the defense forces, but the debate in parliament
tended to concentrate on two separate problems, namely, NATO mem-
bership and the closing of local garrisons.
89 In 2002, as the parliamentary election of 2003 was approaching, two cabinet mem-
bers raised their profiles, requesting a popular referendum on NATO membership.
So did the national convention of the Center Party.
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Even inside the Lipponen government there appeared some disagree-
ment on this issue, or at least different tendencies. In the opinion of the
minister of defence Jan-Erik Enestam, membership of NATO is no longer
a big deal; in practice it would only mean a change in Finland’s status.
He also thought that in the future the core of the EU would include only
countries that belong to both NATO and EMU (Suomen Kuvalehti 4/2002,
pp. 20–21). But obviously the political decision-makers need to respect
Finnish public opinion which opposes membership quite strongly.
Finland’s relation to the future development of the European Union is
not unproblematic either. The most central debate concerns federalist
tendencies in the EU and the role of small member states when the big-
gest members are increasing mutual cooperation and, at the same time,
apparently paying meager attention to the interests of smaller EU coun-
tries. The discussion about writing a constitution for the EU has been
interpreted as an attempt to bring about federalism. Even without such a
debate, the political elite in Finland, as elsewhere, has to meet much public
criticism about the benefits derived from EU membership, about unwel-
come directives, and of the functions and procedures of EU institutions.
The differences between regions (see Chapter 4) cause political ten-
sions, and internal migration makes the regional problems very serious.
While a modern economy attracts active population toward the centers,
the age structure of the peripheral areas gets older relatively fast. There is
no longer high rural fertility to compensate for the loss of inhabitants.
The situation is becoming critical; many rural areas may soon be empty.
Such a trend has been obvious for a long time, and the vicious circle
involves even more: it is an interaction between population, the economy,
culture, and politics (Riihinen 1965). Neither farming subsidies nor do-
mestic and European regional policies seem to solve the problem; the
few token transfers of government offices out of the Helsinki metropoli-
tan region have offered symbolic rather than effective remedies.
In their analysis that focuses on the Finnish information society, Manuel
Castells and Pekka Himanen name seven challenges that, in their opin-
ion, are the most fundamental ones for Finland to address (Castells and
Himanen 2001, p. 103). Three of them concern the economy, namely, the
divide between the old and the new economy, the vulnerability of Fin-
land to the volatility of the global economy, and the conflict which exists
between the current needs of the new economy and the lack of business-
oriented entrepreneurialism among young people. Two of the seven prob-
lems are social or value-related, namely, the rise of new inequalities and the
cleavage between the old Protestant ethic and the new ethic90 of the informa-
tion creators. These contradictions are dicussed elsewhere in this chapter.
Finally, two of the seven contradictions on the list concern the politi-
cal system more directly. One is found between the information society
90 The authors write about “hacker ethic,” but they do not mean hackering as criminal
activity.
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and the governmental structures of the industrial age, and the other one is
between strong national identity and integration in a multicultural world.
To these observations one might add that at least many procedures within
the Finnish bureaucracy have been modernized. For instance, e-mail is
used to such an extent that paper has been largely eliminated from inter-
administrative correspondence. Also, the present strong national identity
and a global orientation of the people may often be complementary rather
than opposing attitudes.
Finnish democracy would seem more vital if the citizenry were more
active politically but the fact is that party organizations have become
smaller and weaker, often unable to attract adequate numbers of young
members, and the prestige of the parties among the mass electorate is
low. More and more people abstained from voting in elections in the
1990s. Individualized political interest and single-issue movements do
not compensate for the obvious need to introduce some new activism and
new idealism into party organizations and more excitement into election
campaigns. Even the election system is being reviewed with additional
voter appeal in mind. [PP]
The Neomodern Country
Chapters 2 and 3 of this book described how Finland developed into a
modern society greadually between 1860 to 1950: how a new kind of
industry was born, legislation on civil liberty and economic freedoms
was implemented, a Finnish identity and national ideology emerged, the
Finnish language rose to a leading position, civil society was activated,
the legislature was vitalized and democratically reformed, the nation state
was built before the country gained its independence, and national de-
fense and foreign policy safeguarded the final steps to modern Finland.
The Finnish welfare state emerged before the Second World War, but
its actual breakthrough occured in the 1960s. When it matured enough to
meet Nordic criteria, the society had already developed to a stage de-
scribed as ‘post-industrial.’ At this stage, for example, the employment
in the processing sector began to decrease while the service sector gained
a stronger foothold. Soon the ‘modern’ society became old-fashioned, a
development illustrated above by the changing trade structure (Table 2.1).
Modernization and modernism are two different concepts, but they
have had somewhat similar effects on the history of Finland. One of the
key triggers of Finland’s modernization in the latter half of the 19th cen-
tury was the national romantic ideology. It idealized the past and pro-
moted the idea of Finnishness and the position of the Finnish language.
This ideology advanced modernization by renewing political thinking
and class consciousness and by furthering the creation of a nation state.
Modernism, on the other hand, represented a new way of thinking and
a new ideology. It aimed at new, international ways of expression, most
of all in the arts and architecture, and it caused a revolution in traditional
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Finnish culture. Sibelius’s music was not modernistic but it advanced the
society’s modernization by supporting national objectives. Eliel Saarinen’s
world-famous architecture was modernistic while also national roman-
tic, as his work represented art nouveau (in Finland known by the Ger-
man term Jugend), a style fitting the spirit of modernism. The architect
Alvar Aalto who represented modernistic functionalism, no longer illus-
trated national emphasis, although he left a permanent mark in Finnish
culture. Eric Hobsbawm has described modernism in the following man-
ner: “...in  the first half of the century ‘modernism’ worked, the feeble-
ness of its theoretical foundations unnoticed, the short distance to the
limits of development permitted by its formulas (e.g. twelve-tone music
or abstract art) not yet quite traversed, its fabric uncracked as yet by
inner contradictions or potential fissures” (Hobsbawm 1995, p. 515).
What succeeded modern society has been characterized with many
terms, such as ‘postmodern’ and ‘late modern.’ On the other hand, soci-
ety seems to have shifted into a global stage where international and
global influences mark people’s lifestyle. Therefore, the stage in the de-
velopment of Finnish society from the end of 1980s is here called
‘neomodern.’ This concept refers to both postmodern and global charac-
teristics. In addition, it refers to a society that aims at combining eco-
nomic efficiency, sustainable development, and social justice. If mod-
ernization and modernism made Finnish society more international, then
the neomodern stage will continue on the same path inestimably further.
A comparison of Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 (in Chapter 2) makes it
obvious that changes within the production structure of an industrialized
society can no longer be described by means of the changing primary,
secondary, and tertiary production. Society’s transition from an indus-
trial to a post-industrial one could be comprehended as rapid expansion
of its service sector, at the cost of the two other sectors, but since the
1970s the expansion of the service sector has not continued much. What
characterises society’s new, still strengthening development is the cen-
tral importance of education and information for occupations that sup-
port production. This change has brought about a new type of society,
generally called the ‘information  society.’
Some changes have built foundations for the birth of a neomodern
society. One of them is the expansion and improvement of education. It
has been argued that a significant quantitative change also results in quali-
tative changes. This argument seems to apply excellently to the conse-
quences of education in Finland. The expansion in education began at
the end of the 1950s, and in 1972–1982 a comprehensive school reform
laid the foundation for large-scale higher education. From 1950 to 2000,
higher education expanded tenfold in Finland, as it did in a number of
countries.
The efficiency of the Finnish school system, described in Chapter 14,
is illustrated by a study by the OECD in 2000 on reading literacy, math-
ematical literacy and scientific literacy of the youth. It covered the OECD
plus certain other countries. Finnish youth were clearly better than the
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rest in reading literacy and only Finland placed among the top four in all
three categories. Both boys and girls were ranked best in reading literacy,
and Finnish girls did extraordinarily well.
Finland’s university education, too, has received very positive interna-
tional evaluations. When the University of Helsinki celebrated its 362nd
anniversary on March 26th, 2002, it noted its fifth place among the Euro-
pean universities carrying out basic research (after Cambridge, Oxford,
Edinburgh, and Leiden). Furthermore, according to an OECD evalua-
tion, adult education is organized best in Finland. Quite generally the
people both understand and support efforts to continue improving educa-
tion. In the fall of 2000, 79 percent of Finns agreed with the statement
“Finland’s success abroad is based on high-level and equal education”
while only 9 percent disagreed (EVA 2001a, p. 62).
Finland’s character as a neomodern rather than postmodern country
involves the aim to develop as an information society. In addition to high-
level education, the objectives of an information society also emphasize
the creation of an innovation system. Government representatives see –
justifiably or not – Finland as a forerunner in building an entity known as
the national innovation system. This system consists of the producers
and utilizers of new information and expertise, and their mutual interac-
tion. Finland’s national science, technology, and innovation policy is cen-
trally shaped by the Science and Technology Policy Council, an expert
body chaired by the prime minister. The share of research and develop-
ment investments in GDP was 1.6 percent in 1985, but rose to 3.6 percent
in 2001. Business has shown a growing interest in innovations: between
1991 and 2001 companies’ share of R&D increased from 57 to 73 per-
cent. (www.tekes.fi/eng/rd/policy; www. research.fi/k tk-menot fi.)
Since the state is responsible for funding Finnish universities, it pro-
vides industry and other business life with the basic knowledge exploited
in technological and other innovations. Finland’s actual research and
development work is mainly carried out in four kinds of institutions: the
National Technology Agency, the universities, state research institutes,
and the Academy of Finland. In 2001, their respective funding shares in
the state budget were 30, 26, 16 and 14 percent of total R&D funds,
while 14 percent was used by others (www.research.fi/k tk-valtio.fi). Some
scholars have criticized the state for exceedingly generous funding of the
technological fields, while many liberal arts are struggling with quite
unpleasant budget problems.
However, the institutions working with research and development do
not have a clear division of labor and the work is not concentrated on
technology alone but is multidisciplinary. For example, the research pro-
grams of the National Technology Agency in the 1990s included
Genome Research Program and Cell Biology Research Program. Be-
cause more and more R&D funding comes from companies it is likely
that business interests will weigh more in the future. Although the state
emphasizes innovation, the educational programs of Finnish schools and
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universities cannot be considered one-sided or purely science-weighted.
Largely due to successful education and innovation policy, Finland
has been able to rapidly increase its productivity and especially its re-
search and development productivity. According to a comparison of 16
OECD countries in 1980 to 1998, the productivity of research and devel-
opment increased faster only in Ireland (cf. Guellec and van Pottelsberge
de la Potterie 2001). The Finnish level of R&D is illustrated by the fact
that the Human Development Report 2001 (p. 48) ranked Finland the
most technologically developed country in the world.
After 1970, Finland’s economic development has been successful de-
spite the slump in early 1990s. Both labor productivity and overall pro-
ductivity increased from the beginning of the 1970s to the turn of the
millennium at a pace approximately double the European average. In
addition to the emphasis on research and development the pace is ex-
plained by a change in the industrial structure: the share of high technol-
ogy products of all exports increased approximately fourfold from the
beginning of the 1980s to the mid-1990s. The ability of the economy is
illustrated by the fact that in 2001 Finland placed third in an international
competitiveness comparison after the United States and Singapore (The
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001).
In cross-national comparisons of wealth Finland does not rank as high
as might be suggested by its levels of education, technological develop-
ment, and competitiveness. Finland’s GDP per capita ranked eleventh of
the OECD countries in 1999, with Luxembourg, Switzerland and Japan
occupying the leading positions (OECD 2001, p. 23). The impacts of late
economic development and the recession have not diminished entirely.
Nevertheless, Finland has ranked high in international comparisons of
wellbeing. Finland’s strengths, despite its high unemployment, include
its even distribution of wealth and small percentage of the poor. Also, the
two genders and the different population groups have quite equal oppor-
tunities for influence within the society. Wellbeing in Finland ranked the
second in the worldwide comparison by Robert Prescott-Allen and the
tenth in UNDP’s Human Development Report 2001. These studies em-
phasize differerent aspects, but both of them indicate a successful devel-
opment. (Cf. OECD 2001, pp. 62–67; Prescott-Allen 2001, pp. 49–57;
Human Development Report 2001, p. 141.)
As an information society, Finland was discussed above from the point of
view of education and innovation policy. But the most practical feature of an
information society consists of everyday communication. In this respect Fin-
land is highly developed in three areas: the number of mobile phones per
capita is greater than in any other country; Internet penetration is at high
international level (SYF 2001, p. 635); and so is the people’s exposure to
mass communication (see Chapter 6). Such factors influence the entire soci-
ety and its values. In daily routines they manifest themselves, among other
things, in the fact that bank transactions are managed via the Internet far
more frequently in Finland than anywhere else (Castells and Himanen 2001,
p. 12).
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Already before Finland reached its present level as an information so-
ciety, Finnish values were typical of a prosperous nation. Postmaterialist
values were replacing materialist ones from the 1970s onwards (see Chap-
ter 7). A materialist orientation, as defined by Ronald Inglehart, empha-
sizes security, whereas postmaterialist values reflect a high regard for a
humane society characterized by a say in working life and politics, free-
dom of opinion, a beautiful environment, and a society in which the ideas
of individual citizens have significance. Finns have become clearly
postmaterialist in their value orientation (Inglehart 1997, pp. 108–159).
The high regard for humane society is, above all, seen in ever-increas-
ing support for the welfare state in the 1990s (see Chapter 14). Humane
values are also reflected in the concern about inequality: 78 percent were
troubled by the decrease in economic and social equality and 88 percent
showed concern for regional inequality. The high percentages indicate that
concern was also widespread among well-to-do Finns. Other causes for con-
cern were the concentration of property and the dominant position of the
market forces. Concern about the abuse of drugs and drug-related crime has
rapidly increased in spite of the fact that, on the cross-national scale, drug
abuse remains at a low level in Finland (EVA 2001a, p. 13).
Environmental issues have started to worry the Finns increasingly, al-
though the state of the environment in the sparsely populated country
may still be considered good. A majority of the people are ready to give
up some of their commodities for the benefit of the environment (op. cit.,
p. 13). Finns seem to be worried about the global environment, too. A
comparative study on environmental sustainability, carried out by Co-
lumbia University for the World Economic Forum, ranked Finland first
among 142 countries. The environmental sustainability index used in the
study consisted of 20 core indicators and 68 related indicators
(www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI).
There are scholars in Finland who are not at all satisfied with the de-
velopment of the country’s environment (cf. Kuronen 2002) and the Finns
carry on a constant debate on the functionality of the country’s education
policy (see Chapter 14). Good news about the international success of
their policy does not curtail the will to argue. Critical attitudes toward
both education and environment policies are typical of the Finns – as is
their criticism of several other policies and the decision-makers. This is
very apparent in the media, especially in letters to the editor. However,
active criticism by citizens does not prove poor performance in any abso-
lute sense. Interpreted in a positive way, critical attitudes can be seen as
an indicator of a functioning democratic system and the citizens’ will-
ingness to participate in improving their society.
Despite globalization and the intense growth of international commu-
nication the Finnish identity has remained strong. In 2000, 72 percent of
the people thought it was worthwhile to protect Finland’s own distinctive
cultural features against internationalization. Most people consider it a
privilege to be a Finn, whereas traces of a European identity are creeping
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in very slowly (EVA 2001a, pp. 73–76). One might even interpret the
expansion of the domestically based cooperative movement as one reac-
tion to increasing internationalization, in this case to the entry of large
international companies into the Finnish market. This would indicate a
new cleavage between a civil society that stresses national interests, and
a more and more international business life. It does not contradict the
increase of international contacts of civil organizations, but civil society
may be reacting to the threats of globalization as it reacted to the threat
of Russification in the 19th and early 20th century.
The most visible changes in Finnish society at the turn of the century
have concerned the welfare state and information society. As a welfare
state, Finland reached one kind of a peak in the end of the 1980s. Since
then the country, as a welfare state, has to some extent moved on to a
post-expansive stage, impelled and motivated by the recession experi-
ence and frightened by the changing age structure. Education and re-
search and innovation policies, however, still continue to expand.
Consequently, at the beginning of the new millennium, the post-ex-
pansive problems of the welfare state and the expansive problems of an
information society are perhaps the most striking characteristics of Finn-
ish societal policies. These policies consist of many important issues.
Unemployment is largely a problem of the aging work force. Many work-
ers within the older group have a significantly weaker education level
than the young generation, and their potential poorly answers the de-
mands of an information society. They are far more likely to become
long-term unemployed and they face the risk of exclusion in a changing
society. Not even efficient adult education has been able to eliminate the
problem. The demands of an information society also exceed the capa-
bilities of many young persons whose education level is low.
Most Finns consider unemployment of over nine percent to be a major
problem, one reason being limitations set by the costs of unemployment
on the other functions of the welfare state. For many, unemployment also
poses a moral problem that should not exist in a welfare state. One ap-
proach in the constant quest for an answer to unemployment is to create
more jobs in low-income sectors and support these sectors with tax relief.
What also seems typical of today’s information society is that while
thousands are unemployed, others suffer from stress caused by excessive
work load. In the information sector people often work very long hours.
It is claimed that too much work increases the risk of sickness and inter-
feres with family life, also having a negative effect on children. In early
2002, the government, parliament, and the citizens have widely discussed
family policies that would allow parents to spend more time with their
children. The divorce rate is also high: of the OECD countries, only Bel-
gium and Sweden had higher rates than Finland in 1995 (OECD 2001, p.
33). As was mentioned above, there is great concern about the declining
birth rate, but the most essential topic in recent discourse is concern about
claims that children are increasingly disturbed.
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Indeed, it would be a severe mistake to see the present or the future as
problem-free, either politically or socially. It is to the credit of neomodern
Finland that the country seems to be avoiding the risk of this delusion. It
acknowledges openly its difficult social problems. And a typical welfare
state has the capability of reacting quickly to problems.
On the other hand, if the desired goals include the citizens’ wealth,
level of knowledge, and interest in the functions of the international com-
munity, the success of Finns has reached an unprecedented level. Finland’s
economy lagged far behind the most developed countries long into the
20th century and the country was handicapped by its peripheral location
and geopolitical difficulties, but closed the gap by making use of catch-
up benefits and the emphasis on education and research.
In the European context, the relative speed of this development merits
the word success. A comparison of the Nordic countries with the eco-
nomic development of Latin America adds another perspective. Uruguay
and Chile are countries that had a GDP per capita quite similar to Finland
in 1950, but thirty-five years later Finland’s was almost three times as
high. A primary explanation of the difference was the very fast popula-
tion growth in Latin America. In addition, scholars who have analyzed
the differences added to their list of explanations land reforms, educa-
tion, the utilization of natural resources, industrial and trade  policies,
and consensus among organized labor, capital, and government.
(Blomström and Meller 1991.)
At least two additional explanations are in order. First of all, political
stability is one of the basic preconditions for economic and social devel-
opment. Even during extreme circumstances, Finland was able to main-
tain and develop its firmly established democratic system. Secondly, so-
cial and political stability are connected to the high level of social capital
in Finland. The people trust each other, corruption is rare, and cross-
national comparisons tell of high social morals. In the 19th century the
philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman emphasized that the strength of a
small nation is in education. In neomodern Finland of the 21st century
one might add: and in dynamic innovativeness. [OR]
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